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ABSTRACT
This study subjects Christian liturgy to linguistic-pragmatic analysis. It
does so first, by 'anatomising' a new discipline of 'liturgical pragmatics' and second,
by putting this anatomy into operation. In each case, it proceeds in accordance with
David Crystal's three-fold schema for religious language research: as such, it co-
ordinates methodological, theoretical and empirical interpretations in a survey
which claims to be more systematic and contemporary than previous work on the
pragmatics of sacral discourse. Specifically, it concentrates on the worship of the
English Reformed church - a domain which has thus far been overlooked in studies
of liturgical language-use, but one whose distinctive bias towards extemporary
prayer invites the approach proposed.
Methodologically, liturgic exegesis is shown to benefit from engagement with
the interpretative strategies of speech act theory, implicature, relevance theory.
extensional pragmatics, conversational pragmatics and socio-pragmatics,
Theoretically. Jean Ladriere's model of liturgical language performativity is
seen to provide a valuable basis for rapprochement between pragmatic principles
and Christian doxology; nevertheless. it is argued that an even closer association
can be made between pragmatic theory and Reformed liturgical doctrine.
Empirically, models and hypotheses are tested against a corpus of data drawn
from liturgical performance in the United Reformed Church. This comprises tapes.
transcripts and participant-accounts of ten services conducted in different URC
congregations on Advent Sunday, 1991.
Close pragmatic study of this corpus, and of its Calvinist precedents, confirms
that English Reformed worship has allowed an over-informative 'didactic
monologism' to eclipse more directly participative and potentially 'eventful' historic
forms, Although these forms have been extensively revived in the 1989 URC
Service Book. it is proposed that they are more likely to return to regular URC
services as creatively-adapted and suitably modernised discourse units.
PREFACE
Dean Inge once likened liturgical study to stamp collecting, and
confessed that he could see little point in either. I take a more positive view, but
there is no doubt that liturgists have traditionally been preoccupied with the work
of textual archaeology and historical reconstruction, and that this has often
excluded a more broadly semiotic approach to sacral performance. In more recent
times, however, there has been a growth of interest in the communicative dynamics
of liturgy in general and liturgical language in particular - not only as a
'philological' concern, but also as an issue to be dealt with through modern, 'post-
Saussurean' analysis. What follows is an attempt to develop this second line of
thought in a way which seems to me to be especially appropriate. That I have been
able to undertake such a project is down to the skill, generosity and support of
several people.
During my time as an undergraduate in the Modern English Language
Department at Nottingham University, Prof. Walter Nash, Prof. Ron Carter and
Miss Margaret Berry all helped ignite a passion for linguistics which has grown to
this day. In particular, Dr. Paul Simpson deserves thanks for having introduced me
with such enthusiasm to the field of pragmatics. When I moved on to read theology
. and train for the Ministry at Mansfield College, Oxford, Dr. George Carras
encouraged me to apply my text-critical education to sacred discourses, while Dr.
Martin Davie and Revd. John Bremner taught me to think theologically. At the
same time, Revd. Charles Brock convinced me that liturgiology was not only
important, but that it also promises an attractive compound of theological
disciplines.
Very special thanks are due to my research Supervisors. Revd. Prof. John
Heywood Thomas smoothed my return to Nottingham by showing faith in my
proposal and accepting me as his student. His wise advice guided me through the
early stages of my work and helped me to sharpen my focus. Dr. Vimala Herman
affirmed my wish to operate in a truly interdisciplinary fashion, and from the outset
has brought her expert knowledge of applied pragmatics and religious language to
bear on my linguistic analyses. I am particularly indebted to her for convincing me
that a field corpus would enhance my investigation, and for raising my confidence
at moments of self-doubt. When Prof. Heywood Thomas retired, I could not have
wished for a better person to take me on than Revd. Prof. Anthony Thiselton. I
have benefited not only from his astonishingly vast knowledge of relevant sources,
but also from his commitment to interdepartmental study and from his personal
kindness.
I should like to express my gratitude to Revd. Tony Coates, who checked my
typescript prior to submission.
The funding for this project has come from Dr. Williams's Trust, the
University of Nottingham Revis Fund, the Coward Trust, the Ministries
Department of the United Reformed Church and the Diocese of Southwell. I thank
each of these bodies for their generous assistance.
I could not have progressed in the first three part-time years of my work
without the co-operation of Keyworth United Reformed Church, who graciously
agreed to share their young novice Minister with his books and papers. Nor could I
have completed this thesis if the City Temple, London, had not consented to defer
my induction for one year until September 1994. I am indebted to the elders and
members there for their patience.
Finally, I can scarce begin here to do justice to the love, companionship and
longsuffering of my dear wife, Mia. For the duration of this project, she has borne
the main burden of financial responsibility in our marriage, exercised two
demanding pastoral ministries, given birth to our son Matthew, and granted me the
utmost spiritual and emotional backing. To everyone mentioned, I express my
sincere gratitude; to Mia, I am grateful beyond words.
London, August 1994
NOTE ON REFERENCING
Referencing in this study is according to the Harvard (author-date-
page) system. This system is now commonplace in linguistics and is beginning to
become popular in theology. It allows notes to be reserved only for necessary
elaboration of the main text. It does mean, however, that the main text becomes
longer than in the 'classical' system, which includes references to other works
alonsgide more substantive footnotes or endnotes. In our case, this increased length
is compounded by the large number of illustrations and practical examples cited
from our fieldwork corpus of church service discourse. Nevertheless, once these
bracketed author-date references and illustrative examples are discounted, the main
text meets the word-limit standards of a normal Ph.D ..
The key abbreviations used are as follows:
AS Advent Sunday Survey. Refers to church or service transcript in
fieldwork corpus. Usually followed by one or two figures: the first
refers to the a particular church in the survey, as numbered in
Appendix 1 (eg. AS.6 refers to Wheatley United Reformed Church);
the second refers to the relevant line(s) in the transcrpit of that church's,
service (eg. AS 4.107 refers to line 107 in the transcript of the service
at Derriford United Reformed Church).
CELC Church of England Liturgical Commission (authors of the 1980
Alternative Service Book)
URC The United Reformed Church in the United Kingdom
It should also be noted that for accuracy, references to Jean Ladriere's core
article 'The performativity of liturgical language' also include line-references after
page references (eg. Ladriere 1973: 59, 1.325).
In citations from older works, spelling has been modernised for consistency.
For the transcription conventions used in our corpus see Appendix 3.
PART I
THE ANATOMY OF LITURGICAL PRAGMATICS:
METHOD, THEORY AND FIELDWORK
1CHAPTER!
TOWARDS A PRAGMATICS OF LITURGY
1.1 Pragmatics and liturgy: grounds for association
Pragmatics may be defined as the study of language use. More
specifically, it is concerned with how language functions in relation to context, and
with how it operates as an instrument of human interaction 1. This study aims to
show that as such, pragmatics can provide valuable insights into the dynamics of
liturgy, since it is in its liturgical context that religious language is most definitively
'put to work'.
At a basic level, it is not difficult to see that liturgy might lend itself very
readily to pragmatic analysis. It is, after all, a fundamental type of social
communication - one which operates quintessentially in relation to specific actions,
specific interpreters and specific contexts (Schmidt 1971: 10-11). In J.D. Crichton's
terms (1978: 5), while liturgical events may be profoundly sacred, they are also
'profoundly human'. From the earliest civilisations onwards, cultural identities have
both shaped, and been shaped by, 'rites of passage', and these seem to have proved
1. For similar basic def'mitions see StanJaker 1972:380; Haberland & Mey 1977:1; Crystal. 1991: 271; McArthur 1992:800;
Richards. Platt & Platt 1992:284. Within such essential relations of language to use, context and communication there are,
as we shall see, numerous variations.
2necessary even where there has been little conscious motivation from religion (van
Gennep 1960; Eliade 1965; Grainger 1988: 10-22).
Although it is a key axiom of pragmatics that the 'meaning' of words is
determined by their contingent function rather than by their etymology (Crystal
1971: 63; cf. Barr 1961: 107-60), the very term 'liturgy' itself bears at least a trace
of pragmatic significance. Most liturgists at some point stress its roots in a Greek
compound (Ael'toupyia) derived from words for 'labour' (ep'Yov) and 'people'
(Aa6~) (power 1984: 148; Fageberg 1992: 181ff.). Though the term related
originally to some service performed by an individual for the public at large, and
though it is likely thus to have meant 'work on behalf of the people' rather than
'work of the people' (Wolterstorff 1992: 274), the resonance of its link between
'activity' and 'community' has hardly been lost on liturgical scholarship. In his
seminal work The Shape of the Liturgy Dom Gregory Dix called memorably for a
re-emphasis on worship as 'primarily something done' rather than something just
'said', arguing that while eucharistic celebration since the Latin Middle Ages had
been cast as 'saying Mass' and 'bearing Mass', 'the ancients on the contrary
habitually spoke of "doing the eucharist" (eucharistiam facere), "performing the
mysteries" (mysteria telem) and "making the synaxis" (synaxin agein, collectsm
facere)' (Dix 1945: 12-13). As we shall see, such ancient conceptions have strongly
'proto-pragmatic' overtones. Then again, Roger Grainger anticipates our task even
more explicitly when he suggests that religious rituals mediate 'a special kind of
language' - one which conveys 'a real meeting of persons in which emotions,
3attitudes, the experience of life itself can all be shared' (1974: xi). The particularity
of sacral language use will recur as an issue throughout this study, but even insofar
as it is focussed on 'users and contexts', pragmatics can be seen to be very
compatibly focussed on how language functions in relation to 'meetings of persons',
to their 'emotions, thoughts, attitudes' and 'experience'. By the same token,
Grainger's depiction of liturgy as 'shared interaction' invites a thoroughgoing
pragmatic exposition.
Though such an exposition could no doubt apply to worship in a vast range of
religious traditions (cf. Ware 1993), we shall be concerned here with Christianity -
firstly because it is with this that we are most familiar and secondly, because we
believe that the placing of liturgical language in a pragmatics perspective can offer
important insights to Christian theology as well as to linguistics per se. Most
especially, we shall concentrate on that branch of Christianity known as the
Reformed tradition. As developed from the mid-Sixteenth century worship of John
Calvin's Geneva, Reformed liturgy has been reasonably well studied from historical
and doctrinal viewpoints (Davies 1948; von Allrnen 1965; Barkley 1966; Nichols
1968; Old 1984; Spinks 1984a, 1984b). Nevertheless, we shall see that even as the
general study of liturgical language remains severely underdeveloped, attempts to
analyse Reformed worship from a modem linguistic stance have been particularly
scarce, while a truly dedicated and contemporary pragmatic account of it has, as far
as we can tell, not yet been developed. Here, we shall undertake such an account
with specific reference to Reformed liturgy in England. Diachronically, this means
4that we shall keep as our continual backdrop the various past traditions of Puritan,
Independent, Presbyterian, Congregational and Churches of Christ worship.
Synchronically, it means that we shall essay detailed pragmatic analysis of worship
in the United Reformed Church in the United Kingdom (URC) - a denomination
whose formation in 1972 and expansion in 1981 merged these diverse traditions
into a new ecumenical framework (Slack 1978). Partly, we have chosen this focus
because the English Reformed tradition in general, and the majority English part of
the URC in particulars, is the context in which we ourselves exercise ministry and
which we therefore know best. Also, however, we shall demonstrate that in relation
to pragmatics, English Reformed worship provides an especially strong and varied
paradigm of religious language in sacral use.
1.2 Pragmatics and liturgy in the realm of semiotics
Modern anatomies of pragmatics commonly trace their origins to the
American philosopher Charles W. Morris (Searle, Kiefer & Bierwisch 1980: xiii:
Leech 1983: 6; Levinson 1983: 1; Leech & Thomas 1990: 173; Mey 1993: 35). In
1938, Morris proposed the 'outline' of a unifying 'semiotic' or 'science of signs'
(1938; 79-80). Claiming precedents in Aristotle, Ockham and Locke, he
2. The nation of Wales fonns one of the 12 Provinces of the URe, and there is a handful of congregations in Scotland.
Overwhelmingly. however, the denomination is based in England. Historically, Celtic Reformed Christianity has many
distinctive features in comparison with its English counterpart. and merits study in its own right (cf. Watts 1978).
5presented the 'sign' as a basic phenomenon of communication or 'semiosis',
describing it as 'the means by which something is referred to by someone' (1938:81;
123)3. More particularly, Morris drew his conception and terminology from the
work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), which he described as 'second to
none in the history of semiotic' (1938:109)4. From these foundations, Morris cast
the discipline of semiotic into a trichotomy where syntactics would examine 'the
formal relation of signs to one another', semantics 'the relations of signs to the
objects to which [they] are applicable' and pragmatics 'the relation of signs to
interpreters' (1938:84, cf. Peirce 1960:2.227-2.308).
As expounded by Morris, pragmatics was meant to cover more than just
language. Indeed, together with his fellow editors on the International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Otto Neurath and Rudolf Camap, his grand
ambition was to provide all human expression and experimentation with a coherent
analytical framework. Hence, his trichotomy was to be applied to 'art, testing
devices, medical diagnoses, signalling instruments' and even 'smoke', as well as to
'human speech' and 'writing' (1938:79; 115). Hence, too, it was designed for 'an
army of investigators', including not only linguists but also 'logicians, philosophers,
psychologists. biologists, anthropologists. psychopathologists, aestheticians,
semiologists' and 'rhetoricians' (1938:79-80).
3. Detailed studies of the ori&ins of semiotics in the history of philosophy are provided by Eeo 1976. Hawkes 1977 and
AarslefY 1982. Lange-Seidl 1986 traces this history with specific relation to the pragmatic dimension of semiosis.
4. 'Semiotic' as a term has since largely been superseded by the plural ·semiotics·. For an account of the terms' history see
Sebeok, Hayes and Bateson 1964.
6In both its taxonomy and its broad scope, Morris' semiotic resembled the
earlier 'serniologie' of Ferdinand de Saussure ([1915] 1959: 15-17), where 'signs'
were perceived in cultural etiquette, military coding and symbolic ceremony as
well as in language, and where language itself was viewed not only as a
communicative resource but also as a constituent of communicative ectiont,
For our part, we should make it clear from the outset that while the significant
'sign-systems' of liturgy are many and varied - ranging from dress to posture and
from gesture to proxemics - we shall not attempt to produce an all-encompassing
version of what Gerald Lukken (1987) calls the 'semiotics' of liturgy, From time to
time, our analysis will extend into the wider dimensions of sacral semiosis covered
by a handful of scholars including Calloud (1972), Almadoss (1973) and Lukken
himself (1987). We would also acknowledge at this point the work of Semsnet - a
study group based in the theology faculty at Tilburg, Holland, and dedicated to an
application of A.l. Greimas' semiological theories to Biblical and liturgical texts
(Lukken et sl 1981; van Tongeren 1983; loose & De Maat 1985, 1986; Lukken
1985, 1986a, 1986b, SEMANET 1987). In similar vein, Gerald Lardner's 1979
doctoral dissertation Liturgy as Communication: A Pragmatics Perspective has
furnished us with useful background insights, but is nonetheless a more general
application of communication theory to the Roman Catholic Mass which devotes
S. As Lukken (1987:109) points oUI. while being Morris' most immediate antecedents, Peirce and Saussure never met and
'probably did not even know about each other's existence', The eomplementarity of their insights is all the more remarkable
for this, but for an accounl of the subtle difference in emphasis between the two men's perception of the 'sign system' see
Tobin 1990: 23-4, who argues thai where Saussure's ~iologie W&Smore social/yfocussed, Peirce's semiotic w&s more a
framework for the interpretation of 'general' (ie. universal) linguistic patterns. This distinction to some extent anticipated
later differentiations between 'ContinentalJEuropean' and 'Anglo-American' pragmatics - see Section 2.3 below.
7barely 10 pages to 'language'. and which thus presents linguistic interaction as just
one 'message system' among many (1979: 82-93). By contrast. we shall very
specifically focus on the language of worship. and it is on the particularly linguistic
dimensions of pragmatic analysis that we must now fix our attention.
1.3 An integrated schema for liturgical pragmatics
Having defined our basic objectives. we are now in a position to state
more exactly how we intend to meet those objectives. In what follows. we suggest
and present a pragmatics of church service language which. though still selective.
would claim to be more systematic and up-to-date than previous work in this field.
Indeed. it is precisely because 'liturgical pragmatics' has hitherto been so
underdeveloped as a subject that we seek here to delineate it more coherently. as
well as to offer a practical demonstration of its validity. Hence. Part I is devoted to
'anatomising' what is a potentially vast domain of interdisciplinary research. Here
we seek first to relate the 'root concepts' of pragmatics to liturgy and then to suggest
how the main branches of contemporary linguistic pragmatics might be used for
liturgic exegesis. liturgiological conceptualization and practical sacral-discourse
observation. In the process. we undertake a review of relevant past studies - a task
made all the more important by the fact that these may be traced to a disparate
range of disciplines and stand in urgent need df assessment under a unified
8'pragmatics of liturgy' beading. Then in Part II we move from 'anatomy' to
'operative surgery', dissecting the linguistic data of liturgical performance using the
main implements provided by modem pragmatics.
By going about our task in this way, we attempt to provide a properly
linguistic basis for Margaret Mary Kelleher's general definition of worship as 'a
form of ecclesial performative meaning - a ritual in which an assembly performs
and enacts meanings and values that are constitutive of its identity' (1993: 306). In
particular, we seek to fulfil this plan in both the 'anatomical' and 'surgical' Parts of
our thesis by pursuing an integrated strategy adapted and developed from David
Crystal's more widely sociolinguistic schema for religious language research (1976:
17). This means that our investigation will be constructed on three distinct but
crucially interdependent foundations. These foundations are, respectively,
methodological. theoretical and empirical.
Our concerns are methodological insofar as we contend that various modes of
interpretation developed by pragmaticians can enrich traditional liturgics with
belpful 'explicit criteria and techniques' for the analysis of sacral language usage
(cf. Crystal 1976: 17).
Secondly, our project is theoretical insofar as it attempts to draw parallels
between the more philosophically-detennined 'patterns, categories and rules' of
language and meaning which underlie contemporary pragmatics, and the broader
concepts of language and meaning which are implicit in what Geoffrey Wainwright
(1980) calls 'doxology' - that is, the systematic theology of worship (cf. Crystal
91976: 17). Most especially. this theological perspective will be centred on the
relationship between the Word of God and the words of worship. and will develop
as a Protestant Reformed critique of the Catholic philosopher Jean Ladriere's model
of liturgical-language 'performativity',
Thirdly, our approach is empirical insofar as we recognise. with Kelleher
(1993), that a fully-realised 'hermeneutic of liturgy' must engage with specific
language-uses in specific congregations, rather than resting content with either
introspective impressions or an exegesis of prayer-book texts conducted in
abstraction from the very 'acts of worship' for which they are designed. As James
Empereur has cautioned, 'several liturgical theologies have been put forth, but the
easily observable fact is that too often the actual celebrations do not verify what is
being asserted on the theoretical level' (1987: 8). Taking this warning to heart and
suspecting its accuracy from our own conduct of worship over several years, we
present an analysis based on an original corpus of data gathered in the 'field' of
liturgical performance. As we demonstrate at greater length in chapter 4, this
corpus is more diverse and extensive than any we have previously come across in
the area of liturgical language study, and is a virtual novelty in the more specific
sub-discipline of 'liturgical pragmatics'.
Following Crystal, it is our conviction that to be 'fruitful', the study of
liturgical language should be at once methodological, theoretical and empirical
along the lines just described. Reciprocally, it will become clear that the integration
of these approaches serves not only our own immediate purpose, but also stands
10
similarly to benefit the application of pragmatics to other forms of ritual criticism.
Having thus outlined our modus operandi, we move on in the next three
Chapters to define it more precisely, and thereby lay the ground for, and establish
the parameters of, our subsequent in-depth analysis of liturgical language data.
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CHAPTER2
PRAGMATICS, LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE:
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDA nONS FOR
A NEW LITURGIC
2.1 Definitional issues
We have already seen that pragmatics can impinge on a wide range of
subject areas. Inevitably, once communicative signs are perceived 'in relation to
their interpreters', important questions arise with regard to cognition, group
behaviour, social systems and the like (Robinson 1986; Mey 1989; Leech &
Thomas 1990: 186). Having said this, there is little doubt that as it has evolved in
its own right into a 'mature' academic discipline (Horn 1988: 116), pragmatics has
developed most substantially within departments, journals and textbooks of
linguistics (Leech & Thomas 1990: 173-4). This is perhaps hardly surprising, since
of all vehicles of human semiosis, language is the most pervasive and most
distinctive.
We would reiterate that the study presented here is set very much within the
broad stream of 'linguistic pragmatics' - although it must be admitted that even this
designation is subject to varying degrees of language-specificity (cf. Haberland &
Mey 1977; Levinson 1983: 2; Green 1989: 2), and that pragmatics has yet
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completely to shake off past characterisations of it as the 'wastebasket' of linguistics
(Bar-Hillel 1971b; Mey 1993: 12-15). From our point of view, the pursuit of
linguistic pragmatics will mean that while we treat users and situations as essential
components in what might be called the 'dialectic' of language and context, it is
with the linguistic manifestations of this dialectic that we shall be primarily
concerned. It is this detail, indeed, which distinguishes our study, as a pragmatics
of liturgy, from more generally context-sensitive accounts of sacral meaning. While
we shall from time to time be indebted to anthropological readings of religious
ritual, we do not seek an 'anthropology of liturgy' such as has been essayed by
Eliade (1959, 1965), van Gennep (1960), Tambiah (1979) and Grainger (1988).
Likewise, though the empirical strand of our study certainly reflects Kelleher's
advice (1993) that fieldwork on the church service would most usefully co-opt
methods developed by ethnographers of communication, we do not aim to imitate
the full-blown ethnographic surveys of liturgical information-exchange which have
been presented by Pike ([1954-60] 1967) and Enninger & Raith (1982).
This specific commitment to the verbal aspects of liturgical interaction is
reflected by the use in our title of the core term discourse. In the first place,
'discourses' are clearly linguistic phenomena, being 'continuous stretches of
language longer than a sentence' (Crystal 1991: 106). At the same time, however,
they must be interpreted as part of a communicative enterprise in which many
relevant features are extralinguistic. This is to say. they must be seen to emerge
from a 'dynamic process in which language is used as an instrument of
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communication in a context by a speaker/writer to express meanings and achieve
intentions' (Brown & Yule 1983: 26). From this point of view, liturgical discourses
must be understood to comprise more than written service texts. they should, rather,
be regarded as the verbal instantiations of sacral enactment (cf. Kelleher 1993: 196-
7).
Now this overarching notion of 'discourse' is predicated on a number of key
presuppositions and concepts - presuppositions and concepts which in tum underlie
the distinction of pragmatics qua pragmatics, and which must thus inform any
pragmatic analysis of liturgy. Let us briefly consider these and assess their
significance for liturgical exposition.
2.2 Root concepts in linguistic pragmatics: their relation to liturgy
2.2.1 Langue and parole
One of the most fundamental 'background' formulations for pragmatics
is Saussure's bi-partite decomposition of linguistic semiosis into langue and parole
(Saussure [1915] 1959: 17-20). This was generated as a distinction between the
common 'systems' of language which are shared generally by their speakers
(langue), and the more specific and 'local' instances of language as it is actually
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used in discrete contexts (parole) 1.Thus for Saussure,
Langue is comparable to a symphony in that what the symphony actually is stands
completely apart from how it is perfonned; the mistakes the musicians make in
playing the symphony do not compromise this fact ..The activity of the speaker
[parole] should be studied in a number of disciplines which have no place in
linguistics except through their relation to language. The study of speech is then
twofold: its basic part - having as its object langue. which is purely social and
independent of the individual - is exclusively psychological; its secondary part -
which bas as its object the individual side of speech, ie. parole. ..is psychophysical.
(Saussure [1915] 1959: 18).
Immediately, this defmition of language in general suggests parallels with the
language of liturgy in particular. Partly, 'liturgy' can be said to consist in a number
of canonical 'scores' or 'scripts'. From the Tridentine Mass to the Book of Common
Prayer, from Calvin's Forme des Prietes to Hunter's Devotional Services - these are
the traditional objects of study among liturgists. Inmany cases, such liturgists may
join theologians in seeking to identify a common global 'langue' underlying the
composition of such texts, much as a musicologist might seek to defme a common
'grammar' for the symphony (cf. Brilloth 1930; Dix 1945; Wainwright 1971). In
like manner, Grainger posits 'the rite' as a generic 'ideal language for the expression
1. I have refrained from lransla!ing the terms langue and parole foe the same IUSODS IS Lyons et aJ 1987: 17: 'There are no
generally accepted equivalents in English for fM4ue and parole. The terms '1anguaae' and 'speech' are sometimes used, but
they are misleading in that they are mace appropriate foe the quite different distinction between the language and the
medium in which it is primarily or normally manifest ...And ·Jan&uage·...transla!es both Imgue and ~ which are by no
means equivalent in French and Which were distinguished. on a tbeocetic:aJ level. by Saussure'.
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of timeless truth' (1983: 328), while Rarnshaw casts liturgical speech as a
distinctive 'metaphoric rhetoric' (1986: 8-10). On the other hand, liturgy exists
beyond the page and beyond the 'mind of man': it is parole as well as langue,
'performance' as well as 'authored work', 'corporate action' as well as 'symbolic
code'. If first written down, it must be spoken and heard in particular ecclesial
contexts; if 'spontaneously' conceived, it must be realised as local extemporary
speech (Schmidt 1971: 8). This second, more contingent dimension of worship has
been largely ignored in theology and liturgiology, and where studied at all, has
tended to be the preserve of social scientists (eg. Samarin 1976a). In this sense, the
study of liturgical language could be said to have implied a dichotomy of langue
and parole, despite the fact that 'liturgy' itself exists as a paradigmatic combination
of the two. By contrast, the integrated pragmatics to which we have committed
ourselves seeks to show the interdependence of Jangue and parole in worship. by
testing theoretical and methodological conceptions against the data of sacral
performance. To this extent, liturgical 'meaning' will be seen as something which is
ultimately and inextricably linked to liturgical language use.
2.2.2 Meaning as use
Now the functional and discoursal facets of 'parole' were emphasised
by several prominent liturgists and philosophers between Saussure and the
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emergence of linguistic pragmatics per se, We noted the insights of Morris and
Camap in this regard at 1.2. but equally worthy of mention is the American
structural linguist Leonard Bloomfield, who was insisting as early as 1933 that 'the
meaning of a linguistic form' is 'the situation in which the speaker utters it and the
response which it calls forth in the hearer' (Bloomfield 1933: 139; Wunderlich
1979: 258-6n Even more radically. the British polysystemicist J.R. Firth based his
whole 'technique' for the analysis of linguistic meaning on a 'serial
contextualisation of our facts, context within context, each one being a function,
and organ of the bigger context' (1935: 33).
Similar emphases on language uses may be traced in post-war linguistic
philosophy. The movement of the later Wittgenstein from logico-semantic to
functional paradigms between the Ttsctstus of 1922 and the Piiilosophicsl
Investigations of 1958 is encapsulated by his famous and influential dictum that 'for
a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word
"meaning", it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language'
(Wittgenstein 1958: 20 (43». As Thiselton has shown ([1975] 1986: 4), these
emphases on 'meaning as use' are especially pertinent when it comes to interpreting
liturgical language - given that 'in common with most religious or theological uses
of language, [it] constantly employs ordinary words in special settings which
decisively determine their meanings', Indeed, the practice of 'liturgical pragmatics'
must centrally involve an assessment of just how this 'decisive determination' takes
place,
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For Wittgenstein, the function of 'ordinary words in special settings' was most
powerfully described in terms of 'language-games: Just as in chess one must know
the 'moves' and 'rules' of the game before one understands the very particular
meaning of the word 'king' in that context, so in general 'only someone who already
knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a name' (1958: 15 (31),
my emphasis). We acquire such knowledge by both 'watching how others play' and
by ourselves deploying it as 'part of an activity' within a whole 'form of life'
(lebensform) (1958: 11 (23); 27 (54)). As Christopher Thomas (1978: 8) has
observed, these notions are especially pertinent for liturgy, which is an archetypal
'public language', evolved, regulated and 'passed down' within the ecclesial form of
life, from one generation to the next; indeed, Thiselton ([1975]1986: 13) thus goes
so far as to suggest that 'when he instances [as part of the variety of language-
games] reporting events, telling stories, commanding, asking, thanking, praying,
Wittgenstein might almost have been describing Christian liturgy'. Certainly, these
emphases are interactive and communal rather than esoteric and 'mystical' in the
gnostic or occult sense: liturgy, likewise, is not so much 'conceived' or 'intuited' by
individuals as 'spoken' and 'enacted' by congregations (cf. Wingenstein 1958: 11
(22)). This point, in fact, takes us on to our next set of key definitions.
2.2.3 Competence, performance and communicative competence
As appropriated by Chomsky (1965), Saussure's distinction between
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language-systems as 'psychological' resources and language-activities as
'psychophysical' phenomena was articulated in a now much-cited duality between
competence and performance2. 'Competence' for Chomsky was the proper subject
of linguistics, representing as it did the 'underlying system of rules that has been
mastered by a speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance' (1965:
4). Scrutiny of competence was thus essentially 'mentalistic' since it would be
'concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behaviour'. For
Chomsky, as for Saussure, inductive observation of 'performance' features like
'dispositions to respond, habits and so on' was significant only insofar as it provided
evidence of this 'underlying mental reality'.
Now at first sight, it might be tempting to interpolate the above distinctions
onto Morris' semiotic trichotomy and thus neatly cast pragmatics as the study of
performance while seeing syntactics and semantics as belonging to the realm of
competence. This interpolation certainly squares with Chomsky's own emphasis on
grammar and also in fact reflects the depictions offered by, among others, Katz
(1977:19) and Kempson (1977:69-74), wherein pragmatics is confmed wholly to
the realm of performance. There are, however, serious problems with such a
division. Not the least of these stems from that interrelation of langue/competence
2. Chomsky himself (I96S) associated $aussure's W1gue/pMoJe cIlstinction with his own notion of competence v.
performance. although as DeD Hymes observes, he 'saw his own conceptions as superior. going beyond the conception of
language as a systematic inventory of items to renewal of the Hwnboldtian conception of underlying processes. The
Chomskyan conception is superior. not only in this respect. but also in the very terminology it introduces to mark the
difference. 'Competence' and 'performance' much more readily suggest concrete persons. situations. and actions', (Hymes
[1971]1972:273).
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with parole/performance which Saussure and Chomsky themselves guardedly
admit:
Doubtless the two objects are closely connected, each depending on the other:
langue is necessary if parole is to be intelligible and produce all its effects; but
parole is necessary for the establishment of language. and historically its
establishment always comes first How would a speaker take it upon himself to
associate an idea with a word-image if he had not first come across the association
in the act of speaking? Moreover, we learn our mother language by listening to
others; only after eowttless experiences is it deposited in the brain. FInally.
speaking is what causes language to evolve: impressions gathered from listening to
others modify our linguistic habits. Langue and parole are thus interdependent; the
former is both the instrument and the product of the latter. (Saussure [1915]
1959:18-19).
Actual investigation of language necessarily deals with performance. with what
someone does Wlder specific circumstances. We often attempt to devise models of
inquiry that will reduce to a minimum factors that appear irrelevant to intrinsic
competence. so that the data of performance will bear directly on competence. as
the object of our inquiry. To the extent that we have an explicit theory of
competence. we can attempt to devise performance models to show how this
knowledge is put to use. (Olomsky 1980: 225).
Although Saussure and Chomsky alike are convinced that because of their
contingent, parochial nature, performance phenomena may mislead the true
linguistic scientist from his/her first task of defining language universals as intrinsic
features of human cognition, one could as yet argue that the way we use language
in real contexts is itself also attributable to some form of psychological
predisposition or 'competence'. As it is, this more 'hybrid' notion of language and
social interaction has been been given seminal expression by Dell Hymes ([19711
1972), and has been applied more explicitly to pragmatics by Jurgen Habermas
(1979). Through the early 1970's, Hymes countered the 'abstraction' and
'idealization' of Saussure and Chomsky's competencism by collapsing sociocultural
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and psychological paradigms of language-production into an integrated model of
communicative competence:
We have. ..to account for the fact that a normal child acquires knowledge of
sentences, not only as grammatical, but also as appropriate. He or she acquires
competence as to when to speak, when not, and as to what to talk about with whom,
when, where and in what manner. In short. a child becomes able to accomplish a
repertoire of speech acts, to take part in speech events, and to evaluate their
accomplishment by others. This competence, moreover, is integral with attitudes,
values and motivations concerning language, its features and uses, and integral with
competence for, and attitudes towards, the interrelation of language with the other
code of communicative conduct ..The internalization of attitudes toward a language
and its uses is particularly important ..as is internalization of attitudes toward use of
language itself (eg. attentiveness to it) and the relative place that language comes to
play in a pattern of mental abilities ...and in strategies - what language is considered
available, reliable, suitable for, vis-a-visotber kinds of code.
The .acquisition of such competency is of course fed by social experience, needs,
motives, and issues in action that is itself a renewed source of motives, needs,
experience. We break irrevocably with the model that restricts the design of
language to one face toward referential meaning, one toward sound, and that
defines the organization of language as solely consisting of rules for linking the
two. Such a model implies naming to be the sole use of speech, as if languages were
never organized to lament. beseech, admonish, aphorize, inveigh (Burke 1966:13),
for the many varied forms of persuasion, direction, expression and symbolic play. A
model of language must design itself with a face toward communicative conduct
and social life. (Dell Hymes [1971] 1972:277-8).
Although Habermas remains more firmly tied to Chomsky's psycho linguistic
essentialism (1979: 19), he nonetheless shares Dell Hymes' recognition that the
competence model must be extended to include the realm of communication.
Specifically, this means that Habennas defines communicative competence as 'the
ability of a speaker oriented to mutual understanding to embed a well-formed
sentence in relations to reality', 'reality' here corresponding to 'situations of possible
employment' and 'objects of possible experience' (1979: 24; 29-30). Crucially from
our point of view, Habennas allows that such 'situations' and 'objects' may be
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'bounded' to particular social 'institutions', and it is clear from his citation of
Christening and marriage in this context that liturgy would yield up typical
examples of such institutional bonding (1979: 38-9).
It is unnecessary here to chart in detail how Chomsky has responded to these
redefinitions (but see Botha 1989: 75-6; 170-4); nevertheless, it is surely significant
that his more recent work has actively entertained a notion of 'pragmatic
competence' related to 'institutional' uses of language, and would thereby appear to
have admitted a closer link between ideal/psychological and
contextualised/sociological elements in discourse-generation (Chomsky 1980:224-5
n.S) What is clear from our perspective is that Hymes' insistence on a linguistics
which accounts for speech as it is socially 'organized' in 'lament, beseeching,
symbolic play' etc. is very much the sort of linguistics which will prove most
profitable for the analysis of liturgy. As Lukken has noted (1987:112), to
participate in a church service is at once to 'perform' a communal act and to realize
a specific 'competence', gained through active induction to a 'congregation' and
sustained by a personal commitment of faith and works. Indeed, our conviction is
that it is specifically through the growth of pragmatics, with its sympathetic
emphasis on meaning in relation to context and use, that linguistics has become
equipped to tackle the ritualized discourses of major cultural institutions like the
church. What is more, it will become clear that Hymes' conflation of competence
and performance, of 'psychological' and 'psychophysical' analysis, is crucial for any
appropriation of liturgical pragmatics which hopes to be broadly based. Thus, while
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we shall draw upon the work of pragmaticians who start from both 'mentalist' and
'behavioural' perspectives. these will be seen as complementary for our purpose
rather than as antithetical within it: we shall in this sense be aiming. with Robinson
(1986:668), to move 'beyond ... the dualism of langue/parole to a larger perspective
on human activity'.
2.2.4 Further defmitive concepts: sentence vs. utterance: type vs token:
sense vs. force
If traditional distinctions of langue/parole or competence/performance
are to be qualified in the way just outlined. we might well turn to another contrast
which is often made in defmitions of pragmatics - namely the contrast between
sentence-meaning and utterance-meaning. Deriving from the work of Straws~n
(1950). this. at least. does not explicitly rely on the kind of mind/action dichotomy
questioned by Hymes. Rather, it turns on a distinction between syntactics.
semantics and pragmatics which is essentially a distinction between universal and
particular aspects of linguistic meaning. A recent explication of this approach is
,
offered by Sperber and Wilson:
an utterance has a variety of properties both linguistic and non-linguistic. it may
contain the word 'shoe', or a reflexive pronoun, or a trisyUabic adjective; it may be
spoken on top of a bus by someone with a heavy cold, addressing a close friend.
By definition the semantic representation of a sentence ...can take no account of
such non-linguistic properties as, for example. the time and place of an utterance,
the identity of the speaker, the speaker's intentions, and so on.
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The semantic representation of a sentence deals with a sort of common core
meaning shared with every utterance of it However, different utterances of the
same sentence may differ in their interpretation, and indeed they usually do. The
study of semantic representation of sentences belongs to grammar [ie. syntactics],
the study of the interpretation of utterances belongs to pragmatics. (1987:9-10).
Once again, the contrast drawn here relates closely to the contrast we have
drawn between 'liturgical language' as a generic concept and 'liturgical discourse' as
a phenomenon of the local church service. As such, it also echoes the distinction
originally mooted by Peirce ([1960]: 2.245, 1933: 4.357) and later expounded by
Bar-Hillel (1954) and Lyons (1977: 13-18), between types and tokens in language,
where types represent whole classes of linguistic units and tokens the specific
realization or 'instantiation' of such classes 'at a particular place in space or time'
(Lyons 1977:14).
Even more specific to pragmatics is Leech's kindred discrimination of sense as
the 'semantic representation of meaning through some formal language or notation',
from force as meaning which is determined not only semantically but also
'pragmatically' - that is, meaning which is 'worked out' in particular communicative
settings by speakers and hearers (1983:30).
Given the stress placed by these three categorizations on the specific
circumstances of language-production, it becomes plain that pragmatics in general,
and liturgical pragmatics in particular, must operate with a suitably nuanced model
of context. It is to the formulation of such a model, and the application of it to the
sacral domain, that we now tum.
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2.2.5 Context
Once meaning is viewed in terms of parole, 'use', 'utterance' and
'communication', the linguistic analyst must inevitably develop an account of
context. Indeed, from Bar-Hillel onwards, (1954: 359; 374-5), context has been
presented as a quintessentially 'pragmatic' variable.
On the most general level, context may be understood as 'a term refening to
the features of the non-linguistic world in relation to which linguistic units are
systematically used' (Crystal 1991: 79). More precisely, however, it has been
categorised by linguists as impacting on language at three main levels: context of
culture, context of situation and context of utterance. The first two terms were
coined by the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1923, 1935) - and
interestingly enough, were developed in his extensive analysis of ritual among the
Trobriand islanders of the South Pacific. They were then made the basis of a
thoroughly functional linguistics by his pupil Firth (1957), whom we have already
cited as a seminal proponent of 'meaning as use'.
Context of culture for Firth was the widest sphere of linguistic instantiation,
indicating the most macro-social constraints on verbal communication. In liturgical
terms, it would include the historical, theological, denominational and
environmental background of worship as practised by different communions. For a
village Church of England service, it would thus comprise such things as 'English
Christianity', 'Anglican identity', 'the influence of Cranmer' and 'rural demography'.
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Context of situation since Firth has more particularly been defined in terms of
'relevant features of participants, objects and verbal effects' (Firth 1957: 182).
Liturgically, it would in this sense contain phenomena bearing more directly on the
conduct of worship by a specific congregation at a specific time and place - egothe
layout of the church building, the roles of different speakers in the rite, the theme of
the service, the size and composition of 'the people', the churchmanship of the
president etc ..
As for context of utterance, Lyons (1977: 570ff.) and Crystal (1991: 79-80)
define this as even more explicitly relevant to individual speech-tokens within a
discourse. Thus the context of utterance of an epiclesis or absolution would
typically be constituted by their 'priestly' expression, by any special gestures which
might accompany them, by their referring respectively to 'eucharistic elements' and
'sinful confessors', and by their relative position within the discourse as a whole.
This last feature of 'discoursaI context' relates more specifically to what
general linguists and pragmaticians alike have come to call co-text (Mey 1993:
184) - although Firth, at least, had already admitted 'verbal action' into his 'context
of situation' (1957: 182). As it is, liturgy provides ample evidence that in terms of
'pragmatic meaning', sharp divisions between 'linguistic' and 'non-linguistic' context
are often rather arbitrary. As Levinson has remarked, 'aspects of linguistic structure
sometimes directly encode (or otherwise interact with) context', so making it
'impossible to draw a neat boundary between context-independent grammar and
context-dependent interpretation' (1983:8). Here, to quote Levinson again, 'we
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come to the heart of the definitional problem: the term pragmatics at the same time
covers both context-dependent aspects of language structure, and principles of
language usage and understanding that have little or nothing to do with linguistic
structure. It is difficult to forge a definition that will happily cover both aspects'
(1983:9; cf Lyons 1977:591). For Peter Auer (1992: 26), an important question
which arises from this ambiguity concerns 'how much of context is "brought along"
and how much is "brought about" in interaction' - that is, from our standpoint, how
much liturgical meaning is determined in advance of particular services by church
tradition and congregational expectation, and how much emerges 'eventfully',
within each particular act of worship as it proceeds. We shall be dealing with these
more detailed issues of context further in Part II, but it is worth noting here that
even that which is 'brought along' to liturgy will itself often be liturgical. Thus,
while it is most fundamentally a 'situated' form of discourse, we can still see that
liturgy is encoded in written church service texts which, though primarily 'types',
can nevertheless themselves assume a 'contextual ising' or instantiating function in
relation to other discourses. This function can be both diachronic (that is,
historically developed) and synchronic (that is, contemporaneous).
From a diachronic perspective, it is clear, for example, that the Church of
England's Book of Common Prayer (1662) has exercised a profound
'contextualising effect' on the Altemetive Service Book of 1980, the latter to a large
extent being a modernisation of the former (C.E.L.C 1980b: 9-18). The same holds
- albeit somewhat less directly - for today's Reformed rites in relation to Calvin's
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Forme ([1542/5] 1980). The process is more complicated still, however, because
even Reformation service texts drew much of their form and substance from the
Roman Mass (Spinks 1984a:53), which in its tum evolved from ancient Patristic
liturgies (Old 1975), which in their tum reappropriated a large amount of Biblical
material (Danielou 1956). Then again, form criticism on the Psalms, on the
Johannine Passion Narrative and on other texts like Philippians 2: 6-11 and
Colossians 1: 15-20 has indicated their likely origin as 'oral' liturgical orders
(Wainwright 1980: 149ff.; Jennings 1985: 200).
If this pattern of what Kathleen Jamieson (1975) calls 'rhetorical antecedence'
bears out the contextualising potential of worship texts through time, we can
perceive a similar process at work across different traditions in time. This
particularly applies to our own century, where the ecumenical movement has
spawned any number of hybrid rites, and where even denominational service books
- particularly in the Free church tradition - display considerable degrees of
intertextuality (eg. Jasper 1978; Perry, Goodland & Griffiths 1992; URC 1989:131-
3). Perhaps even more significantly for linguistics as a whole, it is worth
recognising, with Crystal & Davy (1969:148), Fenn (1982) and Ferguson (1985:
206), that the language of certain liturgical texts has itself sometimes permeated
and thereby contextualised the discourses of quite secular milieu to a considerable
extent - the influence of Cranmer's phrasing on a whole range of English language
varieties being a prime example (cf. Lewis 1954:204-221; Robinson 1973).
One final and obvious witness to the contextualising force of texts themselves
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is afforded by the old Tridentine Mass of the Roman Catholic church. While every
'performance' of this 'script' was clearly different according to time, location and
participants, there is little doubt that its deliberately global language-mode (Latin),
together with its universal form and content, operated actively to shape and detine
the parochial context, rather than existing apart from it.
As we progress, it will become clear that where theologians and liturgiologists
have often stressed the importance of sacral context while yet failing to analyse
how exactly it affects liturgical discourse, linguistic pragmatics affords a more
thorough means of demonstrating how each interacts with the other.
2.3 Modem linguistic pragmatics: its scope and application to liturgy
Now clearly, the various background' concepts just mentioned could
have a wide-ranging application to all kinds of functional language-interpretation.
They have featured very prominently, for example, in the models of philosophical
description and hermeneutic theory developed by, among others, Gadamer ([1965]
1989), Fuchs (1970), Ricoeur (1981), Tracy (1981) and Thiselton (1992). Having
said this, we would underline that we shall be concerned with such concepts here
only where they relate to contemporary linguistic pragmatics as it has been defined
by its principal exponents and publications (Levinson 1983; Leech 1983; Green
1989; Blakemore 1992; Mey 1993; JoumaJ of Pragmatics 1977 ff.). Thus, for
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example, it should be realised that linguistic pragmaticians often regard
Wittgenstein as having had little direct influence on the development of their
subject (Levinson 1983: 227; Leinfellner-Rupertsberger 1990). Likewise, though
the defmition of 'context' in pragmatics has clear affmities with, say, Dilthey's
notion of 'life-world' ([1927] 1962) and Gunkel's Form Critical concept of Sitz im
Leben (1901, cf. Sawyer 1967), we would point out that these affmities have
already been thoroughly explored by Thiselton ([1975] 1986; 1980; 1992), and
would emphasise once more our resolve to confme ourselves to the specific
analytical terms and frameworks of pragmatics per se. This is not to deny, of
course, that implicit connections can be made - and we shall certainly make them
where apposite. Nonetheless, our chosen analytical framework remains quite
specifically linguistic-pragmatic rather than more generally linguistic,
philosophical or hermeneutic. What is more, it should be understood that although
our pragmatics will be shown to have a crucially theoretical dimension, the points
at which this will be seen to connect with a wider sphere of thought will be very
particularly the points at which it can be seen to bear upon doxology or liturgical
theology - a field whose philosophical and hermeneutic bases may be plain, but
which still represents a much more specific area of investigation than either
'philosophy' or 'hermeneutics' as such. Put simply: the interdisciplinary status of this
study derives from its attempt at a rapprochement between contemporary linguistic
pragmatics, liturgic exegesis and the Christian theology of worship.
The use of the word 'contemporuy to describe the particular sort of
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pragmatics with which we shall be dealing is crucial, because although it was
Morris who coined the term in the '30's, the emergence of 'pragmatics' as a major
branch of linguistics has occurred rather more recently. For Hom, in fact (1988:
113), its 'coming of age' as an academic subject can be traced only to 1983, and the
publication of Levinson's 'sound' and 'superior' textbook - although the essential
shape of the discipline can be seen as having formed in the '40's and 50's. More
precisely, contemporary pragmatics can be thought of as having developed in two
overlapping 'tendencies'. These tendencies have been identified by various
commentators as respectively 'Anglo-American', and 'Continental'fEuropean'
(Levinson 1983: 2ff.; Robinson 1986: 653; Leech & Thomas 1990).
'Anglo-American' pragmatics owes much of its genesis to Morris' collaborator
Rudolf Camap. Though Camap shared Morris' vision of 'the semiotic' as a grand
framework for the sciences (1938: 148), and although both men were committed
positivists, Camap came to relate Morris' pragmatic trichotomy more centrally to
the workings of language and, by implication, to the discipline of formal
linguistics. For Camap, 'pragmatics' entailed the investigation of 'explicit reference
made to the user of [a] language' within a sentence or sentences ([1942] 1948:9).
Although it might at first involve an 'observation' of how various 'speaking habits'
determine that certain terms will have certain designata in certain contexts, Camap
nonetheless saw pragmatics as little more than a precursor to the central tasks of
syntactic and semantic description. Thus, for him, 'Once the semantic and
syntactical features of a language have been found by way of pragmatics, we may
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turn our attention away from the users and restrict it to those semantical and
syntactic features' ([1942] 1948: 12-13). In essence, Carnap's concern was thus to
understand how more general features of context are 'written into' or 'encoded by'
grammar and vocabulary, and it is this concern which has most classically
distinguished 'Anglo-American' pragmatics.
Despite Camap's endorsement of 'preliminary' pragmatic fieldwork, those who
have followed in his footsteps have in fact more characteristically relied on study of
those lexico-syntactic phenomena which refer to an external situation - namely
deictic or indexical terms like 'here', 'there', 'now', 'then', T, 'you', 'this' and 'that'
(peirce [1960]: 2.305; Bar-Hillel 1954; Montague [1968] 1974; Levinson 1983: 54-
96). There can be little doubt that a comprehensive pragmatics would have to
include this area of deixis - and indeed, it occupies a prominent place in the
pragmatic agenda of Levinson (1983: 54-96) and Green (1989: 17-36) in particular.
Neither can there be much dispute that an exhaustive pragmatics of liturgical
language would find much to analyse in the deictic elements of church service
language. If deixis is taken principally to encompass expressions referring to
persons, time and place (Mey 1993: 92), its significance within Christian rite very
soon becomes obvious.
Frequently, first-person singular pronouns like T or 'my' are uttered not by
individuals but by a corporate body - the congregation. Even where more explicit
plurals are deployed, one is led to consider the assumptions they make about the
faith of individual participants, and thus to examine the 'continuity' of the human
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subject - that is, to compare the different discoursal 'identities' and 'roles' adopted
by people inside and outside the ecclesial context ( cf. Levinson 1983: 68). Further
still, even in regard to more immediate denotations, liturgical person-deixis can
display a plurality which is far from straightforward: when used as a Benedictus;
we might well ask, for instance, whether 'Blessed is he who comes in the name of
the Lord' refers to the Messiah (cf. Psalm 118), to the communicant approaching
the table, or to both? As Ladriere points out (1973: 56), such personal pronouns
allow individual speakers to take on the identity of the ritual community and so
relate to themselves various multi-meaningful sentence-functions enacted by, and
definitive of, that community.
Where temporal deixis is concerned, it would appear that the 'universe' of
worship discourse constitutes a case worth investigation. As Eliade (1959) has
shown, the liturgical 'clock' and 'calendar' operate in a highly distinctive way. The
process of Christ's passion may be condensed into a single service marking the
'Stations of the Cross', such that present indicatives like 'Jesus is condemned to
death' and 'Jesus dies' come liturgically an hour apart where historically they refer
to events separated by a whole day (CAPOn 1987: 26-8). Tenses and referents are
also 'de-synchronised' in apparently nonsensical ways to make theological points -
for example about that conflation oftime and eternity which is implied by doctrines
like the Communion of Saints. Hence, one contemporary URC eucharistic prayer
speaks for modem Gentiles thus:
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(1) When we were slavesin Egypt
you led us to freedom through the Red Sea •
(URC 1989: 11)
Adverbials, too, can often be deictically polysemic in liturgy: the 'now' of the
Nunc dimittis is at once centuries old (Luke 2: 29-32) and utterly contemporary - it
is both 'cited' and 'presented', functioning simultaneously as the quotation of one
man's words and a corporate, 'universal' request:
(2) Lord, lettest now thy servant depart in peace •
(CE.L.C 1980: 95)
In spatial terms also, liturgical discourse establishes frames of reference which
pose intriguing challenges for deictic exposition. A church sanctuary can constitute
both a local and a 'global' setting: the communion table is simultaneously a specific
congregational focus and yet also somehow a gathering point for people 'from east.
west, north and south' - people who sit down to eat 'in the kingdom of God' (URC
1989: 9). Similarly, although churches are geographically part of 'the world',
liturgical discourse often distinguishes life 'in' that world from what is going on 'in'
worship:
(3)
...as we eat and drink at his command
write us to Quist
as one body in him
and giveus strength to serve you in the world.
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CURe 1989: 15)
These issues of liturgical deixis are clearly important and warrant further
investigation. Having said this, we have chosen not to devote a specific chapter to
them here, for the following reasons. First of all, there is some dispute about the
status of deixis within pragmatics as a whole. As Green admits (1989: 17-35), it is
the most narrowly 'referential' of all pragmatic sub-disciplines. Indeed, it has even
been dismissed on this basis as nothing more than 'a sophisticated way of doing
semantics' (Haberland & Mey 1977: 5). Certainly, En9 (1981) has added weight to
such a view by suggesting that indexicality should logically apply to nouns, as
well as to the grammatical classes with which it has more usually been identified.
Similar doubts would appear to account for Leech's having treated deixis as
peripheral to his survey of pragmatic principles (1983: 11). Even Bar-Hillers work
(1954) saw 'indexical expressions' as primarily describing contexts rather than
interacting with, or shaping them in a more dynamic way. This is not to dismiss
Bar-Hillel's formulation of context per se; it is just that our quest here is for a
pragmatics tailored specifically to the linguistic manifestations of liturgical action
rather than liturgical denotation. For us, as for Lardner, 'the primary purpose of
liturgical language' is 'not its content or information transfer', but rather its
'performance'. Likewise, since 'the performed nature of language in worship is
probably one of the most neglected dimensions in theory and practice', it will be
this, rather than the more 'Referential Pragmatics' of deixis and indexicality which
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will receive most attention here (Lardner 1979: 92; Leech 1983: 11).
None of this means that we shall neglect deictics altogether; it is simply that
where relevant. they will be subsumed under more broadly performance-oriented
headings. Hence Ladriere's relation of personal pronouns in liturgy to the
distinctively corporate 'affective behaviour' of the gathered church will be seen
against the wider vistas of 'institutionalisation' and 'rituality' in Chapter 8. In similar
vein. the more recently-researched phenomena of 'social' and 'discourse' deixis (cf.
Levinson 1983: 85-94) will be dealt with. respectively. as features of 'pragmatic
indirectness' in Chapter 5 and multiple utterance analysis in Chapter 7. Otherwise,
while we note that the referential qualities of 'liturgical time' and 'liturgical space'
have been dealt with elsewhere by theologians like Bouyer (1963: 151-205).
Grainger (1974: 107-72) and Ramshaw (1986: 57-79), we offer a more particularly
pragmatic meditation on them at various points throughout. Part II, where we
consider the eschatological thrust of Ladriere's doctrine of liturgical language
'performativity' .
If deixis lies in something of a 'transitional zone' between semantics and
pragmatics, it still resembles more unambiguously pragmatic branches of the
Anglo-American tradition in having first emerged as a philosophical concern. Just
as Bar-Hillel developed Camap's nodding endorsement of the 'linguistic habits of
users of ordinary language' (1954: 359). so the Oxford philosophers J.L. Austin,
J.R. Searle, P.F. Strawson and H.P. Grice in tum became associated with a full-
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blown school of 'Ordinary Language Philosophy'.
Probably the best-known text in the history of pragmatics is Austin's How To
Do Things With Words (1962). Posthumously edited from lectures delivered in the
'50's, this book presents a challenge to the purely referential and 'truth-conditional'
semantics of logical positivism (cf. Ayer [1936J 1971; Flew 1966). Indeed, it is a
challenge which becomes more radical as Austin's argument unfolds. Austin begins
by making a crucial distinction between purely referential or conststive utterances,
and utterances whose purpose is not to describe something so much as to do it
(1962: 6). This second group of expressions Austin termed performatives. and it is
significant for our purposes that he saw them occurring particularly within ritual
settings - ego1baptise', 1declare (them to be husband and wife)' etc. (1962: 11). As
Austin's exposition proceeds, however, the original constative/perfonnative duality
begins to collapse, and is replaced by a conception which sees all expressions as
'speech acts' dependent for their meaning on the 'total speech situation' in which
they arise (1962: 148). Rather than being assessed according to their respective
'truth' or 'falsity', these speech acts are represented as 'felicitous' or 'infelicitous'
according to the various 'conditions' which different circumstances impose on their
effective usage (1962: 12ff.). This thoroughgoing relation of linguistic meaning to
function and context is schematized by Austin's identifying various 'ilJocutionary
forces' with particular types of acts done in saying certain things, rather than with
mere acts of saying defined in purely lexical or phonetic terms (1962: 131ff.).
As developed by Austin's pupil John Searle (1969, 1979a), and as refined by
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Bach & Hamish (1979), Recanati (1987) and others, 'Speech Act Theory' has
considerable potential for the explication of liturgical discourse. Its emphasis on
language as a means to action; its sensitivity to performance, ritual and local 'rules'
as components of linguistic meaning; its refusal to reject all empirically
unverifiable statements - and religious statements in particular - : these features
must qualify it for a primary place in any pragmatics of liturgy. Indeed, as well as
devoting the whole of Chapter 5 to a 'speech act' analysis of worship, it is there that
we shall strike keynotes for themes developed through the remainder of Part II's in-
depth exegesis of Reformed liturgical discourse.
One of these themes occupies a further area of study formulated within Anglo-
American pragmatics - that is, implicature. As Leech points out (1981: 275-300;
Leech & Thomas 1990: 189), implicature represents a 'pragmatic' extension of the
well-established logico-sernantic domain of entailment and presupposition - a
domain mapped out in some detail by Frege ([1892] 1952) and Russell (1905). As
with much on the semantic-pragmatic interface, the lines of demarcation here are
somewhat blurred. Essentially, however, while both have to do with what is
assumed in a sentence rather than with what is asserted by a sentence, entailment
and presupposition tend to be more focussed on the logically demonstrable aspects
of what is assumed, whereas implicature tends to be more focussed on the
behaviourally demonstrable aspects of what is assumed (Leech 1981: 295-300;
Crystal 1991: 276). We shall trace the interconnection of presupposition and
implicature at the start of Chapter 6, but not surprisingly in view of our stress on
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liturgical periormsnce; it is the relation of implicature to liturgy which will then be
pursued at length.
Building on Strawson's insight (1950: 330) that much of what is assumed in
actual communication goes beyond a 'formalist' and 'antimetaphysical' logic of
entailment and presupposition, Grice recognised that 'there are very many
inferences and arguments, expressed in natural language and not in terms of
[symbolical logical] devices, that are nevertheless recognizably valid' (1975: 43).
Though such 'inferences and arguments' are not recoverable in a strict
'mathematical' sense, they still typically conform to certain 'Maxims of
Conversation' established within a realm of mutual co-operation and 'shared
contextual knowledge'. Just as Austin had stressed that successful 'uptake' of an
expression was often as crucial to its felicity as successful articulation (1962: 117),
so Grice sought more systematically to identify the principles applied by
interlocutors to ensure clear interaction. In all of this, Grice's contention that what
is 'meant' very often transcends what is 'said' (cf. Grice 1957) will be seen as vital
for the analysis of liturgical language, where 'meanings' are so very often
'implicated' by the historical, ceremonial, canonical and socio-psychological
conditions of enactment, rather than being entailed or logically presupposed by the
'statements' and 'propositions' of sacral texts.
Where Grice's work on implicature forms the analytical backdrop to the first
part of Chapter 6, it is an extrapolation from this account which we apply to liturgy
in the second part of the same Chapter. The development in question is fairly
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recent, but has already been cast as a 'paradigm shift' for pragmatics as a whole
(Leech & Thomas 1990: 201). Where Grice identified 'relevance' as a major factor
in successful communication while realising the need to explore it further (1975:
46), Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986; 1987) have come to define it as the
governing concept - not just for pragmatics, but for all branches of communication
theory. Sperber & Wilson recognise that analysis of communication must tum not
so much on a scrutiny of 'shared assumptions' or 'mutual knowledge' per se, but
rather on the discernment of which assumptions are operative in any given
exchange (1987: 698). As a key to such discernment, they suggest the principle that
all acts of communication carry a 'presumption' of optimal relevance. Specifically,
this presumption exists as a 'cost/benefit trade-off between iniormstiveness and
processibility (1986: 125; 1987: 703). Put crudely: the more 'new information' is
conveyed by a speaker, the harder it will be for a hearer to process, whereas the
more familiar, or 'old', information is conveyed, the easier it will be to process.
Thus, where informativeness reaches a maximum and processibility a minimum,
the result will be cliched, formulaic or banal expression; by contrast, where
processibility is hard-won, the result will be correspondingly esoteric or dense
expression such as might be found in very 'difficult' poetry (1986: 48).
This conception of relevance could be applied to liturgy at many levels, but
most especially, it has the potential to illuminate long-standing ecclesiastical
debates: about 'aesthetic' versus 'vernacular' worship; about 'religious' versus
'colloquial' speech,and more generally, about whether liturgical discourse exists to
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confirm a committed body of believers in the creeds and practises of their church,
or to offer a public 'point of contact' between 'religious' and 'secular' life, through
which 'the world at large' can become more familiar with the gospel. These are the
main issues which will be broached in the second half of Chapter 6, just as we shall
test there the many finer nuances of Sperber &Wilson's theory.
One of the distinguishing features of both implicature and relevance theory is
that although Grice and Sperber & Wilson each contemplate their place in other
forms of linguistic communication, they have so far been applied almost
exclusively to single utterances or single exchanges within one-on-one
conversation. In this respect, they resemble Searle's construction of speech act
theory (even though, as we make clear at 5.4 ff., Austin actually appears less
restricted to the straight 'Speaker-Hearer' model). This emphasis in tum raises the
question of just how far liturgy, displaying as it does a multiplicity of participants, a
characteristic 'scriptedness' and a' historic use of unison responses, can be
interpreted as 'dialogue' or 'conversation'. In Chapter 7, we address this question
with reference to recent insights from what May (1993: 181) calls 'extensional'
pragmatics - that is, the attempt by linguists like van Dijk (1977, 1981), Hancher
(1979) and Fotion (1981) to apply 'speech act' and 'Gricean' principles beyond
isolated utterances and interchanges, to whole stretches of discourse. In the same
Chapter, we also follow Levinson (1983: 284-370) and Green (1989: 141-57) by
subsuming into our pragmatics certain procedures developed by ethnographers of
41
communication for the analysis of whole 'sequences' and passages of
conversational interaction. Through all this, we argue that although there are close
similarities between liturgy and conversation, these are offset by several
characteristic differences - differences which in their tum help to distinguish liturgy
as a particular type of speech activity.
These discourse-analytical attempts to 'place' liturgy as a particular form of
speech are extended in Chapter 8 into the wider cultural context or 'universe' of
sacral action. Having appropriated the 'micropragmatic' Anglo-American
perspectives of speech act theory, implicature and relevance, and having then
assumed the more 'macropragmatic' agenda of compound-utterance interpretation,
we here move into the more fully Continental tradition of 'socio-pragmatics' (Leech
1983: 10; Mey 1993: 286ff.). Taking our cue from Levinson (1979: 368), we
present liturgy as an archetypal activity type - that is, a speech event which is very
sharply defmed within, by and over against society, and which is 'constituted' and
'constrained' by various 'rules' imposed through the 'institution' (the church) on
participant roles, allowable contributions, proper settings etc.. To this extent, we
follow GUlich (1980) in arguing that the study of church service discourse provides
an 'ideal example' of institutionalised communication; we then bear this out with an
assessment of our original field data conducted according to Dell Hymes' classic
model for 'the ethnography of speaking' (1972b).
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These, then, will be the main methodological components of our 'integrated'
liturgical pragmatics. Their range consciously reflects Ferrara's call for a holistic
approach to pragmatics based on the fact that 'every utterance is both a string of
symbols somehow connected and standing in relation to some mental construct,
and a full-fledged social action, oriented to the normative expectations of a
community' (1985: 138). By the same token, they express concerns which are at
once 'functionalistic', 'psycholinguistic' and 'conversational' (Horn 1988: 114),
focussing on the structure of sentences as related to those who utter them, the
'knowledge' of discourse-participants, and observed 'uses' of language in particular
settings (cf. Richards, Platt & Plan 1992: 285). In Leech's terms, this means that
our study will at different points be 'pragmalinguistic', 'general pragmatic' and
!gocia-pragmatic': it will deal, variously, with 'the resources' which liturgical
language itself appears to provide for 'conveying particular implications'; the
'general conditions' of the liturgical use of language defined apart from 'more
specific "local" conditions' on such use, and the 'sociologically' oriented analysis of
specific acts of worship 'in the field'.
Having said all this, the pragmatics which we deploy here will reflect the
corporate, public character of liturgy in being weighted somewhat more towards
the societal pole of the discipline than towards its 'pure' or 'universal' pole (cf. Mey
1993: 286). In this sense, it is, as we have already made clear, not an exhaustive
pragmatics of liturgy. Nonetheless, in being tailored to suit the predominant
dynamics of sacral celebration, and being forged with reference to a large corpus of
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liturgical data, it does seek to be more programmatic than prior attempts at a
'pragmatics of liturgical language'. In order to confirm this, we shall benefit now
from reviewing the legacy of 'liturgical pragmatics' - such as it is - which we are
seeking to inherit and develop.
2.4 Pragmatics, religious language and liturgy: precedents and POintsfor
development
Given the obvious potential of a pragmatic approach to liturgical
language, it is surprising how rarely such an approach has featured in assessments
of church service interaction. What is more, this neglect seems just as marked from
the side of Theology as from the side of Linguistics (Jennings 1985: 186). In
general terms, theologians have been keener to broach language than linguists have
to broach religion, but the fact remains that neither group has shown much
inclination to deal more particularly with the pragmatic facets of sacral discourse.
Hence. not everything which might come under the broad heading of 'religious
language study' can concern us here. We have already made it clear that we shall
draw on wider-ranging studies in the ethnography. sociology and semiotics of
religion where they appear to us to illuminate the specifically linguistic-pragmatic
approach to liturgy which we are pursuing. From the same standpoint, we would
distinguish our task from those undertaken by such protean accounts of religious
symbolism as have been offered by F.W. Dillistone (1955; 1986) and Edward
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Robinson (1987), and from more diverse critiques of 'religious discourse' framed in
terms of political, cultural or literary theory (Tracy 1981; Reuther 1983; Prickett
1986; Boone 1989). In addition, though there now exists a healthy body of work in
what might be called 'Biblical linguistics', we note with Cotterell & Turner (1989:
13-19) that much of this has remained philological, grammatical or semantic in
focus, and thus seems largely to have ignored the advances made by modem
pragmaticians (eg. Guttgemans 1974; Caird 1980; Frye 1982). Where there are
exceptions to this trend (and see Thiselton 1992: 283ff.) we shall appropriate them
insofar as their pragmatic exegesis of Scripture can be seen to have ramifications
for the exegesis of liturgical texts. Even where analyses have dealt with liturgical
language per se however, their methods and conclusions are not always germane to
our approach. This is especially true where their methodologies have been mainly
philological (eg. Schmidt 1950; Brook 1965).
If the proper interdisciplinary status of our study can be established partly by
defining what it is not, then we need also to place it in relation to previous work
which can in varying degrees be said to have 'laid the ground' for what we are
attempting. This past work can be divided roughly into the following categories.
First, it includes studies by theologians and philosophers of religion who, while not
consciously engaged with linguistic pragmatics, have nonetheless discerned
pragmatic dimensions within religious discourse. Next, there are analyses from
theology and philosophy which have explicitly used pragmatic methodologies to
interpret the language of religion. Then, our concerns may be compared more
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directly with studies of liturgical language undertaken by philosophers and
theologians - most of which have been general, but some of which have used
overtly pragmatic frameworks. Finally, our project can be set within the relatively
small stream of work undertaken by linguists on religious and liturgical language.
Let us now assess each of these categories in more detail.
2.4.1 General theological and philosophical studies of religious language
Though the late 50's and 60's saw what Mananzan calls a 'linguistic
turn' in the philosophy of religion, developed to defend religious language against
logical positivist detractors like Ayer and Flew, most of the protagonists in this tum
still shadowed the 'verificationist' agenda, even if only to criticise it. On the whole,
this issued in a reactive extension or adaptation of empirical and truth-conditional
semantics to include religious discourse, rather than a proactive endorsement of
ordinary language philosophy as a radical eltemstive paradigm for the
interpretation of sacred speech. The consequence of this was that pragmatic
principles tended to be hinted at rather than fully played out.
A prime example of this reactive approach is found in the early work of Ian
Ramsey on religious language (1957; 1965) - though we shall see in 5.5.3 that he
subsequently embraced Austin's ideas with some enthusiasm (1968). Instead of co-
opting then-emergent concepts of meaning-as-use from the Oxford school, this
46
earlier work sought to demonstrate that 'far from being necessarily religious, logical
empiricism provides us with a tool which can be of the greatest service to theology'
(1957: 5). Specifically, this conviction was articulated through the characterisation
of religious expression as something constructed from 'object language which has
been given strange qualifications', and which 'centres on "God" as a keyword
which itself becomes the subject of significant tautologies' (1957: 5; cf. 1965: 73).
Thus, insofar as God is modelled as a 'cause', our 'theological story' is seen to be
'based on empirical fact' - that is, on a 'familiar' observable phenomenon -, but
insofar as this 'empirical' attribution is qualified in the description of Him as 'First
Cause', the model is extended logically into a realm of 'disclosure' and 'mystery'
which is not 'mystery' in the sense of ignorance, but rather 'mystery' in the sense in
which the existential tautology 'I'm I' must act as a 'logical stop-card' for the
causality of all human phenomena (1957: 61-5; 182-3 cf. Exodus 3). The same
logical extension of 'empirical models' by 'odd qualifiers' was also applied by
Ramsey to other religious phrases like 'infinitely wise', 'creation ex nihilo' and
'eternal purpose' (1957: 66-89). The conclusion which Ramsey inferred from all
this was that, far from being urrempirica1, religious language is simply 'more than
empirical' (1957: 183), arrogating to its firmly verifiable foundations the key
dynamics of narrative, 'discernment' and 'commitment' (1957: 182-6). Indeed, far
from seeing these more 'personalist' dynamics as distinct from the world of 'facts',
Ramsey argued that the very definition of 'fact' itself should be expanded to include
them:
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We reach some 'facts' by selection and pointing them out - and for some purposes,
and in some contexts we can even 'pick out' persons. But we reach orber 'facts' by
their disclosing themselves to us, challenging us - and these are such facts as the
'fact' of Duty, of the Moral Law, or of persons ... Persons challenge us, not as those
facts which are 'ideas', but 'notionally' in activity. (1965: 89)
Now clearly, there are here the seeds of a 'pragmatic' conception. Indeed.
Ramsey's attempt to make the 'personal' and 'actiona!' facets of expression part
of meaning per se became a popular strategy in the work of those other theologians
who at much the same time sought to present religious language as continuous
with, rather than separate from, the realm of logico-semantic exegesis. At a general
level, Ferre (1962: 164-5), Dilley (1964) and Knox (1966) elaborated Ramsey's
assertion of 'truth' encompassing both non-cognitive expression and sacral activity
by arguing that criteria of 'logicality' and 'factuality' are themselves to some extent
products of 'metaphysical' systems. For Knox in particular, Biblical exegesis was
seen to have suffered from an undue polarisation between 'propositional' and
'existential' discourse - a polarisation which had seen mythology misrepresented as
'scientific fact' on one side and 'sheer nonsense' on the other.
Even before all this, James Wilson (1958: 16-31) had suggested 'religious
.experience' as the ultimate criterion of verification for religious statements, with the
(for us) significant proviso that the relevant 'experience' here was shared, 'public'
and 'co-recurrent', rather than purely 'psychological', 'autoboigraphical' or
'existential' (1958: 23). Wilson went on to assert that since there are large groups of
believers who clearly do use the same system of verification for religious assertions
by ~eans of their common experiences, and since these experiences are repeated in
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the same types of context, they allow for the expectation or prediction of other
experiences. Wilson concluded on this basis that such 'communal' religious
assertions are 'similar in point of logic to the case with assertions like There is a
table'. My having had certain visual experiences (seen a table) enables me to
predict other experiences (touching it, putting things on it, etc.)' (1958: 23-4).
Wilson's emphasis on the congregational or ecclesiel mutualization of sacred
speech carries obvious implications for the specific analysis of liturgical discourse.
Indeed, it was Ramsey himself who concluded from a similar perspective that the
'more-than-empirical' character of religious language was most archetypally present
in worship (1957: 185; 1965: 89). More radically still, R.M. Hare (1955), J.J.C
Smart (1955) and Willem Zurdeeg (1958) all came to isolate the unique 'logic' of
theological discourse in the 'worshipful' function of theological speech. More
extreme yet was Ninian Smart's proposition that 'logically variegated' analyses of
religious language are impossible, thus making definitions of religion in terms of
'content' and 'reference' (ie. 'abstract' doctrines) 'a snare' which diverts attention
from the proper focus of analysis on the practice of religion in such areas as
worship, sacrifice and mystical contemplation (1958: 197).
Now these proposals might allow us to suggest that the first wave of
theological resistance to logical positivism had a 'crypto-pragmatic' orientation. All
the same, those who made such proposals appear still to have been constrained by
logico-semantic preoccupations and methods. So, Ninian Smart excepted, while
hypothesising more 'personal' and 'situational' models of meaning, they still
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typically sought to ascribe 'universal' and 'essentiaL' denotations to discrete
theological 'phrases', without considering in any great depth the capacity of belief,
setting and performance to alter such denotations in particular cases. To this extent,
their de facto presentation of religious discourse was very much more deductive
and decontextualised than the presentation we have defined for ourselves here.
To these reservations must be added the more explicit problem that none of
the works mentioned directly engage with the foundational pragmatic concept of
'performative speech' as developed by Austin from 1939 onwards (Austin 1962: vi),
nor with the subsequent refinement of this notion in terms of 'illocutionary force'
which was essayed by him at Oxford and Harvard from 1952 onwards and then
published as How To Do Things With Words in 1962. The reasons for this are
partly chronological and partly down to the time it takes for ideas to disseminate.
Nonetheless, it is notable that even by the late '60's and early '70's, overtly
Austinian treatments of religious language were still very thin on the ground. In
1967, John MacQuarrie identified as 'most important' for the study of 'God-talk' a
'current tendency to place language in the context of situation out of which it arises'
(1967: 117; cf. Austin 1962: 139; 148). This he represented as a promising point of
convergence between 'the analytic school' and those 'more existential accounts of
the matter' on which his own work was largely based. Still, however, MacQUarrie's
guiding precedents were Ramsey and Ferre rather than Austin himself (1967: 118-
9).
A somewhat more specialised assessment of religious language in relation to
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'functions', 'users' and beliefs' issued from Dallas High (1967). Focussing
particularly on the discourse of creeds, High demonstrated how credal statements
cannot finally be interpreted as statements of fact or object-description. On the
contrary, he echoed Austin (1962: 67ff.) in suggesting that the 'first person' form of
creeds places them on a different logical ground from other doctrinal formulations.
Specifically, he said, it establishes a connection of first person utterance with
'personal backing' on the one hand and 'religious acts of believing' on the other. In
this sense, creeds most immediately concern 'existential questions' about 'the
relation, loyalty, trust or value I may place in another person or something
personalized' (1967: 176). Although such readings might obviously have been
developed along Austinian lines, High's study - like the earlier work of William
Hordem on sacred speech (1964) - is constructed, rather, on the model of
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. As we shall confirm in Chapter 8, this
model can be seen retrospectively as a vital precursor to later socio-pragmatic
formulation; it nonetheless remains the case that any connectionsbetween High and
Horden's methodologies and the methodologies of contemporary linguistic
pragmatics remain implicit rather than explicit.
The same may be said of Kenneth Burke's attempt at a new 'rhetoric of
religion' or 'logology' (1970). Burke's approach was certainly functional: indeed,
his core analyses of 'verbal action' in Augustine's Confessions and Genesis 1-3
went so far as to eschew essentialistic theologizing altogether. Rather, his aim was
'simply to ask how theological principles can be shown to have usable secular
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analogues that throw light upon the nature of language' (1970: 2). As with Ferre,
Dilley and Knox however, Burke sought to do this not so much by reducing
religious discourse to positivistic models of 'persuasion' and 'communication', as by
upholding the position that 'in the study of human motives, we should begin with
complex theories of transcendence (as in theology and metaphysics) rather than
with the terminologies of simplified laboratory experiment' (1970: 5).
A year later, Gerhard Ebeling's ambitious attempt at a 'theological theory of
language' ([1971] 1973) took very seriously the effect of local and social
'situations' on the meaning and understanding of sacred words (56-8). Likewise,
Ebeling affirmed that 'it would be inadequate to base a concept of language solely
on the potentiality of language, and to regard every concrete use of language
merely as the application of language to discourse and conversation - as though the
concrete use contributed nothing to the understanding of language as such' (89).
In addition, Ebeling confirmed the importance of 'mutual understanding' and the
'person addressed' in any genuine formulation of religious meaning. Further still, he
suggested that just as 'theology is...a theory of the language of faith' (187), so the
language of faith 'is not something distilled out of the ordinary language of the
world and separate from it', but rather something 'deeply rooted in the language of
the world'. Given such strongly 'pragmatic' convictions, it is perhaps surprising that
Ebeling did not acknowledge the linguistic-pragmatic systematizations of them
which were by then available from both Austin and Searle (1969); indeed, as James
H. Ware has since remarked (1993: 45 n33), his study is 'disappointing' insofar as it
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shows 'almost no recognition of what had been happening in English language
Philosophy of Language' at the time.
2.4.2 Theological and philosophical applications of pragmatics to religious
language
If the studies mentioned above leave us to infer rather than borrow
insights for our own study, a small amount of material from theology and the
philosophy of religion has more directly co-opted the work of linguistic
pragmaticians. The majority of this dates from around or after Ebeling's 'theological
theory of language', but there is one notable - if somewhat neglected - exception.
Donald D. Evans was a pupil of Austin's and in his 1963 volume The Logic of
Self-Involvement he sought to relate the theory of speech acts to Christian language
about divine creation. 'Self-involving' language for Evans was typically
'performative': as such, it was shown to carry implications concerning the speaker's
'attitudes', 'commitments' and 'values' (56-7), as well as often also expressing
'feelings, opinions and intentions' (80). Noting that 'existential' theologians like
Rudolph Bultmann had presented BibJicallanguage in similar terms as a 'language
of faith', Evans insisted that 'like other biblical theologians', Bultmann yet failed to
provide an 'adequate account of how any language can involve a speaker logically
in something more than a mere assent to a fact' (11, my emphasis). (We have seen
already that this same oversight had also characterised the work of doctrinal
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theologians and philosophers of religion writing around the same time). In seeking
to provide this 'missing account', Evans suggested that Austin's work could supply
'a fundamental insight concerning linguistic or logical self-involvement' (11).
Evans' attempt to 'map out' the territory of this new province took creation-
language as a paradigm not only because it archetypally yokes divine words ('Let
there be light') to divine acts ('There was light') (151-73), but also because it
mediates an 'expressive' and an 'impressive' force (174-219). This is to say, like
other forms of sacred discourse, though it carries a 'causal power' to bring about the
very events and states of affairs to which it refers (220-52), it simultaneously both
evokes the being and will of the addressor (in this case, God Himself), while
bearing profoundly on the faith and conduct of the addressee (humankind).
Crucially for Evans, Biblical discourse is distinguished by the fact that it holds
these causative and affective dynamics together. To conceptualize such discourse
purely in terms of 'causal power' would be to descend into 'a fanciful sort of magic',
whereas to conceptualize it as purely expressive or impressive would be to rob it of
its capacity to 'do things' (73-4). Thus even the creation-utterances of God Himself
are more than purely mechanistic: they not only 'bring the world into existence';
they also 'appoint' to it and its inhabitants a certain set of 'tasks' or purposes
consistent with the purpose of God himself. Likewise, from the human side,
Thiselton summarises Evans' argument aright when he says that to ca11 God
'Creator' is 'to use language which is self-involving in terms of our status, role,
commitment, and orientation; it is not simply a flat statement about a process of
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cause and effect' (Thiselton 1992: 275). Supremely for Evans, this combination of
causal power and expressive/impressive force is embodied in the incarnation of .
God's Word as Jesus Christ, whose own speech is at once state-altering (eg. in His
healing commands) and inter-relational (204ff.).
Now even this brief summary suggests rich possibilities for our own study -
possibilities which arise both from what Evans affums and from what he fails to
affirm. While Evans focussed on just one aspect of Biblical language, there is
clearly scope for an application of his ideas to liturgical language. The language of
baptism, absolution and blessing could, for instance, be interpreted as comparably
'causal', 'expressive' and 'impressive'. Then again, just as Evans' work merits
application it also warrants adaptation. Where Evans constructed his thesis largely
on the basis of Austin's account of 'performative language', he recognises only in a
footnote that this account was ultimately superseded by the concept of illocutionary
force (38 n1). Clearly then, the way is open for appropriating and updating Evans'
work for our purposes: as Thiselton has remarked, his research has been 'seriously
undervalued' since its publication. Indeed, one of the main reasons why we shall
champion the work of Jean Ladriere as a key resource for the theoretical strand of
our study is that Ladriere has stood virtually alone in according Evans' ideas the
attention they deserve (Ladriere 1966, 1967, [1970] 1972,1984 : 91-140). We shall
deal more specifically with Ladriere at 3.2, but first we must briefly review the
other general theological and philosophical studies of religious language which
have made explicit use of linguistic-pragmatic approaches.
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Like Evans, Jerry Gill presented Austin's work as 'opening up altogether new
possibilities for 'God-talk" (1969: 36). In precise terms, he saw in it the potential for
breaking down traditional 'dichotomies' and 'stalemates' between action (reality)
and language (thought), by 'blending them in a functional manner' (32-3). Gill
inferred from this functional approach that statements can have 'cognitive and non-
cognitive force simultaneously', and that 'no valuational judgement is without its
factual dimension [while] no factual judgement is without its valuational
dimension'. These inferences in tum led Gill to suggest that religious language be
seen as operating 'multidimensionally' at various points on a sliding scale from
'objectivity' to 'subjectivity', rather than being stereotyped as entirely non-factual
and affective (36). Not surprisingly in view of what we have already said about
them, Gill traces hints of this new approach back to Wittgenstein and Ramsey -
although it is particularly relevant for our 'empirical' purposes here that he regards
Austin's theories as having necessitated 'a far more thorough examination of the
actual uses to which religious language is put - especially given that 'almost all the
standard positions have been proposed with precious little spadework upon which
to base them' (36). Ironically, Gill stops short of undertaking such 'spadework'
himself, and in this he has hardly been alone among those who have hypothesised
the applicability of speech act theory to religious phrases (cf. the brief reflections of
Hick (1964: 44) and others cited by Anders Jeffner (1972: 88nl».
Jeffner (1972: 90) did at least offer and expound a few examples of religious
'performatives', and even went so far as to classify them according to the varying
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degrees of general assent which might be expected of their respective 'correctness
conditions' (1972: 900.). His work is important for its confumation of a 'theoretical'
element within any legitimate pragmatics of sacred discourse, derived from the fact
that theological doctrine itself imposes correctness conditions by operating as a
major embodiment of faith in or commitment to such discourse (1972: 93). Thus,
although Jeffner followed Gill in commending a more 'empirical' study of 'religious
performatives' (1972: 92-5), he rightly stressed the dangers of assuming that such a
study could obviate the 'faith dimension' and thus reduce religious performatives to
utterances which, while locally 'felicitous', might yet be cast as globally 'fictitious'.
These, Jeffner pointed out, were precisely the means by which Paul van Buren
(1963: 183ff.) had earlier sought to 'secularize' sacral language, but they are flawed
precisely because they sidestep de facto phenomenological questions about the
interrelation of metaphysical belief with situational meaning (Jeffuer 1972: 104). In
this sense, Jeffner was justified to conclude that merely 'observing' and 'describing'
the performative use of religious language cannot in itself solve the 'fundamental
problems' of such language: one must factor a philosphical-doctrinal analysis into
one's 'empirical' and 'methodological' exposition if genuinely representative
insights are to emerge. Hence, though briefly stated and relatively undeveloped,
Jeffner's prescriptions very much presage OUI own commitment to an integration of
liturgical dogmatics with 'hardcore' field analysis and orthodox linguistic
description.
In similar vein, James M. Smith and James W. McClendon (1972, 1975)
57
contended that after Austin.' 'understanding religious talk through the illocution
[could show] the way in which the representative and affective elements are
connected to one another and to the utterance as a whole' (1972: 55). Specifically,
and once again, this meant that the 'confessional' dynamic of God-talk should be
treated just as seriously as its 'descriptive' and 'speech-active' dynamics (1972: 60-
3; 1975: 67-70). Like Gill and Jeffner, Smith & McClendon were keener to
schematize the overarching theoretical implications of a speech act approach to
religious language than to analyse illocutions as they occur within actual streams of
discourse. The same limitation applies to those who have discussed speech act
theory in relation to more specific areas of religious language like metaphor
(Soskice 1985: 67. 90-3) - an issue to which we shall return in 5.6.1 ff..
A further group of scholars have sought to bring speech act theory more to
bear on the texts of Scripture. After tentatively suggesting the self-involving and
illocutionary dynamics of Jesus' parables (1970; 462-3), Thiselton (1974) followed
Evans in asserting, against several Old Testament specialists, that the operational
force of Hebraic blessings and curses derived not from the supposedly 'innate
power'of certain Hebrew words - that is, from a 'causal' view of speech action - but
rather, from institutional features of Israel's life which established the contexts in
which effective speech acts could occur (cf. Thiselton 1992: 293). In passing,
Thiselton suggested the same analysis for acts of baptism (1974: 294) and as we
shall see in a moment. he has since made the parallels between Biblical and
liturgical speech action much more explicit.
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The ideas formulated in Thiselton's 1970 and 1974 papers subsequently
reappeared and matured in his two major works on Biblical hermeneutics, The Two
Horizons (1980: 127ff.) and New Horizons in Hermeneutics (1992: 272-307). In
particular, the latter text offered a rare appreciation of developments in pragmatics
since Austin and Searle: Thiselton not only engaged with Francois Recanati's
significant re-definition of speech act theory (1987); he also realised that Grice's
work on implicature affords a prime means of exploring the factors which function
'behind' a biblical text and which yet contribute importantly to its meaning (1992:
365).
Gricean ideas had in fact already informed the parable research of T. Aurelio
(1977) and E. Arens (1982), with Arens offering yet further confirmation of what
we have said about the necessity of relating descriptive analysis to broader
theological theories of speech-as-action (1982: 374). Aurelio and Arens' work had
in its tum been taken funher by Johannes Du Plessis, who appropriated Leech's
extensive elaborations of Grice's conversational maxims (1983) to an exegesis of
the parables. This exegesis aimed to define their 'primary function' within the
whole 'narrative world' of the gospels, as being 'to establish Jesus ..the narrator ..in
an authoritative position towards his addressees' (1988: 5). In particular, Du Plessis'
work anticipated our own in its recognition that communication operates within an
interaction of power-relations and discourse-roles. He realised crucially that the
response of the 'receiver(s)' is often pragmatically as significant as the 'intention'
and 'message' of the 'sender', but even more than this, he recognised that the
59
predisposition of Senders and Receivers towards. a religious message is affected at
least as much by theological, social-semiotic and institutional prerequisites as by
purely cognitive factors. We shall return to these matters throughout Part Il.
A similar preoccupation with authority and the Sender-Receiver relationship
marked the various uses to which speech act theory was put by contributors to
Hugh White's special edition of Semele; entitled 'Speech Act Theory and Biblical
Criticism' (White 1988). Here, however, associations were extended beyond
pragmatics per se; into the wider reaches of literary, cultural and anthropological
theory. Thus, Ronald Grimes saw in Austin's account of communicative
'infelicities' (1962: 25-52) a useful framework for ritual criticism in general and
exegesis of Old Testament rituals in particular. Another contributor, Susan Lanser,
co-opted speech act theory's insistence on meaning as a product of 'use in context'
to refute anachronistic or 'revisionist' readings of Genesis 2-3 which had sought to
infer gender equality from these chapters on the basis of propositional and
grammatical analysis alone. Meanwhile, White himself projected speech act
philosophy as 'mediating position' between the radically existentialist concept of
word-event in Bultmannian 'new hermeneutic' and the radically anti-intentionalist
concept of ecriture put forward by post-structuralists like Roland Barthes and
Jacques Derrida. From a similar starting-point, Michael Hancher related Evans' and
Thiselton's disavowal of the purely 'causal' view of performatives to Barthes' and
Derrida's presumptions about 'the death of the Author'. Hancher pointed out that
although Barthes read Austin 'counter-theologically' as confirming his (Barthes')
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own view that language is 'self-referential' and possessed of an 'innate' force
distinct from intention. this was in fact a misreading of Austin. for whom speech
.acts were made or broken by different contexts and the purposes which those
contexts generated. Against Derrida (1977a. b), Hancher followed Searle (1977) in
maintaining that Austin's 'intentionality' did not in fact entail an implausible 'total
knowledge' or 'cosmic consciousness' of context akin to that often assigned to God
Himself. Rather. even 'sacred' speech acts. said Hancher. could be seen as
'heightened or idealized versions of ..ordinary performative discourse' - that is,
dependent for their felicity on acquaintance with relevant local circumstances.
contingencies and traditions (1988: 35-6)3. Interestingly, Hancher illustrated this
contention with reference to eucharistic discourse as well as scriptural narrative,
and we shall have cause to return to his more systematic insights into the peculiar
conditions of ritual discourse in Chapter 7.
2.4.3 General theological studies of liturgical language
Just as we can group theological studies on religious language into
crypto-pragmatic and overtly pragmatic strains, the same distinction holds for work
more especially dedicated to the language of worship. Since our chief purposes in
3. Hancher does not mention Sperber & Wilson, but his concludina remarks very much bear out their emphases. See 6.3
below for l fuUer discussion Relevance Theory in relation to liturgy.
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this project are first to 'anatomize' and then put into practice a new discipline of
'liturgical pragmatics', it is worth scanning such precedents in order to determine
how they might best be 'taken up' and woven into a coherent methodological
tapestry. As we do so, we note that while Wainwright has offered a useful digest of
general work on 'the language of worship' (1978: 465-8), this is very brief,
somewhat outdated and only incidentally concerned with pragmatic readings of
liturgy. Here, our scope is more specific: we shall deal first with implicitly
pragmatic liturgiologies, and then review studies which have quite explicitly
related pragmatics to church service discourse.
Louis Bouyer's linking of Word' and 'Rite' (1963: 53-62) formed part of a
wide-ranging work on ritual, but reflected Austin's main emphasis in its application
to Christian worship of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber's landmark study I and
Thou ([1937] 1958). Bouyer took from Buber the concept of 'the word' as a 'way to
action' - action 'through which man asserts himself as such' and through which 'he
who speaks, by the very fact of speaking, interposes his own personal existence
into the natural course of events' (1963: 54-5). What is more, there are proto-
Gricean overtones in Bouyer's having further drawn from Buber the insight that
'speech is not only personal, [but] ...interpersonal', such that 'dialogue is inherent in
the intentionality of all speech' (1963: 55). From these premises, Bouyer compared
Roman Catholic and Protestant worship, arguing that whereas the former has often
descended into a 'magical' conception of sacral words by according them an
intrinsic power divorced from their 'primordial' religious meanings, the latter has
62
tended to 'overobjectivize' liturgical language by 'reducing' everything to its
'obvious' denotation, and so conveying 'a mere repetition of verbal pedagogy
undertaken for the ignorant' (1963: 58-9). This perception, together with Raymond
Chapman (1973: 598) and Joseph Gelineau's (1978: 77) subsequent confirmation of
the sin of 'over-informativeness' in liturgy will bear heavily in our own critique of
Reformed worship in Chapters 5-8. In a sense, Bouyer's stance paralleled Evans'
more general attack on views of Christian discourse polarised as either 'causal' or
'propositional'.
Just as Bouyer was writing against a background of liturgical revision - not
only by the Second Vatican Council (1962-5) but also by Protestant churches all
over the world (Chand lee 1986: 312-3), so a good deal of work on the language of
worship produced by theologians in the '60'5 and '70's was preoccupied with prayer
book 'translation' and 'modernisation'. Thus, following inferences drawn from Stella
Brook's definitive study of Cranmer's English (1965: 192-219), John Westlake
(1969) argued that the difficulties of producing a modem 'vernacular' liturgy stem
largely from the fact that 'written' and 'spoken' modes of communication are
nowadays far more bifurcated than they were in the mid-seventeenth century. Then
again, Westlake remarked that 'even when it was first published, the language of
the Book of Common Prayer was never actually used by ordinary people outside
the framework of religious worship' (1969: 149). Indeed, stressing the point that
different contexts demand, and are identified by, different 'registers', Westlake took
a conservative line on both liturgical and Biblical revision (cf. Westlake 1971/2),
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preferring slightly archaic but consistent sacred styles over what he saw as
characteristically modem tendencies towards incongruous stylistic juxtaposition
and a 'lack of differentiation' between liturgical and 'conversational' registers (1969:
149ff.).
Soon afterwards, Raymond Chapman (1973) and David L. Frost (1974: 161-2)
took a very similar line, although for Frost the key area of divergence between
Cranmerian and contemporary style was syntactic rather than pragmatic. the BCP
being typified by a 'Ciceronian' syntax of balance and antithesis' with many
different 'adjectival and adverbial qualifications', in comparison with modem
preferences for 'concision ...and placing the weight of meaning on verbs' (1974:
156).
Although more modernistic in his attitude to liturgical reform, Daniel Stevick
(1970) upheld the concept of liturgy as a properly 'heightened' form of discourse,
more akin to 'aesthetic' expression than to everyday talk. Against the background of
what he called 'a crisis' in liturgical language, Stevick suggested that while 'we
know what prayer sounds like in the language and for the world of Spenser and
Shakespeare', it is less clear what prayer should sound like 'in the language and for
the world of Randall Jarrell, Paul Goodman, James Dickey, Le Roi Jones, or
Samuel Beckett' (1970: 145). Thus, he urged liturgists to call on 'the artists, writers,
social analysts, popular songwriters and dramatists of our time', not only to
contribute new words of praise, but to re-contexrualize old words in relation to new
.
ones and new words in relation to the eternal Word of the gospel (1970: 59-60;
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164-5). Stevick's was probably the most extensive reflection on worship language
to have emerged from the 'high tide' of liturgical reform, and although his linguistic
reference-points were more philological, phonological and semantic than strictly
pragmatic, his consideration of style in liturgical reform links in very much to the
spheres of 'relevance' and 'social discourse' which we have adopted for our own
analytical agenda. In particular, the interaction of 'old' with 'new' expression, and
the connected questions of whether liturgy is a 'code for the committed' or a bridge
between the 'sacred' and the 'profane', are matters which go to the very heart of
liturgical pragmatics. In Chapters 6 and 8 we shall pursue such matters more
thoroughly, and demonstrate that an overt engagement with modern pragmatic
methodologies can serve to sharpen the perceptions about sacral language revision
mooted by theologians like Westlake, Chapman, Frost and Stevick over 20 years
ago.
If liturgical reform prompted some theologians and liturgists to use linguistics
to discern how sacral discourse should be presented, other theologians and liturgists
have since drawn on the work of linguists when tackling even more fundamental
questions about the identity and function of such discourse in the modern world.
Starting with Chomsky's core distinction between the 'deep' and 'surface' structures
of language, Grainger (1974: 1-22; 1983) argued passionately for the unique
integrity of ritual discourse over against local or contingent reference. Rites, for
Grainger, were seen to impact upon human experience as 'deep structural acted
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symbols' permitting all manner of surface 'linguistic flexibility'. Viewed in this
way, ritual emerged as 'the native tongue of religious awareness', which 'when it
speaks, speaks of itself (1983: 329). Primarily, this 'ritual speaking' was done
through 'actions' and not through 'words'; it therefore constituted 'a direct
presentation of religious reality' (1983: 328-9). By thus defining ritual in terms of
'speech activity' rather than logico-semantic denotation, Grainger took an implicitly
radical 'pragmatic' line on sacral meaning. At the same time, however, his
appropriation of Chomsky's biological and psychological universalism meant that
he tended to assume common 'global' components of ritual without presenting
much objective evidence for this assumption. To be fair, many pragmaticians have
also worked from an assumption that there are 'universals' in language use (Leech
1983; Brown & Levinson 1987; Habermas 1979: 1-68) and from this point of view,
they have retained the Chomskyan 'deep structural' paradigm even while extending
it into a more behavioural realm (cf. Butler 1988: 84ff.). Nonetheless, while taking
Grainger's 'distinctive' theory of ritual very seriously, the empirical strand of our
investigation will seek to check it against naturally-occurring examples of Christian
worship discourse as it it used 'on the ground'. The validity and extent of this data-
testing is explained fully in Chapter 4.
If Grainger's work presented ritual linguistic practice as the essential product
of humanity's common mental and anthropological make-up, Herman Schmidt
(1971) had earlier proved more specifically conversant with the vocabulary of
contextual linguistics when assessing the 'function' of language in Christian
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worship. Discerning in the 'literature of the science of liturgy' an 'almost complete
lack of serious interest in the sciences of language' (1971: 2), Schmidt proceeded to
outline a possible framework for liturgical language analysis. This framework was
riveted together by 24 'conclusions', several of which pinpointed the importance of
expounding worship-language in relation to its specific 'discourse situation' and to
the 'community' which uses it. (1971: 10-11, 13, 19,25). Although Schmidt did not
discuss the work of speech act theorists or sociolinguists per se, his agenda
represented a very promising orientation of the work done in philosophical
theology by Ramsey, MacQuarrie et sl; towards an engagement with more
decidedly applied linguistics. For an Schmidt's efforts however, Theodore Jennings
was still able to remark some 14 years later on 'the underdeveloped state of
research in this area of liturgical language' (1985: 186).
Like Schmidt, Jennings' references remained almost exclusively theological
rather than linguistic, and he singularly failed to acknowledge the contribution
which might have come from the by now well established province of linguistic
pragmatics. Having said an this, he did offer some apposite insights for our
purposes. Echoing both Bouyer and Grainger, Jennings insisted that within the
'grammar' of God-talk, liturgical discourse should not be confused with
propositional or purely 'explicative' language: rather, it had an intrinsic 'character of
address'. Being thus directed to God, it was to be thought of dialogically rather than
descriptively or prescriptively (that is, 'kerygmatically'). As such, its 'situation of
address' was to be interpreted as apprehending 'the rupture of structures of
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experience as an address (speech-event) provocative of address (repetition.
invocation, response)' (1985: ,208). We shall explore this model of utterance-and-
response through Chapter 7. It will also emerge there that a strong 'theoretical'
critique of Reformed worship can be inferred from Jennings' designations.
Although it is clear from what we have been saying that work on the language
of liturgy by theologians and philosophers has been sporadic, the sense that a more
concerted effort should be made in this area was underlined by the publication in
1990 of liturgists David and R.C.D Jasper's Language and the Worship of the
Church. Although a self-confessedly diverse collection of essays including
historical, rhetorical, biographical and hymnodic analyses, Jasper & Jasper did
recognise that liturgy cannot 'insulate itself from the serious and profound
developments in philosophy which have influenced our understanding of the nature
and possibilities of language, utterance and communication'. They also remarked
that though judgements about liturgical language corne' almost invariably from the
standpoint of aesthetic appeal', there was a clear need for more scientifically-based
linguistic exegesis (1990: 1-2). Jasper & Jasper duly addressed these demands by
including appropriate articles from Martin Warner and David Crystal - articles
which belong respectively within two very scant traditions of explicitly pragmatic
liturgical interpretation, as carried out by philosophers and theologians on the one
hand and by linguists on the other. It is to these barely-defined 'traditions' that we
now turn.
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2.4.4 Theological and philosophical applications of pragmatics to
the language of liturgy
While it is certainly true that philosophers and theologians have been
slow to appropriate linguistic pragmatics into their work on liturgy, Gail Rarnshaw
(1986: 7; 1988: 119-20) is unjustifiably dismissive of those few who have tried to
do so. No doubt there has been some divergence in the application of Austinian and
post-Austinian terminology to worship discourse (1988: 120), but Rarnshaw
misrepresents the situation when she adds 'neither has this approach ...helped much
in the religious understanding of speech in public worship' (1986: 7). Ironically,
Rarnshaw herself has touched on many issues which might actually have benefited
from a more serious engagement with modern linguistic pragmatics - ranging from
the 'generic' status of liturgy (1986: 1-10; 1988: 109-116), through deictic
considerations about liturgical time and space (1986: 57-79), to the relation
between liturgy and the 'institution' of the church assembly (1986: 102).
More positive adoptions of pragmatics by theologians have been both specific
and broad in scope. Thus Mary John Mananzan (1974) claimed an 'original' fusion
of Austin's speech act model with Wittgenstein's later philosophy to produce a
thoroughgoing analysis of credal statements (1974: 151). Her principal aim in so
doing was to assess 'whether the creed is, in its primary intention, constative or
performative'; she also undertook to chart 'the linguistic topography of the credal
statement by comparing/contrasting it to other forms of discourse in general and to
other uses of religious language in particular' (57). In thus analysing creeds,
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Mananzan dealt with a form of discourse whose usage is at once typically
'doctrinal' and typically 'liturgical'. and which could thus be read 'propositionally' as
well as 'performatively'. For these reasons. she distinguished it as the very 'kernel'
of religious language (151). Mananzan went so far as to conclude. in fact. that all
major modes of sacred discourse. including 'prayer' and 'preaching' are grounded in
'descriptive claims' even as they also necessitate 'performance' and 'decisional' self-
involvement (153). More precisely still. Mananzan argued that speech act
approaches afford theology a 'profitable' way in to the analysis of such discourse
because they offer it a means of dissolving 'cognitive-emotive. descriptive-
evaluative dichotomies ... by turning its attention away from fruitless polemics
about these and spending its efforts at adopting the insights of linguistic analysis in
its own reflection' (154). Mananzan practised what she preached by extending and
adapting Austin's ideas in line with the peculiar dynamics of her chosen sacral
subject. Hence creeds. like other genres of religious language, were presented by
her as 'multidimensional' - 'the crystallization not only of one speech act. but of
several speech acts which differ according to their various uses in different
contexts' (153). The perspicacity. significance and refinability of these insights will
become clearer as we tackle the key issues of 'pragmatic ambivalence' in 5.5.2,
'truth v felicity' in 5.5.3 and liturgical speech act 'compounding' in 7.1ff. It should
be noted. however. that in view of Mananzan's detailed work on them, and because
their recitation is rare in English Reformed worship, we ourselves shall not deal at
any great length with creeds in particular.
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Where Mananzan had yoked Wittgenstein and Austin to investigate 'meaning'
in one liturgical modality, Thiselton ([1975] 1986) brought them together within a
much broader programme for liturgical language interpretation. Like Mananzan,
Thiselton saw within both men's work the basis of a liturgical 'hermeneutic' which
would do much more than present sacral discourse as a 'report' on worshippers'
'states of mind' ([1975J 1986: 17). Thus from the perspective of 'meaning as use',
Thiselton stressed that in a Christian rite 'We are truly sorry and repent' constitutes
an act of repentance, not the communication of information' ([1975] 1986: 18).
Similarly, from Austin's point of view, 'when in a marriage service the bridegroom
says "I take you", he is not informing anyone about his inner intentions, but
marrying his bride' ([1975] 1986: 18). In such examples, Thiselton drew a
somewhat sharper dichotomy between 'stating' and 'doing' than Mananzan allowed
for religious discourse. This was due to the fact that like Evans, Thiselton failed
sufficiently to demonstrate the extent to which Austin's theory had developed from
a theory of 'performative utterances' into a theory of 'illocutionary forces'. Indeed,
he seemed to confuse the two when categorizing 'types of [liturgical} performatives'
according to Austin's taxonomy of illocutions. We shall explain the importance of
these fine distinctions more fully in Chapter 5, but we shall also see there how
Thiselton has suggested his more recent and more nuanced work on the pragmatics
of Biblical discourse might be applied to liturgy (1992: 299). It will also become
apparent that Thiselton has been as consistent in his emphasis on 'relevant
conventional procedures' in relation to liturgical discourse felicity as he was in his
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earlier accounts of Old Testament speech activity (1970, 1974, cf. [1975] 1986:
19).
Just as Thiselton saw in Austin's work a model for the non-cognitive
interpretation of liturgical language, so G. Vincent (1979) suggested that in
theological terms, an analogy could be drawn between this model and the radical
redefinition of sacramental doctrine promoted in the work of John Calvin. Thus,
where Austin's study of language uses posed 'an enormous challenge ...to all
theories which treat language merely as a vehicle for transmitting information', so
Vincent argued. that more than 400 years earlier, Calvin had attacked. prevailing
'Aristotelian' definitions of the sacraments for being falsely based. on 'ontological'
and 'predicative' assumptions about linguistic meaning (1979: 146). In this sense,
Austin's theory could, he claimed, 'provide a suitable metalanguage for major
elements in Calvin's discourse' (1979: 149). Hence, instead of a 'metaphysic of
substance and accidence' which attributed an 'occult power' to the Word of God in
worship, Vincent cast Calvin as having presented the 'various linguistic
phenomena' of sacramental discourse as phenomena of performative action and
institutionalization which must 'penetrate into the heart of mankind' and there be
felicitously 'acknowledged' in 'faith' (1979: 153). After Ladriere, Vincent represents
the most significant reference-point for the 'pragmatic doxology' which we
ourselves are seeking to define; as such, we shall return to his proposals with more
doctrinal thoroughness at 3.3.
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Although both Thiselton and Vincent produced brief taxonomies of liturgical
speech acts by superimposing speech act frameworks on a small number of
intuitive examples, more 'purpose-built' models of liturgical speech action have
latterly been proposed in James H. Ware's Not With Wonts of Wisdom and in
Terrence Tilley's The Evils of Tbeodicy (1991: 1-82). Indeed, Ware and Tilley can
justly claim to have made by far the most detailed studies of liturgical pragmatics
hitherto undertaken by either theologians or linguists.
The first part of Ware's study was largely historical and philosophical and
doctrinal. Essentially, Ware followed Bouyer in arguing that Christian liturgy in the
West has been understood too much according to a 'representational' view of
linguistic meaning, and not enough according to a 'rhetorical' or 'performative'
paradigm (1981: 1-17). Taking Austin and Searle as his starting-points, and
drawing on his knowledge of Presbyterian worship, Ware re-stated Mananzan's
contention that a powerful and 'proper' appreciation of the nature and purpose of
liturgical discourse could be derived from speech act theory (1981: 15-17). Unlike
Thiselton, however, Ware attempted rather more than a grouping of sacral
'performatives' within given classes of illocutionary force. Instead, he constructed
his own 'grammar of liturgical acts', ordered in relation to the distinctive 'overall
goal' of 'participatory communion with God' (1981: 40). Within this grammar,
Ware suggested that such acts would fall into four main classes. Enabling Acts like
blessing and forgiving were cast as acts which in some way enhance the
worshipper's self-esteem or 'ego-strength'; Relating Acts like confessing, ordaining
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and interceding were seen by Ware as diversely 'establishing the status' of
worshippers in some particular relation to God and each other; Directing acts like
charging and teaching were thought of as instructional or in some way
obligational; and Exalting Acts mediated the expression of a speaker's 'creativity' in
regard to his or her 'ultimate concern' (1981: 40-6). These categorizations are
helpful, but they derive largely from an intuitive, introspective reflection on the
language of worship, rather than from the kind of liturgical 'performance data'
which we have committed ourselves to here. In addition, while they go some way
towards describing the main effects of sacral discourse, as a theologian Ware is less
detailed on the linguistic-pragmatic means by which those effects are
characteristically achieved. As if to confirm this, Ware's familiarity with the field
of pragmatics itself seems to extend no further than the early work of Searle on
speech act theory. All the same, there can be little doubt that as the first book-
length version of 'liturgical pragmatics', and as a text which was prepared to argue a
theological case from functional-linguistic analysis, Not With Words of Wisdom
stands as a major landmark in the short and decidedly patchy history of our much
under-defmed subject. Latterly, Ware has turned his attentions to a 'performative'
exposition of the texts and rituals of non-Christian religions (1993 cf. McDermott
1975). From our point of view however, it is disappointing that while he has
engaged with a wide range of contemporary henneneuts and literary theorists in
this project, his awareness of linguistic pragmatics has hardly advanced from that
displayed in his earlier work.
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By contrast with Ware, Tilley (1991) has shown himself to be impressively
conversant with the expansion and diversification of Austin and Searle's ideas
which has taken place in the last two decades. Although his governing model was
still speech act theory, Tilley's discussion took account of later revisions by Searle
himself (1979a, 1983; Searle & Vanderveken 1985), as well as by others like Bach
& Hamish (1979), Habermas (1979) and Fish (1980). He also engaged with the
work of Evans (1963) and Smith & Mclendon discussed above. Whereas previous
theological assessments of liturgical language had tended either to ignore the
'institutional' basis of liturgy or to conceptualize it as a 'felicity condition' without
analysing its actual effects on linguistic meaning, Tilley highlighted it as the
distinctive criterion of religious speech act defmition. Specifically, he extrapolated
from Habermas a division between sacred speech acts which are 'institutionally
bound' and those which are 'institutionally free'. 1nstitutionally bound' speech acts
were defmed by Tilley as those 'which only a person having a requisite status or
role in a religious institution can perform successfully'. By contrast, 'institutionally
free' speech acts could 'be performed without regard to the person's institutional
status or role' (1991: 33). This distinction was crucial, for Tilley went on to argue
that 'other than speech acts bound to religious institutions (eg. baptism), there are
no 'religious' speech acts to be distinguished from 'secular' ones' (26). Whereas
Evans had focussed on examples from language about God and creation, Tilley's
concerns were theodicial - that is, centred on language about 'God and evils'. His
aim was to show that the relative 'sacredness' or 'profanity' of an utterance resided
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not in its propositional content, but rather in its role as 'a constituent in a
communicative action' (4). Where the institution of the church has heavily
'predetermined'the illocutionary force of religious speech acts, the 'communicative
action' of which they form part will be consistently 'sacred'; but where there is less
institutional boundedness (eg, in petitionary prayer, preaching and swearing), the
same speech act may mediate either religious or irreligious - and even wicked -
intent (4). Thus, as Thiselton had insisted in his work on Hebrew promises and
curses, the religious effect of such speech acts is not inherently guaranteed: it is,
rather. dependent on local contexts of intention, tradition and understanding. On a
wider scale, Tilley's purpose came very close to Mananzan's in thus suggesting
ways 'to resolve the incessant debates over the question of whether religious
language is "cognitive" (34). In fact, argued Tilley. 'language used in religious
contexts is no more and no less "cognitive" than language used in other
contexts ...The real questions concern the warrants for the presuppositions,
assumptions and claims people make when speaking in religious contexts' (34).
Given the thrust of Tilley's argument, it is hardly surprising that not all of his
examples were strictly 'liturgical'. Nevertheless, many were - and in any case, the
argument itself is clearly germane to our own concerns. As such, we shall have
cause to cite and Critique it at various points in our practical data-analysis
throughout Part ll.
It should be apparent by now that although theologians and philosophers have
often been ready to apply and adapt speech act theory to religious and liturgical
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language, very few have engaged with other sub-disciplines of linguistic
pragmatics. We have seen that Du Plessis and Thiselton were exceptional in
appropriating Grice and Leech for Biblical interpretation, but our own investigation
of theological and philosophical sources has found only one writer who has dealt
seriously with implicature in relation to liturgy. Through two linked articles (1985,
1990), the Warwick philosopher Martin Warner suggested that both Gricean
pragmatics, and its later transmutation into Relevance Theory, could provide useful
insights into the reform of liturgy, since both recognised that changes in style,
figuration and symbolic expression would entail changes of meaning rather than
simply changes to the way 'meaning', defined in cognitive terms, was conveyed
(1985: 164, 1990: 158-60). Interestingly, Warner thereby set himself against the
majority of liturgists, whom he accused of having fallen prey to 'the perennial
attraction of the attempt to separate style from meaning' (1990: 158). Warner's
approach was thus provocative and very much alive to the wider ecclesiologicel
and theological consequences of viewing sacral language through linguistic-
pragmatic eyes. Of particular moment for our theoretical doxological interests is his
concluding argument that the statements of formal doctrine should not be equated
with the discourses of worship, and that the former can only acquire the 'linguistic
force to make them live imaginatively and transfonningly in the minds of
[contemporary] worshippers' from the linguistic 'context' of the latter (1990: 172).
Warner's work is important because though suggestive rather than exhaustive, it
hints at just how radical a 'pragmatics of liturgy' could be for the theology" of
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worship. over and above its contribution to pure linguistic description. On this
basis, its ideas very much bear the sort of practical testing which we have proposed.
2.4.5 Religious and liturgical language-study in linguistics
If the use of linguistic pragmatics has been limited and sporadic in the
work done by theologians and philosophers on sacral discourse. the inclination of
modem linguistic specialists to deal in any way with the language of religion has
been even less apparent. This point has been confirmed by the Stanford
sociolinguist Charles Ferguson (1985: 208). who has maintained nonetheless that
'the study of religious discourse ...is likely to teach us something about how a
language works and might even teach us something about the nature of religious
knowledge and religious behaviour'.
One professional linguist who has consistently realised Ferguson's point, and
who has already provided us with the basic schema for our research here, is David
Crystal. We - showed above how liturgists like Westlake. Stevick. Chapman
and Frost turned to linguistics for insights into the vexed issue of liturgical
modernisation. Crystal's preoccupation with religious language emerged in the
same context, but reached published form even earlier. during and immediately
after the Second Vatican Council. In a 1964 article for New Blackfriars., Crystal
stressed that 'ultimately' language in general, and religious language in particular.
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must be studied 'in relation to the social context in which it is found' (1964: 149).
Recognising liturgy as a very 'specialized and intense communicative activity', he
proposed that it would be marked by certain features of 'style' and 'register'. Crystal
divided the most 'distinctive' of these features into three main groups: 'archaisms,
specialized vocabulary and formulaic diction' (1964: 151). Anticipating Warner, he
went on to advise that reform in these areas would have to take note not only of
semantic 'equivalence', but also of the fact that established sacred expressions can
carry a 'long association suggestive of permanence, respect and mystery'. Thus, he
added, it was 'essential to have an adequate understanding of the full scope and
function of a term in religious language before one suggests leaving it out of future
usage', while at the same time appreciating 'the popular as well as technical
meanings of any term one tries to introduce, to avoid misunderstandings and
unwanted overtones' (1964: 155-6). If the 'pragmatic' implications of all this are
clear, Crystal more explicitly recognised the contribution which pragmatic
approaches could make to religious language study in his subsequent book
Linguistics, Language and Religion (1965: 93ff.). Admittedly, 'contemporary
linguistic pragmatics' as we have defined it was then very much in embryo, and
Crystal's discussion was informed by the more generally semiotic accounts of
pragmatics offered by Peirce, Morris et al. What is more, his purposes were very
wide-ranging: half the text is a straight summary of linguistic history and much of
the rest is addressed to the sort of 'reference questions' about God-talk then being
tackled by the philosophers and theologians we reviewed in 2.4.1 above (1965:
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133-48. 157-89). Having said all this. Crystal's short chapter on 'Language and the
Liturgy' (1965: 149-56) represents a landmark in the 'pre-history' of liturgical
pragmatics. Reiterating the points made in his New Blackfriars paper. Crystal
further explored the consequences of viewing liturgy as 'a set of procedures given
formal realization by the church for promoting reciprocal communication between
the individual and God [and involving) both conventional and symbolic activity'
(1965: 150). One outcome of such an approach, for Crystal. was seen to be the
recognition of liturgy's 'special "marked" style' - a style which should be
expounded and reviewed only by bearing in mind 'the total relevant liturgical,
doctrinal and cultural implications' (1965: 151).
These insights on the 'distinctive variety' and 'genre' of liturgical discourse
resurfaced four years later in Crystal's collaboration with Derek Davy, Investigating
English Style (1969: 147-72). On this occasion, though. analysis of the constituent
features of 'religious English' was expanded to include phonology, grammar and
morphology. What is more, it was directed towards actual texts - in this case
Wright's English Bible, the BCP and the English version of the Catholic Mass.
Along with the work of Brook (1965) and Frost (1974) on the development of lexis
and syntax in Anglican rites, Crystal & Davy's study contained several implicitly
'pragmalinguistic' insights: certainly. it was aware not only of how historical
religious contexts are mirrored in scared speech. but also of how contemporary
contexts and 'speech communities' bear on ecclesial discourse (1969: 147). For all
this, the insights in question considerably pre-date 'mature' pragmatics. while even
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Austin's work fails to merit a mention. Similarly useful but peripheral to pragmatics
as such was Crystal's 1976 paper on 'Non-segmental phonology in religious
modalities'. Although this paper seminally defined the methodological-theoretical-
empirical approach to religious discourse which we are pursuing. it must be
acknowledged that in itself. phonological investigation has played' little or no part
in the development of modern linguistic pragmatics (Levinson 1983: 374). Without
doubt. Crystal's analysis of pitch, speed, amplitude, rhythm and stress in church
service utterance revealed several distinctively 'liturgical' features of language-use,
and we would be quick to agree that a full-blown pragmatics of liturgy would
eventually have to take account of prosodic as well as of purely verbal functions .
. Nonetheless, insofar as our work in this project is based on 'mainstream' definitions
of linguistic pragmatics, we shall touch on prosody only when it seems especially
pertinent to more orthodox pragmatic concerns (eg. in regard to turn-demarcation at
4.3.3.3).
More directly relevant to our purposes is Crystal's contribution to Jasper &
Jasper's aforementioned 'textbook' on sacral language (Crystal 1990). With its more
recent provenance, this paper was able to acknowledge a 'revolution' in linguistics
since the '60's - a revolution generated by 'the investigation of the way language
was being used in the various contexts of daily life' (1990: 120-1). Although
Crystal cast this revolution generally in terms of 'sociolinguistics' rather than
specifically in terms of 'pragmatics', the revision of his earlier analyses of liturgical
language from the '60's was strongly informed by linguistic-pragmatic insights.
'"
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Indeed, he went so far as to re-classify such language from a clearly 'functional'
perspective, and included both 'Expressive' and 'Performative' operations in a
framework which otherwise identified sacral discourse as being variously
'Informative', 'Identifying', 'Historical', 'Aesthetic', 'Heuristic' and 'Social'. Once
again, Crystal's analysis benefited by reference to actual texts from the Mass and
the BCP. As such, it stands alongside the work of Ware (1981) in its attempt to
adapt existing pragmatic taxonomies to the special features of observed liturgical
language.
Where Crystal incorporated speech act notions into a more broadly pragmatic
model, a small number of linguists had previously essayed more classical Austinian
and Searlian analyses of liturgical language. A.P. Martinich's (1975a, b) 'speech
act' exposition of the Catholic sacraments comprised an impressive marriage of
doctrinal reflection with close linguistic scrutiny - one which categorised the
sacraments according to specially-formulated versions of Searle's 'conditions of
use'. Martinich was also prescient in recognising that in liturgy, several speech acts
may be clustered together within whole discoursal activities - a point we ourselves
shall develop further in Chapter 7.
Similarly, perceiving the applicability of speech act conceptions to religious
language, Phillip Ravenhill (1976) demonstrated their particular capacity to
illuminate invocation, exorcism and consecration. He also crucially recognised that
far from being monosernic, such scared speech acts are often consciously
'multivalent' - that is, developed specifically to mediate a plurality of meanings for
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a diversely-constituted assembly. This insight is worthy of considerable
elaboration, and will thus occupy our attention further at 5.5.2 and 7.5.4.
Ravenhill's article actually stands alongside Crystal's 'phonology of worship'
in a collection edited by William Samarin under the title Language in Religious
Practice (1976a). Much of the material in this volume was culled from a session on
'Sociolinguistics and Religion' organised for the Annual Linguistic Round Table at
Georgetown University (Washington DC) in 1972, and in his introduction (1976: 5)
Samarin confirmed that the main aim was in fact ethnographic rather than
pragmatic. Indeed, he cited as background for the work he had included earlier
'field' studies like those carried out by Kenneth Pike on Free Church Evangelical
worship ([1954-60] 1967), by Bruce A. Rosenberg on American folk preaching
(1970a, b), by Irving Zaretsky on Californian Spiritualism (1970, 1972), by Benetta
Jules-Rosette on the Apostolic Church of John Marangue (1973), and by various
anthropologists on the phenomenon of glossolalia (Goodman 1969; Hine 1969;
Samarin 1969, 1972a, 1972b). While Ferguson submitted an exemplary analysis of
The Collect as a Form of Discourse' and Long a similar treatment of 'priestly
enquiry to God' in the Old Testament, several other articles included by Samarin
(eg, by Shelton, Christian and Rabin) afforded a more broadly anthropological
view of various non-Christian rites and ceremonies. Samarin was very clear that the
dominant approach was thus empirical, inductive and observational rather than
'philosophical', and while this emphasis in one sense served as an antidote to 'the
scores of books on ...God Talk' in 'contemporary theological discussion' (1976a: 5),
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it consciously avoided making links with the deeper questions of doxology which
we have set ourselves to address here.
As it is, the two decades since Samarin's book was published have seen a
blossoming of religious ritual study within the ethnography of communication - to
the extent, in fact, that both Ferguson (1985) and Kelleher (1993) have presented
this discipline as providing the most clearly appropriate 'hermeneutic' of liturgical
performance. While, once again, most of this work has focussed on exotic religious
traditions (Fitzgerald 1975; Loveday 1981; McDowell 1983), worthy applications
of it to Christian ritual discourse have been undertaken by Gulich (1980), Enninger
& Raith (1982), Fenn (1982) and Wonnenberger (1984). Like Tilley (1991), GUlich
was concerned to analyse the extent to which the 'conventions and rules of [an]
institution' are 'binding' on its speech activity (1980: 419). In contrast to Tilley,
however, her methods were strongly data-driven and empirical, being suggested by
a comparison between tape-recorded discourse drawn from academic congresses,
legal trials and telephone counselling sessions, as well as from German Protestant
church services. Like Fenn, who also compared the discourse of court trials and
academic meetings with the discourse of religious testimony, Gulich concluded that
the extent of 'institutionalisation' varied in each case, but with trials and liturgies
exhibiting it at the most generally intense level. Indeed for Fenn, the fact that these
two procedures appeared to represent 'secular' and 'sacred' sides of the same coin
suggested a further, speech act based comparison of them in terms of their relative
'literalness' and 'eventfulness' (1982: 78ff.). Provocatively, Fenn then suggested that
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the process of 'secularization' was epitomised by legal attempts to 'literalize' the
sacrally 'eventful' testimonies of priests and other believers when transposing them
to a courtroom setting.
Less polemical but far more minute in detail, Enninger & Raith's ethnography
of communication survey of the Old Order Amish church service (1982) is a
veritable model of its kind. Beginning with the assumption that this service is
'an...ideal-typical case of communication in institutionalized contexts' (1982: 1),
Enninger & Raith examined its various 'channels of communication' in exhaustive
detail. We have already made it clear that such an approach extends much further
into general semiotics than a dedicated pragmatics of liturgical discourse could
expect to go: indeed, what Enninger & Raith gain in ethnographic
comprehensiveness we hope to gain in linguistic specificity. In this sense, the
approach we have been defming for ourselves will more closely resemble that
adopted not only by GUlich but also by Wonnenberger (1984), for whom the
,
general workings of the church body were to be taken very seriously, but who
nonetheless related them very particularly to the phenomenon of language - in his
case, the language of blessing. Comparably sociological-but-discourse-specific
studies may be found in the more specialized work of Coleman (1980) on the in-
group speech of American 'Born Again' Christianity, and of Bauman (1974) and
Davies (1988) on 'ministry' in Quaker meetings.
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2.5 Confirming key needs: the refinement. synthesis and extension of
liturgical-pragmatic method
What emerges from this unavoidably protean reconnaissance of
explorations along the liturgy-pragmatics interface is that the three strands of our
designated 'analytical thread' have remained largely unplaited, This is to say, the
'theoretical' work of theologians and philosophers on sacral discourse has rarely
sought methodological consolidation from the work of pragmaticians on language
use in general, while both groups still have much to gain from the empirical
techniques developed by ethnographers of communication. A key claim to the
originality of this study is that it seeks a genuine rapprochement between these
hitherto largely discrete areas of liturgical discourse investigation.
In addition, it has become clear that both broadly linguistic and specifically
linguistic-pragmatic studies of liturgy have focussed on Anglican and Roman rites,
and have virtually ignored worship in the Reformed tradition. Thus Brook (1965),
Westlake (1969), Stevick (1970), Chapman (1973), Thiselton ([1975] 1986) and
Warner (1985, 1990) alike drew most of their illustrative material from the BCP,
while Crystal (1964, 1965, 1976, 1990), Gelineau (1971), Mananzan (1974),
Martinich (1975a, b), Ramshaw (1986, 1988) and Tilley (1991) concentrated more
particularly on Catholic liturgy. Furthermore, even where sociolinguists and
ethnographers of communication have explored other forms of worship, these have
tended to lie on the margins of traditional Christian practice, rather than in that
mainstream of which the Reformed church constitutes a significant part (cf.
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Zaretsky: 1970, 1972; Rosenberg 1970a, b; Samarin 1972a; Enninger & Raith
1982». Indeed, of those we have mentioned, only Vincent (1979) and Ware (1981)
have engaged directly with Reformed liturgy - and we have already made it clear
that their analyses were limited by having relied on speech act theory alone.
In the next two Chapters, we shall supplement the methodological foundations
laid here, with more detailed definitions of the theoretical and empirical substance
of our project. As we do so, we shall sharpen our focus on Reformed liturgy and
demonstrate how its English manifestation represents a suggestive root paradigm of
Christian language in sacral practice.
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CHAPTER3
PRAGMATICS AND DOXOLOGY: THEORIES OF
LANGUAGE-USE AND TIlEOLOGJES OF WORSHIP
3.1 Doxology and pragmatic theoIY
We established in 1.3 that the theoretical strand of our investigation
would specifically relate the conceptual frameworks of linguistic-pragmatics to
'doxology'. As we pursue this relation, it will be helpful to defme the latter term
more closely.
Although 'a doxology' has traditionally denoted an ascription of praise
containing some reference to God's S6~a or 'glory', (Grisbrooke 1986: 214), the
more 'gerundive' use of 'doxology' to describe a sphere of liturgical study has had a
much more recent history. In 1980, the Methodist scholar Geoffrey Wainwright
adopted it as the title of his seminal 'systematic theology' - a systematic theology
distinguished, in his own words, by being written 'from a liturgical perspective'.
'Doxology' for Wainwright was thus to be seen as a 'liturgical way of doing
theology' which could 'also be considered as a theology of worship' (1980:
Preface). Refining approaches suggested in his earlier work Eucharist and
Eschatology (1971), Wainwright began from the premise that 'relations between
doctrine and worship are deeper rooted and further reaching than many theologians
and liturgists have appeared to recognise in their writings' (1980: Preface). In
addition, he noted that although his own text had been preceded by 'a growing
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awareness' of these relations, earlier writers from Bouyer (1963) and von Allmen
(1965) to Schmemann (1966), Crichton (1973) and Leenhardt (1971) 'had usually
stopped short after a paragraph or two on the subject' (preface).
Against this background, Wainwrights Doxology presents itself as the first
'complete systematic theology deliberately composed with these links [between
doctrine and worship] in mind' (preface). Crucially, Wainwright sets such links in
the context of the key ancient Eastern formula lex orandi, lex credendi - 'the law (or
word) of prayer - the law (or word) of faith' (218ff.). This 'Latin tag' is significant
for Wainwright, not least because it 'may be construed in two ways':
The more usual way makes the rule of prayer a norm for belief: what is prayed
indicates what may and must be believed. But from the grammatical point of view
it is equally possible to reverse subject and predicate and so take the tag as
meaning that the rule of faith is the norm for prayer: what must be believed
governs what may and should be prayed. The linguistic ambiguity of the Latin tag
corresponds to a material interplay which in fact takes place between worship and
doctrine in Christian practice. worship influences doctrine, and doctrine worship.
(1980: 218, my emphasis).
Elsewhere, Wainwright talks of this worship-doctrine relationship in similar
terms as 'dialectical' and 'bi-directional'. Indeed, he insists that the 'integrity' of
Christian reflection 'requires a movement between the two' (1980: 56). Casting
worship as the most potent instantiation of 'faith', Wainwright echoes Zurdeeg
(1958), Ferre (1962) and Knox (1964) in arguing for a 'convictional' view of truth,
while also reflecting Wilson's (1958: 16-31) stress on the church-at-prayer as the
defmitive arena of theological 'verification'. Thus not only is the 'intellect' of the
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theologian 'at the service of his existential vision and commitment'; this vision and
commitment are in turn properly honed in the communal action of the liturgy. For
Wainwright, 'worship is the place in which [theological] vision comes to a sharp
focus, a concentrated expression, and it is here that the vision has often been found
to be at its most appealing'. We are left in no doubt, then, that 'the theologian's
thinking therefore properly draws on the worship of the Christian community and is
duty bound to contribute to it' (3).
For our part, it should by now be apparent that we share Wainwright's
commitment to the integrity of liturgical practice and doctrinal formulation. Indeed,
this may be seen as the major theological aspect of our consciously seeking to mesh
methodological, theoretical and empirical analyses within a coherent liturgical-
pragmatic framework. For all this, however, the Roman Catholic liturgist David N.
Fageberg (1992) has still criticised the finer points of Wainwright's approach in
terms which bear importantly on the exact way in which we ourselves might
construct this framework. Specifically, Pageberg argues that despite being written
'from faith to faith', Wainwright's new programme for theology is still predicated on
a dichotomy between liturgy and doctrine, which assumes that the latter will be
conceived by the specialist in 'the academy' while the former is practised by
ordinary congregations which, though they might include the theologian, will enjoy
no necessarily reciprocal involvement in academia. Hence, Fageberg charges that
in Wainwright's doxology 'doctrines are quarried from worship practises, and any
stones which the theologian reckons unsuitable are discarded. The raw material is
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sculpted by chisels honed in the academy. and the blocks are returned to the
academy through its leaders in order to build an edifice of worship measured along
an ideological plumb line' (1992: 133).
In contrast to this. Fageberg contends that liturgy per se should be viewed as
an intrinsically and truly 'theological act' - one in which 'the lex ctedendi comes
from the community itself (1992: 135). As he goes on to add. 'theologians are not
the only academics; the liturgical assembly itself is a theological corporation'
(1992: 135). On these grounds. Fageberg follows Aidan Kavanagh (1984: 73-95) in
calling for a 'liturgical theology' distinguished from Wainwright's 'theology of
worship' - one which consciously eschews 'a reductionism which supposes that
liturgy creates feelings which in tum influence the thinker', and which maintains
instead that 'liturgy does more than (even if not less than) create feelings' (1992:
136; cf. Empereur 1987: 70).
Now although this critique and proposal are very germane to our concerns. we
do not take Fageberg's distinction between 'liturgical theology' and the 'theology of
worship' to invalidate the term 'doxology' as such. As Empereur has noted (1987:
7). precise terminologies have yet to be settled within a subject-area that is barely a
decade into its development. Certainly, the Reformed liturgist Hughes Oliphant
Old (1992: 1-2) recognises the actual term 'doxology' as one which could justly
commend itself to 'liturgical theology' in Kavanagh and Fageberg's sense. as well as
to Wainwright's somewhat 'simpler' and more 'bifurcated' coinage of it in relation to
'the theology of worship' (cf. Fageberg 1992: 135). Indeed. although there can be
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little doubt that Wainwright's conceptualization of the role of the church in
doxological formation is stereotypically 'pastoral' and insufficiently 'systematic' (cf.
1980: 118-48). Old is right to emphasise the more fundamental point that he does at
least seek 'very clearly' to relate 'Christian worship. Christian thought and Christian
action' (1992: 20). The specific fact that such 'thought' and 'action' are rather too
sharply divided between 'the academy' and 'the assembly' should not detract from
the more general point that as a whole Wainwright's doxology does seek to be 'both
systematic and pastoral' - something which Empereur himself cites as a defining
criterion of 'liturgical theology' (1987: 7).
Having said all this. even while we shall thus retain 'doxology' as a broad
description of liturgical-theological intercourse. we cannot ignore Fageberg's more
specific critique of Wainwright's analytical programme. The reasons for this will
become clear as we we move on next to consider the relation of doxology to
liturgical language.
3.2 Language-use as an issue in contemporary liturgical theology
Like his great Anglican forbear Gregory Dix (1945: 12-13),
Wainwright is very aware that liturgy should be viewed as 'doing' rather than just
'saying'. Indeed, while Dix's having pre-dated Ordinary Language Philosophy
meant that he made this point more by separating 'action' from 'speaking' than by
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seeing them as fundamentally linked. Wainwright commends various more
explicitly 'performative' models of language as a means to helping us 'understand
the meaning of communion between humanity and God' (1980: 18-20). The basis
for using such models in doxology. says Wainwright. lies in the biblical conception
of 'the Word' in relation to human life and behaviour:
The Greeks used logos for both thought (logos endiathetos and speech (logos
prophorikos). The Hebrews took the potential for exteriorization even further:
dsber could mean also thing. action. event An important patristic interpretation
identified the divine image in humanity with logos. God also had logOS; indeed, he
was the source of logos in human beings. In both God and humans. logos is
perfonnative: it expresses being and engages the person. It is the basis for
communication and therefore the means of communication, (1980: 18).
Although we again take Barr's point (1962: 107-60) that derivations of modem
doctrine from etymology are to be treated with caution, the historic interrelation
between Scripture and liturgy makes Wainwright's suggestion of a 'performative
language doxology' very persuasive. This feeling is reinforced by the fact that his
exposition of this idea claims precedents in a number of the works cited by us in
the last Chapter - ie. from Crystal (1965), Schmidt (1971), Thiselton ([1975] 1986)
- and most notably in this connection, Ladriere (1973) (Wainwright 1980: 19n26
(p,467». Emphasising that 'theologians may draw insight from [linguistics,
philosophy and social anthropology] which will help them to appreciate the
functions of language in worship', Wainwright co-opts three major paradigms from
these fields into his own programme. These are, respectively, Lyons' 'universe of
discourse' (1977: 657ff.), Wittgenstein's 'language-game' (1958) and F.J.
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Leenhardt's 'langage gestuel' (1971). The universe of discourse constituted in and
through liturgy, says Wainwright, derives from the fact that 'Christian worshippers
share with one another and with God a common history focussed in Jesus Christ
and a common interest in the continuing battle of grace against sin' (1980: 19). Just
as this 'common interest' and 'common history' is 'graciously set up' by God
Himself, so it 'comes to expression' in a language of worship which is at once
'given and received' in sacral 'exchange' (20).
Similarly, insofar as liturgy is a language-game ordered according to very
distinctive 'rules, techniques and aims', Wainwright proposes that 'in Christian
worship, we are not playing the game of scientific description or of everyday social
exchange, nor even the game of theological discourse, but we are playing rather the
game of the community's conversation with the God who is the creator and
redeemer'. Furthermore, 'the present delight and permanent "point"of the game lie in
a growing communion of human beings with God' (20).
Thirdly, liturgical language is performative for Wainwright in the sense that its
typical 'framework of understanding' is one in which 'action is accompanied by
verbal interpretation' (20) - whether in the general Hebrew sense of 'dabar', in the
use of gestures, actions and objects as 'communicative signs', or in fully-realised
systems of 'sacraments and sacramentals' (20).
Now as far as they go, these doxological deductions from pragmatic theory
very much coincide with those implications of a pragmatic approach to liturgical
study which we have charted in the work of philosophers, theologians and linguists.
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Nevertheless, Fageberg (1992: 139) is justified in questioning whether
Wainwright's 'pragmatics of liturgical language' in fact goes far enough. Possibly
because he acquired it 'second hand' through theological filters rather than from its
original linguistic sources, Wainwright's pragmatic model of liturgy seems not
quite reconciled with the radical extent to which Austinian and post-Austinian
theory has collapsed traditional dichotomies between 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive'
meaning, between 'propositions' and "speech acts', between 'truth' and 'felicity' - and
more particularly, between 'theological' and 'liturgical' discourse. Indeed,
Wainwright maintains his aforementioned division between 'the academy' and 'the
assembly' in this regard when he writes as follows:
...communion with God, symbolically focused in the liturgy. is the primary locus of
religious language for the Christian, Theological language belongs to the second
order: it is the language of reflexion upon the primary experience. The language of
worship mediates the substance on which theologians reflect; without that
substance, theological talk would have no referent Yet the 'architectonic' and
'critical' functions of theological reasoning, secondary though that reasoning is in
relation to substantial communion with God, play a proper part in shaping and
pnming the continuing primary experience. For reflective reason is part of God's
endowment to humanity and must therefore be included in the total picture of
human communion with God. The second-order activity of theology is therefore at
its own level, properly doxological: the theologian is truly theologian when, in his
very theologizing, he is listening for the 'echo of a voice' and is contributing. even
indirectly. to the human praise of God. It is indeed a traditional dictum of Eastern
Ouistianity that the true theologian is the person who prays. (1980: 21).
Although there is no doubt that Wainwright here moves towards a genuinely
holistic rapprochement between 'theological' and 'liturgical' discourse, the fact
remains that he still links the former primarily to 'reason' and 'thought', while
associating the latter archetypally with 'action'. In this sense, he upholds the classic
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Chomskyan distinction between 'competence' and 'performance', while failing to
realise what we stressed in 2.2.3 - namely that the 'pragmatics' he so warmly
commends has itself fundamentally revised this distinction. For Wainwright,
'speech' is still something 'which allows precision in the expression of intention'
(1980: 20, my emphases), and the same mind/behaviour split informs his
conviction that the 'shared world' of God and humanity' comes to expression in the
language of worship' (1980: 19-20, my emphasis).
This underlying philosophical dualism sits rather uneasily with the linguistic-
pragmatic methodologies co-opted by Wainwright for the prosecution of his
doxology. As Fageberg points out,
We suppose that what Wainwright wants to call 'a liturgical way of doing
theology' is exactly a theology which is grounded in liturgical illocutionary
speech. However, he remains hobbled by the description of worship as an
"expression" of the Christian vision. It sounds as though the Christian vision
precedes its expression and this is why the vision can also be expressed doctrinally
in a way which will then control the lex orandi. (1992: 139)
Subsequent to Wainwright, Kavanagh (1984), David Power (1984) and
Theodore Jennings (1985) have all attempted to refine the concept of worship as
'word-and-act' by closing the gap which Wainwright left between the two and
thereby, between 'conceiving theology' and 'performing the liturgy'. Echoing
Thiselton ([1975] 1986), Power argues that liturgy does much more than report
extant 'states of mind' in language: rather, he contends that it both 'transforms' and
'discloses' in its own right. Worship is thus to be regarded as 'an act of God and the
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church' (1984: 168); from our perspective it could therefore be said to be something
whose truth and purpose are 'brought about' in and not just 'brought along' to the
rite (cf. Auer 1992). Given this premiss, Power is consistent in pressing for a
thoroughly 'sacramental' view of worship discourse - not only within the 'official'
sacraments of the Catholic church analysed by Martinich (1975a, b), but also
within its 'entire canon' of prayer, blessing etc. (168). What is more, rather than
driving a wedge between Scriptural and liturgical language by, say, treating the
former propositionally and the latter 'poetically', Power stresses the
interdependence of each on the other in a superordinate economy of 'testimony'.
Thus, rather than polarising Biblical and sacral discourse as respectively 'the Word
written' and 'the Word performed', he sees both deriving from a 'total unity between
event and meaning' - a unity which is the very essence of God's Word' to His
church. Hence too, though like Wainwright Power accepts that 'quite a difference
exists between teaching doctrines and invoking God' (1984: 159), he diverges from
Wainwright in arguing that the 'ritualization' and 'theologization' of the J..6yoC;are
themselves equally attributable to testimonial 'acts' of the Creator (168). On much
the same basis, Jennings moves from a position which affirms liturgy as
'supplementing' and 'correcting' prior first-order dogmas (1985: 187), to one which
repudiates an 'artificial abstraction of doxological from kerygamatic [that is,
declamatory or credal] language' (1985: 199).
Where Power's and Jennings' approaches to lex otsndi, lex ctedendi are more
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radical than Wainwright's, Kavanagh's is explicitly so. Indeed, Kavanagh goes so
far as to upend Wainwright's blueprint for 'a liturgical way of doing theology':
Wainwright makes the reasoning of theologians architectonic and "critical" with
respect to liturgy. This move enables him then to claim a special doxological
quality for the second order activity of theology at its own level. Wainwright
thinks this is what Eastern Ouistianity means when it says that the true theologian
is the person who prays. But the dictum, so far from endowing a doxological
quality upon the second-order activity of theology, in fact confers a theological
quality upon the first-order activity of people at worship. (1984: 124, cf. Jennings
1985: 201)
Pertinently for us, Kavanagh proceeds to argue that the effect of doctrine upon
liturgy is 'like the effect of philology upon language' - that is, 'a truth but not the
whole truth' (1984: 84). To it must be added an understanding which recognises
that 'language is correlative with society as liturgy is correlative with Church'
(1984: 84-5, my emphasis). In each, 'language and liturgy are both constitutive of
and constituted as enterprises of the first order'. (1984: 85). Though like Power
Kavanagh appears to be unfamiliar with contemporary pragmatics, he evokes core
pragmatic principles when he posits that liturgiology must involve more than a
search for what any given liturgical act 'means', and must go on rather to ask 'how
liturgy 'works' in and from its ecclesial context' (1984: 87). Having done this,
Kavanagh suggests that the liturgical-language analyst will be compelled to the
conclusion that 'a liturgical act is a theological act of the most all-encompassing,
integral, and foundational kind' (1984: 89). Moreover, s/he will realise that this
same 'liturgical act' is 'both precipitator and result of that adjustment to the change
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wrought in the worshipping assembly by its encounter in faith with its divine
source' (1984: 89).
Now with their various emphases on worship as 'action' and 'theology in the
making'. the newer Catholic doxologies of Power, Jennings, and Kavanagh can be
seen as very compatible with a 'pragmatic' reading of liturgical discourse. Given
this, it is all the more surprising that none of them acknowledge the work of Jean
Ladriere, who not only anticipates their thinking by more than a decade, but who
does so with direct and profound reference to linguistic pragmatics. It is to
Ladriere's seriously neglected work that we must now give special attention, the
better to appreciate just how the theory and practice of pragmatics might inform the
construction of doxology.
3.3. Jean Ladriere and the 'performativity' of liturgical language
Though he does so only in a footnote. it is rather ironic that
Wainwright acknowledges Jean Ladriere as a significant writer on liturgical
language (1980: 19n26 (p.467)), where Power, Kavanagh and Jennings seem to
have ignored him altogether. Certainly, Ladriere's work on sacral discourse accords
more closely with the recent views of his fellow Roman Catholics on theology
being brought about in worship, than with the Protestant Wainwright's earlier
model of theology being brought along to worship as a set of 'thoughts' from the
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academy which then undergo 'expression' in the rite. As it is, Ladriere's short 1973
article for Concilium, entitled The Perfonnativity of Liturgical Language' lit the
touch paper for our own study. Since first encountering it, we have become
increasingly convinced that it sounds the keynote for 'liturgical pragmatics' - even
while realising that it needs to be much expanded, updated and revised in the light
of later developments within pragmatics per se, and that it is a consciously
theoretical treatise which warrants not only empirical testing, but also exposition
from a more Protestant perspective.
Since we embarked on our research in 1989. the Lutheran-turned-Catholic
Fageberg (1992: 136-42) has published a brief precis of Ladriere's Concilium paper
and has justifiably placed it on a continuum both with Schmemann's earlier Eastern
Orthodox account of lex orendi, lex ctedendi (1966), and with Kavanagh's
SUbsequent preference for 'liturgical theology' over Wainwright's 'theology of
worship'. Then again, Fageberg is not particularly concerned about the precise
implications of Ladriere's argument, and while fairly summarising what Ladriere
says about worship in general, he does not stop to consider just how or why this
diverges so sharply from 'doxology' as it has been defined by churches and scholars
who trace their origins to the Continental Reformation. In order to pursue these
hitherto unexplored ramifications of Ladriere's work ourselves, we need to review
it in some detail, paying special attention to the aforementioned Concilium paper.
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Born in 1921. Fr. Jean Ladriere became Professor of the Philosophy of
Science at the French-speaking University of Louvain-la-Neuve in Belgium in
1959. His interest in the relation of linguistic pragmatics to liturgy can be traced as
far back as the mid-'60's, when he wrote two reviews of Evans' work on the logic of
self-involvement (1966, 1967). The substance of these articles then reappeared in a
major study of theological discourse, published in 1970 under the title
L 'articulation du Sens: Discours Scientifique et Parole de le Foi. Translated by
Garrett Barden two years later as Language and Belief, this text set Evans' study in
the wider history and context of semiotics, science and linguistic philosophy.
Calling Evans' thesis 'a work of remarkable analytic skill', Ladriere saw it as
facilitating 'a new and far more precise formulation of several traditional problems'
(1972: 84, 91). Specifically, he suggested that Evans' appropriation of Austin's
'speech act' philosophy allowed for a valid presentation of religious language-
meanings which went beyond 'purely informative' models based on reference and
propositional logic (1972: 91). Rather, Ladriere inferred from Evans a 'circle' of
sacred linguistic understanding in which that which was brought along' to religious
discourse was not so much truth-conditional 'intention' in Wainwright's sense, as an
'affectively' and 'rapportively' nurtured 'faith'. While anticipating Kavanagh and
Fageberg's insistence that 'faith' was something which worship itself engendered,
Ladriere nonetheless maintained that 'to see Christ in the mystery of God, one must
already possess a certain rapport with that mystery. One must already have been
transformed by the divine action' (1972: 92, my emphasis).
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From this perspective, 'faith' for Ladriere was not simply wilful and
voluntaristic: it was to beviewed as a 'gift of God' (1972: 92; cf. Ephesisans 2: 8) -
one which 'creates in [humanity] a receptive field in which [the divine mystery] can
be welcomed'. Even so, Ladriere insisted that the establishment of this receptivity
'presupposes its possibility, and this possibility has to be considered as a kind of
predisposition, or presentiment, of waiting' (1972: 93). Thus. even if the proper
interpretation of religious language might entail a bracketing' of its self-involving
aspects. this could never become a 'suppression' of them (1972: 94); indeed,
Ladriere pointed out that while it may not usually countenance Evans' placing of
'acknowledgement' within the realm of 'verification'. philosophical discourse in
general does frequently entail 'an aspect of decision and commitment' - and further
still, may evince 'something ...beyond empirical reality. beyond what is simply
given. a revelatory breakthrough which. necessarily. is active and operative' (1972:
95).
By the time he wrote for Concilium in 1973. Ladriere had clearly grasped that
it is in worship that these self-involving, rapportive and revelatory aspects of
religious discourse are most intensely manifested. Certainly, while his earlier work
had represented an attempt to reconcile established scientific method with
theological interpretation. Ladriere makes it clear from the outset that liturgical
language 'cannot be analysed in terms of information theory: it does not consist in
the reporting of events. the description of objects. the formulation of theoretical
hypotheses, the statement of experimental findings, or the handing on of data'
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(1973: 51, 1.21-3). Rather, such language is to be 'characterized in that it is a certain
fonn of action'. It thus 'puts something into practice; in short, it possesses an
"operativity'", It is not to be thought of as 'merely a verbal commentary on an
action external to itself; in and of itself, it is action' (1973: 51, 1.21-3).
Given this starting-point, Ladriere rightly identifies his 'basic problem' as 'to
discover how liturgical language works, and then to determine 'the exact kind of
[operation] proper to liturgical language' (1973: 51, 1.15-16; 52, 1.52-3, my
emphases). Initially, Ladriere approaches this problem in the same way as Evans
had approached the problem of language about God as Creator. This is to say, he
revives Austin's original distinction between 'constatives' and 'performatives'. Thus
he proposes that 'in order ...to express the operative (non-descriptive) nature of
liturgical language, we may use the term "performativity'" (1973: 52, 1.49-52).
However, Ladriere soon acknowledges that first Austin, and then Searle, collapsed
this distinction into more nuanced models of 'illocutionary force' (53), and that the
analysis of liturgical discourse should in fact be conducted within the wider sphere
of 'pragmatics' - that is, within a realm where linguistic interpretation takes full
account of 'users ...speakers and those spoken to' (1973: 52, 1.66, 74). Indeed, this
perception is made even more explicit by the reprint of Ladriere's article which
appears in the second volume of L 'articulation du Seas; published in 1984 as us
Langages de le Poi (55-65). Here, the text is set within a whole section on The
Pragmatics of Christian Religious Language', a section which includes later work
on 'gospel narrative', John Chapter 11, 'Spiritual language' and 'Ecclesial faith-
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expression' - work which is informed by insights from post-Austin ian pragmaticians
like Montague (1984: 91n3) and Recanati (1984: IOn!).
Perspicuously given the way pragmatics has in fact developed since the early
'70's, Ladriere maintains that the 'very complex' nature of liturgical language should
no longer be understood in the sense of a 'general principle of operativity' (1973:
55, 1.165-8). In effect, this means a thoroughly discoursal pragmatics along the
lines we ourselves have been outlining: for Ladriere then, as for us now, 'every
effort must be made to conceive liturgical language as a whole, or as the general
context in which [liturgical] sentences function' (1973: 55, 1.174-8, my emphasis).
When thus considered, Ladriere seminally suggests that liturgical discourse will
'seem to possess a threefold petiormstivity: that of an existential induction, that of
an institution, and that ofa 'ptesentiticetion" (1973: 55, 1.180-2,my emphasis).
Existential induction is a process similar in effect to Evans' 'self-involvement'.
For Ladriere, it constitutes 'an operation by means of which an expressive form
awakens in the person using it a certain affective disposition which opens up
existence to a specific field of reality' (1973: 56, 1.186-8). Such 'affectivity' is
understood by Ladriere in 'a very basic sense'; it is not, he insists, 'a question of
emotion, nor really of feeling, but of that form of constitutive reciprocity which
makes us capable of adjusting to reality in its several manifestations: to the reality
of salvation which comes to us from God by the mediation of Jesus Christ, who is
announced in the texts of Scripture and is accomplished in the words of the Canon,
and received in the words of the action of grace' (1973: 58, 1.275-82). In particular,
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the use of 'personal pronouns' by the assembly as a whole is seen to make such
'affective functioning' both possible in, and distinctive to, worship: when they are
uttered by the congregation en messe; first person singular pronouns locate
individual worshippers in a corporate 'discourse' which is simultaneously a
'concrete act' - something in which they 'take part' together with others (1973: 56-7,
1.196ff.). Thus Ladriere's 'existentialism' is neither introspective nor solipsistic:
rather, personal being is realised archetypally in the context of ecclesial praising.
As Fageberg has noted (1992: 142), with Ladriere 'there is no pre-existent "I"
which then has a body or is a body. Rather, "I am bodily". The community, which
does primary theology, exists liturgically', Moreover, this 'liturgical existence'
mediates its unity in diversity: it is not merely articulated as a corporate
monologue; it subsists in 'dialogic relationship' - something confirmed iconically by
the liberal use of second person pronouns oriented to, and anticipating response
from, 'another' - whether human or divine (1973: 57-8, 1.221ff.).
According to Ladriere, the koinonial dimensions of liturgical discourse
function not only to 'dispose souls to welcome that which [such discourse]
suggests'; in addition, they serve to establish the church and its liturgy as an
institution. Worship for Ladriere comprises a series of 'acts' whose coherence is
more than simply 'arbitrary' or coincidental. Rather, inasmuch as participation in
the liturgy means being 'inducted' into a community, it means simultaneously
entering a language-game and form of life constituted by 'very exact rules' (1973:
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58-9, 1.295-303). Indeed. one cannot in practice separate the church's 'community'
from its 'rite': each owes its identity crucially to the other. Thus:
Language is not the expression of a community constituted before it and apart
from it and is not the description of what such a community would be, but the
location in which and the instrument by means of which the community is
constituted. (1973: 59,1.303-306).
For Fageberg, this statement represents the ultimate corrective to Wainwright's
vision of prior 'theological concepts' regulating subsequent 'liturgical actions'. As
he points out. Ladriere's understanding of sacral discourses is far more 'primary':
'for [Ladriere], liturgical illocutionary and symbolic acts create the community and
create attitudes which come into effect when the liturgical rite is transacted. The
liturgy creates the attitudes (theological attitudes toward God, self and world), it
does not merely give expression to them' (1992: 139-40, my emphasis).
In particular, Ladriere sees these 'creative' forces of liturgical discourse
belonging to a governing process of presentification. 'By all those acts which it
effects', he contends, liturgical language 'makes present for the participants, not as a
spectacle, but as a reality whose efficacy they take into their very own life, that
about which it speaks and which it effects in diverse ways: the mystery of Christ,
his life and death, and his resurrection: the revelation conveyed to us in him of the
mystery of God: the accomplishment of the eternal plan by virtue of which we are
called to become children of God, co-heirs of Christ in eternal life' (1973: 59-60,
1.332-41).
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This vital 'making present' is achieved for Ladriere in three main ways. First,
he proposes that it is accomplished by repetition. Repetition in the liturgical context
means more than 'mere quotation'; it is, rather, 'the resumption into acts of today of
words written or spoken at a given moment in the past' (1973: 60, 1.348-50). In fact,
Ladriere's original French term reprise in this sense better captures the thrust of his
analysis, which envisages established canonical formulae being 'taken up' afresh by
each contemporary assembly, and thus imbued with illocutionary force through the
instantiation of liturgical discourse in particular ecclesial contexts.
The second way in which presentification occurs for Ladriere is through
proclamation. Significantly from his Roman perspective, Ladriere sees this
reaching its 'culmination' in the creed or 'confession of faith', rather than in the
sermon. Like his fellow Catholic Mananzan (1974), Ladriere regards the
enunciation of the creed in worship as providing a paradigmatic bridge between
'doctrinal' and 'doxological' (that is, attestational, ratificational and comrnitmental)
speech. In this sense, he characterises it, almost paradoxically, as a set of
'propositional acts' - acts which 'bring into existence a form of discursive
articulation in which the very content of the mystery [of salvation] becomes
manifest' (1973: 60, 1.364-71).
Ultimately, though, it is Ladriere's third dynamic of presentification - the
dynamic of sacramentality - through which liturgical language is seen to have 'its
most profoundly actualizing effect' (1973: 61, 1.372-4). Sacramentality in this
regard is a fundamentally eschatological phenomenon - one which links not only
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the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of sacral discourse, but which also points
towards what has yet to be fulfilled (1973: 61, 1.390ff.). Indeed. he goes so far as to
emphasise that it is the 'registration' of liturgical language in this eschatological
perspective which 'allows it its characteristic performativity' (1973: 61. 1.399-400).
Again showing his Catholic orientation. Ladriere claims that 'in repeating the words
of the Last Supper. the celebrant does more than commemorate if. Rather. he
'repeats once again that which Christ did. in giving again to the words which Christ
used that efficacy which Christ gave them. in conferring upon them again the
power to do what they mean' (1973: 61. 1.373-78). What is proposed here, then. is
not just 'repetition' or even 'reappropriation', but a 'real presence' re-enactment of
gospel events. Admittedly. Ladriere begins by dubbing this re-enactment
'secondary' in terms of performativity, to the original 'institution' of sacred words
and acts by Christ Himself (1973: 61. 1.378-9). Nevertheless. he goes on to propose
that by 're-effectuating' such words and acts in 'the context of the prayer of the
Canon'. a modern-day congregation can in fact 'restore them to their primary
pertormetivity (1973: 61. 1.383-4. 386. my emphasis). Furthermore. while thus
'resuming' that 'which has already taken place', the same congregation also makes
'an announcement of that which is still awaited' (1973: 61, 1.393-4).
Unfortunately, Ladriere does not support this grand 'liturgical discourse
eschatology' with specific linguistic analysis - but he does commend such analysis
to others (1973: 61. 1.395-7). Indeed. he maintains that only with such evidence
would it be possible to show 'in what way [liturgical language] really "makes
108
present" that which it talks of (1973: 61,1.397-9). It is our belief that 20 years on,
Ladriere's gauntlet has yet to be satisfactorily picked up, and we see it as one of our
key tasks here to do so. Moreover, it is a task which we shall approach from a
Protestant Reformed viewpoint in the conviction that Ladriere's 'eschatological'
hypothesis is far from axiomatic and thus needs to be tested against observed data
rather than just illustrated by anecdotal introspection.
If Ladriere avoids the close linguistic exegesis to which we have committed
ourselves, he does still address the problem of how liturgical 'performativity' and
'sacramentality' are brought about by, in and through the assembly itself - that is,
how sacral discourse is 'made present' to 'users, ...speakers and those spoken to'
(1973: 52, 1.66-74). As in his earlier work on the general features of religious
language, he resolves this question in terms of faith. 'Faith' for Ladriere is that
which supremely 'impels' liturgical language and 'endows it with performativity'
(1973: 61, 1.401-2). In contrast with Wainwright, and in anticipation of Kavanagh
and Fageberg's more extensive treatment of this theme, he goes on to contend that
this faith is not to be seen as some 'prior experience' generated in a context separate
from and antecedent to the liturgy, which it is the function of liturgical language
then to 'describe'; rather, 'between liturgical language and faith there is a kind of
dual assumption'. According to Ladriere,
Faith takes up this language and gives it its own efficacy, inasmuch as faith is a
resumption of the mystery of Christ, the acceptance of salvation and hope of
benefits yet to come. Language is to faith a kind of structuring field which allows
it to express itself in accordance with the reality to which it corresponds. The
language is proclamation of the very content in which the faith is truly embodied,
and is a sacramental accomplishment of the mystery which is thus announced and
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witnessed. Its threefold perfonnativity enables faith to be expressed. (1973: 61-2,
10407-8).
If this on its own appears to imbue 'faith-driven' language with a quite
extraordinary causality, Ladriere is quick to deny that this causality could be
interpreted in a fideistic or 'occultic' sense - that is, as something generated by
'human believing' alone. On the contrary, 'faith' is itself to be understood as a
product of divine grace - something, moreover, which is mediated specifically by
God's eternal A6yoC;.Thus 'faith ...is the hearing of the Word and the effective
action of the Word in human life' (1973: 62,1.418-20). Even further still,
If faith is the reception of the Word and if liturgical language receives from faith
its characteristic performativity, that language is itself an echo of the Word. In the
celebration it is the Word to which faith allows access that becomes present and
operative in our own words. The word became flesh and dwelt among us. Insofar
as in and by faith we become participants in the mystery of the incarnation, our
speech acts, in the liturgy, become the present mainstay of the manifestation of the
Word. (1973: 62,1.423-32).
In its own right, Ladriere's argument here bears out impressively that 'circle' of
sacred language comprehension which he himself had identified in L 'articulation
du Sens as a vital prerequisite of Christian theology. Liturgical self-involvement
comes by faith, which is defined primarily as the 'hearing of the Word'; liturgy is
the archetypal medium through which this Word is 'made present', but is at the
same time constituted by the Word. Hence not only the Word itself, but faith and
worship too, have their past, present and future source in God, who alone is 'prior
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to' the discourse of praise.
Now all this sounds very close to the basic tenets of Refonned theology: the
superintendence of the Word in worship; the emphasis on 'faith alone' as the
operative fuel of liturgy; the stress on bearing' as constitutive of 'believing' and
'participating' in the church community - all these are axiomatic in Reformed
doxologies from Calvin ([1559] 1960) through Barth ([1936] 1975: 88-111) to von
Allmen (1965) and Old (1992). Nonetheless, as we have already hinted, the detail
of Ladriere's argument might be more readily contrasted with Reformed
understanding, and it seems likely that it will be such differences of detail which
will determine just how smoothly his Concilium hypothesis can be translated to a
pragmatics of Protestant liturgical performance in general, and of Reformed
liturgical performance in particular. What is more: by making this comparison, we
shall put ourselves in a position to assess more prescriptively whether subsequent
'doxologisations' of Ladriere's ideas - be they 'unconscious' in the case of Power
and Kavanagh, or 'conscious' in the case of Fageberg - are actually justified, or
whether the avowedly Protestant model proposed by Wainwright is, after all, a
better reflection not only of what Christian worship is, but of what it should be. It is
on to these matters that we shall now move.
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3.4 Implications for a Refonnedliturgical pragmatics
We have almost completed our survey of past explorations in the
rough border territory of 'liturgical language pragmatics'. It has been necessary and
proper to conduct this survey with thoroughness, because the paths previously
trodden here seem to have run in so many different directions. Indeed until now,
our task has largely consisted in identifying common 'patterns' of concern within
what is a fragmented and as yet severely unintegrated area of scholarship. From
this point on, we shall seek not only to draw such patterns of concern together, but
to refine and address them in distinctive relation to a strand of liturgical practice
which has not yet featured in pragmatic readings of sacral discourse - namely, the
worship of the English Reformed Church.
Before bringing pragmatic methodologies to bear on Reformed liturgical data,
it will be helpful to explain from a theoretical or doxological perspective just why
this tradition of church worship might be particularly expected to provide a
suitable case-study for the definition and prosecution of liturgical pragmatics.
We mentioned in 2.4.4 that among those who have published work on the
philosophical aspects of liturgical language using speech act theory, both Vincent
(1979) and Ware (1981) have done so with specific reference to Reformed worship.
To their texts can be added a lecture delivered by the American Reformed
theologian Nicholas Wolterstorff at Nottingham University on 11th November,
1993 under the title 'Philosophical Reflections on Calvin's Doctrine of the
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Sacraments: An Approach Through the Philosophy of Language' 1.
Now all three of these studies operate at a specifically 'doctrinal' level.
Although Ware does offer a few examples from historic Protestant service books,
these serve as illustrations for points already made in terms of 'Christian thought'
(1981: 87ff.). While we have emphasised that our overall approach to liturgical
language use will be more empirical than this, Vincent, Ware and Wolterstorff do
offer significant clues as to how extant Reformed doxologies might compel the
divergence of a Reformed liturgical pragmatics from the Roman Catholic model
proposed by Ladriere and endorsed by Fageberg. Having said this, none of them
show any actual awareness of Ladriere's work, and it therefore falls to us to make
this divergence explicit.
Vincent, Ware and Wolterstorff echo Ladriere when they contend that speech
act philosophy affords a new and fruitful 'way in' to liturgical theology. For
Vincent, Austin's 'theory of performatives' is seen to present 'a suitable
metalanguage for major elements in Calvin's [liturgiological] discourse' (1979:
149). For Ware, not only Austin but also Peirce, Wittgenstein and Searle are
regarded as having 'opened up the possibility' of dealing with the 'symbols and
symbolic acts' of worship 'in terms of their function rather than simply in terms of
their ability to represent' (1981: 15). Likewise, Wolterstorff embraces Austin and
Searle as providers of the 'most appropriate' contemporary framework for
1. As yel unpublished. Attended and noled by us.
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comprehending Calvin's writing on baptism and the eucharist. Where Vincent and
Wolterstorff especially distinguish themselves from Ladriere is in their explicit
casting of Calvin, the 'founder' of the Reformed faith, in a clearly pioneering
'crypto-pragmatic' role vis a vis Christian doxology in general and the development
of sacramental doctrine in particular. Thus while both alike resemble Ladriere in
their insistence that liturgical discourse transcends purely 'constative' or logico-
semantic models of language, they go on to argue that until Calvin, it was precisely
such models which informed and restricted the construction of liturgical theology.
For Vincent as for Wolterstorff, this legacy is attributed to the domination of
Western Medieval theology by an Aristotelian predicate logic which defined
linguistic meaning in terms of reference and denotative representation, rather than
in terms of contextualized usage.
In Vincent's view, Calvin managed thus to shed the burden' of 'hypothesising
an onto-theological parallelism in which ...the predicative structure of a phrase
normatively corresponds to a construction of (natural) reality expressed in terms of
substance and accidence' (1979: 150). More exactly,
In the Catholic conception - and, no doubt, in the Lutheran conception - the
question of sacramental substance was very much expressed in natural terms: this
question was framed within natuIalistic parameters. Transubstantiation and
consubstantiation are the two responses which dominate this way of thinking.
With Calvin and Zwingli - albeit in different senses - we are engaged with an
emphasis decided according to the effective dimension. The dual affinnation of
Calvin - that Christ is the substance of the sacrament and that the presence of
Christ is 'spiritual' only makes sense from the perspective of Austins theory of
speech acts. (1979: 151, my emphasis. cf. Calvin [1559] 1960: IV.14.3ff.).
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In similar fashion, Wolterstorff proposes that Thomas Aquinas' definitive
appropriation of Aristotelian categories into Catholic doctrine made for a 'sign-
agentive' or 'instrumentalist' view of language in which words were treated as the
intrinsic, natural corollaries of ontological phenomena, rather than as neutral 'types'
which gained performative force only when instantiated as 'tokens' in particular
ecclesial settings.
Although Ware seems less convinced about Calvin's status as a 'proto-
Austinian' doxologist (1981: 15), he does concur with the idea that strong Hellenic
influences on Medieval doctrines of worship made for perspectives which became
'increasingly representational rather than transformational' (1981: 11). Indeed,
Ware rather confirms Dix's dating of the shift in emphasis from 'doing' to 'saying' in
Western rites when he argues that sometime after Augustine, in the 'Latin Middle
Ages'>, the success of liturgy 'came to depend more on its ability to represent
accurately past events and explain them and less on the quality of the speech act
itself (1981: 11 cf. Dix 1945: 13-14). As an antidote to all this, Ware (1981: 16-17)
advocates a 'new' paradigm of worship in which liturgical performativity is seen not
so much to 'recreate' past events or re-present past objects, as to 'encode' a 'form of
life' defined symbolically in relation to the church as a social institution. For
Vincent, this very paradigm can in fact already be found in Calvin, whose
understanding of sacramental language is seen to show a remarkable affinity with
2. II should be stressed that for Wue, Augustine is seen IS marking the end of the previous era of emphasis on God's Word
IS .ctive and tnrtsformatory in worship, rather than the be&inning of the succeeding period of the Middle Aces, in which it
became increasingly representational.
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Austin's stress on the conventional and institutional bases of many cardinal
performatives (1979: 152 cf. Austin 1962: 107, 145ff.). Indeed, Vincent even goes
so far as to suggest that it was Calvin's training as a lawyer which led him 'to
conceive of various linguistic phenomena as affective and institutionalized
phenomena, and not as phenomena of nature' (1979: 152). Vincent sees this 'anti-
representational' and 'pro-institutional' emphasis epitomised in Calvin's famous
comparison of the relationship between 'language' and 'object' in sacramental
celebration to the sending of an institutionally sealed letter (cf. Calvin [1550] 1960:
ill.2.36-7):
The seal is a remarkable sign insofar as one could say that it adds nothing to the
'signifying substance' of the body of the letter itself. It exists wholly as an action:
it consists of·an authcntification of the intention of the addressor of the message,
and of a confirmation of that space within the letter in which the receiver is
designated as addressee. As in the case of the sealed message, so in the case of the
sacrament: the confirmation of sincere intent (sincerity' being, for Austin, one of
the validity conditions of the performative), coincides with what might be
considered as the creation, in the receiver, of the attitude which befits that of an
addressee ...If one goes along with this model, one can grasp that the logic of
sacramental reality is essentially interpreted in a linguistic context, and understood
(epistemologically) from a linguistic perspective. (1979: 153).
Now we have seen that Ladriere makes much of the role of the ecclesial
'institution' in the effecting of liturgical performativity. It is also clear that his
essential relation of sacral presentification to Word' and 'faith' signals an important
'bridging point' to Reformed liturgical theology. Nonetheless, closer inspection of
Ladriere's argument reveals at least some traces of an 'essentialist', de re view of
sacral language causation which would yet distinguish his liturgical pragmatics as
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'Catholic', and at least partly 'Aristotelian', from the consciously 'Calvinistic',
'Reformed' and 'instrumentalist' liturgical pragmatics for which we are striving.
Certainly, Ladriere does on occasion write as if liturgical language was possessed
in and of itself with a peculiar illocutionary force, rather than receiving this force
from liturgical usage alone. To borrow Wolterstorffs description of Aquinas'
liturgiology, Ladriere manages - in spite of elsewhere deploying firm de fide and de
Verbo Dei explanations of sacral discourse performativity - to imply a linguistic
sign-agency even while emphasising the God-agency of liturgical language. Within
this sign-agency, sacral performativity appears to reside in the very form, structure
and composition of the words themselves, rather than in their contextual
appropriation. Hence liturgical language is seen by Ladriere to 'put something into
practice' (1973: 51, 1.21); it is not just taken up operatively by its worshipping users
- it also has an operative 'nature' (52, 1.50); it thus 'awakens' in the person deploying
it an 'affective disposition' which 'opens up' their existence to a 'specific field of
reality' (56, 1.186-8); at a corporate level, this same liturgical language is not just an
'instrument' used by the Christian community to constitute itself as a community: it
is also the very thing which inherently establishes and realises that community (59,
309-10); similarly, it 'makes present ..that about which it speaks and which it
effects in diverse ways' (59, 1.333-6, my emphases). It thus has a 'revelatory
essence' and 'origin' (60, 1.357-80). Given these defmitions, it comes as little
surprise when Ladriere concludes by saying that liturgical language thus constitutes
a 'sacramental accomplishment' of the mysteries it 'announces' and 'witnesses to'.
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What is more, this 'sacramentality' applies not just to the immediate performatives
of sacramental celebration like the Epiclesis, Absolution and Baptismal
Pronouncement; it is, rather, intrinsic both to the whole 'Canon' of eucharistic
observance including the Sursum corda, Sanctus, Benedictus; Offertory. Petition.
Intercession, Anamnesis, Narrative and Ascription of Praise (58, 1.281) - and seems
often to cover the very fullest range of church service expression, from Opening
Sentences to Benediction.
Now it is true that in both Saussure's and Ladriere's original French. 'langage'
is somewhat more connected to usage than mere langue (Lyons et al 1987: 18). It is
also true that Ladriere sees 'le langage liturgique' as a 'totality' of illocutionary
forms rather than a diaspora of atomistic sentences (55, 1.105-53, 162-5).
Nevertheless, he does still appear to 'sacramentalize' the actual object of liturgical
language to an extent which would not be compatible with classical Reformed
doxology - and which must in any case be questioned as to how faithfully it reflects
Austin and Searle's own models. which at least present themselves as models of
how people do things with words. rather than of any 'operativity' possessed by
words themselves. It is significant that a similarly agentive and causative 'linguistic
essentialism' informs the more recent Catholic doxologies offered by Power and
Kavanagh. For Power (1984: 148), the entire Canon must be thought of
'sacramentally', while in Kavanagh's view, liturgical discourse 'itself begins to think
and speak for the assembly and turns wholly into music, not in the sense of
outward, audible sounds, but by virtue of the power of momentum of its inward
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flow' (1984: 86, my emphasis).
Here, one surely begins to detect echoes of what Calvin and his successors so
vigorously opposed in the Mass - namely, the notion that any set verbal formula
could in and of itself ensure a 'holy' (or 'felicitous') act of praise (Calvin [1559J
1960: m.20.29 cf. Wainwright 1980: 263-83). Just as the Anglican Evangelical
Thiselton (1974) sees this as a questionably 'magical' basis on which to expound
Old Testament speech acts, so Vincent pertinently comments that 'the Calvinian
critique of the way in which the Catholic Church manipulates the words of
institution rests on this overriding perception: that there is no need to attribute to
God any 'occult' power: the fiction of such a power is the result of a fictitious word,
of a false word which wreaks betrayal even as it is whispered' (1979: 153).
Certainly, it does seem that Ladriere, Power and Kavanagh's attachment to 'the
Canon' as a lexically fixed and relatively monolithic 'entity' predisposes them to the
sort of operative-linguistic essentialism we have been highlighting. No doubt too,
this predisposition makes it easier for them then to promote 'theology' as something
wholly 'brought about' in and by the language of worship, rather than as something
which must be brought along to, and 'expressed by' such language.
In contrast, Reformed doxology from Calvin onwards has always been far
more sceptical about the capacity of any set form of ritual language to realise 'true
worship' or 'true doctrine' as a function of its own composition. Indeed, the concept
of 'Canon' which is so fundamental to Ladriere, Power and Kavanagh's 'pragmatic'
was one of the very first pillars of Roman liturgiology to be cast down by the
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Calvinists - and not least by those in England. As Jasper points out (1986: 139), its
abolition was 'almost an article of faith for the Reformers except for Cranmer. In
nearly all Reformed rites it was normally reduced to the narrative of the institution
with the possible addition of a prayer for worthy reception'>. What is more, this
movement away from set forms was soon often extended into the whole of the
church service - a trend which again became especially marked in England, where
Reformed liturgies were first translated by William Huycke in 1550 and then more
vigorously advocated by John Knox following his return from exile in Calvin's
Geneva, where he had stayed during the reign of Queen Mary from 1554-59
(Spinks 1984a). Whereas Luther had insisted on vernacular worship while retaining
the basic structure and content of the Mass, the Strasbourg Reformer Martin Bucer
(1491-1551) not only severely reduced fixed formulae, but also pioneered a diet of
choices at different pointsin his liturgies (eg. multiple confessions, optional Kyties;
Psalms and hymns, variable pre-communion or 'long' prayers and a selection of
three Thanksgivings (Thompson [1961 [1980] 159-66; Spinks 1984a: 53-4».
Having come under Bucer's formative influence for three years from 1538-41,
Calvin carried this simplified and more flexible approach with him to Geneva, and
although in some respects more conservative than his mentor (Spinks 1984a: 54),
reiterated the pattern of a Canon distilled to is bare 'New Testament' kernel (Calvin
3. For a detailed account of Reformed simplifications of the Canon, see Spinks 1984&: 17ff.
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[1542/5] 1980: 185-224; [1559] 1960: IV.17.43); Maxwell [1931] 1965: 121-43),
while affording his Ministers freedom either to select or extemporize prayers such
as those 'for illumination' and those 'after the sermon' (1542/5 [1980]; Nichols
1968: 44).
Just" as Calvin had learnt from Bucer, so Knox both translated Calvin's
Genevan liturgy and used it among his congregation of English exiles in Geneva
from 1556 onwards (Spinks 1984a: 76ff.). Calvin's approach to liturgy had been
strongly 'Biblicist' in conception: his reform of the Mass had proceeded on a finn
prior assumption that the Word of God given in the Old and New Testaments was
the sole admissible source for the discourse of worship - that 'no other word [was]
to be held as the Word of God, and given place as such, in the church' ([1559]
1960: IV.8.8). Calvin's revision of worship was based on a corresponding
conviction that Rome had added numerous 'useless rites' to the proper patterns of
corporate praise laid down in the Scriptures ([1559] 1960: IV.I0.19).
Unsurprisingly, Knox concurred with Calvin's assessments: not only was he
adamant that 'diverse Popes...have added their portions to [the Canon descended
from the Apostles)' (Knox [1848]: ill: 48)4, he insisted that rites be 'limited within
the compass of God's Word, which our Saviour has left us as only and sufficient to
govern all our actions by' (Knox [1556] 1965: Preface). If anything, in fact, Knox
4. For consistency with quotations drawn from other modem editions of Reformed texts. I have moclemised the spelling of
Laing's edition of Knox's Works (full deta.iIs of which &le given in the Bibliography).
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appears even more radical than Calvin on this point. having had to be advised by
his mentor at one stage that milder sorts of 'extra-Biblical' ritual might be
provisionally tolerated for the sake of church unity (Knox [1848]: 123-4). Indeed.
R.L. Greaves (1980: 15) may well be right that Knox was at least as much
influenced by Zwingli on this particular issue of liturgical-language criteria:
certainly. the Zurich Reformer was clear that 'everything which is added to the true
institutions of Christ is an abuse' and urged that such additions should be 'done
away with at once' (cit. Garside 1966: 54).
Just as the growth of English Puritanism in the second half of the sixteenth
century reflected Knox's Iiturgiological debts to Calvin and Zwingli, so its
attachment to a 'pure Scriptural liturgy' continued and grew. So, the leading Puritan
apologist William Fulke (1538-89) insisted that 'the church of God is the house of
God, and therefore ought to be directed in all things according to the order
prescribed by the Householder himself, which order is not to be leamed elsewhere
but in His Holy Word' ([1584] 1971: 243). Similarly, one of the first Puritan
Separatists, Richard Fitz, desired that 'the sacraments be ministered purely, only
and all together according to the institution and good word of the Lord Jesus,
without any tradition or invention of man' ([1912]: 2/13). Such sentiments are
resoundingly echoed in William Bradshaw's core summary of Puritan belief (1605),
which makes it clear that 'whatsoever done in the service and worship of God
cannot be justified by the Word of God, is unlawful'. Even more trenchant is John
Greenwood's classic Puritan defence of the Bible as the true 'pattern' for worship:
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The word leitomgia signifieth publicum mius ergon laon, the work of or for the
people: that is, the very execution of the ministerial actions of the church,
acconting to the word of all the officers thereof, that is the practise of all those
ministerial duties prescribed by Christ, we may everywhere read. • •Now, to make
another leitourgia is to lay another foundation, and to make another gospel, but
there are some willing to pervert the gospel of Ouist ([1962]: 12).
Being fervently 'anti prayer book', Greenwood no doubt intended that his
reference to 'perversion of the gospel' should apply to Anglicans as well as to
Roman Catholics. since as Peter Toon has observed, for the Puritans' 'Biblically
enlightened' consciences, 'the chief rock of offence was the large measure of
continuity of the Roman Catholic past which persisted in the ministry and
government of the [English] church, as well as in its liturgy and church furnishings'
(1967: 1). Certainly, the Anglican attitude to viable sources and formulae for
liturgical content developed into a far more 'permissive', intertextual scheme - one
which is succinctly described in the twentieth of the Thirty Nine Articles of 1571,
which states 'It is unlawful for the church to ordain anything that is contrary to
God's Word in Scripture'. Clearly, there will be many more things which are not
explicitly condemned by Scripture than are positively approved by it. Hence, the
validation of liturgical forms in Anglicanism proved in practice far more diffuse
than in either classical Presbyterianism or Independency (Spinks 1984a: 17-36).
Given the Puritan emphasis on worship ordered strictly according to the
Reformation principle of sola scripture; one is bound to ask how they managed this
in practice. Particularly relevant for our study here is the challenge posed by
Cranmer to Knox when the question of an exclusively Biblical worship-discourse
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arose during preparation of the second Book of Common Prayer (1552). Cranmer's
incisive query was 'For what should men prevail to set an order in the form of
service, if no order can be set but that is already prescribed by Scripture?' (cit.
Smyth 1926: 263-5). To re-phrase Cranmer's question for current purposes: 'What
might a "thoroughly Biblical" liturgy look like?' and 'How might it be both
vernacular (ie, intelligible) and unreservedly Scriptural at the same time?'.
Crucially for us, most English Reformed churches have resolved these
questions by attempting not so much to reproduce vast chunks of Biblical language
in precise form, as to maintain and promulgate in their services what they have
perceived to be the underlying 'deep structures', 'propositional contents' and
'doctrines' of Scriptural discourse. Principally, they have done this by rejecting
fixed orders of worship, the better to elevate the 'message' of the Biblical text as
'God's written Word' and thereby, to subjugate their worship completely to this
Word (cf. Toon 1967: 16). We have already seen how Bucer, Calvin and Knox had
revealed such an emphasis by implying that the same basic 'truths' could be
conveyed in worship by a variety of linguistic expressions in different tongues,
rather than by a set 'Canon' of Latin lexis and grammar. Indeed, although Vincent is
right to draw parallels between Calvin's understanding of sacramental discourse
and Austin's theory of speech acts, it must be stressed that the Reformed church yet
consciously reduced the number of sacraments from seven to two - largely in
reaction to the 'sacramentalization' of set liturgical phrases, and thus of sacral
language per se, which its protagonists had perceived in the theory and practice of
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the Mass. Moreover, as English Calvinists became increasingly convinced that this
Roman tendency to sacramentalize the verbal form of liturgy had infiltrated the
BCP, so they moved in varying degrees from 'fixed' liturgies towards an
unprescribed, extemporary model of sacral discourse.
From early on, those who were Separatist in ecclesiology showed a marked
mistrust of written orders. Where Calvin himself had endorsed linguistic variation
at some points but retained fixed texts at others, English Separatists like John Field
(1545-88), Henry Barrow (1550-93) and Robert Browne (1550-63) disavowed set
liturgy altogether. Seemingly oblivious to the liturgical provenance of much in
Scripture itself, these men and their followers held that the revealed 'apostolic
model' of prayer was archetypally 'spiritual' - that is, contingently and
spontaneously expressed in response to 'present wants and occasions' (Barrow
[1970]: 366). Later, some even came to equate attachment to 'prayer books' with
the sin of idolatry (Cotton 1642: 70; Smyth 1645: 29). From these standpoints,
certain Puritan leaders even went so far as to question regular recitation of the
Lord's Prayer, lest it become too sacramentalised and 'talismanic'. Thus the
Bettowist Deposition of 1587 contended that it was 'a form of prayer not to be used
for the Apostles did not used to say it' (cit. Burrage 1912: i.56), while the Brownist
Confession of 1596 argued more subtly that rather than being given by Christ as a
set verbal formula, it suggested 'not that we should be tied to the use of these very
words, but that we should according to that rule make all our requests and
thanksgivings unto God, forasmuch as it is a perfect form and pattern
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conveying in its plain and sufficient directions of prayer for all occasions and
necessities that have been, are, or shall be to the Church of God' (cit. Davies 1948:
98).
Even among those Calvinists who remained within the Church of England, the
drive for a less rigidly monolithic and 'textualised' worship than the BCP became
considerable. Right-wing Presbyterians tendered an alternative liturgy to
Parliament based on Knox's Genevan Service Book (Davies 1948: 111), while
Independents like John Owen (1616-83) went much further in advocating a
thoroughly extemporary approach (Davies 1948: 111-2) By the time of the
Westminster Assembly, summoned by Parliament during the Civil War between
1643-48, both Presbyterian and Independent opposition to the BCP had hardened
into support for a Directory of worship which pronounced it an 'offence' and a
'burden' to countenance 'the reading of all the Prayers' (Westminster Directory
[1644] 1980: 8). Although this Westminster Directory did not wholly reject the use
of set forms, its predominant approach is one in which, though biblically-based
'contents' and 'structures' are defined, Ministers are allowed freedom to pray 'in
their own words', as they are led by the Holy Spirit.
After the Restoration under Charles II and the Act of Uniformity in 1662,
those subscribing to more extemporary techniques over against the BCP, found
themselves forcibly ejected from the Church of England. Ever since,
'nonconformist' or 'Dissenting' Reformed worship in England has been
characterised by either 'directory' or extemporary models of sacral language-use
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(Gunton 1989: xii), and thus, by a repertoire of discourses which are either 'free' or
'semi-free' in nature (cf. Ferguson 1985: 208-9). These models have been
distinguished by their supposing the written Word of God to be not only the
'supreme liturgical criterion' (Davies 1948: 52), but more specifically, a repository
of prior divine ordinances or 'propositions', which it is the purpose of worship both
to celebrate and 'explain'. As Toon has shown (1967: 16), the Puritans had typically
'high' theologies of Scripture - theologies which very soon issued in extremely
'ontological' doctrines of 'verbal inspiration' and 'inerrancy' (Heppe 1950: 12-41).
There is, of course, an acute irony in all of this. For all Vincent and
Wolterstorffs insights into Calvin's 'pragmatic' model of sacramental discourse, it
would appear that although English Calvinism has rejected 'predicative' concepts of
Jiturgicallanguage-meaning in favour of strongly 'contextualized' doxologies, it has
done so on the supposition that Scripture will yet provide 'universal propositions'
for the assembly to interpret and apply. Hence, while the logico-semantic paradigm
may have disappeared from liturgical doctrine, it did not vanish altogether; instead,
it was transferred to the doctrine of Scripture. It is no coincidence that many
commentators have thus identified in post-Reformation Calvinism an Aristotelian-
style 'Scholasticism' of Biblical language to match Medieval Scholastic depiction
of the Mass (Rogers & McKim 1979; Vos 1992: 342). Quite how 'scholastic'
Calvin himself is in his own doctrine of Scripture has long been an issue of debate
(Hodgson & King 1982: 95; Godfrey 1983, cf. Rogers & McKim 1979). Certainly,
he regarded the Old and New Testaments as the exclusive location in which God
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had 'hallowed his truth to everlasting remembrance' ([1559] 1960: 1.7.1) and argued
that the Bible alone contained 'perfect doctrine' ([1958b]: 397). What is more,
Scripture for Calvin was 'self-authenticating' - its own best interpreter ([1559]
1960: 1.8.5). What is beyond doubt is his conviction that this same Word of God
was the ground and starting-point for all true worship. Thus for Calvin, 'by His
Word alone God sanctifies temples to himself for lawful use', and 'God breathes
faith into us only by the instrument of his Gospel ([1559] 1960: IV.1.5; IV.8.11;
IV.2.4).
Given these premises, it is hardly surprising that the central focus of worship
in Calvin's doxology is the teaching, preaching and proclamation of 'perfect
doctrine'in the sermon ([1559] 1960: IV.8.8). Where Ladriere and Fageberg reflect
Catholic thinking in seeing the language of the Canon as 'constituting' the Christian
community, Calvin declared that 'the church is built up solely by outward
preaching' ([1559] 1960: IV.1.5).
As it has developed, the Reformed church has very much borne out this
pedagogic-homiletic paradigm of worship. Both in practice and in doctrine, 'the
proclamation of the Word' has proved foundational in the evolution of its services -
often at the expense of other parts of the liturgy. Although the isolation of a
'preaching service' from a 'Lord's Supper service' was first essayed by Zwingli in
Holy Week 1525, and although Calvin himself pressed long and hard for a weekly
celebration of the eucharist, the fact remains that the Genevan magistrates' decision
to hold communion on only a quarterly basis proved normative for the vast
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majority of Reformed Confessions for centuries afterwards (Davies 1948: 182;
Wolterstorff 1992: 294-5). Positively, this renewed emphasis on the sermon made
Scripture comprehensible to ordinary worshippers in a way which had hardly been
possible in a Mass where preaching had usually been either non-existent or else
read from a prescribed 'Book of Homilies' (Davies 1948: 190; Jones et aJ 1978:
376-7; Fuller 1986: 485). Negatively however, it appears to have ushered in an
overweeningly 'didactic' bias in liturgical discourse - a bias which remains the
most commonly-criticised element of the Reformed service among liturgists today,
and which has been attacked for extending far beyond the sermon itself, into parts
of worship for which it is entirely unfitted, ego the prayers, anaphora etc. (Bouyer
1963: 57; Mayor 1972: 27; Grainger 1974: 36-7; Ware 1981: 155-6; Old 1984:
101; Maxwell 1986a: 458).
Although some modem Reformed theologians have hypothesised the value of
reducing such didacticism, their doxological systems remain largely driven by
'proclamation'. For example, Karl Barth's magisterial Reformed Dogmatics opens
with an exposition of the Doctrine of the Word of God in which 'the Word of God
preached' is seen to constitute 'the function of the church's life which governs all
others' ([1936] 1975: 88). Granted, whereas Ladriere casts the proclamatory aspect
of liturgical performativity purely in terms of reciting a fixed creed, Barth presents
the proclamatory 'act' of the sermon as 'a new event in which the event of human
talk is not set aside by God but exalted, in the Word of God' ([1936] 1975: 95). As
MacQuarrie has observed (1967: 45), in this regard Barth's outlook has much in
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common with the 'performative language' approach to worship. Even so, the
'commencement' of preaching for Barth is still 'the Word of God written' - that is,
the revealed text of Holy Scripture ([1936J 1975: 102). As George Hunsinger has
shown (1993: 47), although Barth has a strongly 'pragmatic' conception of both
Scriptural and homiletic language-meanings, he still 'seems clearly to presuppose
that the truth and intelligibility of theological claims are in some sense logically
independent of the rightness and truthfulness with which they may either be
advanced or contradicted on the human plane'. In other words, a 'cognitive' view of
truth at the level of doctrinal discourse transcends a 'performative' view of truth at
the level of liturgical discourse.
In a similar vein, while von Allmen (1965) sets great store by a holistic pattern
of liturgy freed from the 'rationalist heresy' which sees Scripture making worship
redundant, he nonetheless describes the sermon as 'that phase of worship in which
the preacher can bear witness to the truth and reality of what has been proclaimed
by the reader of Scripture' (1965: 143, my emphases). Still, it is the 'propositions' of
the Bible which predetermine the 'performance' of worship; still, doctrine is
'brought along' to the rite more than it is 'brought about' in the rite.
Here we come back full-circle to Wainwright, for though a Methodist rather
than a strictly Reformed churchman, he nonetheless leans towards the
Reformed/Protestant model of doxology - that is, the same method of taking 'the
dogmatic norm of belief as setting a rule for prayer, so that what must be believed
governs what may and should be prayed' (1980: 251). The difference is that now
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we have a much better understanding of why Reformed theologians and liturgists
seem to have operated in this way rather than according to the converse model of
lex otsndi; lex credeadiadvocated by Catholics like Ladriere, Power, Kavanagh
and Fageberg - a model in which 'what is prayed indicates what may and must be
believed' (Wainwright 1980: 251). Specifically, it would appear that Reformed
doxology has rejected an essentialistic or causal performativity of 'the Canon' for
fear of what Bouyer (1963: 57) calls 'an empty encrustation of ritual' - an 'occultic'
imputation of power to the very form of sacral language itself, rather than to its
function as an instrument by which God communicates the 'truth of His Word'. On
the other hand, Catholics appear justified in having accused the Reformed tradition
of too often assuming that this 'truth' exists only prior to and distinct from worship.
as a set of dogmatic 'statements' which are 'contained' in Scripture and which must
be 'taught' , 'explained' and 'proclaimed' in preaching.
In Part ITof our study, we shall attempt to show that despite their each having
more recently claimed linguistic-pragmatics as an ally, neither of these versions of
lex orendi, lex credendi has managed adequately to realise the implications of
pragmatics for the analysis of liturgical meaning. Partly, we shall confum that this
is because they have almost all failed to recognise that pragmatics entails much
more than a 'theory of performatives'. Also, however, we shall show that it is
because they have largely neglected to relate their doxology to the actual practice
of worship in the church context to which it belongs - a neglect which has caused
them unduly to abstract and idealize the concept of 'performativity', so leading to
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an exaggeratedly polarised view of its meaning on each side.
More specifically still. rooting these doxological concerns in empirical
analysis should help us to test just how 'didactic' English Reformed worship really
is, and thus to assess whether the excessively pedagogical image of it propounded
by liturgical theologians is supported by the actual data of liturgical performance.
In addition. we should also be able to test whether the movement of the English
Reformed church away from 'written' service books and towards 'spoken'
extemporary services corresponds in any way with pragmatic distinctions between
'writing' and 'speech'.
With these expectations in mind. we now tum to the collection and
presentation of the data with which we shall be working.
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CHAPTER4
PRAGMATICS AND TIlE DATA OF LITURGICAL
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH
TO THE SACRAL SPEECH EVENT
4.1. The place and use of coll)US data inpragmatics
Given that pragmatics is by definition concerned with the functions of
language in context, Leech is surely right to surmise that 'a fully fledged pragmatic
theory would not only be formalized, but would also be capable of empirical
testing' (1983: 230). Ferrara (1985: 139) makes a similarly plausible case when he
suggests that 'ideally pragmatics would want to base its claims about
appropriateness conditions on a fum empirical basis and...link its description of
abstract act types to their roots in concrete social and cultural groups'. Indeed, one
might even suggest that a pure 'theoretical pragmatics' would entail not only a
paradox. but a contradiction in terms, What is more. these points gain particular
pertinence when applied to the pragmatics of liturgy. Just as even the most
transcendent doxology must be grounded in the immanent worship of the local
church (Wainwright 1980: 349-52; 357-69), so any allied discipline of 'liturgical
pragmatics' will have to echo the praise of specific congregations as well as the
worship of the whole body of Christ. This is especially true for the Reformed
133
church, whose identity has most often been defined through 'a particular assembly
in one village, city or province' using its own 'ecclesiastical rites', as well as
through 'an oecumenical and universal assemblage scattered through out the whole
world' (Leiden Syn~psis [1625] 1881: XL, 33; Heppe 1950: 664-669).
Now Leech specifically argues that 'confirmation of pragmatic hypotheses can
be sought by analysis of corpus data'. Where such analysis is undertaken, it will be
predicted that conformity to a given maxim is considerably more likely than
nonconformity: then again, says Leech, ' it is always possible that if corpus findings
contradict the hypothesis, this can be explained as due to the influence of
competing maxims' (1983: 231). This scenario bears out David Crystal's definition
of 'corpus' as 'a collection of...either written texts or a transcription of recorded
speech, which can be used as a starting-point of linguistic description or as a means
to verifying hypotheses about Janguage'(1980: 94, my emphasis). Certainly, there
is no reason to suppose that the use of corpora in pragmatics should be any more
troublesome than in those other branches of language-study where their place is
more established (Leech 1983: 231). From this point of view, Levinson also
predicts and encourages the development of pragmatics in a more corpus-based
vein, contending that 'the proper way to study conversational organization is
through empirical techniques' (Levinson 1983: 285). Ironically perhaps, Levinson's
textbook still belongs to that vast majority of pragmatics literature which fails to
demonstrate such commitment to empiricism with original data of its own. 1.
1. To be (air, some o( Levinson's other work on language-use in (act bucks this trend (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987).
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Rather, in a move whose import for us will become clear in a moment, Levinson
presents extant research by various ethnographers of communication as providing
the most appropriate 'model' for a corpus-inclusive pragmatics (1983: 284ff.).
Despite this general lack of dedicated, 'first-hand' experimentation, Levinson does
at least usefully trace the consequences which might attend such a shift in
emphasis, and his comments here relate directly to our own search for a valid
analytical framework:
...the largely philosophical traditions that have given rise to pragmatics may have to
yield in future to more empirical kinds of investigation of language usage.
Conceptual analysis using introspective data would then be replaced by careful
inductive work based on observation. The issue raised here is whether pragmatics is
in the long term an essentially empirical discipline or an essentially philosophical
one, and whether the present lack of integration in the subject is due primarily to
the absence of adequate theory and conceptual analysis or to the lack of adequate
observational data, and indeed an empirical tradition (1983: 285).
Levinson in fact co-opts none other than Austin (1956: 131-2) in support of
pragmatics' transfer from linguistic philosophy to social science. Not all linguists.
however, are convinced by the line of progression which sees language-analysis
developing inevitably from a deductive philosophical discipline into one driven by
'public observation' and 'experimentation'. Chomskyan linguistics, for example, is
characteristically sceptical about the value of 'empirical' studies, holding that
corpora cannot adequately reflect the structure of a whole language and are thus
liable to offer fmdings which are contingent. accidental and selective: as Wallace
Chafe sums up this view. 'the possibilities inherent in language are quite vast.
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and ...it may be fortuitous whether something turns up in one's 'corpus' or not'
(1986: 215, cf. Chomsky 1965: 4). Chomsky's 'generative grammar' relies primarily
on the introspection of the analyst, rather than on data collected in the field.
Moreover, this preference is deliberate and studied - it derives not from academic
laziness but from a closely-argued prioritisation of 'competence' over 'performance',
from a quest for 'language universals' rather than potentially misleading 'particular
cases', and from a conviction that linguistics is at bottom a branch of cognitive
psychology (1965: 4). As Crystal points out (1971: 105), this professedly 'mentalist'
perspective- is indeed far removed from that adopted by the mainstream scientist,
who would go to strenuous lengths to exclude personal intuitions from his/her data
on the grounds that they would undermine objectivity. Chafe is similarly alive to
the drawbacks of introspection, and ironically highlights its potential for denying,
rather than confirming, the 'universals' of language:
...introspection is famous for its penchant for being influenced by the introspector's
idiosyncratic experience and expectations. Different introspectors come up with
different results, even when they are introspecting about the same thing, although
they often appear not even to be doing that Many arguments arise from these
difficulties. Beyond that, as psychologists have been quick to point out, there are
many things we do that we are not aware of, things that are not accessible to our
consciences (1986: 216).
2. CtystaI is clear that not &11 aenerative &J'IIIIIIIII'ia are mentalists, and stresses that thou'" they might shun
introspection. scientists do not always rely on pure observation - ea. the concept or the atom was fannulated without
directly observed phenomena.
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Heeding the points made so far, it would seem inadvisable to pursue our
analysis here on either too introspective and theoretical a basis, or on too corpus-
dominated a level: clearly, each emphasis has its demerits. One of the most lively
debates in modern pragmatics has, in fact, precisely concerned the proper
methodological balance between 'formalist', 'generative' or 'predictive' approaches,
and those which arise more from a 'natural language' or sociolinguistic perspective
(Leech and Thomas 1990, Bickhard and Campbell 1992; Chametzky 1992; Sarangi
& Sembrouck 1992). The issues raised by these studies in tum hark back to
Habermas' seminal hermeneutic assessment of the tension between 'empirical-
analytic' and 'universal reconstructive' approaches to pragmatics. Although
Habermas himself robustly defends the priority of the 'universalist' paradigm, his
argument is nuanced enough to recognise that this should not be taken to deny the
value of inductive sociolinguistic data. Indeed, like Crystal (1976: 17), he
acknowledges that in investigative practice, the two will often be closely linked
(1979: 32-3). Tilley, by comparison, is not only much more sanguine about the use
of corpora; he tips the scales firmly in their direction and follows Nussbaum's
(1986: 270) condemnation of the 'reductionist scientism' of much classical speech
act theory:
...speech act theorists tend to spend little time portraying concrete speech acts.
Their interest is generally in providing rules which account for language use. Once
the theorist has explicated the rules, there is no need to deal with the messy
particularity of speech situations, for these are of no real philosophical or
linguistic interest The real interest can then be pursued: forming a philosophy of
mind or showing how individual minds acquire the rules that give them the
cognitive capacity to use langugae or perform the mental and speech acts that they
perform (see Searle 1983). However, such an approach cannot explain speech
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acts. .. A speech act theory composed only of rules is reductionistic. (1991: 16-7
nl).
It is largely in view of the widely differing opinions on how pragmatics should
be done that we ourselves have resolved here to follow Chafe (1986) in attempting
a consciously 'catholic' programme of analysis - one in which established
pragmatic hypotheses are treated seriously in relation both to doxological principles
and our own 'liturgico-linguistic' competence, but where such universalizing
concepts are tested - and even modified - by reference to specific, observed
discourses. In aiming for such catholicity, it is important to realise that, far from
adopting an entirely novel strategem, we shall simply be making explicit certain
assumptions already underlying the two approaches in question. In this regard,
Crystal again suggests a helpful reflection:
[No mentalist would] deny the relevance of empirical data, in the sense that in
working out his system of rules for competence, and finding that his rules were not
producing the sentences to be found in any corpus, be would conclude that
something was wrong somewhere, and presumably would go back and re-examine
his conscience. A point of contact with empirical data... has to be made sooner or
later. From the other side, no anti-mentalist would in fact restrict himself to the
patterns be found in a corpus, as if he were the linguistic equivalent of a jigsaw-
puzzle enthusiast A corpus-based linguist is not necessarily a corpus-restric~
one - and I have never in fact met a 'corporate' scholar who believes that his rules
do not in some way transcend his data - that is, account for the patterns in his
corpus and a lot more besides ...(1971: 107),
Bearing these insights in mind, let us now tum to the specific issues involved
in assembling and using a liturgical corpus for pragmatic analysis.
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4.2. The use of corpora in liturgica.llanguage study: precedents and
principles
In his definition of the three-fold 'method-theory-fieldwork' schema
which we are applying here, Crystal suggests that empirical analysis will
complement methodological and theoretical exposition of religious language-use
by ensuring 'the establishment of a detailed formal description of systematic
covariation between linguistic features (of whatever kind) and social context'
(1976: 17).
Even as we endorse such an approach, however, the problem remains that the
sort of corpus-driven pragmatics envisaged by this model, and then prescribed by
Leech, Levinson and Ferrara, is as yet 'far undeveloped' (Leech 1983: 231; cf. Rose
1992: 49). What is more, we have seen very clearly that the few existing efforts to
apply pragmatics to the language of liturgy have concentrated near exclusively on
deductive philosophical models like Austin and Searle's classifications of
illocutionary acts (Jeffuer 1972; Ladriere 1973; Mananzan 1974; Ravenhill 1976,
Thiselton 1986 [1975]: 18-20; 1992: 299), or Grice's Conversational Maxims
(Warner 1990). As such, they have tended to incorporate actual liturgical data only
in order to underline or illustrate the a priori hypotheses which these models have
proposed. All this is despite Gill's formative commendation of linguistic-pragmatic
'spadework' on religious discourse (1969) and Schmidt's unequivocal declaration
that 'only by research, experience and experiment can we find out whether
liturgical language in its components or performances is valuable or worthless'
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(1971: 7). Admittedly, Martinich (1975a; 1975b) did substantially remodelSearle's
taxonomy for Roman Catholic ritual, but his 'data' was still culled from general
printed worship books rather than from 'the field' - that is, from specific, local
liturgical performance, The same limitation applies on the Protestant side to the
work of Vincent (1979), Ware (1981) and Wolterstorff (1993). Meanwhile, Charles
Ferguson's brief but useful digest of, and programme for, the study of religious
language does claim some basis in the casual observation of campus chapel
worship (1985: 206), but this is more anecdotal than empirical, and Ferguson
himself admits that he is doing little more than raising issues for others to pursue.
Even Tilley (1991), who is certainly conversant with later developments in
pragmatics and whom we have just seen placing such strong emphasis on the social
and 'institutional' dimension of liturgy, still confines himself either to his own
introspection or to a loose amalgam of 'illustrative' texts, rather than dealing
inductively with a systematic corpus of religious and liturgical material. Thus an
'encyclical' from American Catholic Bishops on nuclear weapons procurement
serves to exemplify one range of 'Institutionally Bound' speech acts, while
Martinich's insights on marriage and baptism are reworked to exemplify another.
Likewise, short extracts from Buddha's sermon at Benares, from God's covenant
with Abram (Gen 15) and from Augustine's Confessions are used demonstrate a
theoretical class of 'Institutionally Free' speech acts.
Now as we indicated in 2.4.5, empirical studies on exotic sacral discourse
abound in the pragmatically-related fields like anthropological linguistics and the
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ethnography of communication; it is, after all, a basic axiom of these disciplines
that the identity of a culture or sub-culture will be significantly embodied in the
'enactment' of its rites and ceremonies (Malinowski 1935; Saville-Trioke 1989: 41-
4). Typical examples of such research are the work of Tambiah on the 'magical
power' of Sinhalese ritual formulae (1968); Fabian's (1971) anatomy of genre-
definition in the Jamaa worship of Shaba, Africa; Fitzgerald's analysis of worship
language among the Ga of Southern India (1975), and Zaretsky's ethnosernantic
categorisation of the language used by Spiritualist churches in California (1970;
1972). As we shall see, these sources offer certain general guidelines for an
'experimental' pragmatics of liturgy. The fact remains, however, that they are
focussed on religious traditions which differ markedly from that mainstream
Western Christianity with which the Reformed church - despite its missionary
expansion - is most readily associated>,
All in all there would appear to'be extant only a handful of genuinely corpus-
based studies on liturgical language-use in European / American church services -
and even these have tended to be either very brief, only incidentally linguistic, or
otherwise decidedly limited in scope. Over thirty years ago, Pike (1967 [1954-60J:
73-92) essayed a detailed analysis of kinesic and linguistic 'segmentation' in one
Sunday morning service at 'a young independent church' of 'a rather informal
evangelical type' - a church he had attended 'on numerous previous occasions'.
3. Undoubteclly, thanks to the major missionary initiatives of the 19th cenIUry, there are now members of the World
Al1ianc:eof Reformed Churches in allmajor continents (Vischer 1982). Many of these have developed 'indipnous' Iiturcies',
but it is the 'Geneva' model, derived from Calvin and based in tum on the ancient Latin Saaamentaries. wlUch dominates.
For confirmation of this see Sell (1991).
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This remains a key resource for the liturgical pragmatician, emphasising as it does
Pike's conviction that 'there are units underlying social structure that are analogous
to those which underlie language structure' (1967 [1954-60]: 96; cf. Bock 1962).
Nevertheless, Pike's data is confined to just one congregation and.in any event, is
used more as 'case study' material for a general demonstration of how behavioural
scientists might 'break down' the constituent elements of any corporate ritual. Even
greater generality attaches to the work of Werner Jetter (1978), whose concern for
the function of 'symbol' in the church service is anthropological in the broadest
sense rather than particularly linguistic-pragmatic. Likewise. despite its title. we
have already noted that Lardner's 'pragmatics' of liturgy (1979) in fact applies a
broad sociology of communication to introspections about the Mass which are only
incidentally linguistic.
A considerably deeper and more concentrated pool of data underlies the work
of Rosenberg (1970a). Presenting no fewer than 17 transcripts from seven separate
ministers, Rosenberg investigates the language of extemporary 'folk preaching' in
various locations across the USA. His analysis is sensitive and his findings
insightful. What is more, his data-gathering technique - a combination of audio-
taping and interviewing - suggests an apt precedent for further 'field' studies of
worship discourse. On the other hand, Rosenberg's focussing on sermons alone
means that he cannot capture the diversity and variation of registers which go to
make up the whole speech event 'church service'. In this sense, he cannot be said to
have modelled a genuine pragmatics of liturgy.
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Similar preoccuptaion with just one facet of worship marks the relatively large
number of well-sampled linguistic studies on glossolalia, or 'speaking in tongues'
(eg. Goodman 1969; Hine 1969; Samarin 1969; 1972a; 1972b) - a phenomenon
which is particularly associated with Pentecostalism. but which has entered many
mainline churches during the last three decades through the so-called Charismatic
Renewal movement (Ward 1984: 192-208; Davies 1986: 220-30; Hesselink [1975]
1992). Hine's survey is particularly extensive. comprising as it does '45 case
histories, 239 self-administered questionnaires, informal interviews with leaders
and members of more than 30 Pentecostal groups, and participant-observation in
seven churches and prayer groups' (1969: 211). For all this. however. glossolalia
remains a single issue within the wider realm of liturgical-language study. and for
our purposes it also must be recognised that Reformed churches have been among
the most reluctant to embrace it (Bittlinger 1981; Pursey 1992). By contrast. David
Crystal (1976) engages not only a major (Roman Catholic) liturgical tradition. but
also a wide range of standard 'modalities' within the Mass - namely unsion prayer,
individual prayer, Biblical reading and sermons. This said, his analytic concerns are
very specialised, focussed as they are on the non-segmental phonology of worship
rather than the more general pragmatic features it might display. Furthermore,
although he has since usefully mapped out a much broader sociolinguistic
framework for the study of liturgical language-use (1990), this is demonstrated
purely with reference to the written texts of Catholicism and Anglicanism. The
former article, at least, is based on four hours of field recording plus questionnaires,
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gathered over a two week period. Like Pike, however, Crystal limits himself to one
congregation only, thereby missing any variation which might occur between
different churches in different settings.
While all the studies mentioned so far shed light on the anatomy of a corpus-
inclusive pragmatics, it is from another group of analyses. all conducted by those
schooled in the ethnography of communication, that the clearest lessons may be
drawn for the approach we are seeking here. Jules-Rosette's doctorate on the
Apostolic Church of John Marangue in Central Africa (1973) presents an
exhaustive account of language-context interaction in religious ceremonial. but
perhaps the most important examples for our purposes are those set by Gulich
(1980) and Enninger & Raith (1982).
Gulich's work is concerned with the relation of formalized discourses to the
institutions in which, by which and for which they are generated. Although she
scrutinizes the language of various other bodies, she shows an acute appreciation of
just how liturgical interaction both reveals and instantiates ecclesiatical identity. In
this respect, her approach can be seen crucially to complement Ladriere's much
more philosophical portrayal of 'Institution' as a vital component in doxological
performativity (Ladriere 1973: 58-9). GUlich's research is, in her own words,
oriented 'more to the analysis of empirical oral material than to the discussion of
theoretical problems' (1980: 419, my emphasis). Specifically, this entails her
having recorded and transcribed various services in the united Protestant Church of
Germany between 1977 and 1979, as well as having undertaken detailed exegesis
144
of that church's Books of Order. Such in-depth data-gathering in tum facilitates
strongly 'functional' readings of a range of liturgical discourses, including welcome.
blessing. confession of faith, prayer introduction, notice-giving. the peace,
confirmation, sermon and ministerial induction. Admittedly, GUlich relates neither
her corpus nor her ethnographic exposition of it to pragmatic theory per se, but her
fieldwork on the discourse of blessing does at least form the raw material of a
subsequent article by Reinhard Wonnenberger (1984). which deals directly with
The blessing as a liturgical speech act', and which thus seeks to make 'a
contribution to the pragmatics of the institutional church service'. Though fairly
brief and narrowly-defmed, this article does at least represent a working example of
how empirical data-gathering can interact with, and so modify, the 'classical'
taxonomies of illocutionary activity which have been formulated by philosophers
like Austin and Searle. It is especially significant that Wonnenberger claims to
conduct his enquiry 'independent of intra-theological teaching' (1984: 1070) - that
is, treating Gulich's data as a contribution to liturgical-discourse theory, rather than
as a purely post hoc illustration of it. On a larger scale, it is Wonnenberger's kind of
inductive-deductive reciprocity which we require here.
GUlich also provides a key reference-point for the magisterial work of
Enninger & Raith (1982) on Old Order Amish worship. We have already made it
clear that for all its merits, this study follows an agenda which goes far beyond
linguistic pragmatics, proceeding as it does on the basis that 'the church service
ceremony can ultimately be modeled as a multicoded supersign, a semiotic system
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in its own right' (1982: vii). Indeed. like Gillich, Enninger & Raith actually bypass
the work of specialist pragmaticians. Nonetheless. their four-fold 'data base',
consisting of historical material on Amish culture and theology. 'internal'
publications such as prayer books and service manuals. notated records of spoken
and non-spoken liturgical action, and voluntary informant testing. suggests a
precedent which would readily apply to a pragmatics of English Reformed worship.
After all, here too is a Protestant tradition. the development of whose thought and
culture need to be understood lest its ceremonies appear as 'meaningless routinized
behavior' (cf. Enninger & Raith 1982: vii, Ferguson 1985: 211, Kelleher 1993:
318). Here too, is a phenomemon whose own 'folk taxonomies' can 'serve as
guidelines as to how the members of the culture isolate and construct the social
event 'church service" (cf. Enninger & Raith 1982: 3). Here too, is a tradition for
whom the Word of God is archtypally 'enacted' in the context of corporate praise
(1982: 46ff cf. von Allmen 1965: 54; Barth 1975 [1936]: 88ff.). Here moreover, is
a Christian community far more extensive and socially significant than the Old
Order Amish - a community the traces of whose emergence in the Sixteenth
century are seen in a contemporary worldwide constituency of some 70 million
Reformed Christians (Sell 1992: 403). If Enninger and Raith had a case for the
'empirical' study of liturgical performance, then surely so do we.
Recently, Margaret Mary Kelleher (1993) has woven the diverse experimental
strands which we have been considering into a more systematic programme for
what she calls the 'hermeneutics of liturgical performance'. Not surprisingly, this
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programme is also based firmly on methodologies used in the ethnography of
communication - methodologies which she reports are 'gradually being recognized
as...significant...in the field of liturgical studies' (1993: 292). Although our own
research data had already been gathered when her paper was published, the
approaches which we have used, and which we recount in the rest of this Chapter,
will be seen both to support Kelleher's programme and to endorse the 'empirical
rum' she has identified elsewhere.
Having said all this, it would be foolish to pretend that in this single study we
could conclusively redefine either liturgiology, or pragmatics itself, as disciplines
based on induction when their development has been so firmly along deductive
lines. Neither should it be forgotten that a major touchstone of our analysis is Jean
Ladriere's intensely doctrinal and conceptual theory of liturgical language
'perforrnativity'. Still, it is noteworthy that even Ladriere hints at a more inductive
development of his own thesis, albeit leaving such work to be done by others:
The time to which liturgical language refers-..has an eschatological structure. A
more detailed analysis would have to try to reveal this structure in the internal
organization of liturgical language. Only thus could one show in what way it
really 'makes present' that which it talks of. (1973: 61,1..394-399)
The phrase 'internal organization' here is vague and rather misleading. but
taken in the context of Ladriere's whole hypothesis. it must mean something more
than syntactic or semantic exegesis. Indeed, given his stress on 'performance', the
most appropriate test of Ladriere's ideas about liturgical language would surely be
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provided by the sort of corpus-inclusive pragmatics we have been advocating.
If the case for undertaking some form of data-based analysis is clear, it is
crucial that we collect and deploy such data in an appropriate manner. First and
foremost, it should now be obvious that if we are to minimise the arbitrariness
which Chafe warns against, it is imperative that such data be well-defined, suitably
'controlled' and reasonably extensive. Kelleher's advice to the corpus-inclusive
liturgical henneneut is germane in this regard: 'use interpretative frameworks that
do justice to the multi-dimensional nature of performance and to the complexity of
the ritual field' (1993: 318). With these guidelines in mind, let us now consider the
material with which we ourselves shall be working.
2.3. Original data used in this study
In 3.4 we suggested that Reformed liturgy would be of particular
interest to the pragmatician due to its characteristic mix of 'written' and 'oral' rites.
Furthermore, we saw that this mix was especially marked in the English Reformed
tradition. whose major strands are in large part defined by different attitudes
towards textualised vs. non-textualised ritual. Given this. it is appropriate that our
analysis should focus on both formal or 'scripted' discourse and on extemporary or
'unscripted' worship language. We shall come to see that these distinctions are more
complex than might be supposed, but at this point it is enough to define the former
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category as comprising printed texts designed for use in a number of congregations.
We shall refer to this category using the term 'prayer book material: although it is
important to note that this category subdivides into those texts authorised by a
denominational body for widespread use, and other publications produced on a
more independent basis by individuals or groups. Furthermore, it should be noted
that in the 'Free Church' situation with which we are dealing, the rites, prayers and
litanies proposed in such material will not always be used in their entirety: very
often, certain sections or 'portions' will be extracted for some especially formal
passage (eg. Holy Communion) within an act of worship which otherwise eschews
published orders. Having said this, whatever the extent of its use, such 'prayer book'
discourse can clearly be differentiated from that which is not reliant on a ratified
text. Typically, the interlocutor in 'non-prayer book' worship will be more
immediately responsible for the formation and ideation of discourse than is the
participant who reads from a standard liturgical order, where the only significant
'encoding variables' are intonation and (possibly) gesture.
Of course, it does happen that either whole congregations or individual
worship leaders will deploy texts produced purely for local worship. These may
enjoy long-term use, or may simply be 'one-offs' composed with a single service in
mind. Though clearly more idiosyncratic than authorised or commercially produced
liturgies, these will still retain a level of 'scriptedness' marked in its contrast to the
kind of thoroughly extemporary discourse common in English Reformed churches
since the rise of Radical Puritanism (Spinks 1984a: 28-36).
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We shall look more closely at issues of liturgical 'fixity' and 'formulaicity' in
Chapter 8, but as far as data is concerned it is surely preferable to draw on as many
of the categories mentioned as possible: this way, we stand more chance of
reflecting the characteristic diversity of Reformed worship. Fig. 1. summarises the
categories of material we have mentioned and identifies appropriate means of
collection for each. From this chart it is clear that our corpus should consist of
material gathered in two basic ways: first, by the simple selection of written
liturgical material; and second, by fieldwork carried out on specific acts of worship.
What is more, since performed church services will themselves often display mixed
use of 'scripted' and extemporary types, it is clear that 'in situ' data collection can to
a large extent subsume other methods (see Fig 1):
LITURGICAL DATA SOURCES DATA COLLECTION LOCAL
DISCOURSE METHOD CONTEXT
CATEGORY SPECIFICITY
1. Authorised Librviesl Gathering a range Low
'prayer book' Bookshops representative
texts texts & portions
2. Unauthorise4 Librviesl Gathering a ranee Low
'prayer Bookshops representati ve
book'texts texts & portions
3, Priated local texts Specialist As I, & requesting Fairly
for long-tenn use libraries copies from local High
& churches congregations
4, Printed local texts Local Gathering copies High
for 'one-off or churches & from local
short-tenn use fieldwork congreeations
,
S, Personal inter- Fieldwork I Background quest- Very
Iocuter scripts ionnaire & record- High
ing 'in situ'
6, Performed Fieldwork Recording Extremely
worship discourse 'in situ' High
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2.3.1 Published material: the URC Service Book (1989)
Although often stereotyped as a tradition shaped by the rejection of
prayer books (Gunton 1989: vi), it should be acknowledged that even while not
legally imposed, formal worship texts have been published, distributed and used
throughout the history of the Reformed church (Maxwell 1955: 53). In his
comprehensive survey of English Congregational liturgy alone, Spinks lists more
than 30 such texts, and also identifies several rites produced and printed 'in house'
by local churches (Spinks 1984b: 270-87). Presbyterianism, meanwhile, has been
even more wedded to the concept of 'common order' (Barkley 1966: 22-40). As for
the modem United Reformed Church, Robinson's 1984 study of worship styles in
local congregations revealed that approximately 10% made use of some kind of
'prayer book' available to every member of the congregation, while around 30%
observed services which were 'mainly fixed', implying that the Minister probably
made use of a published 'script' even if this was not seen by all (Robinson 1987:
17)4. Moreover, even though the rest of the service might have been 'unscripted',
over 50% of churches were described as using a printed rite for communion
(Robinson 1987: 38). Taking all this into account, our examination of pragmatic
hypotheses will from time to time draw upon the historic service books and printed
4. RobiDson's survey covered 93 separate URC congregations, represenlltives from each beinl questioned at " major church
conference in August, 1984. There are 1,813 URCs, so this represented" near 5% sample.
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rites of the Reformed tradition from the mid-Sixteenth century onwards.
Specifically however, we shall pay very particular attention to the most recent
addition to the 'textual' tradition of English Reformed worship - namely the 1989
URC Service Book While itself drawing on a wide range of historic material, this
contains probably the fullest and most widely-distributed body of 'printed' English
Reformed worship in use today.
Now the testing of pragmatic theory with written liturgical texts has both
advantages and disadvantages. In the case of 'authorised service data', conciliar
endorsement and repeated common usage may be seen as a check on the potential
'fortuitousness' and idiosyncrasy which we mentioned earlier. Less helpfully,
though, such 'official' liturgies can tell the analyst very little about the specific
discourse contexts in which they might be used, because publication affords them
an existence which is largely independent of local speech communities; the same is
true of 'unauthorised' general service books. Since pragmaticians are distinguished
precisely by their accounting for such contexts and communities, they are likely in
such circumstances to assume or idealize them, and thereby to risk an over-abstract
and impressionistic analysis. The same problem can arise - albeit to a lesser extent -
in the case of 'local' texts, since no printed order can by itself offer a comprehensive
anatomy of liturgy 'in performance', Further still. we have already seen that the
discourse of English Reformed worship is in any case substantially 'oral' and
extemporary in character, and so yields no 'text' from which even some semblance
of 'context' might be inferred. As Kelleher warns (1993: 302), and as language
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theorists from Searle (1977) and Halliday (1985) to Derrida (1977) and Ricoeur
(1981) have confirmed, significant differences thus mark the 'pragmatics' of spoken
and written language. We shall pursue the institutional and doctrinal implications
of these differences in 8.6.1, but from the analytical perspective they very much lay
behind our decision to supplement purely textual data with material gathered from
'in situ' fieldwork. It is to this second main component of our corpus that we now
tum.
4.3.2 Field Data: Advent Sunday Survey
4.3.2.1 Background
Since Reformed worship is so often 'non-prayer book' in character, it
would be seriously misrepresented by any pragmatic study which did not pay
attention to its more 'phonocentric' or 'extemporary' manifestations. This, however,
presents the analyst with a number of problems. First, by their very nature 'oral'
liturgies are less easily captured: if there is no formal text, utterances are liable to
be 'lost in the air' just as soon as they are produced. It is for precisely this reason
that major areas of English Reformed liturgical history - ego the Radical Puritan
tradition and Eighteenth Century Congregationalism - are bereft of primary
sources. Admittedly, certain ritual formulae may be memorized even though they
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are not written down. Broadly speaking, however, the Reformed church allows
considerable room for speech innovation in worship, so that the precise content and
form of discourse is likely to show marked variation from service to service -
especially as compared with the 'logocentric' rites of Catholicism, Anglicanism or
Eastern Orthodoxy. Robinson may have had 30% of URC informants describing
their liturgy as 'mainly fixed' (1987: 17), but this leaves a significant majority
worshipping in a more flexible or 'spontaneous' vein. Clearly, taking proper
account of such worship means capturing it as it happens, and it is here that we are
led 'into the field'.
Those analysing language as it is used in context have ultimately to move
beyond written sources. Since Reformed liturgy has a bias towards orality, some
form of situational recording needed to be undertaken in this case. Here once again,
techniques commonly deployed in the ethnography of communication are
applicable, and it is in her overview of such techniques that Muriel Saville-Troike
(1989: 121-30) has identified five main methods of data collection in addition to
'introspection' and 'philology' (ie. the analysis of formal texts as just outlined).
These five procedures are: a) video taping; b) audio taping; c) note-taking; d)
interviewing and e) ethnosemantics. S Each of these approaches has its value,
5. Saville- Troike also mentions ·Etnomethodology/Interaction Analysis· as a data-collec:tion procedure, although this may be
seen from our point of view as a form of generalized ~/ysis which is consequent upon the five methods we have identified.
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but it is important to heed Saville-Troike's advice that the extent of their
deployment must be determined by 'the type of data being collected, and the
particular situation in which fieldwork is being conducted' (1989:117). What is
more, the analyst will often benefit from commanding 'a repertoire of methods from
which to select according to the occasion' (1989: 117). Now clearly, our
methodological repertoire has been determined by the 'occasion' and 'particular
situation' of contemporary English Reformed worship, and before considering the
shape of this repertoire it will be appropriate to survey the specific field to which it
has been applied.
4.3.2.2. Determining the data field
The services on which our field study focussed were 'contemporary' for
the obvious reason that we could not regress into the past and conduct 'in situ'
recordings of worship that was over and done with. Furthermore, given the
aforementioned diversity of English Reformed liturgy, this field study was
compelled to reflect various patterns of tradition, churchman ship, theology and
spirituality at work in different congregations.
It was with these considerations in mind that we chose to concentrate on
worship in the United Reformed Church (URC). Although there are several church
'parties' and smaller denominations in England who would claim a Reformed
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heritage. the URC is most extensively and directly linked with this tradition. having
been formed in 1972 from a union of Congregational and Presbyterian churches.
and having been joined in 1981 by a majority of Churches of Christ. whose main
doctrinal heritage was also firmly Reformed (Thompson 1990: 119). Not least
because of this multiple heritage. the URC is a broad church with a diverse
liturgical character - something confirmed by Robinson in the study mentioned
above (1987). Although it has some congregations in Wales and a handful in
Scotland. the URC is largely English in composition. Properly scrutinised. there
seems good reason to suppose that URC worship will be representative of the wide
range of Reformed worship in England today.
4.3.2.3. Analytical perspective
Before assessing the details of our fieldwork approach. one further
point must be reiterated in relation to our singling out the United Reformed Church
for special attention. This is that the author is himself an ordained URC Minister
and as such. occupies the position of what Saville-Troike calls a Participant
Observer (1989: 119). Participant observers are defined as those who are at once
sufficiently immersed in a speech community to understand its structure,
conventions and behaviour, and yet who are at the same time able to scrutinise that
speech community using established analytical methods in order to draw
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reasonably dispassionate conclusions. Saville-Troike comments that such
participant observation is 'the most common method of collecting ethnographic
data in any domain of culture' (1989: 119), and makes it clear that within this
approach 'a high level of linguistic as well as cultural competence is a sine qua non
for successful fieldwork' (1989: 120). While we stress again that this study does not
aim to be a full-blown ethnography of church service communication in the style of
Enninger & Raith (1982), these particular comments are surely pertinent to our own
undertaking. Certainly, our personal experience of Reformed liturgical discourse is
likely to prove less purely anecdotal when set in relation to 'natural data' gathered
under controlled conditions in carefully-selected contexts. Then again, if 'raw
fieldwork' can be interpreted by one who is 'linguistically and culturally
competent', it is likely to contribute more fruitfully to any wider theoretical and
doxological conclusions which might be proposed. Admittedly, being a Participant
Observer in one's own ecclesial culture can present pitfalls stemming from over-
familiarity with certain 'patterns or practices'; likewise, one may 'choose to ask
questions of people compatible with [oneself] and thereby bias the study', or
otherwise 'lose the necessary balance between detachment and involvement'
(Kelleher 1993: 295-97). Ultimately, though, we decided that our dual roles as
practitioner and researcher should, with suitable self-assessment, prove
complementary rather than contradictory.
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4.3.2.4. Selection of participant congregations
One area in which our participant-observer knowledge proved helpful
was in the selection of congregations for scrutiny. Clearly, for data to be
representative of English Reformed worship as a whole, it had to reflect a suitable
range of geographical locations, social settings, tradition, churchman ship and size.
With this in mind, we chose 15 local churches whom we judged would together
comprise such a range, and wrote asking them to participate in our fieldwork
survey (see letter in Figure 2a).
One congregation could not take part and another failed to return sufficient
data. Of the remaining thirteen who cooperated fully, ten were eventually chosen
for closer anlysis. This number was deemed sufficient to present a good cross-
section of the United Reformed Church worship as it is practised today.
From Questionnaire data explained more fully in 4.3.2.6.2. below, it emerges
that our intuitions about the diversity of congregations surveyed were largely borne
out by the information they supplied on themselves. Helpful corroboration was also
forthcoming from the results of a major church census on English Christianity
carried out by the Marc Europe organization in 1989 and published two years later
in a report written by Peter Brierly (1991). Since 77% of all the 1,681 English
United Reformed Churches then in operation participated in this census, it provides
a good check on the representativeness of our own field sample.
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Figure 2a) Initial letter to 15 URC Churches requesting cooperation in Fieldwork
Survey.
ooo~KEYvVORTH UNITED REFOR1\1ED CHURCH ODO~
O~[I] NOTTINGHAM ROAD, KEYWORTH, NOTTINGHA~1 NGll SFD . O~[IJ
Minister:
Rev. David Hilborn BA
29 Maythorn CloSG
West Brid;ford
Nourn. NG2 TIE
Tel: Home Nonm.456147
ChurchPlumtree 3662
Secr erary;
Mrs D. Cragg
2 Rose Hill
Keyworth
Noum. NGI2 5GR
Tel: Plumtree 3081
Tr easu r er :
MrJ. Tinsley
17 Main Strce;
Keywonh
Noum. NGI2 5AA
Tel: Plumtree 26:!2
Pulpit Supply:
Mr S. Hunter
24 NotJin~ham 'Rd
Keywonh
Noum.NGI25FD
Tel: Plumtree 5588
30th October, 1991
Dear
I am writing to request your help with my doctoral thesis. I am attempting
to analyse the d1scourse of Reformed liturgy using 1ns1ghts drawn from
node rn contextual lingu1stics (or'Pragmatics'). Although a good deal of IDy
study is of a philosophical/theoret1cal nature, I ~ant to include a ce~tain
amount of 'fieldwork'. With this in m1nd, r em atcecptlng to gather a
sample of around 10 URC services, all of which are to be tape-recorded on
the seme day - 1st Decelllber, 1991 <Advent Sunday). The sample is int.cnded
to reflect a broad range of worship-styles and I should be very grateful if
you could pe rt t cLpet e.
ilhat I lJould like you to do 1s:
1. Take a recording of your .ain service on 1st December, using
the cassette tape provided. Then return it to me as soon as
possible in the stamped addressed envelope I have enclosed. I
realise tbat you may already record your worship on a regular
basis: in this case I would aSK that you either copy this onto my
tape, or send De your original so that I can copy it and send it
back to you by return of post. If you have an amplification
6yste~ it is obviously best to taKe the recording using this; if
not, most modern cassette machines will do an adequate job. If'it
is simply Dot feasible to organise any Kind of recording, please
let liteIcnow so that I can make alternative arrangements.
2. Complete the accompanying questionnaire and send it back with
the tape. This is an important adj unct to the recorcting, and the
..ore information you provide, the easier my task becomes. The
'Order of Service' section, in particular, requires as much
detail as possible.
If you could include any specially printed bOterial used during the
service, this would be most useful. A photograph or drawing of yourchurch's
exterior would help, too, but is not essential.
I know this all seems a lot to ask, but it is only (I 'one-off', and ,you
really viII be helping to roll beck the frontiers of human kno~ledge (well,
sort of!).
Rev. David Hilborn
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Figures 2b) and 2c) reveal that three of the 10 churches analysed come from
London and the Home Counties, one from the South, one from the South West,
three from the Midlands and two from the North. This mirrors the national
distribution of both Christian churchgoing in general and Free churchgoing in
particular (Brierley 1991: 72-3; Map 47). It also fairly well reflects the specific
spread of United Reformed churches around the country (Brierley 1991: 72; Map
7) - although the lack of a participant from Essex/East Anglia does mean that a
traditionally strong area of ex-Congregational chapel worship is omitted (cf.
Brierley 1991: 68, Map 7). Seven of the 12 URC Provinces are represented, and
even where more than one church is drawn from a single province (eg. Wessex),
the fellowships in question vary significantly in their setting, composition and
character. Indeed, we reckoned that our concern with differences of language-use
in diverse worship contexts would more likely be served by a sample containing a
good spread of social. demographic and theological profiles than by sheer
geographical distribution.
In terms of setting and environment; Figure 2d) shows that three churches
(Heme Hill. Warsash and St. George's High Heaton) define themselves as
'suburban residential', one (Emmanuel, West Wickham) as 'suburban
residential/suburban town centre' and one (Wheatley) as 'suburban residential/rural
village'. One church (Thatcham) is set in an 'expanded village' and another
(Blackford Bridge, Bury) in an 'urban village', One stands in an 'urban housing
Figure 2d) Digest of Information on Churches in Advent Sunday Survey
AOVENT SERVIC!! 111\1.'9\\
COl.LEGE YR. ORDAINED
NAME DISntlCT PROVI:-,1CE SETTlNG BIIILDINC "vCE. CONGo ,\Cit! RANGl:: (7~1 CltURCItMAN
~"IINISTER TIIEME ~INISTER'S DRESS
D.\TE ·16 I(t.l'} 'iJ-b' 6l+ Sill I'"
CO~MIII'II()I'I'
N ..\dyenl.3th
C ....'\SI)(k&c:~1
MlI\Slield 199<1 ,\nn.Yc,,",V, Gift
I. Heme Hill Bromley Southern Suburban ru.. 19.50s la. 14 4) 16 Ubtn.1
JlII~1 LovCIl1
Odord 5crvi,c
y ,\dveRI
t"l."\llCIL. 'OW" & blJ\lU
I?JI
l. Emmanuel. Oromtty Southern Ubenl
D«ck Rkhmond ~cw. London
Suburb"" low" 1?l9 210 lS t7 t7 2?
Wt;!II. Wlckht.rn cenlrUrt\.
,\dveRI <:1I.........'lCk alb 6t c:tCh~
\t(U\SOcld I?R9
). Thatch.", Rudin, &. W~'u Esp&llded villa,e ISM 100 la 10 :J :J Broad EVUI,clicAI
D.1opMc Willia.ml
Oxford
O.ford
.\Jvut. Chutell Milll~cr.!iull.klill
I?~I y l'Tul;hcr. t:a.:........w:k. ,u"'" ,,'~,lc.1
'. Oenirord
.: Comwlll&. South West 1"&1.11Snell
Nnrthct'ft .\nni ...cO!iuV 1:,,11&1, htMlJ. )lOlcl1rbu.!outlyin, 1966 'lO )0 ~O 3D 20 Mlitutru.sn Manc:hes1et
Eyt.nlellul
Plymouth ......
~u( Jipccifi.:d ,\11,,1:\11:(: Sull 4L Ihl
19M
"
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estate' (Weoley Castle), one serves an 'urban/outlying housing estate' (Derriford),
and another is located in an 'inner city' district (Bulwell). These self-descriptions
may, of course, diverge slightly from those which a sociologist might use, but they
are sufficient for us to confirm that our chosen contexts of situation range in a
pattern comparable to that charted by Brierley within the URC as a whole.
Certainly, the Marc Europe census confirms that 'suburban' and 'urban fringe'
environments are by far the most common for URC churches (33% of all social
types), with 'separate towns' accommodating the next highest proportion (20%).
'Dormitory Rural' communities account for 12% of United. Reformed congregations
and 'Other Rural' settings for 16%. 'City Centre' and 1nner City' congregations
represent 10%, and 'Council Estate' churches 4%, of the total (Brierley 1991: 112).
Although at first glance this may suggest that our survey is somewhat skewed
towards urban and 'estate' fellowships at the expense of rural ones. it should be
noted that that former have a far higher average attendance than the latter (97 and
60 respectively compared with 41), and that 'housing estate' in our Questionnaire
was taken to include more than just council housing (cf. Brierley 1991: 114).
As for congregational size itself. the 1989 census revealed the average
attendance at main URC Sunday services to be around 70 adults and 20 children 6•
This compares closely with an average across our survey of 98 attenders per church
(73 adults and 25 children). Within the sample, one church claimed an average
6. This approximate f"J&Ufe is iderred from Brierley statistics for tOl&lSunday adult attendance at all services. where those
attending both morning and evening are COllDted twice (1991: 47), and from the ilIformation dial in 1989, there were approx.
3~,300 children Iltending URC churches, the tOl&lnumber of which inEngland was 1,681 (avge. 21 per church).
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main service attendance over 200. one between 150 and 200. three around 100.
four between 50 and 100. and one about 30. It should be recognised that this
somewhat favours mid-sized congregations at the expense of the many small
'chapel' congregations of the Free Church in general (cf. Brierley 1991: 138-39)
and the URC in particular (cfURC 1993/4).
Age distribution across the 10 congregations analysed here was reflective of
that measured by Marc Ewpoe in the URC nationally (cf. Brierley 1991: 92).
Slightly different age bands were used in the census. so exact comparisons are
difficult. Nonetheless. our overall proportion of under 16's (25%) is close to its
figure of 22% for under 15's, and the 29% of worshippers over 65 in our sample
compares reasonably with the 35% tabulated by Brierley. The percentages of
young adult and later middle aged attenders in our fellowships were also very close
to the overall census statistic: our sample shows an overall average 16% of 16-39
.year-olds as compared with the countrywide figure of (approx.) 18% for the URC,
while our 27% of 40-64 year olds accords closely with Marc Eurpoe's 25%
(approx.).
The age of the church building in which worship was set varied from 1797
(Wheatley) to 1970 (Weoley Castle and Bulwell). In between. three date from the
Nineteenth Century, three from the first half of the Twentieth Century, and two
from the 50's and 60's. Although this distribution is somewhat more 'modem' than
Brierley's national pattern (1991: 180), which shows 26% ofURC churches dating
from after 1900and 74% from before, it should be noted that his statistics relate to
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the foundation of the congregation, which does not reflect any modemisistion or
rebuilding of premises - either on the original site or at another location. (The 'shell'
of Bulwell URC is, for instance, much older than the internal architecture of its
worship space, though it is the date of the latter which appears on the returned
Questionnaire).
When surveyed, all churches in the sample had their own ordained Minister.
Although this fails to reflect the fact that at anyone time many URC churches are
'vacant pastorates' and thus rely on either lay or 'visiting' ministries, it was thought
important that informants for the survey should be Ministers in pastoral charge,
since it is they on whom the denomination places responsibility for 'the ministry of
Word and Sacraments' (URC Manual: 6). Eight of these ministers were men and
two women - a gender split which roughly mirrors that found in the ordained
Ministry of the URC as a whole, where 14.5% of Ministers in pastoral charge are
female 7• The lengths of servi~e of the Ministers in question varied from ordination
in 1953 to ordination in 1990. In addition, the sample included Ministers trained in
each one of the URC's and its forbears' main colleges during this period - that is,
Mansfield College, Oxford, New College, London, Northern College, Manchester
and Westminster College, Cambridge.
As. for historic identity, seven of the fellowships analysed were
Congregationalist by foundation, two Presbyterian and one an ex-Church of Christ.
Of these one (Heme Hill) was united with the Methodist church. Again. these
proportions bear out those displayed across the URC as whole (Slack 1978: 23-4).
7. This fi&llfe was COnIIl11Ied to us by the URC Secretary for Ministries in a leaer dated 16th JUlIe 1994.
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Informants for each congregation were not asked to defme their
churchmanship in doctrinal terms, but using the classifications of the 1989 census,
my own knowledge of them would lead me to designate three as 'Liberal', two as
'broad', one as 'broad evangelical', three as 'mainstream evangelical' and one as
'charismatic evangelical'. It is readily admitted that this distribution is skewed
towards evangelicalism in its various forms, given that the total number of
evangelical URC's represented only 12% of the United Reformed congregations
surveyed by Marc Europe, as compared with 48% 'Liberal' and 22% 'Broad' (a
further 15% described themselves as 'Low Church', which is fairly meaningless in
this context, and 3% gave some other response (Brierley 1991: 164-5». This may
partly be attributed to the fact that I am myself an evangelical and therefore found
it easiest to elicit the cooperation of evangelical Ministers and churches for my
study. More positively, however, it can be emphasised that the distribution of
theologies in my survey is very representative of the broader range of English
Protestant and Free Church worship, where evangelicalism is much more of a force
(Brierley 1991: 165). Thus although our field data comes exclusively from the
URC, its evangelical bias can be justified by the fact that we are concerned as a
whole with the broader sweep of Reformed church practice, and that both
historically and currently, this is more evangelical than statistics for the URC alone
might suggest.
Now just how far all or any of these 'background' factors can be seen to have
affected the actual language use of the sampled congregations is precisely the issue
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which will determine the importance of a field-based, as opposed to a purely
introspective or text-restricted, liturgical pragmatics. It may be that the
ethnographic methods we have outlined will add comparatively little to the
linguistic-pragmatic reading of worship; but at least in contrast to most previous
studies on church service language we can claim to have tested their usefulness,
rather than either assuming or theorising the effect of 'context' on Christian ritual
discourse. At least, too, it is clear that our sample has attempted consciously to
minimise the potential 'arbitrariness' and 'contingency' of a corpus-based approach.
What is more, where even those who have applied more inductive techniques have
confmed themselves to one service (Pike, Ferguson), one congregation (Crystal) or
one homogenous 'sect' (Jules-Rosette, Zaretsky, Enninger & Raith), we are casting
a comparatively wide net over a mainstream Christian constituency whose
liturgical character is well-established and yet historically diverse (cf. Barkley
1966; Nichols 1968; Old 1984; Spinks 1984a; 1984b), In short, there is good reason
to suppose that analysis of worship in this sample will enhance our project, and
little or no reason to suppose that it could detract from it.
4.3.2.5. Selection of services for analysis
Perhaps the most crucial decision after choice of congregations related
to which of their many services should be subjected to analysis. The Reformed
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Church has typically eschewed a strict 'liturgical calendar' with fixed lections and
themes for every Sunday of the year. Although the ecumenical influence of the
Joint Liturgical Group has led some URC congregations to observe set patterns of
readings and topics, it is unlikely that the Biblical or thematic basis of worship
would be uniform across several congregations on any but the most prominent
Festival Days. While this heterogeneity may in itself be regarded as a key mark of
Reformed identity (Old 1984: 57-85), it does not bear directly on our main focus of
interest here, which is the interpersonal function of liturgical discourse per se,
rather than the particular set of ideas such discourse may carry at anyone time. Put
another way, our primary interest is in the pragmatics, rather than the semantics, of
worship. Indeed, precisely because of this, it was deemed that fieldwork should be
such as to reduce ideational diversity to a minimum, the better to foreground
comparisons and contrasts of communicative action. With this condition
established, obvious candidates for a suitable date were identified as Christmas Day
and Easter Day, Pentecost and Advent Sunday. Christmas Day was rejected, as
URC services on this occasion frequently depart from a standard structure, often
being much shorter than usual and omitting a sermon. Easter Day and Pentecost
tend to have a more normal framework, but are still more liable than Advent
Sunday to be celebrated in special, one-off services - services which, for instance,
incorporate a eucharist 'out of sequence' (cf. Robinson 1987: 37). Despite certain
distinctive features (such as the lighting of a festive candle) Advent Sunday is
generally less 'marked' than other major festivals in the URC and as such, has more
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in common with standard weekly worship. This is perhaps reflected in the fact that
of the 10 Advent services which eventually constituted my fieldwork corpus, only
six included Holy Communion, which is close to the average proportion of URC's
identified by Robinson as celebrating the sacrament on any Sunday of the year
(1987: 37)
4.3.2.6 Data Collection Procedures
Having decided for the above reasons to concentrate on the first
Sunday in Advent, the next important decision became how exactly to collect data
from participating churches. Plainly, it was desirable as a form of 'control' to gather
material from one particular Advent Sunday in one particular year - that is, more or
less simultaneously. Obviously, this meant that we ourselves could not be
present in at least 14 of the 15 services originally being scrutinized; indeed, to
ensure equanimity and relative objectivity in this regard, we deliberately omitted
worship in our own church from the survey. While this might be thought to
disqualify us from the participant-observer status claimed earlier, it does so only in
an immediate sense: as a URC clergyman, we are still well placed to relate this
fieldwork data to our own knowledge of Reformed liturgy in general and Advent
liturgies in particular; as a pragmatician, we were able to prepare and frame our
analysis in such a way as to recover specifically that information which would be
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of most relevance to a functional linguistic analysis.
The date of the survey was fixed as Advent Sunday, 1st December 1991. It
was decided that discoursal data would be gathered only from the main act of
worship held by any participating congregation on that day. In practice, this meant
the morning service; many churches hold a 'second' Sunday service - usually in the
evening - but this is typically much less well attended (cf. Brierley 1991: 49-51),
and is often less reflective of the liturgical year.
*
As has already been stated, the combination of data-gathering methods chosen
by the analyst is crucial. In our case, of Saville-Troike's five options, only video
recording was discounted. This was due not least to the operative and financial
difficulties attending the installation of 15 cameras in 15 different churches on the
same day, but also to the fact that, in contrast to the ethnographer or the
anthropologist, the pragmatician is specifically interested in those features of
context which bear particularly on linguistic communication. We concluded that
these features of context could be retrieved sufficiently for our needs by the
integration of: i) audio taping, ii) informant testing (through a kind of delegated
'note-taking' and written interview combined), and iii) ethnosemantic analysis.
Hence, the letter sent to churches selected for our survey (Fig. 2a) above) carried
instructions relating to each of these. Let us now examine them one by one.
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4.3.2.6.1 Audio Recording
Since pragmatics deals primarily with spoken communication, the case
for audio analysis is strong. To some extent, speech contours, dialogical cues etc.
can be captured by an 'on site' note-taker skilled in phonetics and intonation, but
this could never hope to be as comprehensive or objective a method of recording as
that based on microphones and tape cassettes. Besides, the need to cover 15
services more or less simultaneously made the latter approach the obvious choice:
many congregations audio-tape their worship as a matter of course for the
housebound, and so had the relevant equipment already in place, while even where
a machine had to be specially installed, it required very little oversight once set
running. Indeed, in view of its simplicity, it is perhaps surprising that sound
recording has been used so little in pragmatic analyses of worship. Among shorter
studies, only Pike's (1954 [1967]: 76 n2) and Crystal's (1976: 20) seem to have
deployed it to assess a complete service - and then only in one location. On a more
detailed level, Enninger and Raith (1982: 3) are very much in favour of the
technique. but found it unwelcome in the Old Order Amish community they
investigated.
Although sound recording can furnish the liturgical pragmatician with
valuable 'real data', we should not suppose that this data will be entirely impartial.
If it is true that even video recordings are 'limited in focus and scope to the
cameraman's perception' (Saville-Trioke 1982: 121), then we must accept that
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audio evidence will be affected by such factors as the positioning and range of
microphones and the quality of reproduction. Since each church in our survey used
its own equipment, ranging from sophisticated 'in house' systems to portable
cassette players, such variation must be acknowledged and allowed for. Further
still, we should note that the sound apparatus in most churches is oriented towards
the front of the worship area, with microphones centred on pulpit and/or lectern. In
addition, Ministers often wear a clip microphone on their clothing. All of this tends
to shift the 'auditory focus' away from the congregation and towards individual
addressors. However understandably, this may 'skew' our impresssion of the overall
discourse pattern within a service. With all this in mind, the following remarks by
Chafe are apt:
What is recorded by a tape recorder is not the whole story, In fact, for a naive
speaker or hearer, there may be little or no consciousness of these sounds
themselves. It is the message or the interaction that is apprehended and
remembered. This is not to say that the tape recorded sounds are not a rich source
of data: it is only to say that there is much more to language - its content and the
goals of its speakers - that tape recorders can only indirectly capture. (Otafe 1986:
216)
Given the impracticability of video for our fieldwork, alternative ways of
assembling the non-oral information which Chafe emphasises had to be found. It
was here that informant-testing and ethnosemantics came to the fore.
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2.3.2.6.2 Informant Testing: Questionnaire
The process we have called 'informant-testing' represented a
combination of Saville-Troike's 'note-taking' and 'interviewing' procedures. In the
Advent Sunday survey. it took the form of a detailed questionnaire sent to the
Minister of each participating congregation. Data was requested at both a
diachronic and synchronic level: this is to say. questions related to both 'historic' or
'general' details of the church's life such as its age. social profile. average
attendance and internal shape, as well as to aspects of the particular service under
scrutiny - time, duration. specific theme, ministerial attire etc.. Questions were
worded and selected in such a way as to yield only that contextual data which
might have some significant bearing on the discourse of worship: there was no
attempt to construct a complete or exhaustive 'frame' for each congregation (cf.
Minsky 1977) - rather. the aim of the questionnaires was to support and illuminate
the primary material recorded on tape. The results from these questionnaires are
reproduced as background information' for respective churches in Appendix 4.
2.3.2.6.3 Ethnosemantic Analysis: Service Order Chart
Accompanying the tape recordings and questionnaire was a third
analytical tool - one whose purpose was to ascertain not so much the overall
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'context of situation' in each case, but rather the various 'contexts of utterance'
which were in play at different phases of the service. Now while liturgists or
sociolinguists would typically settle at imposing their own taxonomy on such
intradiscoursal phases and contexts, ethnosemantic analysis aims to discover how
the members of local speech communities themselves distinguish different blocks
of linguistic communication. In Saville-Troike's terms, the 'ultimate goal' of such
analysis is therefore 'an ernie account of the data, in terms of the categories which
are meaningful to members of the speech community under study'; an eric account
in terms of a priori categories is a useful preliminary grid for reference and for
comparison purposes, 'but is usually not the ultimate goal of description' (1989:
130).
In our case, the a priori 'grid' for utterance-contexts proposed five main
elements. From a technical point of view, these related respectively to: the identity
of different utterances or liturgical portions; the status and role of interlocutors; the
derivation or 'antecedence' of discourse; proxemic factors, and kinesic factors.
Within the survey as distributed, these were decsribed and presented as in Figure 4.
SECTION OF
~
PROVENANCE ,osmON AND
GESTURE OF
SPEAKER
STANCE OF
CONS.
SPEAr::ERCS1/
SlH6£RCS)
eg.confession
hYlln, serlon
eg.• inister,
choir
Does this p'~rt
deri¥e froD
a set text, or
is it extellp-
oury?
eg.pulpi t,
table; raised
hinds
eg. sittln;
standing
Figure 4. Service Order Chart for Advent Sunday Survey.
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Ministerial respondents were asked to fill these five columns with as much
salient information as possible, thereby providing an anatomy of each horizontal
section or 'portion' which would reveal far more than the tapes could do on their
own. The charts as completed for each church follow each transcript in tum in
Appendix 4.
Clearly, such an ethnosemantic analysis must be seen as contributory to, rather
than dominant within, our overall study. We have already emphasised that
pragmatics has typically adopted a deductive rather than an inductive approach,
and it is worth bearing in mind Susan Ervan Tripp's insistence that 'folk
taxonomies' can vary even within the same speech community and in any case, can
never be relied upon to account for every possible discourse category (Ervan Tripp
1978: 66). Our commitment to a catholic approach bears reiteration in this regard.
Since we are attempting a pragmatic analysis of real social discourse, we cannot
remain in the realm of pure theory; on the other hand, because we are looking to
draw more general linguistic and theological conclusions, we cannot treat our data
in the same way as might a thoroughgoing cultural relativist. Our fieldwork will
serve critically to check, and even alter, hypotheses, but at least as much, it will be
invoked to uphold generalised hypothetical tenets out of a conviction that not only
liturgy, but discourse per se, is characterised by certain properties which arise from
the common condition of humanity in relationship to God.
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2.3.3. Transcription of Field Data
2.3.3.1. General Principles
Given that a significant proportion of our study is committed to the use
of original,'in situ' field data. it is important to establish how such data should be
represented and analysed 'on the page'. We have already discussed the methods of
corpus collection used in our Advent Sunday survey; we must now consider how
best to transcribe this data so that it might properly contribute to our testing of
pragmatic-linguistic and doxological hypotheses. This, however, is a task which is
far from straightforward. Insofar as we are engaged in 'socio-pragmatics', we face
considerable difficulties when trying to define an appropriate set of transcription
conventions. First, our focus on particular speech communities and 'real' discourses
obliges us to develop a notation which presents context of culture, context of
situation and context of utterance more specifically and more delicately than has
been deemed necessary by most 'general pragmatic' and 'pragmalinguistic' studies.
On the other hand, we have by now established that our requirements are not such
as to necessitate the exhaustive socio-cultural descriptions associated with a full
ethnography of communication.
As we have seen, most standard approaches to pragmatics are 'general' in their
orientation. They begin with theoretical principles (eg. 'illocutionary force',
'direction of fit') and then offer imagined utterances by way of exemplification.
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These utterances often form part of a 'dialogue'. in which two (and rarely more than
two) speakers are identified. Apart from such participant-labelling. little other
contextual analysis is supplied - no doubt because the examples given are in the
first place hypothetical and thus virtually context-free! (instances of this abound in
Searle 1969. 1979; Cole and Morgan 1975; Searle. Kiefer and Bierwisch 1980;
Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Searle and Vanderveken 1985; Recanati 1988 and
Blakemore 1992).
Once more, we might well note that all this seems odd in view of the fact that
so many have defined pragmatics as precisely the study of language in relation to
context (Searle 1969: 68; Gazdar 1979: 2; Levinson 1983: 21; Leech 1983: 13;
Blakemore 1992: 5-9). Indeed, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, even
while themselves remaining analytically introspective, some have begun to suggest
that pragmatics needs more seriously to explore the possibilities of natural-
language corpora. Meanwhile, the minority who have already chosen to reassess
pragmatic principles in the light of real data are charged with attempting a much
fuller description of non-verbal, as well as of verbal, features. Any such attempt
should. however, be guided by the kind of 'quantity control' articulated by Eleanor
Ochs in her foundational paper on Transcription as Theory' (1979: 44): 'a transcript
that is too detailed is difficult to follow and assess. A more useful transcript is a
more selective one'. Put another way, we need to develop a transcription of our data
which accords closely with our purpose. In this study, we have emphasised from
the outset that our main interest is in the relation between language and people as
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language users (cf. Morris. 1938: 6) or more particularly. between liturgical
discourses and those who participate in them as worshipping interlocutors. In this
sense. though we are concerned to present a study of liturgy as communication. our
primary grounding in liturgical discourse (both written and transcribed) means that
more generalised codifications of human interaction such as are found in the fields
of ethnomethodology (cf. Goffman 1967. 1974; Lardner 1979) or psychology (cf.
Sperber and Wilson 1986) will be of less immediate value than a descriptive
framework which presents 'context' specifically as it is observed in relation to
particular uses of language in our chosen 'field'.
4.3.3.2. The 'tum' as a basic transcription unit: applications to
liturgical discourse
While the prescription just given might appear to demand discourse
analysis at the deep level pioneered by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975). it should be
recognised that their system was developed especially with the classroom in mind,
and that most adaptations of it have been applied to speech-events where 'speaker
turns' have a comparably short. quick-changing. one-to-one character and where
they are strongly foregrounded as a result - whether to casual conversation (Burton,
1978). doctor-patient interviews (Coulthard & Ashby, 1973), telephone talk
(Schegloff, 1979) or Pinterian drama (Burton, 1980). With the same assumptions in
mind, Ochs follows Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 700) when she posits the
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'speaker-tum' as a 'basic unit' for discourse transcription. This is defined by her as
an utterance bounded by either 'the utterance of another participant' or by a
'significant pause'(1979a: 63). She then argues that
as so much of pragmatics is concerned with conversational sequencing, it is crucial
to use the concept of a tum at talk (or tum at behaving or acting). Many types of
sequences, for example, adjacency pairs ...(Sacks & Schegloff 1973) are based on
tum units. For the analysis of such sequences as well as other areas of concern, our
transcript ought to display tum units in a systematic manner. (1979a: 69)
Where liturgy is concerned, however, it is important to recognise that 'tum-
taking' according to both of Ochs' criteria would appear to have a character which
is markedly different from that displayed. in the more commonly-studied. discourse
types just mentioned. Ferguson (1985) for example, has noted one very significant
difference with respect to 'change of speaker'. Pointing out that most modern
discourse analysis has been concerned with 'dyadic conversation', he observes that
by contrast, 'a very common pattern of church service discourse ...is the one-many
dialog, in which a speaker addresses the whole group and receives a unison
response'. He then goes on to note that a "'systematics of tum-taking" (Sacks et al
1974) in this context has yet to be developed', and asks 'How does the single
speaker, Who is almost always the initiator, assure the appropriate group response,
delivered in the appropriate manner?'(1985: 209).
We shall address this question directly in Chapter 7, but it is pertinent to note
here that such one-many sequencing has been reflected in several written service
books of recent years, where bold type has been used to signal congregational
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responses to Ministerial initiation (eg CELC 1980a; URC 1989).
While Ferguson's qualifications are certainly significant for many Christian
traditions, he fails to recognise an even greater problem for a liturgical transcription
based on tum-taking. This is to say, he overlooks the fact that in Reformed and
other Non-conformist worship, it is possible for a single Minister to be the lone
speaker (hymns notwithstanding) from the beginning of a service to its very end.
Even where multiple voices are used (eg. for various readings and prayers), certain
stretches of discourse - like sermons - may comprise monologues lasting half an
hour or more. For our part, this raises the issue of how to set out our transcription of
taped data in a typographically helpful way.
Even before its systematization by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974),
Ochs (1979: 46) observes that turns based on speaker-changes had been widely
represented by lines 'placed below one another, as in dramatic script' - a pattern
reflected clearly in the layout of most modem service books:
(1) MINISTER
CONGo
MINISTER
CONGo
We bless you from the house of the Lord
My God, I praise you
Give thanks to the Lord for He is good
For his love eudures forever.
CURC 1989: 22).
This so-called 'top to bottom bias' in typography would seem to accord with
intuitive notions of 'discourse flow' in adult conversation, where 'overwhelmingly
we treat utterances as contingent on the behavioural history of an episode', where
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'the contents of a speaker's turn are usually treated as in some way relevant to the
immediately prior tum', where 'the expectation of the reader matches the
expectation of adult speakers' and where 'inferences based on contingency are
correct'. (Ochs, 1979: 46). All the same, Ochs demonstrates that other forms of talk
- notably children's discourse - may not sustain so clear-cut a relevance norm, such
that 'the reader of a script involving at least one child ...has to suspend the
expectation that sequentially expressed utterances are typically contingent' (1979:
74). As a result, she suggests with Bloom (1970, 1973) that in such cases, turns are
better separated into parallel columns so that the reader must 'shift his eyes from
one column to the other in following the evolution of the interaction' (1979: 74). In
this way 'contingency across speakers' turns is not promoted by the transcript' and
'the assessment of pragmatic and semantic links becomes more a self-conscious
process' (1979: 48):
(2) MINISTER BOY
1. what does Advent mean, do you know? it'scountdown to
Christmas
2. it's countdown to Christmas. that's
right
(Based on data from Advent Sunday service at Derriford (Church 4»
Though this style of analysis doubtless has its place, we must emphasise again
that the 'change of speaker' criterion for turns is typically not as significant in
liturgy as it is in conversation - whether adults' or children's. Because they are often
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scripted or in some other way prefabricated. individual turns in worship are
frequently so lengthy and formulaic as to render any notion of 'parallel columns'
redundant. Moreover, although Ferguson's recognition of the Priest/Minister as
'Initiator' is basically sound, this 'utterance event role' (Levinson 1988) may not be
as fixed as it is for the classroom teacher or more generally, for the adult in adult-
child interaction. A lay reader of Scripture, for instance, might temporarily assume
such a status when concluding a lection thus:
(3) READER:
CONG.:
This is the Word of the Lord
Tbaoks be to God
Likewise, a member of the congregation may take the lead in 'free prayer' and
expect her closing 'Amen' to elicit a corporate 'Amen' from her fellow-worshippers.
Such role-shifting and 'multi-party talk' could, of course, play havoc with a fixed
two-column transcription - especially one in which a single 'Initiator' or 'Discourse
Controller' is assumed and in which his/her speech is placed on the left hand side in
the transcription (cf. Ochs 1979: 50-51). Either the number of columns would have
to be increased,
(4) MINISTER READER NOTICE-GIVER INTERCESSOR. ..
or else each new column be retitled when a new interlocutor appears (5):
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(5) INITIAroR
MINISTER: .
MINISTER: .
READER: ...
GWSSOLALIAC ...
RfSPONPENI
CONGREGATION ...
BAPI1ZAND'S PARENTS ..,
CONGREGATION ...
INTERPREIER. ..
Since it could clearly make the transcription 'difficult to follow' (Ochs 1979:
44), such a 'parallel column' approach is best avoided in our case. This, coupled
with what has already been said about the relative infrequency of speaker-change
in liturgy, would suggest that the vertical, 'dramatic' presentation of discourse, with
new lines for new interlocutors. would best suit our material. Hence, this is the
convention we have adopted in the transcriptions which are collected togther in
Appendix 3.
4.3.3.3. 'Significant pausing' as a tum criterion: distinctive patterns in
liturgical discourse
Having decided on a layout for turns based on speaker-change, we had
still to determine how to present discourse within the individual contributions made
by particular speakers. In this respect, it was important to remember that, at least in
middle class Anglo cultures, turns are bounded not only by addressor-change, but
also by 'significant pausing', and that for the main proponents of transcription
theory, 'utterances separated by significant pauses should be placed on separate
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lines' (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974: 704; Ochs 1979: 69). As Ochs admits,
'what will count as a significant pause may vary situationally'. Having said this, she
goes on to suggest that 'typically anything over 0.3 seconds counts as significant'
(1979: 69). Furthermore, this guideline receives impressive empirical support in a
fieldwork survey conducted by Brown, Currie and Kenworthy (1980: 47-75), Here,
Edinburgh Scottish English (ESE) was analysed with a view to determining the
way in which intonation patterns reflect the structuring of spoken discourse into
manageable 'chunks' or 'units' of meaning. Of particular relevance for our analysis
of Reformed liturgy is the fact that Brown et als research involved both the reading
of written texts and more spontaneous speech - a combination which typifies
worship in the Reformed tradition. Their hypothesis is introduced by their stating
that they 'would like to regard the tone group as the realisation of a chunk of
information. If the speaker is speaking fluently, tone groups will usually have
syntactic coherence, in the sense that items within the tone group must be
interpreted with respect to each other ...'.
Now the 'tone group' is widely acknowledged as a fundamental unit of speech
analysis, and there is general assent among linguists that its defining feature is pitch
movement this is to say, it is bounded by syllables which respectively lead up to
and complete a change in pitch. Despite this basic consensus, however, Brown et
aJ. (1980: 41) are right to note that more precise definition of the tone group has
vaned considerably - eg, between Halliday (1967). Crystal (1969) and Brazil,
Coulthard & Johns (1980). We should also note in regard to the tone group that
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while each of the analyses quoted above posits a fum correlation between
phonology and me8Iling as realised by semantic/syntactic structure, Brown et al.
show from their data that in unscripted speech, this correlation can often break
down: 'if the speaker is under pressure, having difficulty working out just what he
wants to say, or having difficulty in selecting the ideal lexical item, he will often
speak in spasms ...where syntactic and semantic structure is interrupted by pause or
pitch phenomena or both' (1980: 44). Hence, they report that 'in many cases we
found that syntactic or semantic criteria would not enable us to make a principled
decision as to where to assign a tone group boundary' (1980: 42).
In attempting to resolve these difficulties, Brown et sl suggest that it is neither
'practical nor profitable to argue about which bits in [our] problem examples are or
are not tone groups' (1980: 46). Rather, they try to construct a model which will
'predict the chunking of speech into units, taking into account constituent structure
(Crystal 1975) and topic-structure (Dahl 1976)' (1980: 46). While admitting that
this model is tentative, they argue forcefully for the soundness of its essential
criterion, which is notthe tone group, but the 'pause-defined unit:
...in read texts a syntactic boundary usually coincides with an intonation boundary
and often coincides with a pause. In non-fluent spontaneous speech it is very
common to find these boundaries not coinciding. This may occur for many reasons -
because the speaker is having planning difficulties, because be thinks his
interlocutor may jump in and take away his tum, because he wants to create a
special effect
The one reliable signal that we observe in spontaneous speech is 'pause:nus
can be relied on to occur frequently, we can readily identify it instrumentally, and
instrumental readings relate very closely to perceived pauses.' (Brown et al .• 1980:
47)
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In the sample of ESE spontaneous speech they analyse, Brown et al. make a
further crucial observation. This is to say that they identify a strong correlation
between the length of pauses and the function they perform in the structuring of
communication. Hence, pauses lasting between 1 and 2 seconds are largely
identified as 'Topic Pauses', operating semantically to intoduce 'new information',
Pauses of 0.6-0.87 seconds tend to signify 'intonation contours' and 'changes of
pitch', while pauses under 0.38 seconds are characterised as 'Search Pauses', in
which the speaker attempts to grasp an appropriate word or phrase with which to
continue (1980: 68). Importantly, the shortest pause recorded by Brown et a/.is 0.28
seconds, which closely concurs with Ochs's suggested 'significance minimum' of
0.3 seconds.
Now although our own transcription of church service data bore out Ochs'
basic insight that pauses have considerable pragmatic significance, it soon became
clear that the lengths of these pauses differed considerably in relation to their
contextual function, as compared with those analysed in the non-ritual discourses
studied by Brown et al. In general, we found that the average duration of Topic
Pauses was much longer, pauses of 4 seconds or more being quite common in the
marking of 'new information'. Likewise, pauses linked with intonation contours and
pitch-changes remained 'unmarked' up to 2 seconds, while 'search pauses' were also
typically much longer. Particularly within the uttering of prayers, it appeared that
this extension of 'normal' pause lengths was linked to the presumption that church
services are arenas of reflection and contemplation, designed to allow for greater
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'thought between words' than does casual or quotidian discourse. In addition,
because the ritual context ties utterances on specific 'subjects' so closely to specific
actions, and because these actions are so often 'segmented' by silence (pike 1954-
60 [1967]), we found that topic pauses in particular were abnormally extended in
the liturgical setting. These observations certainly lend weight to Crystal's
argument (1976) that it is at the macro-phonological level that many liturgical
modalities are distinguished from other forms of speech.
The upshot of all this was a decision to rescale functional pause-timings
considerably upwards from those outlined by Brown et sl; even while bearing in
mind their basic pragmatic distinctions. Due to this, and due to the fact that
pragmatics has no historical association with detailed phonetics (Levinson 1983:
269, 296; 373-74), it was considered adequate that pauses be measured to the
nearest second rather than to the tenths or hundredths of seconds common in more
specifically sound-focussed transcription. Thus lines within individual speakers'
discourse were broken, as standard, between pitch-change/intonation pauses up to
approximately 2 seconds, with pauses of between 2 and 4 seconds being marked in
addition by three dots, and pauses of 4 seconds or more being given in actual
figures to the nearest second. Liturgical 'search' or 'micro' pauses lasting up to 1
second (approx.) and not linked with intonation contouring or pitch movement
were marked by two dots within a line. The following extract from the recording at
Warsash (Church 5 in the survey) makes these pause transcription conventions
clear:
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(6) MINISTER: Thank you Pete. .. .----------- Paae rl2-411:1CC1Dds
One may think 0- on this..Sunday where er
there is somuch flouting of the law going on and somuch
Micropuse --- ~desecradng ..ah of the Lord's Day
it would be good to pray together _-___ I..iDc break· piII:h diaJJ&eI
let's pray ..... ,;"" caat.oar ,... ap ID 211:1CC1Dds
• ..(6.0).~.----------- Laq...- (ID-.atsecoad)
The approach adopted here - as indeed in other aspects of our transcription -
has close parallels with that essayed by Deborah Tannen in her influential study of
repetition, dialogue and imagery in conversational discourse (Tannen 1989). In this
text. Tannen has an appendix on transcription conventions which states: 'examples
are presented in poetic lines rather than in prosaic blocks [because] I believe that
this bener captures their rhythm and makes them easier to read' ..(1989: 202). What
Tannen means exactly by 'rhythm' is somewhat vague, though she does go on to
say that her lines 'represent intonation units to capture in print the natural chunking
achieved by a combination of intonation, prosody, pausing and verbal particles
such as discourse and hesitation markers' (1989: 202). She cites Chafe (1986) in
support of her approach, but here, too, the criteria for breaking lines represent a
somewhat unsystematic mixture of phonological, psycho linguistic and semantic
factors. Chafe argues on the basis of conversational research at Berkeley that
discourse appears to divide naturally into 'certain minimal units' or 'chunks', and
that these units/chunks have 'certain characteristic properties' (1986: 217). Having
first described them as 'idea units' and then 'intonation units', Chafe (1986:
218) says that his definition bears comparison with the 'information units' of
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Halliday (1967), the 'information blocks' of Grimes (1975), the 'tone units' of
Crystal (1975) and others, and' the 'idea units' of Kroll (1977). The eclecticism of
Chafe's approach is underscored when he actually attempts to define the 'intonation
unit', with simultaneous reference to prosody, cognitive science and Thematic
Progression:
The notion I have in mind can be stated in the aphorism, 'one new concept per
intonation writ ..There are two elements of this notion that need to be
discussed. ..what is meant by an 'intonation unit' and what is meant by 'new' ...A
typical intonation unit has a form that can be represented by three dots for a
normal pause and two dots for an especially short one. Then there is a sequence
of words ending in an intonational cadence of some kind. A final comma
represents a clause-final pitch-contour, and a final period represents a sentence-
final falling pitch. ... These intonation writs emerged from covergent observations,
but introspection has suggested to me, at least, that each of them might be the
expression of a single 'focus of consciousness', or a small chunk of thought on
which the speaker was focussing his or her attention at the time the intonation unit
was produced. One thing that might make one feel more sure about this hypothesis
is the psychological notion of short-term memory, the experimentally backed idea
that people have a kind of mental buffer, or workspace, capable of holding
something [of) the order of seven plus or minus two items (Miller 19S6)...the
general point is that a variety of experiments support the idea that our minds are
restricted to focussing on small amounts of information for a limited period of
time. It is a relatively small step to suppose that when we speak. we verbalize a
series of such focusses, each of them as an intonation unit, ..
What then does it mean to say that an intonation lDlit can express no more than
one concept that is 'new'. What does it mean to be 'new' in this sense?
Introspection, observation and experimentation have all converged in this area.
The issue is one that has occupied both linguists and psychologists of various
schools (eg. Firbas, 1966; Haviland and Oarle, 1974; Prince, 1981). One line of
introspection has suggested that 'old' or 'given' information is that which is already
present in the speaker's focal consciousness from long-term memory (Chafe, 1974,
1976).
The observation of real discourse has, I think, repeatedly confirmed the general
nature of the given-new distinction, as well as its important role in assigning
intonational peaks and valleys. (1986: 219).
Like others (eg. Pratt & Traugott, 1980: 285-87), Chafe goes on to distinguish
between 'given' (ie. previously stated) information and 'accessible' or 'shared'
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information (ie, that which is 'inferable from the immediate environment') - and
without doubt, his conviction that the information structure of discourse is in some
way related to intonation patterns enjoys widespread verification and assent (Brazil
et a11980: 73-82; Coulthard & Johns 1980: 73-82; Pratt & Traugott 1980: 286).
The problem, however, is that Chafe fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of how
exactly this connection operates, and here the aforementioned observations of
Brown et el.; which point to certain discontinuities between intonational and
semantico-syntactic boundaries in casual speech. should be remembered. They, in
fact, 'do not recognise an unmarked information structure within pause-defined
units' (1980: 29). Admittedly, we have already noted that in liturgy as in
conversation, pauses of certain lengths tend to display topic-change, but this should
not be mistaken for a hard and fast relation to semantic or syntactic patterning.
Tannen begins by making this very point , but then presents symbols for such
curiously hybrid phenomena as 'sentence final falling intonation' and 'clause final
intonation' (1989: 202, cf. Chafe 1986: 218). In addition, Chafe's determination to
uphold his 'one new concept per intonation unit' hypothesis forces him to deal
rigidly with sometimes highly ambiguous 'information structures' (1986: 221-23).
Further still, despite defining the intonation unit as pause-bounded, Chafe offers
examples in which certain such units appear as lines which neither begin nor end
with pause-notation (1986: 218, 220). Given these difficulties, we would surely be
advised to avoid the very similar associations implied by Rosenberg's transcript
layout, where sermon data is 'printed with one formula or sentence to a line to
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...convey the sermon's rhythm' (1970a: 125). Indeed, we have consciously avoided
imputing either grammatical or Information-structural patterns to our delineation:
not only would this have been potentially confusing; it lies in any case outside the
domain of pragmatics as traditionally defined.
Though we accept that our 'lined' transcriptions are phonetically more 'nalve'
than 'formal' (cf. Brown et 8/ 1980: 48), and though a more clearly non-phonetic
format might have been achieved by a plain prose layout (cf. Gumperz. 1982a;
Atkinson & Heritage 1984), we have maintained lines because even if it is not
absolute, pause-defined units do clearly possess an important relation to divisions at
other levels of spoken language in general and liturgical speech in particular. What
is more, it is surely relevant in this regard that virtually all modem English service
books have their main liturgical passages printed in 'verse' form, While it might be
interesting to speculate on the criteria used to break lines in the latter case, various
contemporary liturgical commisssions are on record as having employed
professional poets to help them in this task (Crystal 1965; Westlake 1969: 150). In
discerning possible reasons for this, the following remarks by Raymond Chapman
bear attention:
..liturgy is spoken language, which has been written down for various reasons -
mainly to ease the memory and to ensure regularity in public worship ...Our private
reading [of it] should only be a preliminary to public recitation. New forms of
worship will be accepted or rejected by their quality on the tongue and in the ears.
(Chapman 1973: 595).
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What is particularly remarkable about this modem practice of textual
'lineation' is that it is not as thoroughly rooted in history as might be imagined.
Original Hebrew and Greek manuscripts of the Bible present solid prose blocks,
and Reformation liturgies like Calvin's Forme, Knox's Ordinal and Cranmer's Book
of Common Prayer have a consistent prose layout. Granted, the early Reformed
churches were distinguished by their use of 'metrical' psalms, but these were
exceptional as far as 'poetic' presentation was concerned. One can only speculate
with Prins (1933) and Brook (1965) that the contours of Sixteenth Century English
speech were sufficiently strong and uniform that the enunciation of liturgy did not
need to be 'signalled' typographically in the way it is today.
Even if we admit that the presentation of 'liturgy as poetry' might aid its public
'performance', we must beware of making too literal a connection between each
modality. As John Westlake has remarked:
Poetry is an especially exact fonn of literary composition. It is impossible to alter
a single word of a successful poem without in some way altering its meaning. One
cannot therefore have two versions of (the same text - one in prose and one in a
poetic fann] and expect that they will have the same meaning. (1969: 1SO)
In view of these potential confusions, it is worth re-emphasising that though
our fundamental 'line-breaking' criterion of 'significant pausing' may make for a
superficially 'poetic' transcript, and though liturgy may sometimes be 'poetic' in
style, this should not be taken to imply a conviction that all liturgical discourse
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belongs in the poetic register. Indeed, the following Chapters will show that our
corpus points decisively away from such a view.
*
We have already hinted that, despite certain definitional ambiguities, Tannen's
system of transcript notation operates at roughly the same level required by our
study. This is to say that it is concerned to record primary features of intonation and
turn-taking without launching into either detailed prosodic annotation or intricate
discourse analysis. To this extent, it resembles several recent studies of
conversation from a broadly sociolinguistic perspective (eg. Jefferson 1977;
Gumperz 1982a; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Aston, 1988; Coupland, Giles &
Wieman, 1991).
While these may be useful precedents, they nonetheless offer a confusing
diversity of symbols and analytic markers: indeed, the same discourse phenomenon
can be represented by anything up to four different notations - not least in that
realm of pausing which we have just been discussing. As for other prosodic and
and situational features, it behoves us to sift from this sometimes bewildering
diversity of conventions a system which will adequately support our analysis while
avoiding 'excess' or 'unnecessary' information. Stressing once again that this is a
thesis about the pragmatics of liturgical discourse rather than one about liturgical
phonology, we have therefore chosen to identify only such major aspects of
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intonation as might have a bearing on key communicative dynamics like
illocutionary force, implicature and tum-progression. As we have said, very few
general pragmaticians have paid much attention to prosodic factors when
considering the interrelation of text and context. Levinson (1983: 269; 296; 373-74)
makes passing reference to them, but apart from acknowleding Austin's obvious
identification of 'phonetic acts' as the physical basis of speech acts (Leech 1983:
200; Davis, 1980: 37-40; Recanati 1988: 239-41), most simply ignore them (though
see Oehrle 1981). As Brown et al (1980: 30) suggest, this could be to miss an
important element of discourse interaction, even allowing that a thoroughgoing
phonology might not be required.
The notation system which we have formulated for presentation of our
fieldwork data is explained and shown in full at Appendix 3, but we comment on
the main features below.
4.3.3.4. Stress. volume, tone and pitch
Writing on the transcription of data for a contextual linguistic analysis
of joke-telling, Auer (1992: 8) contends that a detailed representation of prosodic
features is to be preferred to the more 'orthodox' and 'impressionistic' annotations of
most sociolinguists - annotations in which 'final intonation contours' are
represented purely by 'punctuation marks', stresses by 'underlining' and tum
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overlaps by 'latching'. Then again, Auer's data-field is extremely small compared
with our own, consisting as it does of just one joke told by one Italian-German bi-
lingual child to another. It should be clear by now that ideally, we would commend
a full-scale phonetic exegesis of liturgical speech as something which might tell us
much about the different modalities associated with different Christian traditions.
Both Prins (1933) and Brook (1965) have considered phonology in the Book of
Common Prayer from a diachronic viewpoint, but a modem synchronic study on a
broader basis is surely also in order. As we have seen, Crystal (1976) has sketched
out briefly how such a study might proceed, while Enninger & Raith (1982) have
offered a more thorough blueprint for such work - albeit in a single and highly
sectarian church community. Nevertheless, the fact remains that none of these
studies engage with linguistic pragmatics as linguists have commonly understood
it. Recognising that we must set certain limits on our already potentially wide field
of liturgics/linguistic pragmatics, we thus have decided to forego comprehensive
phonology in favour of the more typical transcriptive 'impressionism' of Gumperz
(1982a), Tannen (1989) et al. This, we feel, is consistent both with our analytical
aims and with the relatively large size of a corpus collected for comparative and
corroborative purposes rather than for 'microscopic' exposition. It is to be hoped
that in future, selected sections of the tapes we have gathered will be subjected to
more rigorous phonetic scrutiny. For this study however, we have restricted
ourselves to highlighting such intonation contours as relate to the natural'chunking'
and 'delineation' of liturgical discourse mentioned above, to vowel elongations and
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glottally-stopped 'cut offs', to the stronger kind of stresses and emphases placed on
particular syllables or whole words, to marked rises in volume and to unusual
features of turn-taking such as simultaneous, overlapping or instantaneous
contributions. This level of analysis is very similar to that endorsed by Levinson
(1983: 369-70), and reproduced by Mey (1993: 233-34), for the purposes of a
corpus-based pragmatics (again cf. Appendix 3).
4.3.3.5. Orthography
Closely related to the issue of prosodic analysis is the problem of how
to represent speech orthographically.
Following Sacks and Schegloff (1974), Ochs (1979: 61) contends that spelling
should be modified so that it 'captures roughly the way in which a lexical item is
pronounced versus the way it is written'. She then offers the examples of 'gonna,
wanna, whazat, yah see' and 'lemme see it' to illustrate this strategy.
Although adopted by many analysts (Labov & Fanshell, 1977; Jefferson &
Schenkin, 1977; Ryave, 1978; Gumperz et a1. 1982b; Atkinson & Heritage, 1984),
such re-spelling has been firmly criticized by Dennis Preston (1985: 328) for its
tendency to 'denigrate the speaker so represented by making him appear boorish,
uneducated, rustic, gangsterish, and so on...'. This, claims Preston, is particularly
true of changes made to reflect dialect and/or accent. Through extensive testing of
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informants, Preston shows that transcriptions using modified orthography can
indeed reinforce class assumptions and lead to unhelpful prejudgements, such that
'the use of respellings by linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, folklorists,
psychologists, and others who want authentic reports of spoken language with a
minimum of phonetic detail may be seriously questioned' (1985: 335-36).
For our transcriptions, we have heeded Preston's critique and have worked
almost wholly with standard spellings. In any case, it is also worth noting that the
often ritualistic and sometimes scripted nature of worship discourse has been shown
to effect distinct prosodic moderation and pronunciative standardisation (Crystal
1976). This suggests again that specialised orthography would be unnecessary in
our case.
4.3.3.6. Non-transcribed material: the omission of senTIons,hymn texts
and readings from analysis
As Ochs points out (1979: 44), the linguistic fieldworker is not obliged
to transcribe every single feature of a sound recording: on the contrary,
'transcription is a selective process reflecting theoretical goals and definitions'.
Having said this selectivity should not be random and implicit; 'the basis for the
selective transcription should be clear', In our case, we decided against full
transcription of three major modes of discourse from the audio-taped material
available to us: sermons, hymn texts and set readings from the Bible (or. in one
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case, from a short story by Tolstoy).
The omission of readings is easily explained: they are already available in
published form and, pronunciation aside, transcription would have added little to a
linguistic-pragmatic appreciation of them. What is more, while the application of
pragmatics to liturgical language is sparse, rather more material is available in the
realm of Biblical exegesis - particularly from scholars versed in classical speech act
theory (eg. Evans 1963; Aurelio 1977; Arens 1982; Du Plessis 1985; White et al
1988; Thiselton 1992: 283ff.).
As for hymn texts, not only are these virtually always found in books: they are
'performed' through singing, analysis of which would have taken us into
musicological territory well beyond the borders of mainstream linguistic
pragmatics. Although exhaustive liturgical 'ethnographies' would be compelled to
include it (and see Enninger & Raith 1982: 23-35), hymnology is in our case best
left to hymnologists - though there is a doxologicsl caveat which attends this
decision. In the last Chapter we showed how Wainwright has been criticized by
contemporary Catholic liturgical theologians for putting lex ctedendi before lex
orandi. He did subsequently point out in dialogue with Power, however, that British
non-Conformity in general and his own Methodist tradition in particular has made
hymns 'the verbal expressions of our worship and doctrine. inseparably fused', and
that 'they are our "orthodoxy", in the sense both of right belief and of right praise'
(1981: 449). While we note and endorse this point in regard to an English
Reformed tradition which counts Isaac Watts among its alumni, it will not be seen
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to detract from our conviction that spoken (as opposed to sung) English Reformed
worship displays a distinctive character derived from an assumption that 'Christian
truth' subsists pre-liturgically and propositionalisticaUy rather than intra-liturgically
and pragmatically.
Our decision to pass over sermon discourse perhaps requires rather more
justification. After all, we have already underlined (3.4) that preaching has been
regarded as the centrepiece of Reformed worship and doxology (Calvin 1556
[1960]: IV.1.v; Barth 1975 [1936J: 88ff.; von Allrnen 1965: 142-47; Old 1984: 73-
85; Buttrick 1987: 449-59, 1992: 289-91). We have also seen that it is partly due to
their distinctive revival of, and emphasis upon the proclamation of the gospel, that
Reformed churches have correspondingly tended to play down the eucharist -
sometimes celebrating it on only a quarterly basis (Bradshaw 1986: 229).
Across the 10 tapes in our Advent Sunday survey. preaching occupies
approximately 25% of aU recorded material and is the speech-activity which most
often crystallises the theme of the whole service. Having said all this, sermons can
be hugely diverse and idiosyncratic: despite doctrinally representing the major
'enactment' of God's Word in worship. they in fact seek to accomplish this through
a vast array of speech acts. styles. registers. genres, schemes. tropes, metaphors.
analogies. jokes etc .. These can be varied to a great extent even within a single
sermon; it then becomes very hard to characterise the act of 'preaching' in detailed
linguistic-pragmatic terms. As von Allmen hints (1965: 142). the subject of
'homiletics' is in fact so broad-ranging that it tends to subsume other academic
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disciplines well before they might be thought to subsume it. The Reformed
homiletician David Buttrick, for instance, co-opts linguistic analysis liberally into
his 'systematic' of preaching (1987: 173-238; 470-72), but can do so only in close
association with narratology, rhetoric, communication theory, hermeneutics.
Biblical criticism and dogmatics. While all these fields may be said to overlap
within liturgical studies as a whole, they tend not to to be so concentrstedly or
frequently interwoven elsewhere as they are in the sermon.
In this study we are most especially concerned with the effect of the ritual
context of corporate worship on language used by, or on behalf of, the gathered
congregation. Our own practitioner intuition, coupled with the evidence of our
corpus, lead us to suggest that contemporary English Reformed sermon discourse is
more readily 'transposed' to other, less ritualized settings than the more obviously
ecclesial discourse of. say, the eucharistic prayer. Indeed. sermons or 'sermon-style'
modalities are patient of a greater degree of what Crystal & Davy (1969: 148) call
'generalisability' than almost any other form of liturgical speech. They resurface not
only at religious-secular interfaces like evangelistic rallies and media-broadcast
'thoughts for the day'; they can also appear in certain forms of political oratory
(Gumperz (1982a: 187-203) and business talk (cf. the exhortatory 'sales lecture'). In
particular, this adaptability seems attributable to the fact that the predetermination
and integration of verbal with non-verbal action within sermons is comparatively
low. Even communal prayer - which also takes place in several contexts beyond the
church service proper - is usually still accompanied by a number of ritual formulae:
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ego an invitation such as 'Let us pray', the bowing of heads or kneeling, the closing
of eyes and a responsive 'Amen'. As Terrence Tilley (1991: 63-7) has defined it,
religious preaching is in this sense relatively 'institutionally free'. The sermon' as a
generic entity may be cast as the 'sole' means by which the Reformed church is
'built up' and 'sanctified' (Calvin [1559] 1960: IV.1.5), but from a linguistic-
pragmatic point of view, the specific structure, content and style of the discourses
used by preachers in our corpus are so diverse as to make any intrinsic
characterisation extremely difficult. Admittedly, Rosenberg (1970a) finds more
common threads running through American Folk Preaching (chanting, rhythmic
delivery, repetition, congregational interjection etc.); but the traditional bias of
Reformed homiletic towards scriptural 'explanation' and against 'affective'
linguistic strategising (or 'mere rhetoric' (cf. Old 1984: 77-8) means that for the
most part, it has been made in the image of pedagogic registers which have
themselves charted the stylistic contours of whichever Bible text is being
expounded at the time. In subsequent chapters, we shall echo Wolterstorff (1992) in
arguing that this, coupled with the sheer dominance of the 'expository paradigm' in
Reformed liturgiology as a whole, has led to a 'didactic monologism' which has not
only spread to other parts of worship, but which in doing so, has suffocated such
more immediately 'eventful', 'performative' 'self-involving' and 'doxological' modes
of speech-action as might contribute to the truly holistic practice of corporate praise
(cf. Penn 1982; 78ff.; Ladriere 1973; Jennings 1985; Hunsinger 1993). For now, we
note that a dedicated 'pragmatics of preaching' would necessitate another study of
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at least this size. and so undertake to fix our analytic focus on the language of these
other. ostensibly 'non-sermonic' parts of the Reformed service.
4.3.3.7. Incomorating ethnosemantic data into transcripts: the segmentation
of service discourse
As well as textual ising the speech of the 10 Advent Sunday tapes,
transcripts have also been used to show how this speech corresponds with the
categories assigned to different parts of the sampled services by our Ministerial
informants. These 'ethnosemantic' or 'metalingual' categories are reproduced in
boxed block capitals above the actual transcription of their constituent discourse,
and are accompanied by the information about their provenance also given in the
'service order chart'. In addition. the 'non-transcribed' portions described in the last
section are similarly indicated, often with a summary of what was said:
(6)
MINISTER Let us pray .
...(6.0)...
Great and glorious God ..
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PRAYERS OF' OONfESSlON (Extemporary, except final
section - from Owrch Family WOJShipNo. 582)
Jesus, you give in a way we can never repay ...
(AS3 - Thatcham: L. 13-23);
(7) READER. 2: This morning's eWst1e reading is taken from,
Rornans~,
verses ~ to fo~.
IREADING: Isaiah 51; +11 (Good News Bible) I
...21.0 ...
Amen.
SERMON. Preached by Minister. On theme of Advent,
particularly in relation to judgement Duration: 16 millS apprx.
(ASS - Bulwell: L.250-53)
In the transcripts themselves, we have been very careful to keep the
taxonomies used by our informants free from our own interpretative gloss. Very
occasionally, we have inferred and added obvious factual detail (eg. that a section
marked 'prayer' was actully a 'pre-sermon prayer'), and in cases where informants
had clearly mis-remembered what occurred, we have omitted their mistake (eg. the
Minister of Emmanuel. West Wickham indicates a Sursum corda where none
appears on the recording).
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4.3.3.8. Extralinguistic features: the representation of context
So far, we have considered only how we should transcribe features
relating directly to the mechanical production and 'folk' definition of worship
discourse (turns. pauses. intonation. pronunciation. segmentation etc.). If we are
engaged in pragmatics. however, we must also account for the 'relevant context' of
this discourse (Levinson 1983: 24). In other words, our transcription should also
record the wide range of non-verbal factors and activities which can be seen to
have a bearing on the structure of liturgical communication.
We have already explained how our fieldwork survey attempted to recover
'relevant context' with a specially-designed questionnaire and 'service order chart'
completed by each participating church and returned together with the audio tape
of their service. As well as identifying speakers and providing a 'folk taxonomy'
and provenance for different portions in the liturgy, these items also pinpointed key
spatial. interpersonal and kinesic elements in the context of situation. In attempting
to design a transcript which pays adequate attention to non-verbal context, it is
clear that we shall have to combine data from our questionnaires and service order
charts with the written representation of those tape recordings to which they
correspond. Once again. however. we find that there is no clearly defined way of
doing this. Ochs (1979: 51-61) notes that the integration of verbal and non-verbal
. behaviour in transcripts has taken numerous forms. Some, like Carter (1974) and
Camioni (1977) use a continuous prose style, reporting action and quoting dialogue
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rather as would a novelist. Others like Dore (1977) and Scollon (1976) attempt a
. sharper distinction of verbal and non-verbal behaviour by enclosing the latter in
square brackets and positioning it to the right of the former. Others still reverse this
order and place non-verbal action to the left of the discourse itself (Bloom, 1973;
Bowerman, 1973). This, indeed, is Oehs's own preference. Yet further variation is
provided by Greenfield & Smith (1976: 85), who offer non-verbal information
above utterances, and by Tannen (1989: 58), who positions it underneath.
In our own transcriptions, we have found it most suitable to follow Greenfield
& Smith: relevant non-verbal activities are thus normally indicated in square
brackets above the discourse they accompany. In cases where informants
themselves have defined certain extralinguistic activities as distinct 'segments'
within the service, these are shown in the same way as verbal 'ethnosemantic'
portions - that is, in boxed block capitals at the relevant point in the transcript. The
appearance of the transcripts thus somewhat resembles the text design of most
modern service books (compare (8) and (9) below):
(B) MINISTER; Eat this lGid and have~owship with Qz[W in his ~ering.
and death.
[Eating of the bread]
The poured outm,
the h!QQg ofQmt,
givenfor~.
DISTRIBt.mON OF WINE Wine handed by Minister to Elders, who
then distribute it to members of the congregation as they sit in the pews
(chairs). Organ interlude.
... (14.0) ...
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Let the ~ of Ouist~ in~ veins,
live his life..with him,
resurrection life,
beyond the power of death.
[Drinking of the wine]
(AS2 - Emmanuel, West Wickham: 1..518-24).
(9) 10. TbaDksgiving aod Sharing
...As of old you fed your people in the wilderness,
so feed us now that we may live to your praise;
through Jesus Ouist our Lord.
Amen.
The Minister breaks the bread saying:
When Jesus had given thanks,
he broke the bread and said. ..
(URe 1989: 27-8).
4.4 From anatomy to operation
The implements for our analytical operation have been made ready.
Methodologically, theoretically and empirically, we have done our anatomy, and
are ready to perform 'exploratory surgery' on a live 'corpus' of liturgical language
data. As we do so, we shall make incisions from four key linguistic-pragmatic
angles. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 we shall deal with liturgy from the perspectives of
IrnplicaturelRelevance; Discourse Pragmatics/Conversation Analysis, and Socio-
Pragmatics. First though, we seek to examine our data using the tools and
principles of speech act theory.
PARTll
PRAGMATICS IN LITURGIOLOGICAL
PRACTICE: THE FUNCTIONS OF
REFORMED SERVICE DISCOURSE
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CHAPTERS
THE WORD PERFORMED: LITURGY AND
SPEECH ACf TIffiORY
5.1 Background
We saw in Chapter 2 that within the limited range of past pragmatic
studies on liturgy, it is speech act analyses which have dominated. The reasons for
this will become clear as we move on more thoroughly to consider both 'classical'!
and later developments in speech act theory, and seek to relate them to our own
integrated liturgic and doxological exposition of English Reformed church
discourse. In the process, we shall realise not only that speech act analysis affords
many fruitful insights into liturgical discourse functions, but also that it begs further
questions - questions which have in their tum spurred the development of other
pragmatic sub-disciplines, and which thus open the way to a broader and more
contemporary 'pragmatics of liturgy' than has hitherto been produced.
1. 'Classical' speech act theory is a term used by Leech & Tbonw (1990: 177) to describe the foundational work on speech
acts done by Austin, and more particularly. the refUJement of it made by Searle (1969).
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5.2 Liturgy and the 'isolation of the performative'
In How to Do Things with Words. Austin develops his seminal ideas
about language and meaning on the premiss that 'speaking is a kind of doing'
(Martinich 1975a: 290). Initially, he questions the prevailing assumption of
philosophers that 'the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state
of affairs, or to 'state some fact' which it must do 'either truly or falsely"(1962: 1).
Against this 'descriptive fallacy! Austin points out that many utterances manage to
play a crucial role in discourse without ostensibly 'describing' or 'reporting'
anything: rather. such utterances are, or are part of, 'the doing of an action,
which ...would not normally be described as, or as 'just', saying something' (1962:
5). What is more, Austin demonstrates that many such utterances fall outside even
those categories of ethical, emotional and metaphysical discourse which logical
positivists had either dismissed as 'nonsensical' or else reduced to some empirically-
verifiable residue (cf. Ayer [1936] 1971: 26-9; 47-61; 157-8; Devitt & Sterelny
1987: 189-90). Examples like 'I name this ship i uttered at a launching ceremony;
'Igive and bequeath my watch to y written in a will, or 'I bet' voiced in undertaking
a wager, are all clearly significant, even while being neither just representations of
acts nor statements that acts are being done: indeed, for Austin, to utter such
expressions was not to 'describe' action so much as 'to do it' (1962: 6).
It is from this starting-point that Austin proposes his key distinction between
performative utterances or performatives, as that class of expressions whose very
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articulation constitutes an 'act', and constetives; the role of which is to refer to or
'denote' particular verifiable phenomena (1962: 3).
Although the 'dynamic' of Austin's performative is more than simply lexical or
grammatical, he does contend that it is most characteristically realised by certain
linguistic constructions: this is to say, he sees it archetypally occurring in utterances
which deploy verbs in the first person singular present indicative active-: 1
promise', '1 warn', 1 apologise' etc. (1962: 56). Furthermore, in order to discern
whether such verbs are in fact being used performatively in a specific case, he
suggests the word hereby be inserted before them: indeed, this hereby test seems to
Austin a 'useful criterion that the utterance is performative' - even in those rarer
instances where the subject is plural (We hereby undertake'), the verb form passive
('You are hereby authorised') or the agent impersonal (Notice is hereby given')
(1962: 57).
Now on the face of it, this 'preliminary isolation' of the performative (1962: 4)
seems to offer considerable encouragement to the student of liturgical language. At
the most obvious level, Austin himself draws several examples from church
worship, as well as from other ritual discourses such as those arising from court
trials (19, 85) and sporting contests (77, 90). Indeed, he emphasises on several
2. As we shal1 see, this '&rarnmatieali2ation' of performatives was subsequently qualified by Austin IS occurrinl mainly with
'explicit' performatives, and has even then been questioned (el by Searle 1979: 8-12 Md Leech 1983: 174-8). Austin himself
allowed that verbless eKpressions like 'Our' in criclcet (1962: 77) were also performative (althou'" this is a bad example
since the umpire is aclUllly only obliged 10 raise an index finger 10 signal a batsman's dismissal!).
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occasions that performatives are particularly associated with ceremonial or
'conventional' language (18-20, 36, 85). So, in Christian liturgy, he observes their
use for acts of baptism (11, 24, 31, 35, 44), marriage (64, 84), confession (83),
excommunication (155) and covenanting (157). Certainly, one of the characteristic
features of liturgy is its 'performance' of specific duties: more often than not these
duties are executed in accordance with some prescribed formula, and typically,
these formulae are, by Austin's primary definition, 'performative'. Certainly,
examples abound both in our corpus and in the URC Service Book
(1) MINISTER; I baptise you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of
the Holy Spirit
(AS 9: 170-1 (Based on URe 1989: 34)
(2) MINISTER: Lpronounce them to be husband and wife in the name of God. Father,
Son and Holy Spirit
CURe 1989: 56)
(3) MODERATOR We ordain her to be a Minister inyour church
CURe 1989: 89)
(4) MINISTER: We laud and munify your glQrious ...name
(AS 6: 484)
(5) MINISTER; Lord YQg our heavenly ~
we give YOU thanks
for a:ll that you have given to ~
(AS 1: 165-7)
Now even on this basic level, one could begin to perceive some difference
between examples (1) - (3) and examples (4) and (5). Whereas (1) - (3) seem very
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specifically tied to the institution of the church, (4) and (5) seem more readily
transferrable to other contexts. Moreover. while (1) - (3) appear to gain their
validity first and foremost from the official status of the speaker rather than any
emotional commitment s/he might have to the ceremony, (4) and (5) seem more
overtly to depend on existential commitment. In order to account for these intuitive
differentiations. we shall need to delve more deeply into the speech act framework.
5.3 Felicity conditions and rules of use in church worship
Having established the intrinsic 'conventionality' of performatives,
Austin goes on to emphasise that this in tum makes them dependent not on 'truth-
conditions' but rather. on a coalescence of 'appropriate circumstances' which would
render them 'happy' or 'felicitous' (13-14). Thus, 'I name this ship x relies for its
effectiveness as a performative upon its relation to some identifiable launching
ceremony, while the sentence 'I bequeath my watch to j becomes 'active' as part of
a legaUy-endorsed will. In the same way, 'I baptize you' is likely to be infelicitous
unless uttered by a recognised Christian leader when either sprinkling or immersing
a candidate for induction into the community of a church. Likewise 'I AB do take
thee CD to be my lawful wedded wife' has no status in English law unless uttered
in a registered building before a suitable authorised person and two witnesses
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(URC 1989: 71). Specifically, Austin defines the felicity conditions attendant upon
performatives as follows. First (A.I), that 'there must exist an accepted
conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to
include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances,
and further (A.2) that 'the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must
be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked'. This
procedure must in tum (B.l) 'be executed by all participants both correctly and
(B.2) completely'. Furthermore, Austin also recognises a condition r.l which holds
that 'where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the
part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure
must in fact have those thoughts and feelings, and the participants must intend so to
conduct themselves'. A final condition following from this (r.2) pertains inasmuch
as the participants 'must actually so conduct themselves subsequently' (14-15).
Liturgy, of course, is most typically defined by its 'conventional procedures'
and 'conventional effects'. Moreover, the special status of 'certain words' uttered by
'certain persons' in 'certain circumstances' is confumed by the existence of
numerous 'liturgical glossaries' explaining in some detail the proper form, function
and purpose of various 'liturgical portions' within the Christian rite (eg. Cross &
Livingstone 1983; J.G.Davies 1986a; Sansom 1990). Likewise, 'correct' and
'complete' performance of 'procedures' like a eucharist or ordination is of the very
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essence of felicitous corporate worship. Furthermore, the necessity of shared
'thoughts and feelings' might well be related to that mutual 'faith' which, for
Ladriere, 'impels' and 'endows' liturgical language with its 'characteristic
performativity' (1973: 61, L.400-2). No doubt, as Ladriere also hints «1973: 57,
1.235-8), the frequent use of first person plurals in worship - whether by the
congregation as a whole or by the Minister on their behalf - suggests a strong
mutuality of intent and commitment:
(6) MINISTER: Jesus you give in a way we can ~ver repay ...
Snirit,
you inspire us beyond our thinking • ...
great and glQrious God,
we ~ and worship you ...
(AS3: 23-7)
(7) MINISTER:
CONG.:
MINISTER
CONG.:
Lift up your hearts
We lift them up to the Lord
Let us give thanks to the Lmd our God
It is right to give our thanks and praise
(AS 6: 447-50. Sursum corda (cf. URC 1989: 15).
(8) MINISTER: We realise our unworthiness to approach you 0God.
in our own strength,
but we ~ ..trusting in yOur strength ...
(AS 2: 501-3)
Now Austin himself makes a significant distinction between his first four rules
and the last two, pointing out that when conditions A.l - B.2 are broken the speech
act will actually fail or tnistire; whereas when r.l or r.2 are contravened, it will
merely suffer abuse (16) and will take effect nonetheless. Hence, an atheist
layperson may recite and so 'abuse' the prayer of confession at an American
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Lutheran service without nullifying the act itself (cf. Rule r.l). but if the
subsequent absolution is pronounced by anyone other than a ratified member of
clergy. the ritual will 'misfire' (cf. Rule A.2) - a point made explicit in this case by
an identificatory style disjunct:
(9) As a called and ordained minister of the Church of Christ. and by His
authority, I therefore declare to you the entire forgiveness of all your
sins, in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit
(Inter-Lutheran Commission on Worship 1978: 77).
Significantly for our purposes. the Independent/Congregationalist strand of
English Reformed ecclesiology has in fact somewhat loosened the links between
'certain words' and 'particular persons' in worship. Most obviously. this has roots in
the move away from fixed rites to extemporary speech. but it also derives from a
more protean theology of ministry based on the key Reformed principle of 'the
priesthood of all believers' (Eastwood 1960). Thus, whereas Presbyterian churches
have followed Calvin's Genevan model quite strictly in making both preaching and
eucharistic celebration the exclusive preserve of the Minister, Congregationalists
have been readier to encourage lay preaching and lay presidency, while many
among the much smaller body of Churches of Christ have been completely lay-led
(Nichols 1968: 102-3; Slack 1978: 32-3; Thompson 1980). Having said all this,
though their worship has thus presented itself as more 'democratic' and less 'priestly'
than that of Catholicism, Anglicanism or 'High Church' Protestantism. such
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traditions have still usually set great store by 'ordaining' and 'licensing' specific
members to specific sacral 'discourse roles', even if not imposing on them any set
form of words. Hence, though this ordination and licensing has taken in a greater
diversity of potential 'speaking offices' (e.g. 'reader', 'presiding elder', 'lay preacher'
etc.), Austin's basic conception of 'appropriate persons' executing 'appropriate
procedures' has held good. Not only this: for aU its promotion of lay empowerment,
English Congregationalism has in reality remained overwhelmingly attached to the
norm of an ordained 'Minister of Word and Sacraments' leading its services
(Micklem 1936: 254; Davies 1948: 222-31) - a norm reflected first, in the current
URC's insistence that such Ministers be trained, set apart and commissioned
particularly 'to conduct public worship, to preach the Word and to administer the
Sacraments' CURCManual: 6, 21), and second, by its policy that lay presidency
should proceed only in matters of 'pastoral necessity' (Slack 1978: 32)3. Certainly,
this norm is borne out by our own Advent Sunday Survey's comprising wholly
'Minister-led' acts of worship, even while showing numerous contributions from Lay
people within the services recorded.
2. This poliey was eonfamed at successive URC General Assemblies from 1987-91.
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Now Austin's 'felicity conditions' on words, persons and procedures undergo
significant revision and refmement in the work of Searle (1969: 66-7). Searle
acknowledges the role of 'extra-linguistic institutions' in the regulation of Austin's
'perfonnatives' and, echoing Dell Hymes ([1971] 1972), goes on to underline that
for their enactment, 'the mastery of those rules which constitute linguistic
competence by the speaker and hearer is not in general sufficient. ..In addition,
there must exist an extra-linguistic institution and the speaker and hearer must
occupy special places within this institution' (1979a: 18). What is more, alongside
the law, private property and the state, Searle offers 'the church' as a typical
example of such an institution (1979a: 18). At the same time, however, Searle
substantially re-works Austin's schema of speech act conditions. In their place, he
posits four basic roles (1969: 63-8).
The first of Searle's speech act rules is designated the propositional content
role. Like Austin, Searle recognises that a few performatives may have no
discernible 'reference' at all, and are thus devoid of propositional content (1969: 30.
67). As examples, he offers exclamations like 'Hurrah' and 'Ouch', together with the
'phatic' discourse of greeting. Interestingly, our corpus contains parallels to all of
these, even though they are hardly ever found written down in service books and
have thus been virtually ignored in 'speech act' studies of worship. Particularly
within the Charismatic service at Warsash (AS 5), we fwd numerous interjectory
'HaUelujah!"s (AS 5.182, 190-7,267-70,288) and 'Thankyou"s (5. 182-200, 216-9,
278). In addition, there is at least one audible passage of diverse but concurrent
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glossolaliac utterances (AS 5.269-70) - utterances which, even if they do have a
'hidden' propositional content. are left 'untranslated' as private idiolects and are thus
ostensibly 'proposition-free'. As for greetings. these feature commonly as 'opening
strategies' on the Advent Sunday tapes:
(10) MINISTER: [At communion table]
Good morning everybody
(AS 8.1)
(11) MINISTER: Good morning and welcome. ...
(AS 7.1)
(12) MINISTER: QQQg mQffiing
(AS 10.1)
As we shall confirm at greater length in 7.5.3.2.2, these relatively 'phatic'
introductions contrast with more traditionally propositional and theologically coded
sacral greetings such as The Lord is here / His Spirit is with us' or 'The Lord be
with you / and also with you'. Indeed. the aim seems almost to 'put people at their
ease' rather than confronting them straight away with specifically Biblical or
doctrinal 'information'.
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Despite such examples. Searle maintains that the majority of utterances will
contain some sort of propositional element, even though this cannot in itself
guarantee the effectiveness of those utterances qua 'speech acts' (1969: 24ff.). In
this sense, Ladriere is right when he perceives (1973: 53, 1.105-6) the 'decisive
point' in Searle's argument to be that 'a propositional act cannot occur in an isolated
state' - although given the instances just cited, Ladriere exaggerates when he calls
this same propositional act a 'necessary adjunct' to the performance of a speech act
(1973: 53, 1.107, my emphasis). What is beyond doubt is that a paradigmatic
Austinian performative like T baptise' clearly refers to some verifiable phenomenon
(baptism), even while itself playing a part in the constitution and institution of that
phenomenon as a specific ecclesial action in certain specific ecclesial contexts.
Similarly, common liturgical utterances like 'we pray' (AS 1.218; 2.525; 4.678) or
'we ask' (AS 1.177; 4.60; 8.321) may contextually 'do what they say', but some
general concept of 'praying' and 'asking' is still being denoted. What is more, such
utterances cannot typically function on their own:.prayer and asking must be foror
about something, and that something requires 'naming' if the speech act is to be
felicitious:
(13) MINISTER: We pray for those whom ~ know,
who are sick or suffering.
12n!;ly or ~ ...
outof~
co~
...(8.0) ...
218
We ask that your healing h.and may touch each one,
that they may know your peace.
(AS 3.329-35)
(14) PREAOIER: (...) we pray now
that the assurance that you are ~,
the assw-ance that you are guning,
may give us ...hope.
(AS 4.529-32)
This confirmation that speech acts may thus be simultaneously performative
and constative is vital not only for the development of speech act theory, but also
for the pragmatic exposition of liturgy; we shall return to it shortly.
Searle's second rule of language-use is dubbed the preparatory rule.
Preparatory rules are defmed by Searle as contextual prerequisites of the
performance of a speech act (1969: 60-7). While this most immediately suggests a
parallel with Austin's 'material' conditions A.l and A.2, Searle also includes here
that mutuality of thought which Austin reserved to his condition r.l. More
recently, Leech & Thomas (1990: 185) have defmed a 'context of knowledge'
related to the shared cognition of participants, and as a professed intentionalist,
Searle has often reiterated that those who engage in speech action must reach a
requisite level of understanding about what they are doing if such speech action is
to be effective (Searle 1977; 1983: 26ff., 200ff.). Similarly, and with particular
relation to 'conventional' speech acts resembling those which characterise liturgy,
Bach & Hamish maintain that apart from a few exceptions, such acts are 'nullified'
if 'shown not to have been performed intentionally', and conclude that the effects
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they bring about 'live by mutual belief and die by mutual belief (1979: 118-9).
Now as we progress, it will become clear not only that liturgical felicity proceeds
despite - or even because of - considerable variation in the 'intents' held by different
worshippers; it will also transpire that Austin's original distinction between
'misfires' and 'abuses' is actually more conducive to sacral discourse study than
Searle and Bach & Harnish's more thoroughly mentalistic expositions (cf. Tilley
1991: 28 n2). For now, however, the main thrust of the preparatory rule can be seen
to correlate quite closely with what makes church service language function as it
should. So, for instance, the URC performative 'I declare you to be a Church
Related Community Worker' (URC 1989: 96) would have as preparatory
conditions: the proper ecclesiastical validity of both those commissioning (ie.
District Council appointees) and the Worker being commissioned (as trained and
appointed by the church); a correctly-observed service constituted by the District
Council and presided at by the Provincial Moderator; and protagonists who do
indeed understand what they are doing and saying. Furthermore. even while regular
Sunday services may seek rather less obviously to confirm individual callings and
'intents', the presumption of a basic and proper 'common mind' is still clearly
apparent:
(15) MINISTER: great and glQrious God.
we come again to worship you
(AS 3.14-15)
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(16) MINISTER Father as we come to you on this day we co:me to praise and worship,
to glorify your name,
(AS 4.35-6)
(17) MINISTER We light the candle for o~,
for the I!QQ[,
and for everyone who ~ for God to come ....
(AS 7.30-2)
As well as making the preparatory rules of worship explicit. these examples
also carry some suggestion of Searle's third speech act rule - namely the sincerity
rule. Where the preparatory rule incorporates the shared 'thoughts' of Austin's
condition r.l. this subsumes the same condition's emphasis on the appropriate
mutual feelings of interlocutors. More exactly. it establishes that a speaker must
genuinely intend that his speech should issue in such acts as it would
conventionally bring about (1969: 60). The significance of such sincerity in
worship seems plain. Indeed, Smith & Mclendon (1972) infer from Austin and
Searle's assumption of sincerity that the felicity of religious speech action will be
subject to kindred 'affective conditions: Noting that 'almost everyone is ready to
acknowledge that religious speech is affective, whatever else it may be', Smith &
McClendon take the example of 'confessing one's faith' and propose that 'the
regular and requisite affect belonging to such a confession as G in the tradition of
judaism or Christianity at least is humble or awed grattitude, or, what is no
different, gratitude to God' (1972: 59). They then express this as follows:
1. Speaker (S) has an affect (Fa) viz. awed gratitude, and conveys Fa to H by
means of the sentential act So.
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1.5. Htakes~to have FGand takests to have conveyed FGby means of So.
2. ~ intends to use a convention (Vz) for confessing and he inta1ds H to understand
(by his use) that he is using it
3. H takes .rto have the intention specified in 2.
Clearly this kind of analysis moves us a long way from purely syntactic or
semantic exposition, touching as it does on key issues of psycho linguistics,
anthropological linguistics, psychology of religion and, most especially, on the
theology of faith as it relates to the action of the divine Word in worship. These
associations are confirmed by Thiselton (1992: 287-8), who echoes both Gill (1969:
33) and Martinich (1979a: 289) when suggesting that speech-act approaches to
Christian discourse will necessarily 'include the dual dimensions of the ontological
and the existential'. As we noted in 3.4. these are the same dimensions which
Vincent (1979) saw seminally integrated in the work of Calvin. and which thereby
suggest that Reformed doxology might be especially patient of speech act analysis.
It is also worth recalling that it was Evans (1963) who perceptively found in
Austin's work a new and positive acknowledgement of the logical connection
between a man's utterances and his practical commitments, attttudes and feelings'
(1963: 11). From the same viewpoint, when dealing particularly with liturgical
language, Ladriere draws on Austin. Searle and Evans when proposing the
interconnection of 'perforrnativity' and 'faith' in sacral discourse (1973: 56,1.186-8;
1984: 57).
Now doubtless liturgy does demand and assume a certain 'commitment' from
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those who take part in it. At this most fundamental level, there can be little dispute
that lex credendi precedes lex orandi: to argue otherwise would make the preceding
utterances (15) - (17) not only abuse-ridden but nigh on absurd. Having said this,
we must still look more closely at what 'sincerity' and 'faith' might actually mean in
a liturgical context, and how - if at all - they might be related. As we do so, it
becomes clear that the rendition of sincerity in terms of 'belief by secular
pragmaticians like Bach & Hamish is potentially confusing because their concern
is purely with the psycho-dynamics of communicating and acting, and has nothing
to do with religious belief - that is, 'belief in the metaphysical or 'spiritual' sense.
Vincent (1979: 153ff.), for one, fails to make this distinction clear, but Tilley is
surely right to stress that the 'sincerity' demanded by Christian worship does not in
fact have to begin with a fully-realised assent to credal doctrine:
Admitted.ly, '·0 God (if there be a God), save my soul (should I have a soul)" is not
much of a prayer. But it can be a minimal prayer, perhaps a first exercise in a
strange practice, a practice in which a person can develop an ability to pray more
deeply. (1991: 62).
Once we thus begin to regard 'sincerity' as ·starting with assent to what
Habermas (1979: 4) calls the validity conditions of liturgical action, rather than
with the propositionally-defmed validity claims associated with such action, we can
begin more representatively to apply Searle's rule to the reality of ecclesiatical rite -
a reality in which the spiritual fervour of participants may range from that proper to
contemporary saints through pre-school infants and 'occasional' attenders at
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baptisms, weddings and funerals, to thoroughly sceptical first-time visitors. It is
with this rather more subtle analysis that Tilley's scenario comes into its own, and it
is here too that lex orandi can be seen to mediate lex credendi to some extent - that
the 'language-game' of liturgy appears to be 'learnt' by 'watching how others play'
(or pray!), rather than immediately 'comprehended' by inferring and expressing the
right 'intentions' (cf. Tilley 1991: 28 n2). It is worth underlining on this basis that 'a
man's commitments. attitudes and feelings' - or what we might collectively term his
'faith' - is not simply a product of his own personal genius. Liturgy is
characteristically a supreme instantiation of corporate faith - 'the faith of the church'
- and as such, its expressions function performatively at a level which is more than
purely parochial. contingent or 'micro-contextual'. Indeed, as S.J. Tambiah suggests
(1979: 126), where these expressions are 'universalised', they become subject to
increasing conceptualization and abstraction from their original intention and
situation of utterance. One upshot of this is that they are accorded fixed
interpretations and reformulated in 'constative' or 'propositional' form as doctrine-
as lex credendi (cf. Mananzan 1974: 59-73). Having said this. there is also a clear
reciprocity at work whereby dogmatic propositions, once established as such, will
themselves 'regulate' the speech acts of church worship. In this sense, Jeffuer is
quite right to observe that 'performatives, when they function among religious men,
have theological theories as correctness conditions' (1972: 93, my emphasis).
Now of course, there are occasions in worship where a more explicitly
personal or 'cognitive' sincerity is demanded. John Knox's Genevan Service Book,
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for example, foregrounds Words of Institution which include Paul's severe warning
to individual communicants from 1 Cor 11:27:
(18) MINISTER; Therefore whosoever shall eat this bread and drink this cup unworthily.
he shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord (Knox [1556] 1965:
121).
Similarly, the current United Reformed Church ordination service draws sincerity
to the surface when putting the following question:
(19) MODERATOR: Are zeal for the glory of God. love for the Lord Jesus Quist and a desire
for the salvation of the worJd, so far as you know your own heart, the
chief motives which lead you into this ministry? CURe Manual: 11. my
emphasis).
More co~monly, however, the prerequisite of individual sincerity is diffused
through the first person plural deictics mentioned earlier - some of which are
uttered by the congregation en masse, but many more of which are spoken - more
implicitly still - by the Minister on their behalf. As Leech & Thomas point out
(1990: 177), there might be some debate about whether the speech act of
apologising depends for its felicity on the mental and moral sincerity of the speaker
or whether it is intrinsically 'self-verifying'; even so, there can be little question that
the comparable sacral act of confession becomes pragmatically distanced from such
criteria of personal intentionality - especially when, as most frequently in English
Refonned worship, the Minister enunciates it 'by proxy';
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(20) MINISTER: We hurt each other
we are sorry for it
(AS 2.408)
(21) MINISTER: Weconf...=.
weQpen our~.
and our lives
to ~ the for~ you loffer/.
(AS 7.502-5)
The main point here is surely that the whole church is confessing and that as
Austin realised, the import of this corporate 'institutional' act will override the
possibly flawed motives of anyone participant. Much the same could be said of
Ministerially-voiced 'credal discourse' like the following:
(22) MINISTER: Fatherwe ac~ledge that,
everything we have ~
you have giyen us
(AS 5.229-31)
(23) MINISTER: (...) We believe that [Quist] shall appear again.
like the brightness of the sun
(AS 6. 531-2)
Although (22) appears more 'perfonnative' and (23) more 'constative', the fact is
that both alike express official doctrines 'brought along' to worship from the lex
ctedendi of historic church dogma - the former in regard to the Providence of God
and the latter in regard to Christ's Second Coming. Significantly, these types of
utterance, together with more formal 'statements of faith' like the Apostles' and
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Nicene creeds (URC 1989: 113-4) have become a focus for much doxological
debate - debate which has very much reflected the issues of 'sincerity' we have been
discussing. In his magnum opus, Wainwright (1980: 279ff.) considers Maurice
Wiles' unconscious reiteration of Austin's 'institutional' gloss on performatives (eg.
Wiles 1974: 1-19). Wiles argues for a clear distinction between 'devotional' and
'doctrinal' language, and suggests a willingness to retain in worship the language of
incarnation and divinity in relation to Christ, even while his critical reason as a
theologian compels him to reject such language. He does this on the ostensibly
'pragmatic' premiss that the two forms of 'religious talk' in question serve very
different purposes - the former largely 'poetic' or affective, the latter principally
'evidential' or verificational. As Wainwright pertinently asks, the key question then
becomes 'How is [Wiles'] liturgical 'poetry' related to his doctrinal/theological
prose?' (1980: 279). Or put in Searlian terms: How is his sincerity as a 'rational'
theologian linked to his sincerity as a 'devotional' worshipper?
One possible answer to such questions might be to say that in worship. an
individual chooses to subjugate her own personal convictions to the received or
institutionalised 'faith of the church', whereas outside worship. she is 'free' to
express those convictions just as she wishes. In this scenario, the 'sincerity' of the
church worshipper is subsumed by the established 'intentions' of official orthodoxy
and orthopraxis, whereas the 'sincerity' of the individual Christian is mediated by
the dictates of her own reason, conscience and 'faith'. If this seems at best
disingenuous and at worst hypocritical, it is worth pointing out that a similar
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tension between 'personal' and 'ecclesial' faith can be detected in certain areas of
Reformed theology. As we have argued at length elsewhere (Hilborn 1991a, b),
both Calvin himself and the Calvinists who followed him, placed great stress on
individual salvation and personal faith. In several Reformed churches, tables have
been 'fenced' - not just from unbelievers, but also from those who have not shared
the 'particular' faith of a denomination or the 'strict' beliefs of a local fellowship
(Calvin [1559] 1960: IV.12.5n8; Bromiley 1992: 227-8). At the same time,
sacramental theology has been marked by a disavowal of the Donatist notion that a
eucharist could be invalidated purely by 'insincere' administration or reception
([1559] 1960: rv.14.7ff.; Burkhardt 1992: 130-1), and has often been defined by its
attachment to infant baptism - a practice in which 'faith' is understood ecclesially
and covenantallyratherthan individually (Hilborn 1991a: 10-13; Barkley 1966: 7).
This tension between personal and institutional 'sincerity' marks not only a
major theme in English Reformed liturgiology, with its characteristic attempts to
balance 'freedom' and 'order' in worship (Davies 1948; Spinks 1984b); it also
reflects that major division between 'psychologically-based' and 'sociologically-
based' models of pragmatics which we reviewed in 2.3. As such, it is a tension
which will recur at several subsequent points in our discussion.
Searle's fourth rule is rather more straightforward in its application to liturgical
discourse. Termed the essential role, it specifies what a speech act must
conventionally 'count as', Thus Searle (1969: 66-7) points out that a congratulatory
performative will be felicitous if it 'counts as' an expression of pleasure by some
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speaker (s) at some event (H) achieved by some hearer (h); an utterance such as 'I
warn you' is 'happy' if it 'counts as' an undertaking by 5 that some E is not in hs best
interests, etc. There are strong links here with Austin's condition B.2, concerning
the correct execution and 'uptake' of perfonnati yes (1962: 36; 117-8), and again the
application to liturgy is clear. Consider, for example, this pre-baptismal utterance to
the parents by the Minister at Blackford Bridge (Church 9 in our survey):
(24) MINISTER: Let usg then,
in the presence of GOO
and before m as witnesses,
that you conf.,§ your faith in ~
and promise to fQllow him.
(AS 9.102-6)
Here, it is an essential condition of the Minister's speech act that it must 'count
as' both a request and a command that the couple addressed then each answer 'I do'
to a series of questions regarding their intent to uphold basic Christian tenets and to
bring their child up in a Christian manner. The parents cannot respond to the
Minister's utterance in any other way, for to do so would be to render the ceremony
'misfired', or invalid, rather than simply 'abused'.
For our purposes, there have been helpful suggestions as to how Searle's four
·rules might be applied to liturgy by Jeffner (1972: 89-93), Smith & McClendon
(1972: 56-62 (also Mclendon & Smith 1975: 48-83); Eretescu (1973: 426-7)", Ware
4. Eretescu's paper interprets 'C!uiste!lin&' in the wider social sense or 'n&min,', but het COIIc:lusiOftS ate still valid for the
specific:ally ec:clesiastic:&.l context of baptism.
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(1981) and, most helpfully of all, by Martinich (1975a: 301-2, 1975b: 408-9).
Over and above Searle's four basic categories, Martinich posits a 'Non-
identity Condition operating on the speech acts of six out of seven Roman Catholic
sacraments. This is to say that in all but the eucharist, the recipient of the sacrament
must be fully distinguished from the administrator of the sacrament: priests cannot
baptise, confirm, absolve, anoint, ordain or marry themselves; they can only give
themselves communion. The same condition is recognised by Eretescu in particular
relation to Christening speech acts, and she adds that these are also subject to a
'Singulsrity' Condition, whereby they should not be repeated. Interestingly, the
issue of 're-baptism' has much exercised the URC in recent years, thanks to the
growth of 'Baptistic' soteriologies in several of its more Charismatic and
Evangelical congregations. Indeed, the insistence of many Baptist or baptist-style
churches on believers' baptism regardless of what occurred in infancy is a salutary
reminder that liturgical speech act conditions may vary from denomination to
denomination. As it is, the URC has entertained a 'two-track' policy, giving equal
weight to both forms of baptism, but has maintained Eretescu's 'Singularity
Condition' by insisting that those baptised as infants should not be baptised 'again'
as believing adults CURe Manual: 3-4; Hilborn 1991a, b).
Both Martinich and Jeffner infer from Austin's B.2 axiom crucial 'Status
Conditions' for liturgical performatives, reflecting the fact that they are often
felicitous only when uttered by designated speakers with specific 'discourse roles'.
Hence only priests can pronounce absolution in the second person or say the
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epiclcsis at an Anglican communion; only bishops can ordain Catholic clergy, and
so on. As we have already noted, the URC reflects its more Independent forbears
by imposing such Status Conditions less rigidly and less frequently, but there are
still plenty of examples to cite: one does not have to be ordained to absolve or
invoke the Spirit over the bread and wine, but Ministerial ordinations must be
conducted by a Provincial Moderator (URC 1989: 85). Furthermore, newly-
inducted Ministers can only be received into District Council through the speech
action of those who already belong to that Council CURC1989: 88). Technically,
funerals and even baptisms can be conducted as URC services by lay people, but
the assumption of the Service Book is that these will be presided over by 'the
Minister'. Then again, the ordination of Elders can exceptionally be conducted by a
lay person, but only if that lay person has been accorded the specific 'status' of
Interim Moderator to a fellowship (URC 1989: 97).
Finally, Martinich pinpoints 'Material Conditions' linked to those ritual non-
linguistic actions which accompany certain religious performatives - egosigning the
cross or lighting a candle at a baptismal pronouncement, joining of a couple's hands
at the declaration of marriage etc.. Significantly. Calvin was very wary of such
'kinesic' symbols, and saw most of them as Scripturally unwarranted. Thus, while
he could justify the breaking of bread and pouring of wine from the gospel
narratives of the Last Supper, he reacted violently to 'procession' and 'display' of
the consecrated host, branding it nothing less than 'idolatry' ([1559] 1960: IV.17.37;
McDonnell 1967: 122ff.). Likewise, he counselled the removal of all
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superfluous 'pomp'from the rite of baptism ([1559] 1960: IV.15.2), and even more
famously, excised the imposition of hands from his Genevan ordination service of
1542, reasoning that even though this act did have Biblical authority (cf. I Timothy
4:14; I Peter 5:1-4), it had been distorted so much by Rome that to perpetuate it
would risk 'scandal'. As the Ecclesiastical Ordinances had argued, it was thought
'better to abstain from it because of the infirmity of the times' (Maxwell [19311
1965: 170 nlO). Though Calvin later softened his line on this particular act ([559]
1960: IV.3.16), and though he came to regard other Biblically-justifiable gestures
such as kneeling for prayer as matters for local interpretation ([1559] 1960:
IV.I0.30), many of his followers were even more suspicious of their potential to
detract from the true 'matter' of worship - that is, linguistic articulation of the Word
of God. Knox, for example, is widely thought to have influenced the insertion into
the 1552 BCP of a so-called 'Black Rubric' making it clear that kneeling to receive
communion implied no 'real and essential' presence of Christ - that is, no 'adoration
of the sacrament' (Reardon 1981: 259-60). Then again, many English Puritans did
away with kneeling altogther (Davies 1948: 214), as well as abolishing all special
'symbolic' vestments (Maxwell [1931] 1965: 211) and frequently omitting the
imposition of hands at ordinations (Davies 1948: 225-7).
Today in the URC, congregational kneeling remains highly unusual, and
features in none of the service order charts returned by informants in our Advent
Sunday Survey. Other specific gestural and 'visual' rituals are also rare, although
the laying on of hands at ordinations is now standard. as is the joining of a couple's
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hands in marriage (URC 1989: 56, 89), Also, under recent ecumenical influence,
nine of the 10 churches in our corpus include a special 'Advent Candle' ceremony
to symbolize the coming of Christ as God's 'Light to the World', (Elsewhere, similar
use of a candle has been introduced as an option at URC baptisms (URC 1989:
34». As for vestments, these remain discretionary and are thus not a 'Material
Condition' of valid speech acts in the URC in the same way that they are in the
Churches of Rome, England and even Scotland (cf. Maxwell [19311 1965: 213).
Ministers are not bound by any 'canon law' to wear any particular garment, and this
freedom is evidenced by the eschewal of vestments at Warsash (AS 5) and BuLwell
(8), as well as by the varying degrees of formality adopted elsewhere, from a
simple dog-collar at Weoley Castle (7) to full cassock, bands, hood and cross at
Wheatley (6).
What emerges from all this is that, while speech act conditions and rules are
somewhat less apparent in English Reformed worship than in other church
traditions, this difference is only relative. For all its claims to 'freedom', felicitous
English Reformed church discourse is still subject to 'regulation' - not only along
the lines specified by Austin and Searle, but also in the 'extra' dimensions noted by
Martinich and others in respect of more obviously 'ritualized' liturgical traditions.
What is more, we could even go on to say that just as it has jettisoned various
'Material' Conditions in favour of an emphasis on purely 'Biblical' worship. so the
English Reformed church has added - or at least reinforced - a lex oandi
'SCriptural Discourse Condition', related to the form and reference of the language
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itself. If justified, this would once again challenge the dichotomy of
constative/performative expression. It is to this dichotomy that we now turn.
5.4 From Performative/Constative to LocutionJIllocutionlPerlocution:
sense, reference, force and purpose in sacral speech
From what we have seen so far, it is hardly surprising that several
attempts to apply Austin's work to religious language in general, and worship
discourse in particular, have made much of his 'discovery' of the performative.
Indeed, where, say, Ramsey was struggling in 1957 to cast God-talk in a logical-
empiricist mould - addressing demands for 'descriptive factuality' and 'verification'
in scriptural and doctrinal phrases - once Austin's lectures had been published, a
way was open to invoke the 'performative' as a more positive paradigm with which
to account for theological utterances. Thus as early as 1963. Evans could assert that
'performatives are important in religious language ...both God's use of His 'Word' in
creation, and men's use of their words in talk about God as creator, are
'perfonnative" (1963: 27). Similarly. Ladriere's acquaintance with Evans (1966;
1967) led him to the confident announcement that
liturgical language ...is not merely a verbal commentary on an action external to
itself; in and of itself. it is action ...In order. therefore. to express the operative
(non-descriptive) nature of liturgical language. we may use the term
'performativity', as proposed by Austin. The problem with which we are faced is
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one of determining the exact kind of perfonnativity proper to liturgical language.
(1973: 51-2.1. 15-53).
Now there is room for debate about exactly where Austin ends and Ladriere
begins: as far as we are aware 'perforrnativity' was not, in fact, Austin's word
(though it is used by later pragmaticians like Recanati (1987». Moreover, its
appropriation by Ladriere at best elaborates what Austin himself wrote.
Nonetheless, Ladriere's basic point is clear: the fundamental status of worship
discourse is 'active' rather than 'denotative'; its words are used to 'do things' rather
than just to 'say things' (cf. Austin 1962: 5).
At this level, Austin's constative/perforrnative contrast can be seen as a
necessary premise for the development of speech act theory, and there can be little
doubting its potential for 'legitimating' liturgical discourse beyond the confines of
verification ism and predicate logic (cf. Leech & Thomas 1990: 176). Nevertheless,
it is essential to realise that it was a contrast which was soon regarded by Austin
himself as too crude a division of linguistic functions. Indeed, his refinement of it
eventually leads to a conflation of both 'performatives' and 'constatives' into a more
subtle schema - one which acknowledges that not only performatives, but all
utterances, possess the quality of actions (1962: 90-3).
Firstly. in Lectures VI and vn of How to Do Things with Worn's, Austin
moves towards the conclusion that what he originally presented as 'performatives'
were in fact just 'primary', 'pure' or 'explicit' manifestations of the performative
character of utterances in general. To bear this out, he shows how various
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'performative verbs' might be supplied to demonstrate the speech-activity inherent
in a whole range of expresions whose 'surface' forms are apparently non-
performative. Thus, even a seemingly straightforward constative like 'the car is
blue' could carry 'implicit' constructions such as 'I state that', 'I judge that', 'I
maintain that', 'I assert that', 'I promise you that' etc. - each of which would fulfil his
initially distinctive criteria for performatives (1962: 91). Likewise, an interrogative
such as Where is the office?' might be rendered as 'I ask you to tell me where the
office is'; an imperative like 'Go to my room' could be expressed as 'I order you to
go to my room', and even a mood less sentence like the cricket umpire's 'Over'
might be articulated as 'I declare that we have reached the end of the over'. Austin
infers from all this that the defining criteria for performative language must derive
neither from grammatical structure nor from a simple absence of descriptive
meaning (1962: 91). Instead, at the mid-point of his argument (p.91), he proposes a
'reconsideration' of the senses in which 'to say something is to do something, or in
saying something we do something. and even by saying something we do
something' (1962: 94).
Austin's 'reconsideration' .sees the constative/performative polarity superseded
by an anatomy of speech action which is designed to account for the fulJ range of
linguistic utterances. Within this anatomy, the old constative/performative
distinction 'no longer serves to characterise different sorts of utterances, but to
reconstruct different aspects of one and the same utterance' (Wunderlich 1979a:
268, my italics). Crucially, Austin comes to realise (1962: 94-108) that a single
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utterance might at the same time constitute three kinds of act.
The first speech act-type identified in Austin's refined schema is the
Locutionary Act or Locution. This is the act of saying something. It includes as
constituent elements: the utterance of certain noises (phonetic act), which are
articulated as certain vocables or words within some lexico-grammatical (or for
speech, intonational) system (phatic act), and which are used with a 'more or less
definite' sense and reference (rhetic act) (95-6).
Austin's second act is the IIJocutionary Act or Illocutioa; and it is this which
has preoccupied subsequent speech act theorists most. The Illocutionary Act is the
act performed in or by virtue of the locutionary act. For instance, on the Advent
tape from High Heaton, the locutionary act of saying 'Lord God, we want to ask for
your forgiveness' (AS 10.191) realises an illocutionary act of 'confession' (cf.
Austin 1962: 99-100).
Finally, the PerJocutionary Act or Pedocutioa is defined by Austin as the act
performed in consequence of what is said, in specific relation to its 'effects upon the
feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience,or of the speaker, or of other persons'
(101). For example, in using the locution 1urge you to believe x a preacher may
produce the illocutionary act of 'strongly encouraging' a congregation towards
some conviction; but s/he will have effected a suitable perlocutionary act only if,
by this locution and illocution, the congregation are thus persuaded of x.
Now Austin underlines these distinctions with a number of illustrations. In
addition to the saying/urging/persuading paradigm just cited, he posits that 'we can
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distinguish the locutionary act 'He said that' from the illocutionary act 'He argued
that' and the perlocutionary act 'He convinced me that' ; similarly. telling someone
(1') 'You can't do x is locutionary; thereby 'protesting' against P doing x is
Illocutionary, and consequently 'stopping Pfrom doingz' is perlocutionary.
Austin's speech act trichotomy is readily applied to the discourse of worship.
but the use of language in liturgy confirms several complications within it. Some of
these complications were envisaged by Austin himself; others have been
highlighted by later pragmaticians. Let us now consider them in tum.
5.4.1 Locutions v illocutions in worship
For Austin. although 'locutionary usage' had long formed the dominant
focus of linguistic philosophy (1962: 100), and was obviously of significance to
'grammarians and phoneticians' (95), it failed even to throw light on his initial
problem of 'the constative as opposed to the performative utterance' (98). More
specifically, it would not yield necessary information about precisely how an
utterance is being used on a particular occasion (99). Austin's confirmation that
even the 'rhetie' aspect of locutions concerns the 'sense and reference' of
expressions rather than their force (99-100) would appear to underline this. On the
other hand, as Bach & Hamish have since observed (1979: 19-20), linking
locutionary acts with sense and reference in this way still begs certain questions:
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Unfortunately, there are two ways of taking [Austin's] phrase "with a certain sense
and reference" and thus two ways of taking the notion of a rbetic (hence of a
locutionary) act On one reading, the phrase identifies the operative sense (and
denotation) of expressions in case they are ambiguous; on the other it specifies
what the speaker means and refers to by the expressions used. The latter is
probably what Austin bad in mind (pp.l14-S, n.1). Even though he did not draw
the distinction clearly, for Austin there is a major break between the phatic act and
the rhetic act, in that specification of the former entails no specification of what
the speaker meant, whereas the latter does. For one thing, identifying the operative
sense (and attendant denotations) of the expressions in a sentence uttered does not
guarantee that something was saidrather than, say, recited. (1979: 19-20).
The distinction Bach & Harnish make here reiterates what has already
emerged as a key issue in our quest for a 'liturgical pragmatics' - namely, the
distinction between intention and convention in speech acts (cf. Strawson [1974]
1991). If locutions are indeed products of 'speaker-meaning', one must wonder how
the 'sense/reference' or 'rhetic' component of fonnulaic or corporately recited
liturgical locutions might be anlysed. As we have seen, English Reformed worship
functions particularly according to a model of what Ferguson (1985: 208) dubs
'semi-free texts'; this is to say, it combines extemporary discourse with more
established uses of Biblical and liturgical language. Given that it would be
desirable for the liturgical pragmatician to demonstrate both the continuity of and
differentiation between locutions uttered more or less formulaically (cf. Tilley
1991), it might be possible to argue for a cline in which each was depicted as more
or less 'generic' or 'specific' in character. As much as anything, it is far from easy to
distinguish sharply between liturgical locutions which are 'said' (and thus
cognitively 'meant') and those which are merely 'recited' by members of a
congregation (and so 'meant' in the more general operative-denotative sense
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I identified by Bach & Harnish ). This 'generic-specific continuum' is in fact upheld
by Searle (1973). On his reckoning. however. once applied to the rhetic dimension
of Austin's locutionary act. it should be clear that the continuum in question is more
accurately understood as a representation of illocutionary rather than locutionary
activity. For Searle, indeed, the distinction between locutions and illocutions is
regarded as superfluous: since Austin made speaker-meaning a rhetic component of
the locutionary act, Searle asserts that he was envisaging there a range of pragmatic
indications (eg. as to whether the sentence conveyed is intended as a statement,
question or command) - indications which are properly designated as elements of
illocutionary force. It is for this reason that Searle makes 'propositional acts' part of
illocutionary activity, rather than differentiating them sharply from it. Thus,
whereas Austin (1962: 102) had drawn a substantive division between the
locutionary act 'He said that' and the illocutionary act 'He argued that', Searle
proposes that both must be treated as types of illocutionary action - the former
simply a 'less precise' and more 'generic' version of the latter (1973: 149).
These refinements appear to square with evidence from our corpus. Returning
to the relation between 'praying' and 'asking'. it is clear that in illocutionary terms,
(25) and (26) are just as 'intercessory' as (27) and (28) - even though the latter seem
more particularly to signal their operation as such:
(25) MINlSTER: We pray for continuing success and hope in the Middle ~ process,
(AS2.574)
(26) MINISTER: We pray for Pauline /Membury/.
that Lord you would grant her your blessing and strength
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(AS 4.690-1)
(27) MINISTER: [ • • • Jfor those,
who devote their }iy§,
to the benefit of ~g others,
• ..(4.0)...
and those who spend their time
caring for our community.
We ask that your ~ing will be on each one
(AS 3.323-8)
(28) MINISTER: Lord we ask that you will come into the hearts of all men,
(AS 10.443)
Furthermore, Searle's suggestion of an 'overlap' or 'continuity' between
locutionary and iUocutionary meanings would seem to bear out what we said in
2.2.5 about liturgical-pragmatic 'contextualization', Certainly, several liturgical
'locutions', by their very rhetic fixity. feature not only as products of
institutionalised intentions, but also as genuine conditioners of ritual felicity, and so
in themselves appear to bring about' a clearly 'pragmatic' force. As we have seen,
certain service portions in some traditions are validated (or rendered 'happy') only
when precise wordings (or in Austin's terms, phemes (1962: 97-8» are used. In
such cases, the 'text' significantly shapes the 'context', rather than being wholly
dependent upon it for its contingent meaning. On this basis, Martinich (1975a: 301-
2; 1975b: 408) goes so far as to identify a special category of Locutiotury Act
Conditions for institutional settings as a further addition to Austin and Searle's
Conditions and Rules of Use. Later, Bach & Hamish refer in similar terms to
'locution-specillc speech acts' (1979: 118). Citing the Catholic requirement that a
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baptism be marked by a priest's saying 'I baptize you in the name of the Father and
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit', Martinich comments that 'unlike non-
institutional speech acts, which allow many different locutionary acts to count as
the performance of a particular illocutionary act, institutional speech acts usually
require a specific locutionary formula or give a choice among a select number of
formulae', As Martinich indicates, the use of such institutionalised formulae blurs
the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary activity, since the
phonetic/phatic/rhetic act of articulating their specified sounds, vocables, sense and
reference is, eo ipse, commensurate with the act performed in doing so - whether
that act be lawful church maniage, Roman christening or swearing a courtroom
oath.
While all this may seem to validate Searle's basic assumption of locutions into
illocutionazy acts, certain more specific problems remain. First, as Recanati points
out (1987: 248-54), a flaw opens up in Searle's argument when he goes on to tie
Austin's 'locution' firmly to what he calls 'sentence-meaning', while associating
illocutions specifically with 'utterance-meaning'. Indeed, while Austin held that the
phatic element of a locutionary act clearly conveys sentence-meaning as the
'determinable' meaning of the pheme, he nevertheless portrayed the rhetic element
of illocutions as consisting in the production of 'determinate' meaning - that is.
meaning produced in the actual issuing of an utterance. In itself. this does not refute
Searle's overriding contention that locutions carry illocurionary force and may thus
be subsumed into illocutionary acts. Indeed, assignment of 'utterance meaning' to
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the rhetic level of locutions might be said actually to strengthen this point, since the
association of 'utterances' with 'illocutions' is axiomatic! Nevertheless. Searle's
analysis does leave unanswered the question of just whether and how the
illocutionary force of 'rhetic utterance acts' might differ from the illocutionary force
of 'illocutionary utterance acts'. If this seems perplexing. a way through is offered
by Strawson (1973). Like Bach & Hamish after him, Strawson recognises that there
is a vital distinction to be drawn in Austin's locution. between the phonetic-phatic
component and the rhetic component. Indeed. he proposes that Austin is properly
read as suggesting not two. but three 'states' of illocutionary force - states which
correspond closely to the articulation of propositional content. Maintaining the
aforementioned link between rhetic acts and utterance-meaning. Strawson retracts
sentence-meaning into Austin's 'phatic' component and argues that here both
propositional content and illocutionary force exist in purely 'potential' states. being
thus subject to a range of possible contextual 'specifications'. The rhetic level is
distinguished from the phatic by the fact that propositional content is specified
there, while at the illocutionary level specification applies not only to propositional
content but also to illocutionary force as well. Most significantly of all, however.
Strawson hypothesises an .'intermediate' status for illocutionary force at the rhetic
(or as he terms it, 'locutionary') level - that is, between mere 'potentiality' and
complete 'determinateness'. This status is associated by Strawson with the sort of
'rough' pragmatic indications offered through syntactic structures - the verbal mood
of an utterance being an obvious example (see Fig. 1 overleaf).
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Now the relevance of these rather fine distinctions for our purposes is that they
begin to approach the kind of taxonomic intricacy demanded by liturgical speech
action. Rather than simply sub-dividing locutions and illocutions or even collapsing
them into a continuum running from 'sentence-meaning' to 'utterance-meaning', the
liturgical pragmatician needs a framework which recognises not only degrees of
generality and specificity in sense, reference and force, but which also
acknowledges that the relative interplay between them is crucially determinative of
pragmatic meaning in the language of church worship. We can illustrate this by
taking the baptismal formula quoted above, and tracing its use in the United
Reformed Church, where an identical Locutionary Act Condition applies (cf. URC
1989: 34). While we might associate this formula with a virtual co-incidence of
Strawson's phatic, locutionary and illocutionary action, there are in fact subtle
dynamic variations and potential exceptions to be charted. Phatically, as a
sentential 'type', we must analyse its propositional content as determinable rather
than determinste; as universal and generic rather than as contextually specific - that
is, simply as
(29) Some person A baptises some person B
At the locutionary level - when encoded in the URC Service Book - the same
formula will possess a more (though not yet totally) definite sense and reference:
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the pronouns will carry greater deictic precision and there will be more distinct
propositional content:
(30) Some ordained Minister Mbaptises some sanctioned candidate Cin
some United Reformed Cllurch.
In this case, the illocutionary force will be generically that of 'a church
sacrament', but will still not be distinctively related to a particular act of worship at
a particular time involving a particular clergyman and baptizand. Only at the
il1ocutionary level will it be possible to assign definite referents and specific force
to the words used. This, of course, is the level at which the Minister at Church 9 in
our Advent Sunday Survey baptises the daughter of two of his adherents:
(31) MINISTER: [...] Lucy Emily Routledge,
I bap~ you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit
(AS 9.170-1)
. Rev. D.W. Thomas baptises Lucy Emily Routledge at Blackford Bridge
United Reformed Olurcb on 1/12/91. IDocutionary Force: Sacrament of
Baptism.
Stripping down this analytic process as we have just done enables us to realise
that while there may often be a correspondence between phatic, locutionary and
illocutionary acts, and while these may be 'iconic' in relation to propositional
content and illocutionary force, this need not always be the case. The baptismal
pheme need not always be addressed to a suitable candidate by an ordained
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Minister over a font in a valid church service. Like many other formulae, it may
instead feature in what Austin dubs 'parasitic' usage (1962: 22) - in the 'fictional'
discourses of novels and poems, in reported or 'cited' speech, in 'rehearsal'
situations and in general speculative or theoretical language about speech events
such as we have been using here (cf. Searle 1979: 58-75). What is more, these
'special cases' raise vital questions about the relative status of liturgical
performatives in written or 'prayer book' texts as contrasted with spoken or
'performed' sacral discourse - questions which as we have already seen, bear
particularly on English Reformed worship. It is clear that although there may be an
overt co-identity between locution, illocurion and illocutionary force in many
'standard' institutional speech acts, 'parasitic uses' like those just noted show that
wider felicity conditions must still be taken into account. Indeed, specifically
within Christian discourse, it would be simplistic to suppose that any formulaic
locutions could be treated causatively like 'magic spells' - ie. as always possessing
the same, inherent illocutionary force regardless of the context in which they are
uttered. No doubt. anthropological linguists like Malinowski (1935) and Tambiah
(1968) have shown this to be a prevalent paradigm of sacred speech in various
exotic religions and cultures, but as Thiselton confirms (1974), the 'operational
force' of ludaeo-Christian sacred language rests more characteristically on
'procedures and presuppositions in a context of promise related to the covenantal
God', and on 'institutional features' in covenant community's 'life' which extra-
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linguistically 'set the stage' for effective speech acts (1974; 1992: 293). As a key
illustration of this phenomenon, Thiselton observes:
...when Isaac cannot revoke Jacob's blessing [Gen 27], this is not necessarily
because his words are believed to be like a grenade whose explosion can only be
awaited, but because, in Austin's terms, to give the same blessing to Esau would be
like saying 1do' to a second bride, or like saying 1appoint you' when someone has
already been appointed. A convention for withdrawing the performative utterance
did not exist; hence the original performative remains effectively in force. (1974:
294).
For similar reasons, Jeffner (1972: 101-4) is sceptical about regarding
eucharistic performatives as 'power prescriptions', while post Vatican Il, Martinich
is clear that 'treating the sacraments as speech acts gives some content to the denial
that [they} involve magic'. Martinich goes on:
It is quite clear that the sacraments are not magic if they operate like promising,
inaugurating and non-sacramental marrying; that is, if they are speech acts. Just as
a person actually becomes president by uttering the oath of office, a person really
becomes a priest by the sacramental words of ordination. The change from 1ayman'
to 'official' occurs without tricks, mirrors or occult powers. It is the conventions of
the society using the language that make it so. (1975a: 297, my emphasis).
For Calvin, a similar 'anti-occultism' is apparent both in his own doxology,
and in his swingeing polemic against Medieval Roman Catholic doctrine.
Fundamentally, Calvin follows Augustine in his conviction that 'words' should
never be confused with the 'power' of liturgy. Words for Calvin are 'nothing but
signs', and in this sense resemble the elements of bread and wine. Moreover. while
signs may ultimately change, 'faith' remains immutable ([1559] 1960: IV.14.l5;
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IV.14.26). Indeed. signs without faith are 'empty' because it is only through faith
that they become 'operative' in worship. On this point, at least. Calvin is very close
to Ladriere (1973: 61-2, IA07ff.). Faith in tum is a gift of God mediated by the
Holy Spirit, so any idea that mere signs - whether verbal or material - could
intrinsically convey the 'real presence' of Christ is anathema (Calvin [1559) 1960:
IV .14.14). This is one of the central pillars of Calvin's attack on the Mass, which he
argues had perpetuated just such an 'ontological' and 'causative' view of liturgical
language ~d symbol, and which had thus led 'men's pitiable minds' to 'repose in
the appearance of a physical thing rather than in God Himself (IV .14.14).
Although Calvin's 'epistemology' of sacral discourse is worked out with
specific regard to the sacrament of holy communion, its applicability to other parts
of liturgy is readily inferred from his conviction that the word 'sacrament' has a
'wider sense' beyond its specific relation to eucharist and baptism. This sense is the
sense in which it 'embraces generally all those signs which God has ever enjoined
upon men to render them more certain and confident of the truth of his promises'
(IV .14.18). Since language is itself 'nothing but signs', it is clear from Calvin that as
and when it mediates, and is received as conveying, the unchanging 'Word of God',
so then and only then can the language of worship more generally be said to
possess a 'sacramental' illocutionary force (IV.14.6. cf. Vincent 1979: 153).
Now one of the major reasons why a causative 'word-magic' hypothesis might
prove tempting with regard to religious language in general and liturgical language
in particular stems from the fact that these varieties appear to exhibit a high
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proportion of model explicitperformatives, excessive attention to which might well
obscure the true 'illocutionary logic' of worship. We shall need now to devote
special attention to this problem.
5.4.2 The problem of 'explicit performatives' in liturgy
We have seen how Austin arrived at a rejection of fixed grammatical
criteria for performatives. Nevertheless, as Leech (1983: 175-9) observes, it is clear
that in spite of this he remained wedded to the notion of certain. mostly first person
indicative active, verb forms as paradigmatic manifestations or 'icons' of the
performative character of speech in general (Austin 1962: 67-8; 160-1).
At one point, Austin puts forward what Recanati (1987: 44-63) has since
termed a 'Paratactic Hypothesis' in relation to such 'explicit performative verbs'
(1962: 67ff). This is to say, he casts them as devices which variously 'make plain'
(70) or 'make clearer' (73) the 'force of the utterance or... how it is to be taken' (73).
So, for example, 1shall be there' may function pragmatically as a promise in its
own right, but prefixing it with 1promise that' underlines and confirms its
operation as such (69). Inour own corpus, when the Minister at Wheatley says,
'strengthen and enlighten us, we beseech you 0 God' (AS 6.565), or when the
Minister at Weoley Castle prays 'Lord for the things we take for granted, ... we say
thank you' (AS 7.578-80), the 'we beseech' and 'we say' have a similar function.
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Significantly. Austin insists that the explicit performative in such cases is more than
purely 'descriptive'. discourse deictic (70), or as Lyons (1977: 782) would later put
it. 'token reflexive'. This is to say, it is not merely a 'report' of action taking place
elsewhere in the sentence, in the so-called 'pure' or 'primary' performatives. This is
due to the fact that while subject to 'abuse' or 'misfire' in the way we have already
discussed, such explicit performatives cannot be 'true' or 'false' in a strict,
propositional sense. To say them is still, in itself. to perform an action - even
though this action may be carried out insincerely or illegally, and thus 'unhappily'
(86). This would also apply to explicit performative statements like 'I confess that I
have sinned' and 'I declare that they are husband and wife'. Even so, severe
problems remain in this line of analysis - problems which Austin himself came to
recognise and which Warnock (1973), Searle (1979a: 1-29) and Recanati (1987:
44ft) have since exposed further.
First, despite Austin's formal separation of 'pure' and 'explicit' performatives, it
is plain that the same single verb-form may realise both at once. For instance. a
statement like 'I salute you' characteristically effects an action while simultaneously
signalling the force of that action. Likewise, Bach & Hamish (1979: 117-9)
pinpoint a cardinal instance of this phenomenon in the policeman's "You're under
arrest", which 'informs' the arrestee of what is happening even while helping to
make it happen. Comparable examples from URC worship would be as follows:
S. Austin in fact develops an intriguing thesis in reptd 10 the pure/explicit distinction (pp.71·3, 83) wilen lie sugesl$ that
the fonner will tend to predate the Ia1ter in a society's 1iDpistic evolution.
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(32) MINISTER: Icall uponyouto pray for [Lucy],
and CJlt'efor her
(AS 9.181-2, my emphasis)
(33) MINISTER: God,
coming to be with us in Jesus,
we greet your coming withjoy
(AS 2.289-91, my emphasis)
(34) MINISTER: So Lord we give you praise and gioryon this day
(AS 4.56, my emphasis)
Second, and more complexly, Austin admits that even while they are not
simply 'descriptive', the descriptive element of explicit performatives is often such
as to make for an ambiguity which is then hard to disentangle. Hence 1 approve'
may have 'the performative force of giving approval or it may have a descriptive
meaning: 1 favour this" - or, presumably, both (1962: 78). Likewise, liturgical
staples like 'we praise' or 'we glorify' could be seen as simultaneously describing
extant affective activity or as themselves instantiating such activity. Further still,
distinguishing these functions is again made more difficult by a need to make value
judgments about the inner motivations, intentions and feelings of the speakers - ego
whether in saying 'God, we greet you' they are actually welcoming Him afresh or
merely 'bidding Him welcome' in order to fulfil a ritualistic obligation (AS 2.282;
cf. Austin 1962: 78-9)
At one level, these complexities are no more than might be expected given the
aforementioned recognition - implicit in Austin and explicit in Searle - that many
speech acts contain both a 'stating' and a 'doing' element. Austin's difficulty is that
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he can find no fixed or objective criterion by which these elements may be
distinguished. one from the other. As he says himself. 'it is often not easy to be sure
that, even when it is apparently in explicit form. an utterance is performative or that
it is not'(1962: 91). Neither is it only 'extrinsic' or 'material' perfonnatives which
sow such confusion: Austin also cites the liturgically relevant 1know that' and 1
believe that' as more mentalistically 'complicated' examples of verbs which may be
read both 'descriptively' and 'performatively'. The question of whether 'thinking'
and 'believing' can constitute 'doing' is. indeed. a vexed one. and goes to the very
heart of traditional philosophical distinctions between cognition and action or
'thought' and 'expression'. What is more, it is a question which becomes especially
pertinent in the liturgical context. How, for example. are we to interpret the
following utterances from a 'performative' point of view?:
(35) MINISTER: We re~ber Quist's death
(AS 2439 - Extemporary Eucharistic Thanksgiving)
(36) MINISTER: We realise our unworthiness to approach you 0God
(AS 2501 - Extemporary Prayer of Access)
(37) MINISTER: And Father we think
of the Eastern Bloc and RoJ]llDia.
(AS 4.636-7 - Extemporary Intercession)
(38) MINISTER: Father we ~ledge that,
everything we have ~
you have gLven us.
(AS 5.229-31 - Extemporary prayer to dedicate offering)
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In each case here, it transpires that the mental 'reference' of the locution is
incidental when compared to the pragmatic force of the illocution. In their
respective contexts, all four prayers (35) - (38) serve not only to denote existing
'states of mind'; nor do they themselves simply 'bring about' the 'remembrance',
'realisation', 'thought' and 'acknowledgement' they describe. Rather, they must be
seen to carry an additional illocutionary load of instruction to the congregation as
to what it should pray next The first person plural pronouns are in this sense
deceptive: no doubt, the Minister is praying along with the people, but he is also
'going ahead' of them and prompting them from 'in front'.
Now Austin himself did at least begin to acknowledge such complications.
Towards the end of How to Do Things with Words he becomes much clearer that
locutionary 'phemes' cannot themselves be performative, and that they can only
become so when ascribed a certain illocutionary 'force' - a force which is in its tum
determined by context and usage. As his eventual title suggests, it is people who 'do
things with words'rather than (as in the 'magic spell' scenario) words which do
, things to people (1962: 60). Granted, our own data has confumed that on specific
occasions, particular verbs, or other grammatical elements, may be uttered in such
a way as to make the illocutionary force of a speech act 'explicit' and may even,
when thus articulated, form an integral part of the speech act itself; finally,
however, they cannot themselves be classed as 'illocutionary'. Instead, as Searle
(1969: 62) puts it, they will typically function as Illocutionary Force Indicating
Devices (IFID's), manifesting not some parallel 'pure' performative, but rather
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confuming the full situated act which is performed in the contextualised utterance
of the sentence to which they belong (cf. Levinson 1983: 238). What is particularly
significant about this approach for our purposes is that it allows for the placement
of explicit performative verbs within a much broader domain of phenomena which
might clarify the purport of an illocutionary act: in this sense indeed, they belong in
the same class as pragmatically-detenninating linguistic variables like 'word-order,
stress. intonation ...punctuation and mood' (Searle 1969: 30). Perhaps more
significantly still. though. they could justifiably be related to paralinguistic and
extralinguistic IFID's like gestures and sacramental symbols (cf.Leech & Thomas
1990: 176).
On our Advent Sunday tapes, there are numerous instances of explicit
performatives functioning as IFID's in the way just outlined. At the Offertory for
example, we see physical acts of 'giving money' integrated with utterances like the
following:
(39) MINISTER: Father [...J
we bring these ~,
particularly for the work of your kin&dom
(40) MINISTER:
(AS 5.243-5)
Lord (oo.)
were!Ym
these mkens of our ~ and commilment
(AS 8.333-6)
(41) Loving God,
we give you ~ these mkens of our love for you
(AS 9.278-9)
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If such speech acts have a broadly 'sacramental' quality in their strong fusion of
verbal and non-verbal signs, an even more canonical sacramentalism is evident in
these eucharistic co-incidences of 'word' and 'deed':
(42) MINISTER: [While breaking the commtmion loaf]
We break this bread
to share in the body of Onist
(AS 8.425-6)
(43) MINISTER: So we take this ~
and we take this wine
and we set it aside for that sp;ciaJ. purpose which God
has given it
to US for.
(AS 4.722-6)
Once again. the explicit performatives used in such sequences are more than just
'commentaries' on the 'actions' of offertory, fraction and consecration; on the
contrary, in fact, they form an essential part of these actions. It is not as if the non-
verbal gestures of bringing money' and 'reserving' or breaking' bread could alone
mediate the illocutionary force of 'offertory', 'fraction' and 'consecration', Neither,
as we have seen, is anything significant 'done' by the words themselves. Rather,
language and gesture together 'indicate' or 'make explicit' an illocutionary force
which derives neither from each in isolation, nor even from both in combination.
Calvin was clear that the general quality of 'sacramentality' was dependent on a
merging of verbal and non-verbal semiosis ([1559] 1960: N.14.15; 18), but even
this merger is seen as necessary rather than sufficient because 'the sacrament is one
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thing, the power of the sacrament another' (IV.14.15, my emphasis). Indeed, the
'power' - or in our terms, the 'illocutionary force' - of the sacrament derived not
from performing the right 'ceremony', important though this ceremony was; instead,
it derived from the performance of the ceremony in a specific context - namely the
corporate worship of gathered believers in church. To this day. Reformed
denominations discourage sacramental enactment outside the setting of
congregational praise: Calvin was particularly scathing about 'private Masses' on
the grounds that they imputed 'power' to ritual itself, rather than to the Word of God
and to personal and ecclesial 'faith' as it is manifested in the church service as a
whole. Likewise, not only baptism, but other more broadly sacramental acts like
candle-lighting and absolution tend to be confined to formal public services, and
are certainly not endorsed as 'official' acts of personal devotion in the same way as
in the Roman or Eastern Orthodox traditions (von Allmen 1965: 61-2). Hence
while Ladriere insists that 'sacramental performativlty' acquires its proper force
only 'in the context of the prayer of the Canon' (1973: 61, 1.382-3), Reformed
doxology would insist even more specifically that it is within the whole 'context of
situation' of public church worship that liturgical expressions most fully attain to
the status of liturgical 'illocutionary acts', This compares favourably with Austin's
conclusion that 'what we have to study is not the sentence [or, we might add,
grammatical categories like explicit performative verbs] but the issuing of an
utterance in a speech situation' (1962: 139).
If all this seems to augur well for a 'pragmatic explication of Reformed
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worship, Austin himself stops frustratingly short of developing his argument more
thoroughly to suit such an explication. Hence, even in his final Lecture, he still
deduces a classification of illocutionary forces according to lexicographical criteria
- to no less, in fact, than a 'dictionary survey' of so-called 'explicit performative'
verbs! (1962: 150). Leech rightly criticizes this methodology as 'fallacious', and
notices a similar internal contradiction even within the work of Searle:
The ll.l.OCUTIONARY-VERB FAllACY is the view that the analysis of
illocutionary force can be suitably approached through the analysis of the meaning
of illocutionary verbs such as advise, command and promise On the face of it. this
appears to be a reasonable approach. But it leads to the error of 'grammaticizing'
pragmatic force. Whereas the sense of illocutionary verbs is part of grammar, to be
analysed in categorical terms, illocutionary force is to be analysed in rhetorical
and noncategorical terms. When we are analysing illocutionary verbs, we are
dealing with grammar, whereas when we are analysing the illocutionary force of
utterances, we are dealing with pragmatics. It is easy to confuse the two things.
because one is part of the metalanguage of the other ...But it is to commit a
ftmdamental and obvious error to assume that the distinctions made by OlD'
vocabulary necessarily exist in n:ality. Language provides us with verbs like order,
request, beg, plead, just as it provides us with nouns like puddle, pond, Jake, sea,
ocean. But we should no more assume that there are in pragmatic n:ality distinct
categories such as orders and requests than that there are in geographical reality
distinct categories such as puddles. ponds and lakes. Somehow. this assumption
slips unnoticed into Searle's introduction to his taxonomy [of illocutionary acts
1979a:2] .• .But ...a) one bas no right to assume in advance that such categories
exist in reality (although one might discover them by observation) and b)• • •in
actuality, when one does observe them, illocutions are. .•like puddles and ponds.
distinguished by continuous rather than by discrete characteristics. (1983: 177-8)
Leech's argument here amplifies precisely what we said in the previous
section about illocutionary force operating along a cline of generality and
specificity according to contextual or 'pragmatic' definition. Thus. while 'I baptize'
may be an explicit performative, the degree of illocutionary force it indicates, far
from being 'innate' or 'stable', will vary in direct proportion to its 'situatedness' and
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'appropriacy' - as well as to the related presence of other IFID's such as the non-
verbal ritual of sprinkling from, or immersion in, a specified font or baptistry. In the
face of such scalar variability and context-dependence, it would indeed be hard to
maintain a purely causal, 'word-spell' perspective for even overtly sacramental
language: not only 1 baptize' but also 1 anoint', 1 ordain', 'I induct', 'I consecrate'
and 1 pronounce them husband and wife' may all appear to carry 'intrinsic'
illocutionary force and so to be 'self-actualizing', but in fact this force will be
determined by their conjunction or otherwise, with appropriate extralinguistic
ceremonies undertaken in appropriate circumstances. As we have shown, Austin
did finally propose that in reality, illocutionary acts in toto are tied to 'conventions'
(115; 121-2). Indeed, we have also confirmed that he came to see this as their
defining characteristic. What is less clear, having been questioned by commentators
from Warnock (1973) to Recanati (1987: 44ff.), is what Austin actually meant by
'conventions' - and in particular, whether he had in mind strongly institutional
activities like those just described, or whether he intended the term to extend much
wider, to include general human attitudes and/or 'idiomatic' strategies within
language itself. After all, even in church worship, it is possible to imagine
illocutionary acts which might be 'brought about' more simply (though not
exclusively) by the process of speaking than by some requisite parallel action:
promising/vowing, confessing, absolving, prophesying and blessing are, for
instance, largely gesture-free in non-Conformist liturgies, being accomplished with
utterances rendered felicitous more by the overall context of 'corporate worship'
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than by any attendant kinesic ceremony.
These distinctions in tum raise the question of whether liturgical illocutions
can in any way be divided according to whether their conventional dynamic is such
that they alter states of affairs more 'by themselves', or whether certain states of
affairs are already either in existence or taking shape, to which they are then either
matched or 'added'.
In order to address these key issues of convention and 'direction' in liturgical
speech activity, it is necessary to examine Austin's crucial distinction between
illocutionary acts as acts achieved in saying and perlocutionary effects as effects
achieved by saying.
5.4.3 IlIocutions and perlocutions in worship
If, as we suggested above, the formulaic utterances of religion often
reveal an overlap between locutionary and illocutionary action. even further
complications arise from Austin's attempt to distinguish between illocutions and
perlocutions. This distinction is crucial because it goes to the heart of the
relationship between language-use and 'the world', and specifically the way each
relies on, affects and 'shapes' the other (Wunderlich 1979: 269). Austin devotes
both Lectures IX and X to this matter, but as we have already mentioned, his
guiding principle throughout is that illocutions may be differentiated according to
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the criterion of conventionality. In practice. this means that whereas perlocutions
comprise a whole range of social. psychological and physical effects - effects
which might just as well be achieved by a variety of means beyond language itself -
illocutions are inextricably bound up with the established linguistic usages through
which these effects are brought about (1962: 119).
According to Austin. a major test of conventionality. and so of illocutions as
opposed to perlocutions, is that the former 'could be made explicit by the
performative formula' (1962: 103). Thus. whereas illocutionary acts might be
realised in the utterance of types like 'I argue that' or 'I warn you that'. we cannot
manifest their perlocutionary effects in the same way by saying 'I convince you
that' or 'I alarm you that' (103-4). Austin's examples here seem persuasive. but they
are decidedly partial. Remembering Leech's critique of the 'performative verb
fallacy', we might well wonder whether correspondence between the grammar and
semantics of verbs and the dynamics of actions in the world are always quite this
neat. As Ravenhill hints (1976: 35) and Tilley (1991: 20ff.) conflrms, in liturgical
situations the lines between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary outcomes are
often especially hard to discern. Even confining ourselves to fust person forms, we
might very well wonder how 'illocution' and 'perlocution' are to be distinguished in
cases like 'I absolve you', 'I induct you' or We bless you', where if the speech act is
sacrally instantiated, it would seem simultaneously to encode intention and effect,
speaker-initiation and hearer-impact. Indeed, Austin's assumed model of an
addressor CA)uttering an iUocution which has perlocutionary effect on a discrete,
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comprehending addressee (B) quite overlooks the fact that many illocutionary acts
are reflexive. such that the 'illocutor' is simultaneously the object of the perlocution,
so making distinctions that much harder and thus incidentally undennining any
strict delineation of'illocutionary verbs's. In church worship alone, we could cite
here the formulae 1 repent', 1 confess' and 'we rejoice', all of which may be uttered
in such a way as to produce 'certain consequential effects' upon the 'feelings,
thoughts or actions' of the speaker(s) (cf. Austin 1962: 101), and which may thus
bear at one and the same time an iilocutionary act and an 'introspective'
perlocutionary effect.
Admittedly, liturgical discourse might always be assigned a transcendent
divine hearer, God, but the fact that these locutions can function similarly when
used outside the immediate church context reinforces their potential for
illocutionary/perlocutionary ambiguity. Doubtless, Austin accepted that 'the same
word may genuinely be used in both illocutionary and perlocutionary ways' (1962:
125), but he seems not to have envisaged what we have observed - namely that this
might occur simultaneously within the same single utterance.
The confusion of what Austin calls 'means' and 'ends' in speech acts (130) is
evident even in those instances where conventionality is manifested apart from
language itself. To illustrate this, let us return to a familiar example. It is clear that
even in a proper church with appropriate personnel, the iIlocutionary act realised in
saying 1 baptize x in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit' will not
S. There is a hint by AU$lin (1962: 101) that pet1ocutiotwy effects may be wroupt on 'the speaker', bUlthls Is not borne oul
in his Subsequentanalysis, which is entirely based on a speaker-hearer paradlcm.
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eo ipse have the perlocutionary effect of 'baptizing x. This will only be attained
with attendant sprinkling or immersion of x by a proper person in the approved
way. But it would be wrong to infer from this that the verbal formula is
'illocutionary' and the non-verbal ritual 'perlocutionary'. Far from it: both combine
means-end qualities while themselves interacting in a complex fashion. Simply
saying 1 baptize etc.' is Dot to effect baptism, but neither is simply sprinkling or
immersing x in the approved manner. Both the verbal ritual and the non-verbal
ritual are here simultaneously means to action and action itself. baptism is not
something which exists apart from 'word' and water, as if they were merely the
instruments used to achieve it; rather, its substance precisely consists of the word
and water as they are conjoined with the requisite sacral context of a faithful
gathered church grounded in the Word of God. It is for these reasons that
Blakemore (1992: 92) is so badly mistaken when judging that, like naming ships
and consecrating buildings, baptism only 'happens to involve language' and that
since it could be performed 'without an audience', cannot 'have anything to do with
communication, and hence pragmatics. at all'.
To be fair, Austin's original distinction between illocutions as acts done in
saying and perlocutions as acts done by saying begins to break down towards the
end of How to Do Things with Wonts (1962: 132-3), and he admits that other tests
such as the explicit performative check for illocutions are 'at best very slippery'
(131). For all these qualifications, however, Austin's division between illocutions
and perlocutions does at least have the virtue of defining a distinct emphasis and
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focus for speech act theory in particular and pragmatics in general. By making it
clear that his main concern is with analysis of the illocutionary act (103), Austin
strikes that keynote of language-specificity which we ourselves are pursuing. As
Leech & Thomas confirm,
The locution belongs to the traditional territory of truth-based semantics. The
perlocution belongs strictly beyond the investigation of language and meaning.
since it deals with the effect. or result. of an utterance: whether my words persuade
someone to lend me £10 depends on factors (psychological. social or physical
factors) beyond my control. and is only partly a matter of what I said The
illocution occupies the middle ground between them: the ground now considered
the territory of pragmatics. of meaning in context (1990: 176. cf. Searle &
Vanderveken 1985: 11-12).
From what we have seen. the intertwining of illocutions and perlocutions in
worship is obviously not to be underestimated. All the same. there can be little
doubt that a dedicated study of perlocutionary effects in liturgy would be only
incidentally linguistic, rather than concentratedly linguistic-pragmatic. This is
underlined by Martinich (1975b: 416), who, in seeking to discern liturgical
perlocutions. pinpoints 'grace' on the grounds that it is available beyond the church
and is thus not bound by 'convention'. Along the same lines, Mananzan (1974: 75)
offers 'communality' as a core perlocution of credal illocutionary acts. Of course,
Reformed doctrine would support these two suggestions: after all, one of its key
foundations is sola gratia and one of its governing teleologies concerns the church's
call to be a 'federal' or 'covenant' community of the faithful (Stroup 1992; Wallace
1992). Of course, .too, Tilley is right when he argues that attending to
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perlocutionary 'ends' as well as to illocutionary 'means' will reveal that 'results can
change the meaning of the act performed, as the difference between "assault and
battery" and "manslaughter" shows' (1991: 21). Likewise, it should be clear by now
that we would sympathise with Tilley's further conviction that 'to avoid the Scylla
of pure intentionalism and the Charybdis of unlimited consequentialism, we need to
focus on how context provides the connection between the intention to perform an
act and the results of performing that act' (1991: 22).
Despite all these qualifications, there is still a sense in which assessing the
perlocutionary outcomes of worship is a task which must remain substantially
beyond the scope of the liturgical pragmatician. Analysing liturgical discourse
cannot, typically, reveal whether the prayers spoken in worship are actually
answered; it is unlikely to determine whether a worshipper has actually understood
the Scripture readings; neither will it establish whether individual communicants
have in fact received the bread and wine as Christ's 'body and blood'. As Calvin
stresses time and again, these matters are decided by the presence or otherwise of
the Holy Spirit and faith, and even a thoroughly contextual analysis of sacral
language is unlikely to resolve such things. No doubt, liturgical theology can
indicate what Christian worship should achieve, but as we have already stressed
from Empereur (1987: 8), the theory and practice of worship will not necessarily
coincide. What is more, with specific reference to the Reformed service,
Wolterstorff (1992: 297-9) has pointed unconsciously but suggestively to 8 root
assumption that its perlocutions will come about mainly after worship has taken
265
place - through its participants' quotidian 'work in the world'. As we shall see in
Chapter 7. this perceived liturgical 'purpose' can be seen to have had a reciprocal
effect on the actual composition of Reformed services as mono logleal , explicative
and 'didactic' rather than as dialogical and responsive and 'doxological'. Of more
immediate pertinence to our current exposition however. is Ladriere's gravid
proposal that even if not realised. the perlocutions of worship are still often
discernibly 'hoped for' and 'looked forward to' in its illocutionary construction - that
they are thus somehow 'registered in an eschatological perspective' and that
'performativity' is thus both 'now' and 'not yet'. We shall attempt to bear out this
intuition. but in order to do so. we need first to take a closer look at the nature of
sacral illocutions themselves.
5.5 lliocutioo3.l)' acts, illocutioo8l)' forces and 'directions of fit'
in liturgy
In seeking to classify the illocutionary elements of speech-action.
Austin reiterates that attention should be directed beyond purely syntactic or
semantic criteria: We said long ago that we needed a list of 'explicit performative
verbs'; but ...we now see that what we need is a list of iJJocutionary fo~s ...'(1962:
149-50).
At first sight. this shift might appear to push us back towards a 'perlocutionary'
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assessment of 'action' along psychological, psychophysical, sociological or purely
doxologicallines, rather than towards a firmly language-centred analysis. Austin is
clear, however, that because the 'forces' in question are illocutionary, they must of
necessity arise from the issuing of utterances (1962: 150). Now as we have seen,
Austin in fact remains too exclusively attached to one linguistic conduit of
illocutionacy force - the 'explicit performative verb'. What is more, this narrow
focus has meant that those who have applied Austin's framework to liturgy have
concentrated unduly on explicit sacral speech acts like 'I baptise you', 'Ideclare you
to be husband and wife' etc. at the expense of other significant pragmatic aspects of
church service discourse. One consequence of Austin's 'performative verb fallacy'
is that his illocutionary taxonomy classifies only those forces which might be
imagined as deriving from, or being mediated by, the use of items belonging to this
limited grammatical set. Having said all this, Austin's 'rough' and 'general' schema
(151) provides an important starting-point - not least for the comparison and
contrast of various liturgical speech acts. He suggests five main classes for
ilIocutions, and it will be helpful to summarise his explanation of them as a whole
before inferring any application to worship discourse.
Austin identifies a first group of illocutionary forces under the general heading
Verdictives. Verdictives comprise acts of judging and assessing - that is, of 'giving
a finding as to something' (151). In Austin's exegesis, they might be realised by
verbs such as '1 acquit', '1 reckon', 'I estimate' and 'I calculate', although the fact that
his classification is according to force rather than verb form is here upheld by his
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citing a cricket umpire's moodless 'no ball' as similarly verdictive (153). Often. in
order to be effective in a particular context. these must be issued by some
officially-designated person (eg. a judge or referee).
Secondly. Exercitives are specified as differing from Verdictives inasmuch as
they constitute 'a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement
that it is so'. An Exercitive is thus 'an award as opposed to an assessment; it is a
sentence as opposed to a verdict' (155). Austin offers as examples 'appoint',
'dismiss', 'degrade', 'resign', 'repeal' etc. Even more than with Verdictives, there is
usually some link with 'vested authority'.
Thirdly, Commissives commit the speaker to a certain course of action: 'vow',
'adopt', 'oppose', 'swear', 'bet', 'guarantee' and 'consent' belong in this category,
which is clearly more affective and reflexive than the preceding two.
The fourth class of illocutions identified by Austin are Behebitives - 'a very
miscellaneous group', having to do with 'attitudes and social behaviour' (152).
Examples given are 'thank', 'deplore', 'condole', 'resent' and 'blame'. They are in fact
difficult to distinguish from Commissives; indeed, Austin's suggestion that they
might be defined as entailing 'reaction' to some external stimulus or phenomenon
(151) is belied by the fact that this criterion applies equally to 'consent', 'side with'
and 'embrace' - all of which he classes as Commissive. What is more, 'apologise',
'welcome', 'bless' and 'arise'. which Austin cites as Behabitives, undoubtedly
involve a considerable degree of self-commitment or 'commissive force'.
Finally, Expositives relate to 'the expounding of views, the conducting of
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arguments and the clarifying of usages and references'. In this sense, they are most
obviously generated in the sort of 'token-reflexive' utterance of explicit
performatives which we alluded to earlier: 1 quote', 1 recapitulate', 1 cite' are all
obvious Expositives. Then again, Austin accepts that Expositives might
simultaneously indicate the force of a Verdictive (as in 'concede', 'insist' and
'argue'), a Commissive (accept', 'support', 'testify', 'maintain') and a Behabitive
('demur', 'boggle at').
As these explanations confum., Austin's five categories interact with one
another to a marked degree. Moreover, this becomes especially apparent as one
attempts an analysis of liturgical speech acts according to his taxonomy. The
distinction between Verdictives and Exercitives, for instance, is far from
straightforward in worship. Ostensibly, the more or less spontaneous Judgements'
and 'opinions' required for Verdictives are all but absent from church services.
Preachers may be permitted to 'give their assessment' of certain matters, and
prophets may offer 'reckonings' of political or spiritual situations, but in each case
intentionalities are likely to be predetermined rather than purely synchronic or
personal - that is, constrained by the prior estimations of scriptural, doctrinal and
ecclesiastical discourse. Furthermore, insofar as Judgement' is pronounced
'felicitously' in such cases, it will be assumed to have originated with God, rather
than with the preacher or prophet - a massive complication which conflnns that
liturgical pragmatics cannot do for long without liturgical theology - particularly as
it relates to 'the doctrine of the Word of God. Admittedly, in secular contexts,
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judges and arbiters may be constrained by extant 'rules', 'statutes' and 'precedents',
but it is still assumed by Austin that their Verdictives will have about them an
element of personal, cognitive 'discretion'. This is much harder to detect in
liturgical illocutions, which tend to be more obviously Exercitive - even when
possessing the sort of locutionary form more normally associated with assessing,
reckoning, calculating etc.. It is precisely because of this norm that the following
remark from the Minister of Weoley Castle seems so startling. A member of the
congregation has just read the set lection Matthew 25: 31-46, which ends with
Jesus affirming the prospect of 'eternal punishment' for the unrighteous. The
Minister then comments:
(44) I still don't ..like it
(AS 7.332)
Perhaps it might be argued that this utterance is more Behabitive than
Verdictive, given that it clearly expresses a viewpoint derived from personal
opinion rather than one commensurate with the speaker's status as a 'Minister of the
Word'. Even so, 'personal opinion' is hardly a prerogative of Reformed worship,
and it is particularly striking to see it articulated at this point in the service. Less
egregious but still somewhat incongruously partial are the kind of Verdictive
evaluations offered by the Ministers at Bulwell and Heme Hill:
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(45) roNG.: Amen.
• • • (S.O) • • •
MINISTER: Thank- that's a lovely amm!
(AS 7.7S-9)
(46) MINISTER: And our hm.n.
is a good..Advent hymn,
and perhaps we'll sing it with the ~ that Ithink it deserves.
(AS 1. 198-200)
These. however, are exceptional in our field corpus, and find no corollary in
'service book' rites. Rather, they appear as parenthetical comments on the main
substance of liturgical discourse, and would certainly make no claim to mediate 'the
Word of God'. As we have said. it is more likely that the 'personal assessment' of
sacral Verdictives will seek or imply some official sanction as a 'word from the
Lord'. Certainly, they appear more significant and central to the purpose of worship
when thus presented. The Warsash transcript bears this out clearly:
(47) MINISTER: [From microphone]
Before I..mwhat.! believe God has laid on my heart.
er! want to invite ..~ tomm the saiptme which er ..has
been given to bim this morning
because it seems to me to be a very good..foundlP.on on- upon which to
_erm,
or with which to fgJJow as it were what Ihave to say.
(AS 5.307-10)
If the above remains hedged by admissions that the Verdicti ve force might just
be personally rather than divinely motivated ('it seems to me'), the same cannot be
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said of the next two examples, both of which follow prayers of confession. Though
ostensibly analogous to Austin's Verdictive 'I acquit'. they are in fact more
thoroughly predetermined in their respective contexts: the Minister cannot equally
say to the congregation 'Your sins are not forgiven' or 'You are not free', and so the
optional component of the Verdicti ve is missing:
(48) MINISTER: Here are words that you may trust,
words that merit full acceptance:
'Jesus Christ carne into the world to save sinners'.
Your sins are forgiven for his sake.
CURe 1989: 20)
(49) MINISTER: Scripture says Christ is the one through whom we have fo~ness.
accept it,
believe it,
weare~
(AS 9. 43-6)
As Austin himself admits, 'Exercitive' may describe 'absolving' illocutions like
these better than 'Verdictive', since they are certainly akin more to 'awards' than
'assessments' (1962: 155). Likewise. in this sense it is no surprise that Austin
classes 'pardon' as an Exercitive rather than a Verdictlve. Having said this,
Exercitives are still presented by him as active decisions - albeit that something 'is
to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so'. There is, therefore, still an
element of 'ostensive wilfulness' even in Austin's Exercitive - something which. as
we have seen, may be unnecessary for the effective operation of liturgical acts.
Perhaps, indeed, the 'absolutions' in question are better labelled 'Expositive' -
signalling the performance of an act which is taking place in any case, or, as
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Thiselton (1992: 301) intimates, even expounding an act which has already
occurred but which needs somehow to be 'appropriated' in the here and now:
namely, the atoning death of Christ. This analysis would certainly account for the
Scripture quotations which precede, authorise and so contextuallze the
pronouncements which ensue. In Reformed soteriology, the sacrifice of Christ on
the cross is characteristically viewed as a once-for-all offering for the sins of the
world, and 'absolution' is more decisively mediated as a 'declaration' of the
forgiveness already wrought by God, than by a reprieve conferred upon individuals
at the discretion of a Priest or Minister (Calvin [1559J 1960: illA.l8-19; Nichols
1968: 42-3). Thus while Calvin did retain 'private confession', he denied its
previous status as a 'sacrament' and cast it more as a 'preparation' for corporate
confession than as an end in itself. In the URC Service Books of 1980 and 1989,
these emphases are reflected in the description of absolution as an 'Assurance of
Pardon', even though there is no doubt that what has been assured 'objectively' by
God must still be 'received' in 'repentance' and 'faith' if it is to be fully effective in
human lives.
Now Ladriere in large measure endorses this concept of 'decisive' past acts of
God being 'reappropriated' and 'reapplied' in present liturgical celebration. Hence
supremely at the eucharist, he contends that 'in repeating the words of the Last
Supper the celebrant does more than commemorate it. He repeats once again that
which Christ did, in giving again to the words which Christ used that efficacy
which Christ gave them, in conferring on them the power to do what they mean'
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(1973: 61, 1.373-8). Although Reformed doctrine would robustly question the
causal powers of re-effecruation' assigned to the Priest here, there is no question
that the linking of present Verdictives like This is the body of Christ' or present
Exercitives like '[This bread] will become for us the body of Christ' rely for their
'performativlty' on a previous 'decision' that they should be so - a decision
pronounced by Jesus in the Upper Room.
More prosaically, the same past-present decisiveness can be seen to apply to
those liturgical Verdictives and Exercitives validated by some prior endorsement of
the 'institution' or 'tradition' of the church. Thus, illocutionary acts performed by
appointed officials when, say, ordaining, inducting or receiving someone into
membership can be seen as linguistic manifestations of decisions taken in advance -
by church meetings, councils, committees and so on. Indeed, just such aprocess is
made transparent in the following instances:
(SO) MINISTER: In accordance with the decision of this church, I declare that you are
inducted to the office of elder in this church.
CURC 1989: 99)
(51) MODERATOR: In accordance with the decision of the District Council, I declare you to
be commissioned to the office of lay preacher in the United Reformed
Church.
CURC 1989: 103)
Though clearly significant, the observations just made should not be taken as a
blanket denial of 'spontaneous' and 'personally chosen' Exercitives. As hinted at by
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Austin himself (1962: 156), worshippers in free prayer may use 'I pray' in just this
fashion, while an unplanned exorcism at a Pentecostal service may be marked by
the exorcist's uttering '1 rebuke you' to a perceived demon, even while at the same
time claiming ecclesial authority 'in the name of Christ' (Martin 1984: 65-6).
Indeed, the less formulaic the discourse in a church service, the more likely it is
that such apparently unpremeditated (and thus 'classical') Exercitives' will arise.
Certainly, those frequent ascriptions of 'praise', 'blessing' and 'glory' to God
interjected by Charismatic worshippers at various points in the service at Warsash
could be read as fully-intentionalised 'awards' in accordance with Austin's own
criterion for Exercitives (AS 5. 194-201; 269ff.; 288ff.).
Now insofar as it archetypally contains acts of 'promising', 'covenanting' and
'pledging' (cf. Austin 1962: 157), there can be little doubt that Austin's third class of
Commissives is well represented in liturgy. Participants are called to 'commit'
themselves explicitly in a variety of special ceremonies and services. Personal
vows expressed with the formulae 'I do' and '1 will' appear commissively several
times in rites for baptism, dedication, marriage, ordination and induction. while
corporate variants on the same theme are seen in the following examples:
(52) CONG: We as a congregation, and on behalf of the whole church of Jesus Quist,
undertake to provide instruction of this child in the Gospel of God's
love.
CURe 1989: 39 (Thanksgiving for the Birth of a Oilld»,
(53) MINISTER: Congre8ilion,
do ~ as members of Quist's~,
and ~ting inGod's~,
promise tom:n: for Lucy,
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pro~ for the teaching of the apel,
and live a Ouistian life in the family of God?
CONG: We do.
(AS 9.136-43. Infant Baptism CURe 1989: 31f.locally adapted»,
Incidentally, the archetypal question-answer format of (53), consisting as it
does of a speech act which is genuinely dialogical and supmsententisl; reconfirms
that illocutions must be represented in discoursal, rather than purely grammatical.
terms - a point we shall explore at greater length in Chapter 7.
Interestingly enough. though such Commissives are common in what may
loosely be called 'rite of passage' liturgies. they seem far less prevalent in regular
Sunday morning worship. Indeed. outside a baptism at Blackford Bridge (AS 9)
and an Infant Blessing at High Heaton (AS 10). they are hard to detect in our
Advent Sunday corpus. The following are in this sense exceptional:
(54) MINISTER: FATIIER we worship you we give. ..our ~ to you this morning ....
We offer you our very selves. ...
(SS) MINISTER:
(AS 4.474-5. Extemponry pre-sermon prayer).
Heavenly Father you have called us to cast off the works of dIlkness
and to walk as ~ of the light.
We give ourzlm to this work.,
in the confidence that you will strengthen us in time of need.
(AS 8.442-5. Post-communion prayer (from Dixon 1983: 13»,
The rarity of such commissives in standard worship might seem odd given
what we said in 2.4.1 about the large number of religious language philosophers
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who have emphasised the implicitly 'commitmental' basis of sacred meaning. It
might also seem inconsistent with the seminal attachment of Reformed doctrine to
the 'covenantal' model of church subsistence. Then again, we have already stressed
that Austin's fourth category of Behabitives could well include many utterances in
which 'pledging' and 'committing oneself to the propositional content of the speech
act stands as an assumed corollary of that act, even while appearing more overtly as
an expression of 'attitude' or 'feeling'. Indeed, the acts of 'giving' and 'offering'
oneself to God in (54) and (55) could be said to carry their Commissive force as
part of a more generally Behabitive dynamic.
With regard to Behabitives per se, our emphasis on the affective quality of
liturgical discourse would suggest a prevalence of such types in liturgy (cf.
Thiselton 1992: 299). In our Advent Sunday corpus, Behabitives cluster most
noticeably into certain psychological and attitudinal types. Not surprisingly, these
types in turn reflect the standard classifications of prayer and affirmation in
Christian liturgiology and spirituality (cf. Selby 1986: 440-3). Adomtiotul
Behabitives are characteristically realised by God-oriented forms like 'we praise
you', 'we worship you', 'we laud and magnify your name', and by the Sursum
corda's 'we lift [our hearts] to the Lord' (AS 3.28; 4.57; 6.483; 6.447-50; URC
1989: 11ff.). Penitential Behabitives are associated with expressions like 'we
confess', 'we are sorry', 'we want to ask for your forgiveness' etc. (AS 2.408; 7.502;
10.191). Thanks-giving Behabitives are typically produced using 'we thank you',
but also with 'we give (you) thanks', or else by a straight 'thank you' to God (AS
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1.12; 3.294; 7.368; 10.424ff.; 1.166; 2.424; 4.73Off.; 5.l83ff.). Then again,
Petitionary and Intercessory Behabitives are most usually linked to the form 'we
pray for x (AS 1.218; 2.282; 3.337-40; 4.529; 6.405), but are also realised in the
corpus by 'we ask that/for x (1.177; 3.328; 4.60; 8.321), 'we bring x to/before you
(4.616; 4.694), 'we beseech you' (6.565) and 'we hold to you x (3.315). Somewhat
less explicitly, illocutionary acts of petition and intercession are instantiated on the
Advent Sunday tapes by certain of the 'cognitive' verb forms cited in (35) - (38)
above - ego 'we remember x (3.318; 10.410) and 'we think of x (4.636; 5.289).
Needless to say, many of the utterances just quoted might also be analysed as
conveying Expositive force in relation to the 'feelings and practices' generated by,
or associated with, them (cf. Austin 1962: 16). Indeed, it is important to remember
that Expositives, like Austin's other four classes of illocutionary force, refer not
merely to linguistic action but rather to a whole range of activity - both verbal and
non-verbal. Hence while examples (56) - (58) are clearly iconic in regard to vocal
production, (59) - (62) expound activities which otherwise need no necessarily
'voiced'realization:
(56) We ask to be forgiven
CURe 1989: 6)
(57) I ask your prayers for God's family throughout the world
(AS 9.947)
(58) We say,
!bmk you Lord...
(AS 7.592-3)
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(59) We tum to you now and to your word
CURC 1989: 69)
(60) Great and glQrious God.
we come a8iin to worship you
(AS 3.14-15)
(61) We respond to this word, whose servants we are
CURC 1989: 117)
(62) And so as we stand we,
hand back to ):QY
the rest of what you have given us in trust
(AS 5.242-5)
Doubtless, the considerable overlaps and inconsistencies in Austin's
classification of illocutionary acts are largely down to his illocutionary verb fallacy
- the assumption that lexico-semantic distinctions could be 'mapped onto'
distinctions of force, or, as Leech puts it, that 'a performative. an utterance
containing an explicit performative verb, is the canonical form of utterance. the
yardstick in terms of which the forces of other utterances are to be explicated'
(1983: 175). This criticism reflects that made by Searle (1979a: 1-29), and though
Leech may be right to detect in Austin's pupil a lingering 'isomorphism' between
language organisation and social action, there can be little doubt that Searle
outlines a rather more consistent set of criteria for distinguishing illocutionary
forces - principally the 'point' or purpose of the speech act; the 'direction of fit'
between its words and the world; the 'psychological states' expressed by it; the
strength with which its point is presented; differences in the way it relates speaker
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and hearer; differences in its propositional content, and, vitally for our purposes,
whether it requires extra-linguistic institutions for felicitous performance (1979a: 2-
8). In his subsequent attempt to revise Austin's taxonomy, Searle especially
highlights illocutionary point, expressed psychological states and 'direction of fit' as
basic decisive factors (1979a: 12).
Illocutioasry Point corresponds with those 'Essential Conditions' which
determine what utterances are to 'count as', and which we have already related to
liturgical speech acts in 5.3 above. Expressed Psychological States are bound up
with the Sincerity Rule, likewise considered earlier. Direction of Fit, though,
presents us with an extremely valuable principle by which liturgical illocutions
might be assessed. Searle's premise here is that 'some illocutions have as part of
their illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly, their propositional content)
to match the world, others get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the
former category, promises and requests are in the latter' (1979a: 3).
As we have seen, certain liturgical illocutions do either anticipate or bring
about definite changes in circumstances, while others are expressed in such a way
as to accommodate or confirm existing states of affairs. Once again, this distinction
speaks to our doxological concern with the extent to which theology is 'brought
along' to worship as against the extent to which worship brings theology about-
that is, with the import of lex orsndl, lex credendi. In combination with the other
criteria mentioned above, Searle makes this distinction constitutive of his
reassessed illocutionary schema. Here, Assertives subsume 'most of Austin's
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expositives and many of his verdictives as well', their 'point' being to 'commit the
speaker(s) (in varying degrees) to something's being the case' (1979a: 12-13). Their
direction of fit is consequently words-to-world: they are what Leech (1980) calls
'pragmatically reflexive' - this is to say, they refer to an existing speech situation
rather than instituting a new one. Liturgical examples of such Assertives would be:
(63) MODERATOR: In the name of the Lord Jesus Ouist
the head of the church, we meet to
commission as a lay preacher AB
CURC 1989: 101)
(64) READER.: We light the candle for o~,
for the RQQr.
and for ~one who ~ for God to come. ...
(AS 7.30(2)
By contrast, the point of Directives is 'that they are attempts ...by the speaker to
get the hearer to do something' - or perhaps more precisely, to change some state of
affairs in regard to some addressee. In this respect, they bear affinity with certain of
Austin's Exercitives and Behabitives (Searle 1979a: 14). Their direction of fit is
quite obviously world-to-words rather than words-to-world, but it is
important to stress that the perlocutionary effect to which they are oriented is
envisaged, rather than realized by their very sniculstion. As Searle confirms. their
Sincerity Condition is in this sense. 'wanting' or 'wishing' for some future outcome
(1979a: 14), and they can thus be said to instantiate that 'eschatological perspective'
at which Ladriere so tantalisingly hinted (1973: 61, 1.390ff.). In an ecclesiastical
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setting. such Directives are most cardinally expressed by God-ward invocations,
intercessions and petitions. since it is towards God that the deepest liturgical
'desires' are aimed. Certainly. Searle takes Directive illocutionary action to include
sacraUy relevant acts like 'requesting', 'begging', 'pleading', and 'entreating' as well
as the more generic 'praying' (1979a: 14). Certainly too, God-ward Directives in
worship will involve 'asking for' rather than 'commanding' since God, in His
sovereign grace, is assumed to respond as he wills rather than as we insist. So,
representative God-ward Directives from our field data include general invocations
of God and more specific 'epiclectic' invocations of Jesus and the Holy Spirit - the
latter category being particularly manifest at Holy Communion:
(65) READER:
(66) MINISTER:
CONG:
(67) MINISTER;
(68) PREACHER:
God of the poor [.• • ]
interrupt our gunf'ort with your nAkedness.
touch our ~iveness with your gQ..vert)'.
and surprise our guilt with the grace of your welcome.
(AS 7: 33-40 - Extemporary Invocation realised by Imperative)
Lord Jesus,
Come soon
(AS 6.366-7 - General Olristological Epiclesis realised by Imperative)
Out of your ever increasing joy,
as the Father with the SQn.
Let your Holy Spirit~,
to keep our praise~.
(AS 1.34-7 (Part Alan Gaunt, part extemporary - General
Pneumatological Epiclesis realised by Imperative)
Come Lord Jesus,
by: ~ your gifts,
speak not only to our bodies and to our minds but,
to our deepest being.
(AS 4.484-7 - Extemporary Eucharistic Epiclesis realised by Imperative)
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(69) MINISTER: Send down the Spirit of ~ and power,
gIQry and love upon us an.
upon thismd and~
(AS 2467-9 - Extemporary Pneumatological Epic1esis realised by
Imperative)
The same basic forces are at work when requests are made for forgiveness and
for God to intervene beyond worship itself - either in the daily lives of those who
pray to him, or in other lives and circumstances:
(70) Lord,
giyer of life,
lalus,
and ~ US to be truly your people.
Holy SJmit ~ to us,
help us to listen.
(AS 2413-8 - Extemporary Approach to Communion)
(71) Reach out loving Father to (...)
illwho are in special need at this time,
~le them with your love.
(AS 7.559-61 - Extemporary Prayer after Communion)
Although such God-ward entreaties are perhaps the most obvious forms of
'liturgical Directive', we must not overlook the fact that many other Directives
occur on a purely 'human' level, as instructions given by the Minister or leader to
the congregation concerning what they should do next. Sometimes, these
instructions are made explicit by an iconic imperative verb form:
(72) Hear again the words of institution
CURe 1989: 27)
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(73) MINISTER; Take,
and eat,
in fellowship with Quist and with one anQIher
(AS 8.431-3 - Breaking of Bread)
(74) MINISTER; Scripture says Christ is the one through whom we have forgiypless,
accept it,
believe it
(AS 9.43-5 - Confession (Declaration of Forgiveness»
(75) MINISTER; Go inpeace to love and serve the Lord
(AS 6.584 - Blessing (Dismissal) (et: URC 1989: 22)
Far more frequently, however, the Directive liturgical illocution is realised
with an indicative rather than an imperative mood, and from this we see again that
force is not isomorphic with sense. Here again too, Bach & Harnish's "You're under
arrest" is relevant. When police apprehend a suspect, utterance of this 'institutional'
locution not only 'expounds' the action of arrest; neither does it exhaust the
exercitive 'performance' of that action; it also tells the suspect to behave in a
particular way (Bach & Harnish 1979: 117-8). In this sense, its potential
perlocutionary effect is both instantaneous (qua Expositive and Exercitive) and
anticipated (qua Directive). A close parallel to this comes with an act we have
already discussed in another regard- namely the pronouncement of forgiveness:
(76) MINISTER: All those who truly repent of their sins.
a:re forgiven
(AS 1.81-2)
(77) God grants you the forgiveness of
your sins
({]RC 1989: 7)
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As we have already stressed. the context of Reformed absolution demands an
uptake of personal faith-response to be effective. but the point is that in both of
these instances. the penitent are instructed that they can proceed from this juncture
to worship in a properly sanctified state, Interestingly. this imminent orientation of
Directives is often brought to the surface by the future tense - and even where an
apparently Expositive/Assertive present is used. the illocutionary orientation is still
plainly 'soon to come' rather than bereby enacted':
(77) MlNISTER: Wc're going to iiog
number l!!2 four eight
(AS 5.1~7)
(78) MINISTER: We're going to praise God to_er and begin with Om H)'DUlIO'
number one 1uJDdred and thirty fmu:.
(AS 10.8-9)
(79) MINISTER: And SO we allmod together to begin our service of worship
(AS 2153)
(80) MINISTER: Wedrink. .
praying that 1m life
may bem us
(AS 8.438-50)
Occasionally, the incongruity of 'semantic' and 'pragmatic' meanings is made
very clear when the temporal deictic 'now' in fact operates discourse-deictically to
'cue in' what should be done next:
(81) MINISTER: We will now sing.
bymn number muty one
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(AS 1.208)
(82) MINISTER; Now we will sing.
our next hymn
(AS 7.342-3)
(83) MINISTER; Now the children go off to their own groups.
(AS4.3S4)
Even more starkly illustrative of the way Directive illocutionary forces
override the lexico-grammatical sense of such 'spoken rubrics' in worship is this
passage from the service at Emmanuel. West Wickham:
(84) MINISTER: We [make our offering] now and dl=dicare it,
and then we c:onJ;iuueour preparation for the a;rament as we sing,
the carol &ovenhundred.and &oven~
(AS 2.381-90)
The presumption of grammatical-illocutionary isomorphism is even more
dramatically refuted b)' Directives whose realisation is actually mood/ess in liturgy.
Thus at the Communion in Wheatley. these noun phrases function as instructions to
consume the elements:
(85) MINISTER: The bread of heaven,
inOuist~us
[Bread is shown to the con&Tegation]
the cup of saJndgn,
in Quist Jesus.
[Wine is shown to the c:on&Teption]
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[Bread and wine given byelders to communicants sitting inpews ...]
(AS 6. 556-9)
Similarly, the URC Service Book suggests the following as suitable for utterance as
Directives to consumption:
(86) The body of Christ, given for you.
The blood of Christ, given for you.
(URe 1989: 19).
As well as confirming Enc's (1981) thesis that nouns can be viewed deictically
(the words here 'indexicalize' what is on the Lord's Table)~ these examples can be
seen very specifically to rely on .the ritual context in which they stand. They
function as Directives rather than simply as verbless Assertives by virtue of their
location in a ceremony whose linguistic actions are firmly prescribed in advance.
Like 'At ease' on a parade ground or Time out' in a basketball match, they derive
their force as commands from the institutional procedure with which they are
associated. In each case, the link between the locution and the illocutionary act
cannot be inferred logically: one could not 'know' that the rules of the liturgical
language-game at this point stipulate eating and drinking as the appropriate
response to the nominal expressions in question unless one had first 'seen how
others play'.
We shall return to these issues of logical inference v conventional response in
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the next Chapter, but for now we need to consider a further vehicle of Directive
force which seems especially marked in liturgy. This is the optative. Though most
usuaUy dealt with as straight items of grammar - and most particularly as a sub-set
of the subjunctive mood - Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech & Svartvik have recognised
(1985: 147 (3.51); 830 (11.26); 839 (11.39); 1030 (14.34» that optative
subjunctives are very often used to mediate 'elevated' and 'fairly fixed' modes of
Directive illocutionary action, and in fact bear sufficiently close correlation with
such action that they might almost be regarded as 'pragmatic particles' alit (1985:
148 (3.51); 829 (11.26». Indeed, they seem more consistently fitted to this
designation than do Austin's 1st person indicative active verbs. Undoubtedly, they
appear to take certain very common forms within liturgy and do so with
consistently Directive force. First, there are expressions prefaced by the 'part-
asking/part-ordering' formula 'Let + Object Pronoun + Verb' - a formula which
occurs in (87) - (91):
(87) MINISTER: Let us pray
(AS 1.215; 2.578; 4.608; 6.15; 7.355; 8.60 etc.)
(88) MINISTER: Let us proclaim the mystery of faith
CURe 1989: 16)
(89) MINISTER: Let us eat together,
and be thankful.
(AS 7.627-8 - Distribution of Bread)
(90) MINISTER: Let US keep the feast
CURe 1989: 18)
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(91) Let's dedicate our gifts to God,
let's ...stand together to do that
(AS 5.227-8)
(cf. Quirk et .al1985: 148 (3.51); 829 (11.26».
Here, the first person plurals again emphasise a 'priesthood of all believers':
the Minister is not an 'army general' figure, giving orders to his 'troops' in the
second person without having to follow them himself; rather, the 'Let us' optative
confirms him as an equal participant in the actions he prescribes. Of course, this
expression of solidarity is not unique to liturgy and is a common tool of rhetorical
'pathos' (cf. Churchill's 'Let us go forward together'). Nonetheless, it remains one of
the most identifiable markers of liturgical speech action. This is not least. perhaps,
because its agency seems somewhat widened from the sort of cognitive intention
and reception implied by straight imperatives: by 'letting' something happen rather
than wholly 'making' it happen, there is a sense of predetermination - or even
providence - about the activity in question, which is commensurate with a ritual of
which God is assumed to be in ultimate control. Even where the pronoun becomes
third rather than first person, the same sense of formal, institutionalized
premeditation is detectable:
(92) MINISTER: If any know of any reason why A and C may not now lawfully be
married to each other, let them now declare it
(URe 1989: 52)
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More complexly. other optative Directives are used not only with the force
wishes for but also conferrals of something. These often take the verb 'to be'. and
the liturgical paradigm case here is blessing. Blessings may be obvious and 'strong'
as in (92) and (93). or 'weaker'. as in (94):
(92) MINISTER; The blessing of God Almighty ....
the Father ..the Son and the Holy Spirit,
be with you now,
andllways
(AS 6.585-9 d. URC 1989: 22)
(93) MINISTER; The blessing of the God of Sarah and Abraham
the blessing of the Son. born of Mary,
the blessing of the Holy Spirit who
broods over us as a mother over her children.
be with you all.
(Wec 1983: 102).
(94) JNR OIUROI: The Lord be with you
LEADER
OONG.: And also with you 7
(AS 1.190-1)
(cf. Quirk et a11985: 839 (11.39); 1030 (14.34».
As with other 'liturgical optatives'. the illocutionary point here, while
obviously 'expectational', is also to some degree 'actualizational'. Searle may have
defined Directives as oriented towards some future outcome, but there is a sense in
which the blessings in (92) - (94). are simultaneously 'hoped for' and 'delivered'.
and inwhich the perlocutionary effect is both 'now' and 'not yet'. This tension
7. For more detail on blessings as speech adS, see Wonnenber&et 1984.
290
between what language specialists call the perfect and perfective, or punctual and
dumtive aspect of expressions thus clearly reflects that 'eschatological perspective'
which Ladriere perceived in liturgical discourse, but which he failed to relate to
specific patterns and structures of language-use.
Insofar as they accomplish as well as anticipate action, 'optative Directives'
possess the quality of Austin's Exercitives: they are most often uttered by someone
with 'ministerial' authority. What is more, this 'minister' operates within a tri-polar
dimensionality whereby s/he at the same time invokes God and assigns His grace to
a 'worshipper' or worshippers. Then again, the directions of force within this
'triangle' are occasionally such that it is God Himself who becomes the object of
His peoples blessing:
(95) MINISTER:
')
Blessing and honour,
and glory and power,
~toourGod
(AS 4.836-8 (based on URC 1989: 13, 16)
(96) MINISTER: ~ be your mm: name for ever
(AS 6.415)
Another version of the optative often used with Directive force in Christian
worship is that which deploys the modal auxiliary may - an auxiliary which could
have readily preceded any of the examples (92) - (95) and, with syntactic
rearrangement, (96) as well, and which actually occurs in our corpus in the
following forms:
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(97) MINISTER: May we know that he:
isImm~uel,
the God who isM1h us.
(AS 8.381-3)
(98) READER: May the Lord
add his blessing
to the reading
of his holy Word
(AS 4.392-5)
(98) May God. the source and giver oflove,
fill you with all joy and peace .
CURe 1989: 59)
(99) May we grow together in unity and be
built up into the body of Onist
CURe 1989: 43)
As (99) confirms, the 'may'fonn , like the 'Let + Object + VerY structure, is
also prevalent in petitionary and intercessory prayer - perhaps because it makes the
God-Ward desire of the Directive that much more explicit:
(lOO) May we be fruitful throughout all our days
CURe 1989: 110)
(101) Strengthened by this assurance, may we
return to the duties which
await us in the world
CURe 1980: SO)
(cf. Quirk et a11985: 147-8 (3.51»,
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In such cases, the optative again helps to register liturgical discourse in an
eschatological perspective. It allows a desired 'perlocutionary effect' to be
envisaged even while mediating the Directive illocution of 'requesting' .. This
teleological thrust is made even more patent when the modal 'mays' and 'mights'
occur as part of a purposive 'that' clause - a phenomenon which can be heard at
least 30 times on the Advent Sunday tapes:
(102) MINISTER; And we pray for 0Ul and for AIm
for Richard and for Andrew,
that they may be gLven these ~ of Rltience and ~om,
which come by be!Qnging to the people of God.
(AS 10.259-62)
(103) PRYR2: Let us pray for olllZlm,
and for all God's ~ple,
that our ~.iUitudes and ~ons,
may commend the gQSpel.
(AS 7.430-3)
(104) MINISTER; Open our ~ and our ~ to ha: you,
that we may continue to be,
XQYr servants,
and may do YQl![ will,
(AS 3: 340-3)
If human Directives to God are the most obvious type of Directive to be found
in worship, it can also be seen to include a number of Directives issued from God
to the congregation. An example would be the reading of the Decalogue - which
the Reformers revived as a liturgical staple after long neglect (Davies 1948: 267;
Nichols 1968: 15-16), and which we have already seen presented as a major basis
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of the service at Warsash (AS 5.387ff). Like many other sacral lections, this might
be interpreted as God ordering or 'instructing' His people. The same might also be
said about the articulation of contemporary prophecies or 'words of knowledge' in
Charismatic and Pentecostal churches (Davies 1984).
Though Searle retains Austin's category of Commissives and confirms that
they reveal an obvious world-to-word fit, it is worth at this juncture taking note of
Thiselton's (1992: 300ff.) fertile insight into the theological significance of those
paradigmatic 'promissory' illocutions which distinguish this category and which are
so prominent in Biblical (and 'rite of passage' liturgical) discourse - namely that
they '[bridge] the gap between what 'is' and what 'ought to be'. This is to say, in
contrast with Assertives, Commissives are self-involving and participatory. Both
as uttered by God in His covenantal relationship with His people and as articulated
by believers in worship, promises constitute deeds which are once again
'eschatological'- simultaneously 'shaping the identity' of the Christian and 'creating
the reality of the new creation'. This is significant for us not least because Calvin's
understanding of sacraments as 'promises' is a keystone of his doxology. He makes
it clear that a sacrament is 'an outward sign by which' the Lord seals on our
consciences the promises of his good will towards us in order to sustain the
weakness of our faith' ([1559] 1960: IV.14.1). Later, he notes that just as Old
Testament 'sacraments' like circumcision, purification and sacrifice had their origin
in the sealing of divine 'covenants', so New Testament sacraments are instituted in
the context of God's 'promise' embodied and renewed in Christ (IV. 14.20). Not
294
only this: both 'old' and 'new' covenantal promises are set by Calvin in an explicitly
eschatological perspective; they mediate present assurances of future fulfilments
(ll.10.16). As Vincent (1979: 153) points out, within this view of sacramental
promising Calvin 'defines the realm of theology in terms of the realm of the Word:
in promising, the God who promises manifests Himself as Transcendent One and
yet simultaneously involves himself in His own Word; His presence is actual, but it
is the actual presence of a God who remains transcendent - of a God for whom
presence in the human realm is the presence of the Exalted One (liThe Lord")'.
Insofar as this promise thus communicates 'presence, prevenience and
transcendence', Vincent points out that not only in the language of Calvin but also
in the language of 'contemporary theology', 'we would speak of the eschatological
dimension of the sacrament'. Certainly, Ladriere bears this out when he speaks of
sacramental discourse facilitating for the believer 'a resumption of the mystery of
Christ, the acceptance of salvation and hope of benefits yet to come' (1973: 62.
1.411-2). As we have seen, it is a human desire for these promises to be fulfilled
which is typically expressed in optative Directive requests. .
Now while Searle's first three categories of illocutionary acts are defined by
one direction of fit or another, his fourth class, which he dubs Expressives; are
perceptible as having no direction of fit at all:
In performing an expressive. the speaker is neither Dying to get the world to match
the words nor the words to match the world. rather the truth of the expressed
proposition is presupposed. Thus. for example. when I apologize for having
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stepped on your toe, it is not my purpose either to claim that your toe was stepped
on nor to get it stepped on. (1979a: 15).
According to this definition, Expressives are introspective along the lines of those
Austinian Behabitives which we have already analysed. Specifically, they
articulate 'the psychological state specified in the Sincerity Condition about a state
of affairs specified in the propositional content' (1979a: 15). After Leech (1983:
52), we might conceivably propose 'mental states' as a 'world' parallel with the
'worlds' of physical objects, social conditions and objective facts, and might
thereby imply that Expressives 'fit' words to this psychological world. Nevertheless,
the delimitation of the class itself would not be affected by such a move, and that
there is a distinct set of 'self-referring' liturgical illocutions - from 'rejoicing' and
'celebrating' to 'knowing' and 'loving' - seems beyond dispute.
While Searle's first four modes of illocutionary action are plainly well
represented in liturgy, it is his fifth class of Declarations which is most seminally
manifested in the discourse of worship. According to Searle, the defining
characteristic of this class is that 'the successful performance of one of its members
brings about [a] correspondence between propositional content and reality.
[guaranteeing] that the propositional content corresponds to the world' (1979a: 16-
17). This is to say, 'Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or
condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the
declaration has been successfully performed' (1979a: 17). As we have seen.. this
'saying makes it so' quality was most strongly linked by Austin with his Exercitives
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- a connection which is made clear when Searle recognises that Declarations
likewise typically gain their force from some 'authority' or 'executive power', this
power having been vested in the speaker by virtue of his/her 'official position'
(Austin 1962: 154; cf. Searle 1979a: 18-19). Hence, as he illustrates it,
illocutionary acts like appointing, nominating, declaring war, sacking.
excommunicating and bequeathing will be 'successful' only when performed in the
context of an 'extralinguistic institution' - one in which the relevant speakers and
hearers occupy 'special places' (1979a: 18). This insight is echoed by Hancher
(1979: 3). who comments that it is typically 'social institutions' which 'both
authorize declarations and derive identity from them'. Not surprisingly. Searle and
Hancher alike cite the church as a classic example of just such an institution, and
while Searle limits his exemplification of ecclesial Declarations to
'excommunicating', we have ourselves dealt with several other sacral illocutions
which would fall into this category: egobaptizing, marrying. ordaining. inducting a
Minister, consecrating the elements etc.. This link. in fact confirms a crucial point
articulated by Warnock (1973) and Leech (1983: 179) alike - namely that Searle's
Decleretions are actually what Austin (1962: 5) first thought of as performatives
per se. Furthermore, Leech is also probably right to suggest that even in his later
refmement of the performative in terms of five 'illocutionary forces'. Austin rather
overemphasised such institutional usage within the whole range of human speech
activity. Indeed. it is almost certain that Declarations are in this regard 'the
exception rather than the rule' (Leech 1983: 179). On this very basis. Searle.
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Warnock and Leech alike criticise Austin's blanket assignment of illocutionary acts
to 'conventional' circumstances. Warnock argues that there is little comparison
between the speech actions of, say, bequeathing, which is tied firmly to the legal
system, and asking What time is it?', which is regulated at a purely 'semantic',
rather than socially-specific, level. In the same vein, Searle comments that 'Austin
sometimes talks as if all performatives (and in general theory, all illocutionary acts)
require an extra-linguistic institution, but this is plainly not the case' (1979a: 18).
Meanwhile, Leech takes an even more decisive step, arguing that Declarations
might be viewed not only as 'atypical' and 'exceptional', but as 'not illocutionary
acts at all' (1983: 180). He goes on:
[Declarations] are conventional rather than communicative acts: the linguistic
parts of rituals. The sense of the words may, but need not, indicate their part in the
performance: if the conventions were suitably altered. one could name a ship by
reciting a poem, or by eating a cream bun. Such examples are reminders that
linguistic declarations (as Searle himself notes) are often paralleled by non-verbal
declarations, like the raising of an umpire's finger. or the bang of an auctioneer's
gavel. As Searle points out, declarations have no sincerity conditions [1979a: 19];
the only way in which they can fail to take effect is through the failure of one or
more of the accompanying conditions of the ritual (for example, when a marriage
is performed by a layman impersonating a priest). Searle is right in saying that
'Declarations are a very special category of speech acts' (1979a: 18-19). They are
'performative' in the sense of 'action performing', in a more obvious sense than is
true of illocutionary performatives like 1promise to be there' (1983: 181).
Leech's stance here mirrors that which we saw Blakemore adopt with respect
to baptism - namely, that declarations. whether secular acts like resigning,
repealing and declaring open, or liturgical acts like ordaining, anointing. marrying.
consecrating and dedicating, are only 'incidentally linguistic' and so belong more
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within ' a theory of social institutions' than within a theory of communication or
'pragmatics' (Blakemore 1992: 93). But as we have already intimated, this critique
simply fails to do justice to the complex interdependence of verbal and non-verbal
ritual in the Declarations of church worship. Baptism is not the only instance of a
'deed' which would simply be void without a particular form of words: Leech
seems to assign the possible infelicity of Declarations purely to the absence or mis-
application of 'parallel' extra-linguistic action, but as we have already seen from
Martinich (1975a: 302), they can just as easily be invalidated by a disregard for
designated verbal formulae - that is, by violation of a 'Locutionary Act Condition',
From this point of view, Leech's 'poem' and 'cream bun' scenarios completely miss
the point: utterance of 'I ordain you', 'I declare you to be husband and wife' or We
commit his body to the ground' may not be sufficient conditions for proper
Christian ordination, marriage or burial, but they are certainly necessary ones, In
particular, to attempt baptism without using some form of the verb 'I baptize'
followed by the preposition 'in' and a 'divine name', would itself nullify the
procedure, even if every other detail of the ceremony was appropriately executed.
It is just not conceivable that a completely different sort of locution might be
introduced without radically altering the ritual itself - let alone that the locutionary
act element might be abandoned altogether and replaced by a newly-agreed non-
verbal 'cue'. Granted, some liturgical Declarations might allow a certain lexemic
and syntactic variation - the proclamation of marriage may exchange 'man' for
'husband'; absolution may be confirmed using the oven 'I absolve you' or the more
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covert 'Your sins are forgiven' -, but as Martinich has confirmed (1975a: 302), the
spread of acceptable locutions will still be restricted in terms of reference and
(often) in terms of sense. Then again, even subtle differences in surface form may
bespeak important denominational and doctrinal divisions: the Bast/West split in
the Medieval church was mirrored by respective baptismal formulae in the passive
and active voices (Fisher 1986: 56), while different branches of Pentecostalism can
be identified according to whether they baptize in the name of the Trinity, in the
name of Christ alone, or solely 'in the name of the Father' (McDonnell 1986: 71).
Clearly, then, we cannot accept with Leech and Blakemore that liturgical
Declarations simply 'happen to involve' language. No doubt the 'institutions' and
non-verbal rituals of worship drive and shape the words which are used; but there is
also a very real sense in which the words themselves identify and validate those
institutions and rituals. As we suggested earlier, this pattern of interrelation is
epitomised by the particular insistence of Reformed theology on the essential
interaction of Word' and 'sacrament' in worship - the conviction that physical
rituals such as baptism and the Lord's Supper cannot stand apart from language but
are, rather, 'pictorial representations' of God's 'discourse' with humankind, and that
they must be 'explained' as such. The poverty of Blakemore'S account of baptism is
compounded in this regard when she goes on to suggest that baptismal illocutions ,
far from being 'explicatory' or 'communicative', are little more than ceremonial
ciphers, making for an initiation rite which can be 'successfully performed in the
presence of an uncomprehending audience or in the presence of no audience at all'
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(1992: 92). This analysis would have John Calvin and his successors baulking since
it is a fundamental principle of Reformed doxology that the sacraments can only
have perlocutionary effect in the presence of a congregation, and must always be
'made comprehensible' by appropriate accompanying speech acts (Heppe 1950:
608ff.; von Allmen 1965: 42ff.; Old 1992: 127ff.). Leech, too,. begs further
confusion in regard to the interpenetration of verbal and non-verbal ritual in liturgy
when he compares Declarations on the one hand to 'sacraments', and on the other to
'magical acts such as casting spells' (1983: 180) - a connection which is also
implied by Hancher (1979: 3). Bearing in mind what we have been saying about
'causative' occult formulae, these two 'parallels' must surely be seen as
contradictory, rather than compatible, in Christian worship, and in Reformed
worship in particular. Somewhat closer to the reality we are investigating is Searle's
explicit acknowledgement that the 'illocutionary fit' of Declarations is bi-directional
in precisely the way we have been describing:
The performance of a declaration brings about a fit by its very successful
performance. ..[but] ...the direction of fit is both words-world md world-to-
words. ..Declarations do attempt to get language to match the world. But they do
not attempt to do it either by desaibing an existing state of affairs (as do
assertives) nor by trying to get someone to bring about a future state of affm (as
do directives and commissives). (1979a: 18-19, my emphasis).
It is no mere coincidence that the language of bi-directionality here parallels
the 'bi-directionaliry' of the lex omndi, lex credendi relationship as mooted by
Wainwright (1980: 58,218) - a relationship in which the 'world' of theology is both
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brought along to and brought about by the performed 'words' of worship (cf. Auer
1992). No doubt, sacral Declarations appear to iconicize this reciprocity quite
transparently, but before becoming too sanguine about such connections. we must
recognise that they are far from clear-cut, and that they assume quite varied forms
and intensities.
In our consideration of Austin's Expositives. we saw that whereas his list of
examples restricted the 'expounding' function of illocutions to linguistic action (as
in 'testify', 'report', 'explain'. 'conclude by' etc.), there must also be a sense in which
they might expound non-verbal activity. The word-to-world dimension of Searle's
(overtly institutional) class of Declarations clearly attends to this latter
phenomenon. He does, however, still recognise the distinctive nature of language-
related expositions and in fact treats them as one of two 'classes of exceptions to
the principle that every declaration requires an extra-linguistic institution' (1979a:
18). Thus, although 'pleading the eternal sacrifice' is transparently a JitW'gical
illocution even while being a language-oriented Declaration 8, 'asking to be
forgiven' is far less ecclesiastically 'marked', despite its membership of the same
class. Indeed, there may in this respect be some sense in attempting to distinguish
'conventions' from 'institutions' - despite the fact that Searle's critique of Austin's
'radical conventionalism' (cf. Recanati 1987: 67ff.) appears to treat them as
synonymous.
8. For a more detailed discussion of this pIuue's retention by the 1989 URe Service Book see Kennedy" Tovey 1992: S.
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Developing the intuition from their 'everyday' meaning that on a cline of
'situational constraint'. conventions tend to be less socially structured and regulated
than institutions, we might say that whereas institutions will always produce
conventions, conventions may not necessarily derive from institutions. By this
standard, Expositives (Austin) or language-oriented Declarations (Searle) could be
'conventional' without being necessarily 'institutional'. So we might say that
apologizing' is relatively conventional in the sense that it will be identifiable
principally as a linguistic ritual. but that 'confessing sins' is relatively institutional in
that it is much more closely bound to a discrete social body - the church. This
modification of Austin and Searle is consistent with that proposed by Sandy Petrey
(1990: 64). It is also more subtle than Tilley's inferring from Habermas (1979: 38) a
polarisation of religious speech acts as either 'institutionally bound' or
'institutionally free' (1991: 33-81) - that is. of marriage and baptism as belonging to
the former category and petitionary prayer, preaching, pledging, swearing, and
confessing as belonging to the latter. Even if theoretically helpful. one would still
have to qualify this distinction by accounting for the fact that certain ritual speech
acts are institutionalised in relation to more than one institution: thus, 'committing a
body to the ground' is mainly done in churches and chapels, but can form part of a
Humanist funeral rite; and the legal vow of marriage is a requirement of both
church and Register Office weddings.
Habermas himself in fact acknowledged such ambiguities - although he still
wrongly aligned marriage to a 'single institution' (the church) 'which is, however.
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found universally' (1979: 39). Then again, even where speech acts are very firmly
tied to the ecclesis; one wonders how exactly the 'institution of the church' might
be defined in relation to sacral speech. If it is to include as a prerequisite the
building in which worship takes place, what of 'open air' services and baptisms
performed in a local river? If it is to rely instead on the presence of particular
'officials' exercising designated roles, what of the move towards more 'democratic'
and flexible models of leadership adopted in English Independency and Radical
Puritanism? If it is to be sought in the use of a statutory prayer book, what of the
Dissenters' eschewal of imposed rites in favour of extemporary discourse?
These qualifications reflect an important point made by both Tambiah (1979)
and Fenn (1982: 124-39) - namely that merely placing the speech acts of church
worship on a conventional-institutional scale is to run the risk of crude sociological
reductionism - of ignoring precisely the qualities which distinguish liturgical
discourse as 'sacred' from the comparably institutionalised discourse of secular
bodies like courts, auction houses etc .. Yet again, this confirms that a 'pragmatics of
liturgy' must take account of 'theological theories', or doctrines - and most
especially, the doctrine of the Word of God as it is understood and presented in
liturgy. On this basis, it is particularly relevant to our concerns that Searle cites as a
second exception to his institutional 'rule' for Declarations the possibility that they
might be 'supernatural': so 'when ego God says "Let there be light" that is a
declaration', but it is not bound as such to any 'specific bureaucratic organization'
(Searle 1979a:18; cf. Petrey 1990: 64). As we have seen, though they might
304
incidentally be uttered in a local church, illocutionary acts like prophecy, words of
knowledge or the recitation of 'oracular' Scripture texts could be said to 'transcend'
the institution of the church itself, deriving as such from the 'mouth of God', rather
than from any ecclesiastical authority (cf. Matthew 4:4). The Reader who ends the
lesson Thanks be to God for His Word', or the prophet who concludes Thus saith
the Lord' clearly underline this view. More generally. even the apparently less
'supernatural' discourse of the sermon is elevated by much Reformed theology into
a sacramental re-presentation of the verba dei: the Second Helvetic Confession
([1556] 1931: 237-8 (Ch. 1), for instance. simply reflects mainstream Reformed
liturgiology in its assertion that 'the preaching of the Word of God is the Word of
God' (cf. Barth [1936] 1975: 88ff.; von Allrnen 1965: 142; Nichols 1968: 31-3).
Now linguistic pragmaticians might very well contend that it is not their job to
pursue the sort of 'essentialistic' distinction between 'divine' and 'sacred' discourse
that we have just contemplated (cf. Samarin 1976: 5). This. they might add, is the
task of the philosopher of religion or the dogmatic ian. But even if we follow Jeffner
(1972) and confine our treatment of doctrine purely to examining its role as a
contingent 'correctness condition' on liturgical illocutions. it is still clear that we
can leave neither its metaphysical domain of reference, nor the beliefs it
presupposes unanalysed, since these are bound to contribute to our understanding
of such things as Sincerity, propositional content rules and 'uptake' in the actual
function of liturgical discourse. Thus, while it would be wrong to claim that
liturgical pragmatics can be done by 'believers' alone, there is a real sense in which
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the liturgical pragmatic ian needs also to be a theologian, rather than just a gatherer
and describer of empirical data; or, as Ravenhill puts it in another way (1976: 37):
the application of speech act theory to 'practical religion' will require an approach
which 'mediates between cosmology and sociology'.
*
It should by now be apparent that when 'superimposed' on liturgy, even
Searle's 'improvement' of Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts raises as many
questions as it answers. Neither, following Wunderlich (1979: 297), should we
suppose that there will be a substantially 'clearer' model among the range of
alternative classifications which have been proposed since (though where thought
helpful, these will enter into our subsequent discussions (cf. Hancher 1979: 4». The
reasons for this become clear as we review the problems and limitations of a purely
'speech act' based pragmatics of liturgy, and seek to resolve these difficulties by
pursuing a more catholic methodology adapted specifically to our purposes.
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5.6 Key complications for a speech act analysis of liturgy
From our discussion so far, certain key difficulties have emerged-
difficulties which apply to speech act theory and pragmatics in general, but which
are likely to have a particular bearing on liturgic exegesis. Chief among these are:
Indirectness; Multivalency and Truth v Felicity. It will be helpful now to consider
each of these more specifically.
5.6.1 Indirectness
As we have seen, Austin failed sufficiently to develop his insight that
speech acts should be classified according to 'force' rather than according to
grammatical criteria. Indeed, apart from a few isolated exceptions (1962: 62), he
demonstrated different forms of illocutionary action with reference to different
classes of 'illocutionary verb'. Nevertheless, as we have also seen, later
pragmaticians (and most notably Leech (1983» have made the distinction between
'sense' and 'force' much clearer, and have in tum accounted more consistently for
those instances where 'performativity' is conveyed through means other than
'isomorphic' syntactico-semantic forms, In liturgical contexts, we have particularly
seen Directives realised by indicative and moodless and optative sentences rather
than by imperative structures - eg, The children will leave us'; The body of Christ,
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broken for you'; The Lord be with you' etc.. Likewise. certain Declarations have
been shown without first person agents - ego 'Your sins are forgiven'.
Both Searle and Leech alike relate force to the putative indirectness of
illocutions - that is. to those instances where 'face-value' semantic meaning. or
sense, appears to be incongruous with 'pragmatic' or 'utterance' meaning. Even
more saliently, both Morgan (1978: 266-74) and Brown & Levinson (1987: 70-1)
have underlined that such indirectness can often be conventionalised into clear
social and institutional rituals - particularly those which attempt to uphold formal
principles of Politeness. A classic instance often cited in this regard is 'Can you
pass the salt?' used as a Directive command mitigated for the sake of 'manners' by
an interrogative syntax ( Searle 1979b: 36ff.; Morgan 1978: 261ff.; Allen 1986:
207). Parallels to this kind of strategy are not hard to find in our field corpus:
(lOS) MINISTER: Will you bdg me to pray?
(AS 2.535)
(106) MINISTER: Shall we;..further worship God
with our Qfferings
(AS 6.4().1)
(107) WORSffiP:
LEADER
Would you like to stand
(ASS.S)
Now there is a case for arguing that the prevalence of such indirect illocutions
in worship is symptomatic not only of its inherent 'formality' as a sacred ritual. but
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also, of that perceived need for 'reticence' in the presence of God which Smith &
McClendon (1972: 59) pinpoint as a key perlocutionary goal of worship discourse.
Then again, perhaps we should not be too swprised by such 'indirectness', given
that the essential discontinuity of sense and force is, after all, a major factor
distinguishing pragmatics from syntactics and semantics. Besides, while the
incidence of 'indirect' strategies in our corpus may be common, they do not seem
particularly more marked than in the quotidian rituals researched across different
cultures by Brown & Levinson (1987). In any case, as the American literary critic
Stanley Fish has robustly contended (1980: 284-92), the appearance of 'directness'
or 'nonnative force' in sentences whose form and reference seem commensurate
with their normal 'function' may in fact be an illusion. since even 'what is normal
(like what is ordinary, literal, everyday)' is itself'a function of the circumstances in
that it depends on the expectations and assumptions that happen to be in force'. Fish
goes on to argue that in this sense "'normal" is context specific and to speak of a
normal context is to be either redundant (because whatever in a given context goes
without saying is normal) or incoherent (because it would refer to a context whose
claim was not to be one)' (1980: 287).
Fish is certainly right to point out that Searle's early work on 'indirectness'
(1979a: 30-57) drove an unwarranted wedge between 'literal' and 'indirect' meaning
- especially in view of the fact that Searle's own Propositional Content Condition
had so clearly stressed the dependence of propositional meaning on contingent
illocutionary force (Fish 1980: 284). Latterly, however, Searle's collaboration with
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Daniel Vanderveken on the 'foundations of illocutlonary logic' (1985: 179ff.) has
seen the direct/indirect distinction 'factor out'. Even for our purposes, though,
Searle & Vanderveken recognise another problem which arises from speech
analysis and which we have already touched on in our own investigation of liturgy.
This problem arises from the fact that the illocutionary point of certain speech acts
seems to be 'systematically ambiguous' (1985: 181). Let us look at this
phenomenon more closely.
5.6.2 Pragmatic ambivalence
We have already noted in passing that some liturgical illocutions seem
to exert more than one force at the same time. In the sacral contexts of our
transcripts, utterances like 'We praise you' and 'We thank you' seem simultaneously
Expressive, Declarational and 'Expositively' Assertive. Credal utterances - whether
prefaced by We believe' or not - seem not only to 'express' personal faith but also
to 'assert' the institutional 'faith of the Church'; they also carry a Commissive force
by virtue of the fact .that to 'confess' such faith is assumed to bind one existentially
to the truth of what is affirmed (cf. Ladriere 1973: 56-8; Mananzan 1974; Thiselton
1992: 305). Then again, a eucharistic Assertive like We drink I praying that his life
may be in us' (AS 8.438-9) 'doubles up' as a Directive command to the
congregation to consume and a Directive petitionary request to God.
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In an early study of such pragmatic pluralism. Fraser (1971: 3ff.) developed a
concept of force multiplicity for certain speech acts. Subsequently, Searle &
Vanderveken (1985: 181ff.) have written of 'hybrid' illocutions, and Leech &
Thomas (1990: 195) of multivalencyand pragmatic ambivalence. What is more,
together with Brown & Levinson (1987: 70-1), Thomas (1986) has recognised that
various utterances might not only be taken but also deliberately meant in two or
more ways - particularly. and once again, to uphold particular social conventions.
Consistent with all this, Tilley (1991: 34) has hypothesised that pragmatic
ambivalence is especially marked in liturgy, where it is often very necessary to
mediate more than one force at the same time. Thinking particularly of a Catholic
Bishops' letter. he notes that 'when institutional authorities make assertions, their
audience may take their utterances as directives or declarations as well. This is
because the authorities occupy positions from which others in the institution
reasonably and normally expect to hear declarations of doctrine and directives
concerning personal matters,' Tilley recognises three main types of force-
multiplicity in the letter he analyses: Assertive Declarations like 'we write this letter
from the perspective of the Catholic faith'; Directive Declarations like 'we expect
Catholics to give our moral judgements serious consideration', and Commissive
Declarations like 'we, for the cause of peace, commit ourselves to fast and
abstinence on each Friday of the year'. It should already be clear, however, that our
much larger corpus reveals considerably more, and more complex, categories of
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multivalent illocutionary action. Let us now identify and exemplify each of these in
a more systematic way.
5.6.2.1 Assertive-Directi yes
In this category, 'reports' and 'comments' on the action of the church
service itself serve also to instruct the congregation as to what they should do or
say next:
(108) MINISTER; And now we're going to IDY the ~ that you have,
on the smaller sheet of ~
(AS 2.271-2)
(109) MINISTER.: the res~ ...after the words Lord Jesus.
i:s for you to say,
come ..mn.
(AS 6.367-9)
(110) MINISTER: The broken bread,
the bmken QyW.
For you.
[Distribution of bread]
(AS 2.513-5)
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5.6.2.2 Assertive-Commissive Declarations
In a sense, ail Commissives are simultaneously Assertive and
Declarational, since verbally uttering a 'promise' or 'pledge' involves both a
'statement' of the promise's propositional content and the effecting of a
correspondence between that propositional content and the reality of one's own
commitment:
(111) MINISTER: We seek
new~, ...
(AS 2409-10)
(112) MINISTER: Lord as we go from this place,
we ~ meet with you.
(AS 4.845 - Prayer after Communion)
5.6.2.3 Asserti ve-Expressives
We have seen that sheer acts of 'stating the gospel' can have both
Assertive and Expressive force in liturgy. Given the extent to which Reformed
doxology and Ladriere alike stress the dependence of liturgical language
perfonnativity on 'faith', and even accepting Tilley's proviso that such 'faith' might
vary in cognitive intensity, simple citations of Scriptural or doctrinal propositions
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can be seen to operate in this way, whether 'scripted' as in (113) and (114), or
'extemporary' as in (115) and (116):
(113) All: Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord.
(AS 6.491 - Benedictus (based on Matthew 21:9)
(114) All: Quist has died
Ouist is risen
Quist shall come again
(AS 4.833-5 - Ascription of Glory (Church of England 1980: 132; URC
1989: 13, 16)
(115) W. LDR 2: He loves us to sing ~ songs
throughout the psalms i~ saying,
SlliQ a new sogg unto the Lord,
(AS 5.177-9)
(116) MINIS1ER; We've seen ~ of different ~ of.
the: abilities of God,
the way that God is able to do all these ~erfuI things.
God is Bble to give us ~.
God is Bble to open our ~
God is Bble to bumble the ~
even to ~ theg those.
who are ~tually dead in ~ way,
those who are...gy dead.
(AS 10: 327-35)
Those leading worship are charged at many points with 'speaking for all' and
this appears to involve both assuming and asserting the 'thoughts and feelings' of
the congregation towards God:
(117) MINIS1ER; We are aware of the gulf between us and you,
(AS 2296)
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(118) MINISTER: It is our fault,
that.things have come to this pass.
For ~ and our fathers,
have not honoured you,
(AS 5.345-8)
(119) MINISTER: We 1Qng to ~ you
(AS7.34)
(120) MINISTER: No longer need. we ~perately hope for the best,
for we have the assurance of your love.
(AS 9.19-20 (From Dixon 1983: 17)
5.6.2.4 Assertive-Expressive-Commissi ves
It has emerged from our investigation that when structured more
formally into 'creeds', Assertive-Expressive discourse will either effect
commitment, or else more typically mediate re-comrnltment to, or 'affumation' of.
truth-claims made already:
(121) We believe in one living and true God,
creator, preserver and ruler of all things in heaven and earth
CURC 1989: 115 - Confession of Faith)
(122) We believe that
Christ gives his Olurch a govenunent
distinct from the government of the State.
CURC 1989: 118 - Statement of the Nature. Faith and Order of the URQ
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Similarly. the many 1do' and 1will' responses made by protagonists in 'rite of
passage' ceremonies like baptisms. weddings. ordinations etc. confirm that
liturgical promising. like promising in general, will characteristically entail the
'affective' or 'psychological' self-involvement associated with Expressives.
Certainly. we have made it clear that insincere Commissives uttered in such
circumstances would seriously 'abuse' the rite in question.
5.6.2.5 Asserti ve Declarations
This class of illocutions was actually envisaged by Searle himself
(1979a: 19-20). He saw that 'some institutions require assertive claims to be issued
with the force of declarations in order that the argument over the truth of the claim
can come to an end somewhere and the next institutional steps which wait on the
settling of the formal issue can proceed', As examples. Searle gave a judge's
'pronouncing' judgement (You have been found guilty'), an American football
umpire's uttering 'touchdown', a head of state declaring war and an official
'nominating' someone to a post, as in The above-named candidate is duly elected'),
Assertive Declarations are thus closely allied with Austin's Exercitives - although
Searle's point about their place in the segmentation and procedure of the language-
game is a valuable development.
Now in liturgical discourse, 'validity claims' are characteristically assumed in
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advance rather than decided 'on the spot', so Searle's exposition is of limited value
in our case. Having said this, there is a sense in which all Declarations are also
Assertive, since in Searle's own definition they must effect a 'correspondence
between [their] propositional content and reality'. Certainly, it should be clear by
now that 1 declare you to be husband and wife' or 1 baptise you' will function as
proper Declarations only if at the same time they truthfully 'assert' the existence of
a valid bride and groom or a duly sanctioned baptismal rite.
5.6.2.6 Assertive Expressive Declarational Directives
As well as referring to 'psychological states' which are brought along
to worship by participants. Expressives can also relate to the worship going on at
any given moment in the service. As such. they can function as Illocutionary Force
Indicating Devices with regard to contingent affective liturgical activity:
(123) MINISTER: We want to ask for your forgiveness as we ~ today
(AS 10.191)
(124) MINISTER: We ~ our lUl~ to approach you 0 God
(AS2.501)
(125) MINISTER: Father we acknowledge that.
everything we have~.
you have given us.
(AS 5.228-30)
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In these examples, there is further ambiguity as to whether 'wanting', 'realising'
and 'acknowledging' are simply durative psychological states being 'commented on'
assertively in language, or whether such states are actually instantiated by the
language itself as it is used. In the latter case, they would have to be classed as
Declarations, but it would be unwise to select either at the expense of the other: the
force ambiguity means that we must talk here of Assertive-Expressive
Declarations. Even this, however, fails to recognise that such speech acts might
also be viewed as 'prompts' by the Minister as to what the congregation should
think, feel or do. This, of course, is the definition of a Directive, so it is quite
possible to posit a four-way force multiplicity in such instances. The same
tetrapartite polyvalence attends the following examples:
(126) MINISTER: Heavenly Father as we: draw
~ to this table we draw near to you.
(AS 4.610-11)
(127) MlNISTER: We hurt each other
we are ~ for it
(AS 2.407-B)
*
The high level of pragmatic ambivalence in liturgy not only bears out its
complexity as a speech event type; it also raises fundamental questions about the
location of 'truth' in sacral discourse. From a negative viewpoint. we might doubt
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whether 'meaning', which seems so often 'probabalistic' and 'indetermlnate' in
worship, can ever be 'pinned down' sufficiently to make the lex orandi a reliable
source of the lex credendi in the way that Kavanagh, Power and Fageberg propose.
More positively,however, we could argue that it is precisely because religious
language-functions are so often and so necessarily multivalent or 'numinous', that
liturgy is exactly the most appropriate medium for the expression and instantiation
of Christian theology. A corollary of this would be to say that since church service
discourse must meet the needs of a diverse body of people with very different
intents and commitments, it has developed a force multiplicity commensurate with
this diversity.
Can these two perspectives - the first essentialistic, the second pluralistic and
context-driven, be reconciled? It is to this question that we now turn.
5.6.3 Truth vfelicity in sacral discourse
So far, we have stressed the value for liturgical study of linguistic
pragmatics, and have set this over against the logical-positivist dismissal of
religious discourse as 'non-verifiable' and thus 'meaningless'. On the other hand, we
cannot ignore the dangers for liturgiology in a sociolinguistic relativism which
would seek to reduce matters of 'truth' and 'falsity' wholly to 'cultural conventions'
or 'institutional norms', Austin himself was considerably exercised by the question
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of truthfulness and 'facticity' vs 'felicity' and 'appropriateness' in speech acts.
Indeed, in the penultimate lecture of How to Do Things with Words. he tackles this
question with specific regard to the dissolution of his original
constati ve/performative duality:
Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment from arguing
soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably? Do these not have
something to do in complicated ways with facts? The same is true also of
exercitives such as naming, appointing, bequeathing, and betting. Facts come in as
well as our knowledge or opinion about facts...But consider for a moment whether
the question of truth or falsity is so very objective. We ask 'Is it a fair statement?',
and are the good reasons and good evidence for stating and saying so very
different from the good reasons and advice for performative acts like arguing,
warning and judging? Is the constative, then, always true or false? When a
constative is confronted with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the
employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with those that we use in the
appraisal of performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple situations
envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether
it is true or false. (1962: 142-3)
As examples of such 'uncertainty' Austin cites 'approximations' like 'France is
hexagonal', synecdoches like 'Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma' and
generalisations like 'All snow geese migrate to Labrador', each of which may be
regarded as 'partly' true even if not 'literally' so. More recently, Leech has seen the
same problem attending rhetorical devices such as hyperbole and litotes (1983:
145-6). In both sacred and secular discourse, however, it is in the realm of
metaphor that traditional definitlons of truth and falsity seem least adequate. As
-Gill (1969: 36) points out, Austin's eventual conflation of constatives and
.performatives
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...opens the way for an exploration of the role played by metaphor in the logic of
God-talk. If ever there was a type of utterance capable of carrying multi-
dimensional meaning, it is most certainly closely related to metaphor. By this time
of day it ought to be clear that metaphorical language cannot be dismissed as
'merely emotive' or 'cognitively unnecessary'. Not only is our everyday discourse
shot-through with metaphor, but even the exact sciences can be shown to fall back
on concepts and terms - 'models' - which cannot be defined either in tenns of other
concepts, or in terms of observations.
Unfortunately, Austin himself fails to develop his own analysis of metaphor
beyond a vague impression that it is somehow 'abnormal' and/or 'parasitic' upon
'serious' speech (1962: 104). Searle (1979a: 76-116; 1979b) more specifically
prefers the designation 'non-literal' to 'non-serious', reserving the latter term for
whole discourses which (like novels) are suspended from the usual principles of
reference, and noting that individual metaphors can occur 'as much in...nonfiction
as in...fiction'. Searle's guiding principle is that metaphors show a marked
disjunction between 'sentence meaning' and 'utterance meaning' (1979b: 94; 100;
120), such that addressees have 'to contribute more to the communication than just
passive uptake' (1979b: 123). This is to say, these addressees must invoke 'the
general rules for performing speech acts' in order to grasp the metaphor's force
(1979b: 121). As we have seen, once the invocation of such rules becomes central
to the defmition of 'meaning', classical delineations of 'truth' and 'falsity' are prone
to complication and modification along 'pragmatic' lines. Searle recognises this, but
is still unwilling to relinquish truth-conditional criteria altogether. Indeed, he posits
an analysis in which metaphors display two-fold semantic content - first in relation
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to their (literally false) 'surface' denotation and second in relation to their (true)
underlying denotation:
The basic principle on which all metaphor works is that the utterance of an
expression with its literal meaning and corresponding truth conditions can, in
various ways that are specific to metaphor. call to mind another meaning and
corresponding set of truth conditions. The bard problemof the theory of metaphor
is to explain what exactlyare the principles according to wbich the utterance of an
expression can metaphorically call to mind a different set of truth conditions from
the one determined by its literal meaning, and to state those principles precisely
and without using metapborical expressions like "call to mind". (1979b: 99).
In essence, the solution Searle proposes here is based on defining varieties of
what Leech (1969: 155) calls commonness of Ground between the actual or
perceived semantic content of the literal sentence (or Vehicle) and the actual or
perceived semantic content of the underlying utterance (or Tenor; (cf. Searle
1979b: 116-120), The drawback of such an approach, however. is that it assumes
both too rigid a correlation of 'truth' and 'falsity' with 'utterances' and 'sentences'
respectively, and too synthetic a dichotomy between the 'literal' and the 'figurative'
in metaphor. Indeed, as both Burgess (1972) and Soskice (1985: 93-6) have shown,
religious metaphors are typically and notoriously 'irreducible' to distinct literal and
non-literal components. 'Redemption' and 'salvation' are, for example, much more
than mere 'figures' of God's action towards humanity: rather, they have come to
acquire a whole complex of discrete dogmatic denotations in their own right.
Hence, despite Searle's insistence that metaphor 'does not require any conventions'
(1979b: 121), it would seem that the metaphoric language of the church community
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defies his merely 'semanticist' decomposition and necessitates instead an analysis
which takes full account of socially and institutionally specified meanings. From
this point of view, Petrey (1990: 68) is right to imply that it is Austin's insistence on
illocutionary force as 'the work of a community', rather than Searle's assignment of
it to individual intentionalities, which offers a more positive paradigm for
'corporate' non-literal discourse. Indeed, it is significant in this regard that it is
precisely when tackling non-empirical speech that Austin comes closest to what
Recanati (1987: 81-5) calls 'strong radical conventionalism' - the notion thac
'meaning' and 'truth' in all linguistic communication is siruationally contingent and
contextually determined:
It is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', do not stand for
anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right and proper
thing to do as opposed to the wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience,
for these purposes and with these intentions ...The truth or falsity of a statement
depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were
performing inwhat circumstanc:es. .•(1962: 145).
Clearly, although Austin is quick to disassociate his approach from slogans
like The truth is what works' and thus from post-Peirclan philosophical pragmatism
(1962: 145), his comments can only appear as a profound challenge to the notion
that religious discourse might convey any 'absolute' or 'universal' verities, or that
liturgy could be anything more than culturally conditioned. Certainly, in applying
his model to the language of creeds - which might be thought more literal and
propositional than that of most other sacred registers - Mananzan (1974: 56; 121-8)
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feels compelled to disavow 'essentialistic' approaches and confines herself instead
to an analysis which is 'situational and functional' - that is, to 'studying the actual
uses of the creed in different contexts and characterizing its forces as speech act or
acts' (cf. Samarin 1976b: 5). Similarly, Smith & Mclendon (1972: 60-1) invoke
Austin when challenging the 'propositionalist' approach to religious discourse:
...Consider {this] proposal: Someone says 'Let's cut the chatter about language,
conditions etc., and get down to the nitty-gritty. Does God exist or doesn't he? If
there are reasons to think so, give them to me; if not, shut up shop. Why bother with
anything else until that is settled?' Passing for a time over the unsatisfactory state of
all such proofs and the (not irrelevant) reasons for that unsatisfactory state, let us
note a presupposition of the objection. Our objector asks us to get away from all
this talk about talk. What is it, however, which he wants us to get away from?
Grammar, structure, diction? But that is not the way in which we were talking about
talk. Does he then want us to transcend the linguistic, ie. the human. condition? No
theist ever made an emptier plea for transcendence than that would be. Are we to
get to some discourse which is not confined to the conditions of discourse? To go
on and say something without bothering whether in the nature of the case it can be
said? It sounds so. 'Just state the facts, please; does God exist, or no?' But is that the
kind of thing which can be stated? Not everything can bc, as Austin pointed ouL..At
least it is noteworthy that Hebrew and Ouistian scripture releases no statements
about God, though it does issue many speech acts about him. (1972: 61).
Though the final sentence here begs many questions of definirion. we can at
least recognise that even avowedly Reformed scholars have in large numbers come
to accept the inadequacy of a 'propositionalist' hermeneutic. For Karl Barth ((1936]
1975: I.1: 109-10; 120-1; 143ff.), God's Word must be understood as much more
than empirical description: rather, it 'becomes active' within the dialogical context
of church life and worship. Subsequently, Torrance (1988: 49-50) and Seerveld
(1988: 92-5) have echoed a widespread concern that propositionalism runs the dual
risk of turning Christian faith into a religion based on pseudo-scientific assertions
and textual idolatries, while Rogers & McKim (1979) have maintained that though
324
such tendencies have been evident in 'Protestant Scholasticism' from the mid-
Seventeenth Century onwards, they do not reflect the level of concern shown by
Calvin and Luther for the function of Holy Writ in the contextualised discourses of
corporate praise and proclamation. Furthermore, even staunchly conservative
scholars like Frame (1974) and Godfrey (1983) are sceptical about predominantly
positivistic approaches to God's Word. Coming from a Reformed perspective, these
accounts are naturally more focussed on the text of Scripture than on the discourse
of liturgy per se, but their conclusions are easily applied to traditions like Roman
Catholicism, Anglicanism and Eastern Orthodoxy. where the language of worship
itself is more 'canonical' and apparently more universal in its inherent
propositionality. Then again, the issue here is not so much whether worship
discourse is wholly or even mainly propositional. or whether it is intrinsically or
post-doctrinally propositional, but whether it is propositional at all - whether.
indeed, it is ever possible for liturgy to mediate 'univocal truth', Barth at least
allowed that Christian discourse. 'proclaimed in the church' might display a
propositional character 'from time to time' ([1936] 1975: 1.1. 156ff,); but even this
position is threatened by Austin's apparently thoroughgoing 'situationalism', As we
have already hinted, Searle seems more sympathetic in this regard: while
maintaining that they must be 'expressed' with illocutionary force and so
themselves constitute something of an abstraction, he nevertheless retains
'propositions' as a determinate class underlying actual speech acts - one whose
generality and truth-conditionality is confirmed in his assurance that the ssme
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proposition might be realised by a variety of utterances (1969: 29-30). In addition.
his aforementioned exemption of 'supernatural speech' from institutional
dependency (1979a: 18) would seem more conducive to a theo-logical reading of
worship discourse - one in which an eternal 'divine Word' is seen as sanctifying
'human words' in such a way that they can articulate stable cosmic truths.
Before we set Searle too sharply against Austin. though. we should
acknowledge that for Austin, 'context' could be much more than purely parochial or
'local'. In a key definition, he stresses that: The total speech act in the total speech
situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in
elucidating'. (1962: 148, first 2 emphases mine; 3rd emphasis Austin's).
Ultimately, of course, 'the total speech situation' might be proposed as 'the
church worldwide' or 'the historic liturgical tradition' - so it is at least theoretically
possible that one or more of its 'total speech acts' will have a global or
franstemporal propositional content. Having said this, the sheer plurality of
denominations, congregations and individual worshippers makes discerning such
propositional content a process fraught with difficulties. Now a lucid treatment of
just these difficulties is offered by Jeffner (1972). Jeffner argues that religious
performatives may be classed as variously 'unproblematic', 'problematic' or both,
depending on the extent to which the validity of their respective 'truth-claims' is
taken to affect the validity of the whole speech act. There is an obvious link here to
Austin's perspicuous classification of 'infelicities' (1962: 15-20), but it will be
recalled from our earlier discussion that his approach to this matter was still
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predicated on degrees of deviation from norms which were conventionally and
ritualistically determined, rather than on degrees of deviation from absolute, 'de-
contextualisable' truths. Furthermore, even when Austin proceeds to consider how
felicity might be affected by 'correspondence with the facts', he adheres to that
version of Strawsonian presuppositionalism in which 'truth' and 'falsity' have
genuine meaning only in relation to particular utterances in particular discourse
situations (1962: 47-52). More specifically, Austin holds that the so-called
'Reference Conditions' which pertain to 'true statements' actually operate in the
same way as the 'appropriateness conditions' which pertain to 'successful
performatives'; then in keeping with his conviction that 'stating' is in any case a
form of action, he concludes that the fanner are more properly subsumed into the
latter, and most especially into his Condition A.2 concerning the 'appropriate
circumstances for the invocation of particular procedures' (1962: 15).
If all this appears to shift the ground of linguistic philosophy from ontology to
epistemology, from realism to idealism, and from essentialism to voluntarism,
Austin confirms as much when, building on his Condition r.1.. he takes such things
as 'knowledge', 'thought', 'belief, 'intention' and 'sincerity' to be vital components of
'the total speech situation' rather than mere adjuncts to it (1962: 15; 43-5; 48-50).
As Gill confirms (1969: 31), 'the traditional view dichotomizes language (thought)
and action (reality), whereas Austin's view blends them in a functional manner.'
The problem this raises for the study of Jirurgicallanguage is clear: though
worship discourse may make numerous apparently 'universal' propositions (eg.
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about God's existence or the nature of human sin), these must be analysed as no
more than the 'agreed conventional idioms' of a particular speech-community
(again cf. Samarin 1976b: 5). Further still, even where the speech community in
question may be very large and the 'propositions' uncontentious, Austin insists that
'Reference' will still always depend on 'knowledge at the time of utterance' (1962:
144), and will thus always be contingently rather than necessarily determined.
Following Austin, Fish (1980: 291-2) proposes that although 'a sentence' cannot
mean 'anything at all', neither can it 'always mean the same thing'. Rather, he
maintains, it 'always has the meaning that has been conferred upon it by the
situation in which it is uttered'.
Also taking its cue from Austin, Jeffner's three-fold division of 'religious
performatives' is a division based on degrees of consensus about what 'counts as'
true rather than on degrees of truth value per se. Hence unproblematic religious
performatives are those which have 'common' and 'complete' perlocutionary effect
without necessitating the acceptance of 'any religious statement. or any special
religious convention' (Jeffner 1972: 90 cf. Austin 1962: 15). So even atheists could
accept a priest's pronouncement that a couple be 'husband and wife' because they
'can deny that the priest has any special religious authority. and find his prayers and
blessings ridiculous, but still accept that he has the legal mandate to declare people
married' (1972: 90), By the same token, 'Many Christians - for example Lutherans -
also agree that no circumstances dependent on the Christian revelation are
necessary for a marriage to be created by a priest' (1972: 90).
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By contrast. problematic religious pertormstive« are those whose felicity is
directly dependent on personal commitment to an assumed belief-system. Thus
believers and non-believers alike will probably agree that intention-oriented speech
acts like covenanting. vowing and confessing sins. and reception-oriented speech
acts like absolving. rely for their efficacy on the faith which interlocutors bring to
them (1972: 90).
Thirdly. and most interestingly. Jeffner identifies certain religious
performatives as inviting interpretations which are both unproblematic and
problematic. The instance he uses to illustrate this 'mixed' category is by now very
well known to us:
... think of a priest who utters 1baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the
Son. and of the Holy Ghost', to a child, acting according to the ritual of baptism.
Everyone must admit that he is uttering a performative and people with a different
theology and outlook on the world can agree that the performative is used correctly.
It is really a true statement that the priest is baptizing. But is it possible for a
religious man and an atheist who are in agreement as to the correctness of the use to
agree also as to the c:orrectness~nditions in this case? This is an empirical
question, and the answer is that it is often impossible. An atheist may say that
acceptance of certain conventions concerning the solemn naming of a child is
sufficient for us to be able to say that the priest baptizes in the situation desaibed.
But a religious man will generally add that the performative is misused if God does
not in some way take account of what is done by the uttering of the performative. If
this is not the case, he will say that the priest did not really perform a baptism in
saying 1 baptize' ...This means that a religious man will add certain special
correctness-conditions. which the atheist is not bC)l.mdto accept,
It is also true that different religious persons have different ideas in regard to the
content of these additional claims. This is weU-known from the history of the
Christian church. The additional correctness-conditions generally accepted by
religious men include sentences which are candidates for the problematic set of
sentences, for example sentences concerning actions of God. (1972: 91)
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Now from a doxologicel point of view. the major problem with Jeffner's
classification, as with the Austinian approach to religious discourse in general, is
that it tends ultimately towards a iideistic hermeneutic. This is to say. it represents
truth-claims as faith-descriptions and reduces statements about God to utterances
\
about worshippers' belief in God. This problem has been acknowledged by Ramsey
(1968: 183ff.) and by Gill (1969: 33ft.). At the same time. however. their response
to it is far more constructive than might be imagined - and as such. suggests a
crucial paradigm for our own study. Both alike infer from Austin the major
'epistemological tum' mentioned earlier - that is from bare logical empiricism to a
perspective in which 'self. thought. language. action and reality are conceived as
points OD a continuum, rather than as totally distinct ontological entities' (Ramsey
1968: 170; Gill 1969: 33. My italics). More specifically. they each see this shift as
compatible with the key proposal of 'Hungarian scientist and philosopher Michael
Polanyi (1891-1976), who reflected the claims of religious philosophers like
Zurdeeg (1958). Ferre (1962) and Knox (1966) that for all assertions, whether
religious or non-religious. truth is always a function of personal commitment and
that traditional polarities between 'fact' and 'value' should thus be abandoned
(Polanyi 1958, 1961; Langford 1966):
...only a speaker or listener can mean something bya word, and a word in itseJfcan
mean nothing. When the act of meaning is thus brought home to a person exercising
his understanding of things by the use of words which describe them, the possibility
of performing the act of meaning according to strict aiteria appears logically
meaningless. For any strictly formal operation would be impersonal and could not
therefore convey the speaker's personal commitment. (1958: 252, cf. Austin 1962:
60; Ramsey 1968: 169; Gill 1969: 36).
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If this appears to anticipate speech act theory, Polanyi seems more Austinian
than Searlian in his conviction that notions of 'truth' and 'falsity' cannot be confined
to merely 'abstract' propositions, but must instead be extended to the use of
language by specific people in specific contexts:
...if 'p is true' expresses my assertion of the sentence p, then 'p is true' cannot be said
to be true or false in the sense in which a factual sentence can. 'p is true' declares
that I identify myself with the content of the facrual sentence p; and this
identification is something I am doing, and not a fact that I am observing. The
expression 'p is true' is therefore not itself a sentence but merely the assertion of (an
otherwise unassected) sentence, the sentence p. To say that 'p is true' is to
tmderwrite a commitment or to sign an acceptance, in a sense akin to the
commercial meaning of such acts. (1958: 254).
For T.A. Langford (1966: 47), PoLanyi'swork takes even explicitly 'scientific'
or 'empirical' investigation 'into a context that insists upon the dimension of
personal decision and commitment', even where (as in the church), 'commitment' is
to an already-established or institutionalised set of values. The echoes of Austin
sound even clearer when Langford makes the following observation:
Polanyi has argued that we have no more reliable grounds for our knowledge
claims than these acts of personal disaimination, whether they are our own or
those to which we happen to subscribe personally, since appeals to 'objective fact',
'empirical data' or 'fonnal rules of explicit inference' are, at bottom, no more than
what a community of enquiry accepts them to be (that is, when members of this
community are acting as persons making claims having universal intent). Hence,
logically, these appeals have the same sort of backing and are no less precarious
than other types of personal decisions. Far from altering the procedures by which
we would know and do scientifically, this is merely a desaiption of the means by
which we have, in fact, worked and prospered in science, notwithstandins the
regnancy of general misdesaiption. The first result of this investigation is,' then,
the assertion of the primal place that personal expectation, hope, and commitment
have in every act of knowing. (1966: 47).
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Now from one point of view, Polanyi's insistence on the 'personal participation
of the knower in all acts of understanding' (1958: vii) appears radically and
problematically affective. This is to say, while it allows us to close the positivistic
distinction between literal, factual or 'meaningful' language and the 'meaningless' or
'non-verifiable' language of religion, it does so by a seeming universslisstion of
subjectivity. While this might make for the rehabilitation of religious language as a
suitable subject for linguistic study, it hardly resolves the theological issue of divine
revelation as mediated through a transcendent A.6ro~ since this still carries with it
associations of a God 'out there' - a God who operates even 'above and beyond'
Gill's anti-empiricist 'continuum' of God-talk; a God who in Frame's succinct
phraseology, is 'Lord - even of human language' (1974: 175). That this is Calvin's
God, and the God of classical Reformed theology, is beyond dispute, for here our
words ace subject to, and sanctified by, an eternal Word of God' which 'lasts
forever' (Calvin [1559] 1960: 1.13.8; Davies 1948: 49-56).
Now despite appearances to the contrary, Polanyi in fact disavows
subjectivism. The way he does so is, however, somewhat inscrutable:
[The personal participation of the knower in all acts of UIlCimtanding] does not
make our understanding subjective. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a
passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such
knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden
reality; a contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an indeterminate
range of unknown (and perhaps yet inconceivable) true implications. (1958: xiii-
xiv).
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As Ramsey soundly argues (1968: 196), Polanyi's exposition of 'hidden reality' here
merely begs the sort of 'reference questions' he had originally set out to resolve.
Indeed, Ramsey goes so far as to assert that 'we do not ourselves make contact
with, establish our hold on some 'hidden reality'. To suppose that is to make a
myth-eaten error. Rather does the 'hidden reality' establish contact with us by
disclosing itself to us'. Although Ramsey's concept of 'disclosure' is presented as
something rather more general than Christian 'a1t01C<iA.U\j1t~ - being defined as 'a
cognitive situation which breaks in on us as we survey a series of verifiable criteria'
(1968: 177) or even, to paraphrase crudely, a realisation that 'wholes' are greater
than the sum of their 'atomic parts' (1968: 171ft.) -, there can be little doubt that
when applied to liturgical discourse, it would incorporate the orthodox, Biblical
doctrine that not only worshipping, but also faith itself, are 'gifts of God' (Rom
12:3). Here, Ladriere very much comes back into the picture, insisting as he does
that 'if faith is the reception of the Word and if liturgical language receives from
faith its characteristic performativity, that language is itself an echo of the Word'
(1973: 62). Into this brief comment, indeed, there is compressed a wealth of
potential for our own study - not least in the sense that Ladriere therein suggests
both a challenge to, and a rapprochement with, Reformed conceptions of Word and
faith in worship. In the Chapters which follow, we seek to realise this potential by
showing how, as it has developed beyond the 'classical' speech act theories of
Austin and Searle to which Ladriere was limited. modem pragmatics offers an even
more sophisticated framework for the analysis and understanding of worship
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discourse, and most particularly from our perspective, of worship discourse in the
Reformed tradition.
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CHAPTER6
THE WORD COMMUNICATED: LmJRGY,
IMPLICATURE AND RELEVANCE
6.1 From speech acts to interaction
We have shown that Austin recognised the importance of uptake in the
felicitous performance of speech acts (1962: 117-8). We have also pointed out that
in Searle's schema, most speech acts require the collaboration of a 'Hearer' in order
to be effective (1969: 66-7). We have in turn related these insights to the
importance attached by both Reformed doxology and the work of Ladriere, to 'faith
response' as a prerequisite of true liturgical enactment - even while recognising that
from a pragmatic point of view 'faith' must in this case be understood corporately
and institutionally as well as individually and cognitively, and that it may thus vary
in strength between 'unproblematic' assent to ritual behaviours, and a more
'problematic' assent to the 'claims' or 'assertions' expressed in the act of
worshipping. Having made these points with regard to classical speech act theory.
we are nonetheless compelled to ask more specifically how a 'worshipping Hearer'
might receive and interpret the speech acts of liturgical celebration. Clearly. it is
one thing to say - as the Reformers said in reaction to the Latin Mass - that any
worthwhile liturgy must be 'comprehended' by those who participate in it. It is quite
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another to explore the means by which that comprehension takes place.
Since the work of Austin and Searle in the '60's, pragmaticians - most notably
Searle himself (l979b: 32), Bach & Harnish (1979), Leech (1983: 30) and Sacangi
& Slembrouck (1992: 117) - have suggested that the most appropriate means of
extending speech act theory in the direction just described would be to incorporate
H.P. Grice's definitive work on implicature (1975) into a wider analysis of
language and communication.
Most recently, Grice's own ideas have been radically modified by Sperber &
Wilson (1986, 1987), whose theory of communicative Relevance has been cast by
Leech & Thomas (1990: 201) as 'perhaps the most significant development in
pragmatics over the last few years', and which has been embraced by Diane
Blakemore as a new basis for the subject in her 1992 'Introduction to Pragmatics'
Understanding Utterances.
To date, only Warner (1990) has given serious consideration to bow the study
of implicature and relevance might benefit interpretations of liturgical discourse.
Though perspicuous, his findings are fairly brief and tentative, while his
engagement with actual examples is limited to barely half-a-dozen portions from
'service book' prayers, plus a few Biblical passages. It is our belief that this whole
'communicative' aspect of 'liturgical pragmatics' warrants more thorough
investigation, and that our own corpus allows us to advance such an interpretation
in a fresh and helpful way.
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6.2 Implicature and Liturgy
Grice's work on Implicature can be seen as developing a century of
logico-philosophical work on presupposition by Frege ([18921 1952), Russell
(1905), Strawson (1950, 1952) and others (cf. Levinson 1983: 167-225). Then
again, where both Prege and Russell had spent considerable time seeking a formal,
symbolic analysis of the 'propositions' which are 'entailed' and 'presupposed' by
'linguistic objects' or 'sentences' such as 'the King of France is bald', Grice also took
account of the move of Strawson and other ordinary language philosophers away
from purely formalist and 'anti-metaphysical' explications of linguistic meaning,
and recognised with them that 'there are very many inferences and arguments.
expressed in natural language, and not in terms of [symbolic logical] devices, that
are nevertheless recognizably valid' (1975: 43).
Ostensibly, Grice's work claims to favour neither one of these two approaches
over the other, but rather maintains that the assumption of divergence between the
two rests on a common misapprehension or 'mistake' - a mistake which 'arises from
an inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the conditions governing
conversation' (1975: 43). Expanding on a distinction mooted in an earlier paper
(Grice 1957), Grice argues that a proper account of meaning must take into
consideration not only what is said (that is referential or truth-conditional meaning
analysed in traditionally logical terms), but also what is meant or 'implicated' at the
same time. Although a concept of 'implication' is present in Strawson I,Grice
1. For more detail on this implicatiOD/'unpUwure distinction see Leech 1981: Leech & Thomu 1990: 183.
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applies implicature specifically to his own exposition of saying/meaning - an
exposition which begins with the following illustration:
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual mend, C, who is now working in
a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job. and B replies Ob, quite well, I
think; be likes his colieaollUes lind be bMn't been to prison yet At this point. A
might well inquire what B was implying, what he was suggesting, or even what he
meant by saying that C bad not yet been to prison. The answer might be anyone of
such things as that C is the sort of person likely to yield to the temptation provided
by his occupation. that Cs colleagues are really very unpleasant and treacherous
people, and so forth. It might, of course, be quite unnecessary for A to make such
an inquiry of B, the answer to it being, in the context, clear in advance. I think it is
clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant etc. in this example, is distinct
from what B said. which is simply that C had not been to prison yet. (1975: 43).
Here, it is plain that Grice has moved away from an exclusive focus on
language (whether artificial or natural), and towards a recognition that meaning in
communication depends heavily on such matters as 'general knowledge' and 'shared
contextual knowledge'. In 2.2.3, we saw how Dell Hymes ([1971] 1972) extended
the domain of 'competence' in linguistics from syntactic structures and semantic
'types' to whole situations of utterance; Grice suggests something similar in another
illustration:
Suppose someone to have uttered the sentence He is in the grip of a vice Given a
knowledge of the English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the
utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said, on the
assumption that he was speaking Standard English, and speaking literally. One
would know that he had said, about some particular male person or animal X. that
at the time of the attendance (whatever that was), either 1) X was unable to rid
himself of a certain kind of bad character trait or 2) some part of X's person was
caught in a certain kind of tool or instrument (approximate account, of course).
But for a full identification of what the speaker had said, one would need to know
a) the identity of X. b) the time of utterance and c) the meaning. on the particular
occasion of utterance, of the phrase in the grip of a vice [8 decision between 1) and
2).] (1975: 44).
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It is significant for our purposes that Grice highlights his argument at this
point with reference to the interpretation of a potential metaphor, for it is axiomatic
that any linguistic analysis of religious discourse must take metaphoric inference
seriously if it is to be sensitive to the operation of such discourse . So, what Grice
says about context and background information with regard to 'He is in the grip of a
vice' (57-8) can be seen as applicable to the following 'dual-purpose' URC prayer.
written for use in the baptism of both infants and adults, and for ceremonies based
on both sprinkling from a font and full immersion in a baptistry:
(1) MINISTER: We pray that A.... who is washed inthis water,
may be made one with Christ inhis death
(URC 1989: 33).
Here the reference to 'washing' is figurative for both classes of candidate and
for both modes of baptism. but to different degrees. Whereas an adult undergoing
full immersion is 'washed' literally as well as spiritually, this could hardly be said to
the same extent where a baby's forehead is merely dampened in the sign of the
cross. This in itself does not validate one mode of baptism over another, but it does
confum the need to infer the meaning of liturgical-linguistic signs very clearly
from their use by specific people at specific times on specific occasions. Our High
Heaton transcript reveals a similarly representative instance of what Grice refers to
when the Minister prays using the following Assertive Declarational Directive:
339
(2) OHolYWIit
we bow before you now,
(AS 10: 363-4)
As Horton Davies makes clear (1948: 61-4), physical forms of obedience like
kneeling and bowing were widely eliminated from worship by the English Puritans,
and this exclusion of kinesic ritual persists in today's Reformed churches. Certainly,
the High Heaton congregation are shown as 'sitting' for the petition which ensues,
and short of this being an oblique reference to 'bowing our heads in prayer', we
must assume, as they clearly do, that this is a metaphorical indicator of
psychological submission to God rather than the literal description or 'stage
direction' it might have been in a more 'High Church' rite.
Now if this confirms the need for a proper treatment of non-literal/non-
referential linguistic communication in liturgy, Grice goes on to propose that as
well as general, contextual and mutual knowledge, participants in discourse must
have regard to what he calls The Co-Operative Principle (CP),
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted direction of the talk exchange inwhich you are engaged. (1975: 45).
Subsequently, Bach & Harnish (1979: 12-15) have spoken in similar terms of the
Communicative Presumption of discourse. Although the 'CP' is most obviously
applied to casual conversation, Grice does suggest that it would work for discourses
'whose purpose may be fixed from the start', whose consequent structure may be
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'fairly definite', and whose constituent elements are marked in some way as
'suitable' (1975: 45). From this point of view, it is significant for liturgy, which we
have already begun to see following predetermined patterns even when not based
on a fixed prayer book, and which is clearly emerging as an archetype of
'appropriate' linguistic behaviour. Indeed, while Grice's work remains largely
theoretical, both Holdcroft (1979) and Sarangi & Slembrouck (1992) have
suggested that his concept of implicature might well be extrapolated and adapted
for institutionalised discourses.
From its initial articulation, Grice reifies the CP into four key maxims (1975:
45-6) - maxims whose designation he derives from Kant's categories of reason.
First among these is a Maxim of Quantity. This entails two 'sub-maxims':
1.Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the currentpurposes of
the talk exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Secondly, Grice proposes a Maxim of Quality. This he expresses as Try to make
your contribution one that is true'. Specifically, he defines this as adherence to the
following:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
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Third comes a Maxim of Relation. expressed simply as
Be relevant
Fourthly and finally, Grice identifies a Maxim of Manner, defined in four main
terms:
1. Avoid obscurity of expression
2. Avoid ambiguity
3. Be brief
4. Be orderly
Although Grice's Maxims are presented as most specifically and primarily
connected with the purposes of 'talk exchange', he goes on to conjecture that still
further ones might be added - particularly in order to account for the 'aesthetic,
social or moral' dimensions of discourse (1975: 46-7). In fact, he offers the
suggestion that 'Be Polite' would be a notable member of this group. As we saw in
5.6.1, politeness has indeed developed as a major concern within sociolinguistic
pragmatics; more particularly, it has provided an especially valuable focus for the
study of ritual communication (Leech 1983: 107-14; 131-42; Brown & Levinson
1987; Sarangi & Slembrouck 1992: 121-22).
Now in one sense, Grice's maxims have a fairly direct application to liturgy. In
terms of Quantity, we might well say that liturgical language must communicate its
messages efficiently and sufficiently between members of the congregation.
Particularly in Free Church worship, preachers can be unnecessarily prolix,
intercessors can unwisely try to deal with too many world crises in a single prayer.
and choruses can be repeated beyond a point where repetition has any discernible
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creative or pedagogic value. Conversely, if it is true that a primary feature of
'ritualization' in discourse is ellipsis (Couture 1986: 86-7), then one must also
accept that church rites can become so restrictively 'coded'2 that their
'informativeness' is reduced - at least to a point where those not entirely familiar
with the liturgical system get 'lost' or become confused. In both cases, the Quantity
Maxim may be 'violated' and worship impoverished as a result (cf,. Grice 1975:
49). The following observation from Louis Bouyer is apposite in this regard:
There actually are religious forms in which the rite has, as it were, absorbed and'
assimilated the word, and there are on the other hand forms where the words have
practically suppressed the rite: In ancient Rome, for example, there were cults such
as those of the Salian priests in which the sacred words had lost all their meaning
even for the priests. In a sense they had become nothing more than verbal rites.
Conversely, in some extreme forms of Protestantism, the merely spoken word has
taken the place of ritual and saaaments. In both cases, little enough is left of
religion. In the former, it has degenerated into senseless superstition, and in the
latter it has exhausted itself in a kind of religious intellectualism. (1963: 54).
Bouyer's insights are readily borne out not only from the history of Reformed
worship, but also from our own field data. On the one hand, there is no doubt that
Calvin and his successors reacted vigorously to what they perceived to be
'senseless superstition' in the discourse of the Mass, Not only was it offered in
Latin by often classically ignorant priests to people who were frequently illiterate
even in their own language; it was in any case widely recited out of earshot of the
congregation (Crichton 1986b: 365). In Calvin's terms, the result was a ceremony
reduced to a series of indecipherable symbols - a language-game which had long
2. Liturgic:al discourse 'coding' will be dealt with more specifically &I 8.6.2.
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ceased to be 'in play' for all but an ecclesiastical elite. As we have been
highlighting, this critique stemmed substantially from Calvin's conviction that
Roman doctrine had mistakenly assigned inherent 'power' to the words of liturgy
rather than to the transcendent Word of God which endows those words with
meaning, and to the faith which makes that meaning effective in the lives of the
elect ({1559] 1960: IV.14.14-15). As a result, he portrayed priests as 'muttering like
sorcerers' - casting 'spells' to which few were drawn by understanding, and many
more by 'superstition' (McDonnell 1967: 132). Moreover, we have already seen
how a similar reaction against 'intralinguistic causation' led many English Puritans
to reject fixed forms of words altogether.
However exaggerated and polemicised, these 'anti-ritualistic' stances clearly
informed both Calvin's own rites, and those of the English Reformed churches
which followed in his wake. As well as translating liturgy into the vernacular and
insisting upon an audible and accessible rite, the recovery of a central place for
'expository preaching' in these services bespoke a core commitment to worship as a
genuine act of communication between 'Minister' and 'people' on one level, and
'God' and 'Church' on another (Davies 1948: 182-3; Nichols 1968: 18-21; Old
1984: 69-85; Wolterstorff 1992: 287-8). As Richard Baxter put it in his classic
handbook The Reiormed Pastor, this re-establishment of the sermon was effected in
order 'to speak so plain, that the ignorant may understand us' ([1655] 1956: 74, my
emphasis).
While in itself. commendable, this revival of sacral communication through
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proclamation. teaching and 'explaining the Word' can be seen more negatively to
have threatened the Quantity Maxim in regard to other parts of worship beyond the
sermon itself. Leaving aside debates about the relative 'lengthiness' and 'prolixity'
of Puritan preaching (Davies 1948: 193-203), a tendency to 'over-inform' does
seem to have been a consistent feature of Reformed worship since its inception -
and this appears to have been particularly apparent in English Reformed worship,
where reliance on extemporary speech has been especially high. No doubt, this can
be put down to over-compensating for the erstwhile 'impenetrability' of the Mass,
but even committedly Reformed liturgists agree, if not about its exhausted
intellectualism, then certainly about the excessive 'didacticism' of their tradition's
worship (Routley 1960: 108-12; Mayor 1972: 27; Spinks 1984b: 82). In
Wolterstorffs terms, this has led to no less than an 'overwhelming' of the 'worship
dimension' of Reformed church services by the 'proclamation dimension' (1992:
297).
In the next Chapter, we shall see that this tendency has manifested itself very
distinctively through the widespread replacement or transformation of 'responsive'
and 'dialogical' forms by more overtly expository, mono logical discourses. Here,
we note more generally that the drive to footnote', 'editorialise' and 'teach' through
non-homiletic Reformed liturgy is pervasive in our Advent Sunday transcripts just
as it became a hallmark of Sixteenth Century Calvinist worship. So, the opening
few lines of Calvin's own Collect for Illumination - an innovation from his 1542
Geneva rite - provide, en pssseat; a dense disquisition on the providence and
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uniqueness of God, the doctrine of atonement, human sin, the means of grace,
soteriology, pneumatology and Christo logy:
(2) We pray thee now, 0 most gracious and merciful Father, for all men everywhere.
As it is thy will to be acknowledged the Saviour of the whole world, through the
redemption wrought by thy Son Jesus Ouist., grant that those who are still
estranged from the knowledge of Him. being in the darkness and captivity of error
and ignorance, may be brought by the illumination of thy Holy Spirit and the
preaching of the Gospel to the straight way of salvation. which is to know thee, the
only true God. and Jesus Quist whom thou hast sent (Calvin [1542/5] 1980: 200).
It is noticeable here that much of the sermonising and exposition in question
takes place through 'supplementary' subordinate clauses - and especially those of a
relative type - ego 'As it is thy will to be acknowledged the Saviour ...'; 'those who
are still estranged from the knowledge of him ...being in darkness ...'; 'which is to
know thee ...and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent' etc .. Adverbial groups are also
used to carry significant doctrinal information: 'through the redemption wrought by
thy Son'; 'by the illumination of the Holy Spirit'; 'to the straight way of salvation'. In
addition, substantial 'pedagogic' modification and qualification of nouns loads
further weight onto the Quantity Maxim: 'most gracious and merciful Father; 'the
Saviour of the whole world; 'thy Son Jesus Christ'; 'the only true God' etc.. As well
as confirming Ramsey's (1957: 66-89) point about the distinctively 'odd qualifiers'
of religious discourse, these phenomena are mirrored in the seminal Middleburg
Liturgy of the English Puritans (1586), whose sometime post-sermon prayer is, if
anything, even more replete with didactic deviation:
346
(3) Almighty God and Heavenly Father, since thou hast promised to grant our
requests, which we shall make unto thee in the Name of our Lord Jesus Quist thy
wellbeloved Son, and that we are also taught by him and his Apostles, to assemble
OW" selves in his Name promising that he will be among us, and make intercession
for us unto thee, for the obtaining of all such things. as we shall agree upon here
on Earth: we therefore (having first thy commandment to pray for such as thou hast
appointed rulers and govemers over us, and also for all things needfull, both for
thy people. and for all sortes of men., forasmuch as our faith is grounded on thine
Holy Word and promises, and that we are here gathered together before thy face,
and in the Name of thy Son our Lord Jesus), we, I say, make our earnest
supplication unto thee, our most merciful God and bountiful Father ...(Micidleburg
(1586J 1980: 325-6).
With particular relation to Baxter's Savoy Liturgy of 1661, but with more
general reference to English Puritan rites, Erik Routley has observed a governing
principle that 'nothing must be left to the imagination ...'. With the Anglican
contention that a brief and oft-repeated prayer can inspire personal devotions
arising from it 'the Puritans would have nothing to do'. The result, he concludes,
was an excess of 'literalism' which virtually obliterated 'style', 'rhythm', and
'graceful turns of phrase' and which preferred 'that crudity which comes from
Scripture to that urbanity which smacks of 'the church". Indeed, Baxter went so far
as to repeat the practice of the earlier Middleburg and Waldegrave' liturgies by
printing relevant Bible references in the margin of his order (Davies 1948: 126).
Although the more extreme versions of this didactic Reformation approach
may be less evident today, our field corpus still throws up numerous examples of
doctrinal assertion made in passages where more straightforwardly Expressive or
Declarational discourse might be thought more appropriate. Now, as before, sub-
clauses generally and relative clauses especially, along with adverbials, modifiers
and qualifiers, are the most noticeable vehicles for such 'sermonisation':
(4) MINISTER:
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Father as we come to you on this day we co:me to praise and to worship,
to glorify your name,
for you: are the one who has sent h:ms,
and will/save the earth/ ...•
Thankyou: that he has come ~.as a baby.
The one who was able to step into history to declare your love,
to i~ wi:th our human lives
in their frailty and sin..,
to come amQDgS! us
and to share illthat you have in store for us.
To declare your kingdom ...
and to bring...forgiveness,
and new life
through his death on the cross ...
(AS 4: 35-58 - Prayer of praise & invocation (extemporary».
Here, certainly, the lex ctedendi dominates the lex orandi: credal dogma is so
explicitly 'brought along' to the prayer that its stated purpose of 'praise' and
'glorification' is relatively much less apparent. Theological exposition enters
pervasively also, into the following prayer of thanksgiving from Blackford Bridge:
(5) MINISTER: Wegiveyou~
for our life and salyjtion in Jesus,
who became one with us.
Who died,
and who rose again,
that we might have ~ in him.
Be made members of your church,
and heirs of you kingdom.
(AS 9: 152-9)
Intriguingly, none of the churches in our Advent Survey recite a creed proper,
and in this they diverge from the liturgical practice of Calvin and Knox - if not
from subsequent English Independent procedure (Davies 1948: 135). Nevertheless,
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'credal' speech acts are clearly dispersed throughout their services and as such, bear
an 'informational' load which might be questioned from a 'Quantity Maxim'
perspective. Moreover, this load seems somewhat heavier in extemporary discourse
than in that drawn from contemporary service book sources - sources which have
mainly followed the more elliptical model of 'high' church prayer (eg. URC 1989).
Hence, rather than a terse 'General Confession' from which worshippers can infer
their own particular sins (as in URC 1989: 5), the Minister at Warsash offers this
very pointedly sermonised act of penitence:
(6) ~S~ Father it would be easy to enter into judgement,
and condemn.
~and~alike,
for ignQIing,
the Lord's Day.
It would be easy to con~
the houses of parliament,
for ...not putting their fQQl down.
and for th- and to co~ the local authQrities for not.enf2._rcing the
law.
But Father we have to recognj,& that it is your ~ that is under
~menl
It is OW" fault,
that things have come to this pass.
(AS 5: 335-46)
In this case, it would seem that the chief load of implicature is directed
towards God: the Minister is defming the people's sin as much as confessing it on
their behalf.
If Reformed worship seems in ways like those just illustrated characteristically
to challenge the Quantity Maxim with an excess of detail, there are odd traces in
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our corpus of an apparently opposite violation. In such instances. ritual ellipsis is
disambiguated not by adjacent linguistic explication. but rather. by its relation to
some extralinguistic 'context of action'. The moodless Assertive Directives we
analysed at 5.6.2.1 would fall into this category: the function of The body of
Christ, broken for you' as a command to eat is not 'presupposed' or 'entailed' in the
linguistic object: it is inferable only from the rite as habitually 'practised' and
'learnt'. The same applies to the stark Scripture texts which are quoted. without
identification and in radical displacement from their Biblical settings, at the start of
several services in our corpus:
(7) MINISTER: 'How lovely on the mountain are the FEET of the herald,
who comes to proclai:m,
pro~ty
and bring the good news
of deli verance'.
Our first bxmn is number FIVE HUNDRED and twelve.
SONGS of PRAISE
the angels ..8I}g.
(AS 1: 1-5)
(8) MINISTER: 'Who has raised up from the east
one greeted by victory wherever he goes?'
We sing this first Sunday of Advent
the traditional Qpening of the Advent season,
number one hundred and twenty six.
(AS 6: 1-9)
(see also AS 3: 1-3; 9: 1-2)
Here, worshippers must not only recognise the discourse as Scriptural citation;
they must also realise that though this is hardly a normal opening strategy for
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casual conversation, it is acceptable for sacral speech events and will have some
bearing on what follows later - even if it is not immediately or overtly 'explained'.
Having said this, we can perhaps see a confirmation that the Reformed church as a
whole is relatively more wary of ellipsis that other more rigidly 'textualised'
traditions, in the fact that four of our 10 churches begin with a less liturgically
distinctive 'Good morning' (AS 2: 1-2; 7: 1-2; 8: 1-2; 10: 1-2 cf. CELC 1980a: 82;
Sunday Missa11984: 109)
As we move on to consider Grice's second maxim of Quality, it might seem
axiomatic that a Christian 'believer' would not say what s/he 'believed to be false',
and especially not in worship. After all, the Ninth Commandment is only one of
many Biblical injunctions against telling lies {Exod. 20:16; Lev. 19:11; Rom 1:25;
Col. 3:9). Furthermore, though the 'evidence' for Christian truth-claims may be
disputed by others at an empirical level, one could reasonably assume that these
truth claims are sufficiently 'operative' in the church community, where they
constitute no less than a 'rule of faith'. The problem with this link, however, is
precisely the problem we identified in 5.3 as arising from application of Searle's
'Sincerity Condition' to the language of liturgy, and in 5.6.3 as attending the
definition of 'truth' and 'falsity' in sacral speech action. The plain fact is that not all
who participate in liturgical discourse are equally, or even barely, committed to its
truth-claims, even while they may yet collude with its social and behavioural
functions. Like Searle, Grice bases his model on an intentionalism which is
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essentially individual and mentalistic, but as Tilley points out (1991: 28 n2), 'our
actions can mean and communicate what we intend, or more or less than we intend,
depending on the context in which we perform them'. In this sense, Tilley's
criticism of Searle applies equally to Grice's Quality Maxim in that it bas trouble
accounting for the ways in which contexts constitute (in part) the nature of our acts.
To learn how to perform meaningful acts, to learn what meaning others' acts have,
one learns not how to understand their mental intentions, but how to do things (my
emphasis).
The echo of Austin here is pertinent, for he at least acknowledged a 'particular
difficulty' in the question whether 'when two parties are involved 'consensus ad
quem" is necessary' (1962: 36), Similarly, he perceived that 'thoughts are a most
interesting, ie. a confusing, case' (1962: 41). In particular, he pointed. out that in
saying 1 congratulate you' we may believe the 'truth' and 'validity' of the
convention of congratulating some person in some context, without necessarily
believing that they have done anything worthy of praise. Even more appositely. he
suggested that certain circumstances might require 'apologies' even though those
giving them may not believe they have erred (1962: 45-6): a newspaper printing a
retraction to avoid being sued would be a salient contemporary example of this.
The parallels with liturgy are clear: the uncommitted or semi-committed might still
pray prayers of adoration or confession out of deference to the wider sacral context.
In such instances, ritual and institutional prerogatives supersede personal
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intentionalities and the Maxim of Quality begs a revision which accounts for more
corporate wills and purposes.
Grice's third Maxim - the Maxim of Relevance - is, by his own admission,
'exceedingly difficult' (1975: 46). In basic terms, he states it thus:
I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at each
stage of the transaction; if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be
handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate
contribution at a later stage). (1975: 47).
With specific reference to discourse, however, he confesses ' a number of
problems', including 'questions about what different kinds and focusses of
relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to
allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on'
(46). As we shall see in 6.3 below, these questions have now been addressed in
great detail by Sperber and Wilson (1986; 1987), but simply as a maxim of
liturgical communication, there can be little dispute as to the importance of 'Be
Relevant'. We made it clear in 5.3 that liturgy is archetypally 'rule governed': even
where fixed orders are rejected for the sake of 'lexical freedom', vocabulary is still
likely to be 'marked' and will often still adhere to formulaic patterns (Rosenberg
1970a, 1970b; Coleman 1980; Jamieson 1975). Insofar as Christian liturgy is
based on an authoritative Scripture, its language and relevant themes are
predetermined (Danielou 1954; Gray 1988); and insofar as it is shaped by church,
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tradition or both, its expression is pragmatically institutionalised. As a consequence
of all this, the parameters of Relevance in liturgy are more sharply defined than in,
say, a 'casual chat' between friends. References to mundane matters like shopping
or gardening may be permissible at certain junctures (eg. during a children's
address or as 'parabolic' sermon illustrations), but would not normally be
considered appropriate.
Of course, within this broad characterisation there are diverse styles of
worship, each of which might be distinguished by the range of topics which are
regarded as 'relevant'. Hence, a charismatic or Pentecostal service is more likely to
permit testimonies from worshippers sharing deeply personal concerns than a
traditional BCP mattins in the Church of England. Then again, the Relevance of
such testimonies is not entirely without qualification: they would have no place, for
example, in the enunciation ofa prophecy (Davies 1984: 114-16).
We shall deal more thoroughly with issues of liturgical regulation,
institutionalisation and style in Chapter 8 but even at this point in our discussion it
is clear that what Grice says about relevance overlaps to some degree with his final
Maxim - the Maxim of Manner. Here, 'Being perspicuous' clearly entails 'Being
relevant': an 'obscure' or 'ambiguous' speaker will more often than not be perceived
as 'failing to stick to the point', while 'unnecessary prolixity' (which, as we saw with
examples (2) and (3) above, is a Quantity violation) might very well involve excess
digression. Aside from this, 'manner' can be seen as a vital component in the
constitution of worship: insofar as church rites represent 'governed behaviour',
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injunctions to 'decency' and 'order' are central (cf. 1 Cor. 14:40). Indeed. such
prerogatives are sometimes so pervasive that participants may be required to
countenance what Grice (49) terms a clash in order to maintain them. Good
evidence of this is offered by Warner (1990: 159). who follows Holdcroft (1979:
141) in observing that circumlocution is sometimes encoded as a means to
orderliness, rather than a denial of it. This is to say, where Holdcroft cites fulsome
and deferential address to an emperor as just such an instance of the Quantity
Maxim and 'Brevity' sub-Maxims being sacrificed in the cause of institutional
felicity, Warner notes a similar tactic at work in various forms of Anglican petition
(1990: 159). A parallel from the English Reformed tradition would be this Prayer of
approach from the Congregational Union's 1959 Book of Services.
(9) Almighty and everlasting God, Lord of heaven and earth, of whom, and through
whom, and to whom are all things: we glorify thy majesty and grace. All thy
works praise thee in all places of thy dominion; and thy truth and love are revealed
in Jesus Quist. Therefore, with the redeemed of all ages, we laud and magnify thy
holy name, 0 God, most blessed for ever. (Congregational Union 1959: 9).
A similarly fulsome deference is apparent at various points in our corpus.
Normally, it would be unnecessary to lavish praise and obeisance upon someone as
extensively, repeatedly or ascriptively as in the examples which follow.
Nevertheless, when the addressee is God and the institutional context a prayer of
adoration, the Manner Maxim again overrides the Quantity Maxim:
(10) MINISTER: Ykro' be to you,
Lord God King of the universe.
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QiQry be to you Lord God.
dwelling in light and majesty,
g!Qly be to you,
Lord God beyond our highest thoughts.
Glory be to YQY Lord God.
giver of llght and ~
Y!2IY be to you,
from the £Qmpany of heaven who see you face to face.
Y!2IY from your people on earth,
who have seen,
your love and your sal!ition.
Glory be tu you Lord God.
through ~ Q:u:W our Lord.
Amen.
(AS 8. 61-76 - From Dixon 1983: 12).
(11) MINISTER: So Lord be with us inour worship,
for we offer you..everything that we have today,
we give it to you,
for you a1~ are ~y
of illthat we can give. ...
We offer our praise and worship inJesus' name (...)
(AS 4. 65-9 - Extemporary)
Less extensively, but no less distinctively, the 'Orderliness' sub-maxim can be
seen to account for what might best be described as 'idiolectal' features within
particular strands of churchmanship. For example, we have long observed a marked
use of the adverbial limiter just' in English Charismatic worship - a word which
seems semantically rather redundant, but which nevertheless appears to 'encode' a
whole style of Christian belief and practice. At first sight, its use seems to diverge
from the Maxim of Quantity and the Manner sub-maxim 'Be Brief; all the same, it
is clear from our transcript of the Charismatic service at Warsash that it actually
instantiates a contextually felicitous 'order' - not only as a mere 'badge' of
Charismatic identity, but also as a genuinely meaningful way of expressing that
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passionate 'humble yearning' for God which is in fact a keystone of Charismatic
spirituality (Lister 1983):
(12) W.LEADER 2: Lord we just pray for our ~
(ASS.202)
(13) W.LEADER 2: And we just want to ~ in that,
aura of your .bQ_liness this morning
(AS 5. 286-7)
(14) W.LEADER2: We [...J
Justmu that you will,
Jrum< among us
(AS S. 291-2)
As it is, both invocatory circumlocutions and the 'Charismatic "just" could be
said to maintain a special form of liturglcal 'politeness' - one in which proper
address to God requires a corporate version of that very same 'awed gratitude'
which Smith & McClendon identify as a core 'affective condition' on the
performance of worship. Although this 'corporatization' might apply more readily
to the former than the latter, it is clearly necessary for liturgy as a whole.
Fortunately for our purposes, David Holdcroft has recognised that Grice's model
must be revised to accommodate such institutional contexts. With specific regard to
the CP, this means that it might be brought more explicitly to bear on all discourse
types, rather than merely on conversational interactions. Holdcroft's revision reads
as follows:
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Make your contribution to the discourse such as is required. at the stage at which it
occurs, by the purposes you have in entering into, or which you have accepted as
the purposes of, or which are the generally accepted purposes of, the discourse in
which you are a participant (1979: 139) •
Like Levinson (1979: 374), Holdcroft realises that not all talk exchanges are
uniformly co-operative: police interrogations, diplomatic encounters and sales
negotiations for instance, will often run contrary to Grice's assumptions - not least
because they display a variation of 'discourse rights' between their respective
participants (Holdcroft 1979: 133). Hence the recognition of 'individual' as well as
'mutual' purposes in this revision. What is more, even where rights and aims are
apparently shared, Holdcroft importantly perceives that the degree of existential
commitment to them may vary: while it may indeed be unequivocal, there are
occasions where the purposes of discourse will be more 'generally willed' than
individually endorsed - that is, more ritualized and conventionalized than
personally approved (1979: 136). Holdcroft recognises that this latter scenario is
more typical of multi-party discourse than of two-person dialogue, and thus
importantly distinguishes between conscious co-operation and a less wilful consent
on the part of the audience - 'even on occasions when it says nothing' (1979: 130 cf.
Tilley 1991: 62). Of complementary interest here is Sarangi & Slembrouck's (1992)
focus on a crucial ambiguity in Grice's notion of co-operation, showing how it has
been interpreted both as an ethical prescription (Allwood 1976), and as a purely
empirical, descriptive norm (Leech & Thomas 1990: 181). In the same vein, they
go on to show that it could be regarded as a principle which is either universal (that
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is, 'socially neutral'), or else affected by particular contexts and cultural variables
like class, power, education etc .. In placing greater stress on the latter, 'discoursally
situated' approach, Sarangi & Slembrouck echo Holdcroft's perception that degrees
of individual 'benevolence' may vary between participants, even within the same
talk exchange. Furthermore, both their and Holdcroft's emphasis on institutional
discourses as prime examples of such variation raises major issues for our study of
Christian rite:
...a theory of communication cannot take an institutionally defined truth, ie. a
socially relative one, as an absolute one for explaining and describing what goes on
in interactions ...the use of the (]> as a device for explaining how language users
arrive at meaning forces us into a position where one has to postulate a mutually
accepted and defined content for the Gricean maxims, and the risk is indeed that the
institutional definitions are given an absolute, scientific status. (1992: 132 cf.
Holdcroft 1979: 136).
Again here, we find ourselves returning to the essential question of faith as a
cognitive dynamic in the 'activation' and 'validation' of ritual meaning. Is liturgy to
be defined as 'social discourse', wherein considerations about the 'speaking (or
believing) subject' are misguided (Derrida 1991 [1972]: 67; Mey 1989), or is it
rather to be viewed as a divinely-initiated dialogue to which an individual is
'inducted' on the basis of his or her 'affective disposition' (Ladriere 1973: 56)? This
question in turn touches once more on the much-debated place of intentionality in
pragmatic analysis (cf. Derrida 1977, Searle 1977, 1983; Petrey 1990: 67-69), and
as such reiterates the tension between 'personal' and 'corporate' identities in
liturgical pragmatic analysis.
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Although Grice's Maxims can clearly be applied to the liturgical situation, it
should be stressed that the core phenomenon of Implicature is most essentially and
substantially associated by him not with a simple observance of these maxims, but
rather with the 'flouting' of them for some ulterior rhetorical purpose (1975: 45,
49). As it typically occurs in conversation, this flouting is distinguished by an
apparently constructive desire to uphold the overall CP: it is in this sense quite
different from either 'violating' a maxim 'in order to mislead', or from deliberately
'opting out' of a discourse. Neither is it the same as that endorsing of necessary
'clashes' between maxims to which we referred above (1975:49). Indeed, as Grice
describes it, flouting generates implicatures 'by means of something of the nature of
a figure of speech' (52). On this premiss, he associates it with Quantity-related
devices like ellipsis and tautology (52); with 'Qualitative' tropes such as irony,
metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole (53); with Relevance-oriented strategies like
'changing the subject' when someone commits a faux pas, and with such positive
exploitations of the Manner maxim as a poet's seeking 'multiple readings' by using
ambiguous phrases, the invocation of euphemism for humorous effect, and
deliberate obfuscation by two speakers wishing to conceal information from a third
party (54-5).
Grice's exposition of flouting is associated organically with what he calls
conveaetionel implicature (1975: 49) - that is, with implicature as it operates in
'spontaneous', non-ritualized discourses. Specifically, this means that Grice's
addressee decodes flouted maxims 'on the spot', by applying the general
360
constituents of the CP to particular utterances as and when they occur. Cognitively,
this suggests a process of logical deduction in which, according to Grice,
..• a man who, by(in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that
q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q PROVIDED TIlAT 1) he
is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims. or at least the eo-
operative principle; 2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is
required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in llfOSE
terms) consistent with this presumption; and 3) the speaker thinks (and would
expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of
the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in 2) IS
required. (1975: 50)
This association of implicature with the contingent 'working out' and 'intuitive
grasping' of presumed suppositions may well be valid for conversation, in which
participants are dealing with relatively new or 'unpredictable' utterances from one
exchange to the next. It is surely less applicable, however, to those 'fixed' and
'fairly definite' discourses which Grice claims might also be dealt with by his
theory. As we have begun to see, the precise fixity of liturgical discourses can vary
considerably, but insofar as they represent 'routine' or 'institutional' forms of
communication, the points at which such discourses 'exploit' Grice's maxims are
likely to be recognised less by spontaneous deduction than by convention - that is,
by prior knowledge of the 'language-game'. In uttering the Agnus Dei, individual
communicants are not expected at every eucharist to decompose Christ's logico-
metaphoric relation with the Jewish Paschal lamb; rather, in Holdcroft's terms, they
are invited to 'give their consent' to this expression by virtue of its historic place in
a rite which stands at the very heart of Christian faith and practice.
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Now Grice does acknowledge that certain implicatures may function
formulaically in the way just described. Indeed, he proposes that conversational
implicatures must be set alongside so-called conventional implicsnues in any
account of the relationship between 'saying' and 'meaning' (44-5). Conventional
implicatures develop as ritual associations between words and are in this sense
exemplified by such sentences as
(16) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.
The dynamics at work here are explained by Grice in these terms:
I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its
being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an
Englishman. But while I have said that he is an Englishman, and said that he is
brave, Ido not want to say that it follows from his being an Englishman that he is
brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so. I do not
want to say that my utterance of the sentence would be, S1RICILY SPEAKING,
false should the consequence in question fail to hold.. So SOME implicatures are
conventional ...(1975: 44-5).
Later, Grice underlines this distinction by insisting that even though they may
be intuitively grasped, conversational implicatures must still be expressible as an
'argument' in the formal, logical sense (50); conventional implicatures, by contrast,
have no such necessarily logical foundation and are thus non-truth-conditional. The
'therefore' in (32) is from this point of view misleading. and certainly cannot be
equated with the symbols -4 (denoting material implication) or ~ (denoting strict
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implication). This is to say, from a logical, truth-conditional perspective, it follows
neither
(15) that if a man (M) is English (E), then he is brave (b) (ME .....b)
nor
(16) that in all possible worlds, to be an English man is, ipso
facto, to be brave (ME ~ b)
Rather, the inference made here is purely habitual: as in the discrimination of 'and'
from 'but' (Levinson 1983:127), there is nothing logically significant about
'therefore': its pragmatic function is routinized rather that conversationally
implicated.
An interesting liturgical parallel to all this is the introduction to the Senctus;
which traditionally begins with the same causal connective Therefore':
(17) MINISTER.: Therefore with all your people in heaven
and on earth we sing the triumphant
hymn of your glory:
Holy, Holy. Holy Lord...
(URC 1989: 12, 14. 15)
(18) to.1INISTER.: Therefore with angels and archangels,
and with all the gnnpany of ~
we .lJuQ and lJligI1ify your glQrious ..name.
Evennore praising you,
and singing.
Holy, holy, holy Lord (...)
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(AS 6.482-7 - From A Book of Experimental Womup)
Significantly, this section is preceded by a 'Seasonal Preface' which varies in
content according to the time of the liturgical year (URC 1989: 17-18). Commonly.
Proper Prefaces praise God for what He is and what He has done in relation to
Lent. Passiontide, Ascension and so on. The point is that the link between reciting
such prayers of praise and voicing the Sanctus cannot be 'intuitively grasped': there
is nothing in the semantics of these Proper Prefaces which implies an inevitable
joining with the heavenly host to declare God's holiness. The implicature is
conventional. not conversational; it relates to the institutional structure of the rite
rather than to its logical structure; it must be 'learnt' and cannot simply be 'inferred':
(19) We praise you that [Jesus] took our nature and was born as the child of
Mary, that he might share our life, reveal your love. reconcile us to
yourself. and give us power to become your children.
Thereforewith all your people in heaven and on earth we sing the
triumphant hymn of your glory ...
CURe 1989: 15/17 (Ouistmas)
(20) You did not send [Jesus] to condmm the world.
but inorder that the world might be enlightened and saved through him,
so that everyone who believes
is nQl condemned.
~ore with angels and archangels.
and with all the company of llaml
we ~ and murUfy your Ilmious ..name.
Evermore praising you.
and singing, (...)
(AS 6.458-86 - From A Handbook of Experimental Litvrg)l)
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Although these distinctions between conversational and conventional
implicature seem persuasive, it has latterly been argued (eg. by Morgan 1978 and
Leech & Thomas 1990) that they are not always sustainable. Most especially,
problems of definition arise when utterances whose force could originally be
calculated only by the means and methods of conversational implicature become,
through repeated usage, more 'conventional' in nature. When this happens, analysis
in terms of 'logical deduction', 'formal argument' or 'inferential processing' may still
be possible, but will substantially miss the point (Morgan 1978: 263). So, a
construction like 'Can you x is unlikely now to be 'worked out' as a yes/no question
functioning pragmatically as a polite request to take some action: rather, it has
become idiomatic and as such prompts a typically 'automatic' response. Leech &
Thomas (1990: 184) see the same process affecting Sir Robert Armstrong's
Spycatchertrial expression 'to be economical with the truth': when first uttered in a
Sydney courtroom, it represented a conversational implicature deriving from a
flouting of the maxims of Quantity and Manner; now it has become a 'frozen
metaphor' whose comprehension is far less reliant on 'conscious' application of the
CP and its linked maxims. For our part, the 'Charismatic Just" would fall into the
same bracket: although it has a residual implication inferable from its logico-
grammatical status as an adverbial limiter (Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: 213), it's
'conventional' operation as an ecclesiologicsl signifier in the worship of Warsash
and kindred fellowships is at least as much a component of its 'meaning'.
Given its markedness as a language-game, the implicatures of Christian
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worship would seem to be mostly 'conventional' in character. As we shall
demonstrate more fully in Chapter 8, rituality and repetition in liturgy are universal
phenomena and are certainly not confined to traditions based on set. written rites:
even where prayer books are eschewed. reliance on established Biblical discourse.
and a common need to consolidate religious identities in linguistic terms, has led [0
a preponderance of 'institutional expressions' demanding little in the way of
cognitive disambiguation - at least from the initiated (Rosenberg 1970a; Gulich
1980). This phenomenon underlines the importance of examining more closely just
how conversational and conventional implicatures might be distinguished. the
better to ascertain the point at which the former could be said to transmute into the
latter in liturgical speech.
Now Grice himself maintains as a first criterion of differentiation that
conversational irnplicatures are cancellable whereas conventional implicatures are
non-cancellable. For 'conversational' types this means that a speaker might 'add on'
a retraction which is both logically possible and some way short of flat
contradiction. For instance. whereas it is usually the case that 'not all x implicates
'at least some X. a church Minister could still conceivably say:
(21) Not all of today's worship will follow a set pattern - in fact. none of it
will.
By contrast, it is both unacceptable and plainly heretical for the same Minister to
cite Matthew 7:21 in preaching that
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(22)
* Not all who call Quist 'Lord. Lord' will enter the Kinsdom of Heaven -
in fact. nobody will
Because the first statement functions as a spontaneous 'spoken rubric', it is
relatively unbound by convention and so quite susceptible to cancellation;
however. since the latter draws on a sacred Scripture which operates
conventionally as God's Word within the church, the verse quoted comes with
certain established. 'universal' implicatures attached - implicatures which cannot be
reversed in the way just mooted. The Biblical co-text makes it clear that Jesus
adhered. at this point to the normal' implication of 'not all X, and since he is the
authoritative Word made flesh', it is his initial, intended implication which is
conventionalized as the only possible implication for an orthodox church today.
Interestingly however, not all such 'scalar' lmplicarures (Levinson 1983: 127ff)
are conventionalized in this way within Biblical discourse. Any congregation
which seeks to dramatise the resurrection story as part of its Easter Day liturgy is
faced with a dilemma vis a vis the representation of guardians at Jesus' tomb. Does
it have one such figure (as in Matthew and Mark's account), or two (as in Luke and
John's versions) ? Intriguingly, John Wenham (1984: 87) suggests a resolution of
this dilemma by invoking the conditions of conversational rather than conventional
implicature, arguing that Matthew and Mark's report of a single figure does not
rule out (ie. may be 'cancelled' to confum) that there were in fact two. Indeed,
liturgies appear often to have made use of the 'cancellability principle' when
inferring from Scripture a degree of hannony on which many modem Biblical
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critics would cast doubt - for example by conflating three or four possible 'Mary Sf
into a single Saint Mary Magdalene (Cross & Livingstone 1983: 884); or by
highlighting Christ's cleansing of the temple as a Lenten episode drawn from his
Passion when John places it (or another similar incident) at the beginning of his
ministry (CELC 1980a: 508-510). In each case, a unitary approach to the Biblical
texts can be seen to have derived from an inherently cancellable conversational
implicature to the effect that 'although there may be more than one case, there is
certainly one case'. Ironically. of course, such apparent 'liturgical logic' has with
time been transmuted into powerful conventional implicatures, such that a single
Mary and a purely Paschal cleansing are now widely assumed among churchgoers
and the population at large to be what the Bible itself teaches.
These examples confirm that though a 'condition' like cancellability may help
us to make a formal distinction between conversational and conventional
implicature. it does not always enable us to discriminate between the two in
specific instances.
Much the same can be said of Grice's second distinguishing condition for
conversational as compared with conventional implicatures - that of non-
detachability. At heart. this means that conversational implicatures are not tied to
specific linguistic items in the way that conventional implicarures are, but rest
instead on logical relations which may be expressed through a variety of lexical
and grammatical means. Indeed. it is from this premiss that Grice depicts the
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aforementioned and/but distinction as purely conventional. According to his own
definition of non-detachability,
Insofar as the calculation that a particular conversational implic:ab.ll'e is present
requires. besides contextual and background information, only a knowledge of
what has been said (or of the conventional commitment of the utterance), and
insofar as the manner of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will not be
possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the
implicature in question, except where some special feature of the substituted
version is itself relevant to the determination of an implicature (in virtue of one of
the maxims of Manner) (1975: 58).
In an important supplementary article on the themes of logic and conversation
(1978: 115 ), Grice exemplifies this condition of non-detachability by stating that
while the word 'try' conversationally implicates either failure, the chance of failure,
or some perception of the chance of failure, this implicature would also be carried
by the verbs 'attempt to', endeavour to', 'set oneself to' and so on. By contrast, we
should recall that the 'therefore' in sentence (32) constitutes a particular form
associated by convention with a particular presupposition 3• In this sense, it is
comparable with items like 'even' (Kartunnen & Peters 1979), 'moreover', 'anyway',
'still' and 'oh' (Levinson 1983: 128). Admittedly, constructions like 'thus' or 'as such'
might have performed much the same role as 'therefore' in Grice's sample
statement. but the point is that they would then have represented discrete
conventional implicatures in their own right, rather than all belonging to one truth-
functional con versstionsl implicature (cf. Green 1989: 94).
3. In anempting to distinZUish the formul&ic. prefabricaled force of such forms fI'om prauppocitions of the claalc.al,
'spontaneously processed' type. Gazdar (1979) applies to them the term preosuppoaIdoII Green (1989: 94) simply nOCUth&I
this class of expressions 'are now custoawily rd'emd to as conventional implicarwa ruher tIwI prauppoaitions' • atrend
'Which studs in marked contrast to Kcmpsoa.'s (197$) coatention that all conventional Implic:anara are reducible to
ent&iJmcnts, conversational implic:atures or standard presuppositions.
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Applying the 'nondetachability' criterion to liturgical implicatures raises
considerable problems - problems which beg key questions about Grice's
methodology. Perhaps most crucially, difficulties arise in the thorny area of service
book revision. Does the much-disputed change from Thee' to 'You' for addressing
God constitute minimal 'redecoration' of the same detachable implicature, or is the
shift more fundamental, obliterating a vital honorific stratagem (preserved in the
French tu/vous) - one which Levinson (1983: 128) sees as generating a distinct and
defmite conventional implicature in its own right? Does the drive towards inclusive
language in many liturgies mean merely a superficial updating of 'equivalent'
forms, or is a more deep-rooted change of generalised conversational implicatures
involved? It is worth underlining Grice's caveat that the non-detachability condition
cannot be applied in cases where implicatures depend on observation of the
Maxims of Manner rather than of Quantity, Quality or Relation (cf.. Horn 1988:
123). In effect, this is a recognition that though conversational implicatures are
determined by 'meaning' rather than 'saying' - that is. by logical rather than lexical
constructions, there may be occasions which offer 'no alternative way of saying
what is said. or no way other than one which will introduce peculiarities of Manner'
(1978: 115). Here again, one can envisage a blurring of the distinction between
conversational and conventional implicatures. For liturgy in particular, one might
well ask on this basis: Are 'modem' versions of established prayers recast purely to
'avoid obscurity' or 'ambiguity' in the original, and if so, are we to accept with
Grice that since such prerequisites of Manner cannot compromise non-detchability,
" ~
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they retain the same conversational implicatures as their antecedents? Or are the
differences actually more profound than this. involving not only new conventional
forms but new conversational implicatures as well? Thiselton ([1975] 1986: 3)
invokes a salient example of these complexities with reference to Anglican
worship. The Prayer Book term 'prevent' in the petition 'Prevent us, 0 Lord, in all
our doings' might very well be rendered today as 'Go before' in order to avoid an
ambiguity stemming from diachronic change in the original term's meaning, but the
substitute version could nevertheless be said to dilute an implicature of divine
restraint which was present even in Cranmer's day, when the word had an
adminedly more spatial denotation.
Of course, the recognition of such conscious and subtly exploited ambiguities
is a primary facet of 'communicative competence' in liturgy. As such, it relates to
Grice's remaining conditions for conversational implicarures - namely that they
should be calculable. that is, derivable from the CP and its kindred maxims; that
their 'truth' in terms of what is 'meant' must be distinguished formally from the truth
of what is 'said' as they are conveyed; and that they are indeterminate - that is,
potentially open to more than one interpretation. Calculability is the issue which
was at stake in our earlier discussion of whether irnplicatures are 'worked out'
conversationally or 'received' conventionally. The distinction between 'saying' and
'meaning' has also been made above, and it is clear from what has been said already
that Indeterminacy (or unpredictability) of interpretation is crucial to Grice's
discrimination of conversational from conventional implicatures.
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For all their usefulness as general principles, Grice's 'five conditions' cannot be
treated as laws - especially not for liturgical discourse, where, as we have seen, the
conversational/conventional dichotomy is far from sharp. Indeed, Grice himself
admitted at the end of his 1975 article that 'it may not be impossible for what starts
life, so to speak, as a conversational implicature to become conventionalized'
(1975: 58), and three years later this insight had grown more certain:
Indeed I very much doubt whether the features mentioned [of cancellability etc.]
can be made to provide any ...knock-down test, though I am sure that at least some
of them are useful as providing a more or less strong prima facie case in favour of
the presence of conversational implicature. But I would say that any such case
would at least have to be supported by a demonstration of the way in which what
is putatively implicated could have come to be implicated (by a derivation of it
from conversational principles and other data); and even this may not be sufficient
to provide a decisive distinction between conversational implicature and a case in
which what was originally a conversational implicature has become
conventionalized. (1978: 115).
If the 'indecision' to which Grice refers seems problematic, the problem is
largely of his own making, given that it stems from a root
conversational/conventional dichotomy whose dissolution would seem to be a
norm rather than an exception in institutionalised discourses like those of church
worship. Grice's frankness about the flaws in his framework is notable, but given
the somewhat abstract distinction between intention and convention on which that
framework is predicated, one might wonder whether a less 'polarised' model of
linguistic communication would not serve liturgical discourse study better. It is to
just such a model that we shall now turn.
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6.3. Liturgy in the light of Relevance Theol)'
We have seen that Grice believed issues raised by his Maxim of
Relevance to be 'exceedingly difficult' (1975: 46). Not only did he envisage various
'kinds and focuses of Relevance'; he was also concerned with how these might
change throughout a discourse. Although he intended to explore such matters
further 'in a later work', it has in fact fallen to Sperber & Wilson (1986, 1987) to
provide a definitive study of them. It is our conviction that this study offers useful
analytical fuel to the liturgical pragmatic ian - fuel which can drive his task rather
more easily than that provided by Grice. Certainly, Sperber & Wilson treat
Relevance as much more than a sub-category of Implicature. For them, in fact, it
constitutes nothing less than a new paradigm for pragmatics as a whole (1986: 10-
15; 56-60; 24347). Further still, they claim that their 'Relevance Theory' actually
serves as a general theory of communication rather than being simply a
methodology for the analysis of particular utterances in context (1986: 1-64).
Sperber and Wilson begin by observing that all theories of communication
from Aristotle onwards have been based on a 'code model', where a 'code' is 'a
system which pairs internal messages with external signals, thus enabling two
information-processing devices (organisms or machines) to communicate' (1987:
697). Without doubt, this code model reflects the semiotic/semiological theories of
Peirce and Saussure who, as we saw in 1.2, envisaged communication very much
in terms of 'signals' being paired with 'messages' (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986: 55).
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Indeed, with particular reference to the primary case of language, Saussure's
insistence that this pairing is essentially 'arbitrary' ([1915] 1959: 67-8) - that there is
no 'inner relationship' between signifiers and that which they signify - suggests
precisely that utterances must be 'encoded' and 'decoded', that is, produced and
received with reference to their relative 'position' within the system rather than to
any 'fixed' or 'universal' denotation beyond it. It is on such established 'code
models' of information theory that Lardner (1979) predicated his more broadly
anthropclogical 'pragmatic' of the Mass.
While recognising the pervasiveness of the code model, Sperber and Wilson
claim that it is 'descriptively inadequate' (1987: 697) and invoke the work of
pragmaticians like Green & Morgan (1981) and Leech (1983) when stressing that
'there is a gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts
actually communicated by utterances. This gap is filled not by mere coding, but by
inference' (1987: 697). Inference differs from coding in that, far from being
predicated on an arbitrary relation of 'premises' and 'conclusions', it 'takes a set of
premises as input and yields as output a set of conclusions which follow logically
from, or are at least warranted by, the premises' (1987: 698). According to Sperber
& Wilson, pragmatics has often failed to make this distinction between 'coding' and
'inference' explicit: the semiotic provenance of the subject has led to its being
presented 'programmatically', on analogy with syntax and semantics, as 'a code-like
mental device underlying a distinct level of linguistic ability'; in practice however,
Sperber and Wilson maintain that 'pragmaticians have described comprehension as
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an inferential process' (1987: 698) - a development which they attribute largely to
Grice's original distinction between 'saying' and 'meaning' (1957) and to the
subsequent 'psychologizing' of pragmatics which has followed from his work on
implicature (1975, 1978 cf. Sperber & Wilson 1987: 699). Having said this, while
Sperber & Wilson take Grice's inferential model as their 'point of departure' (1986:
21ff; 1987: 698), they contend that its co-option by pragmaticians has faltered
precisely through being tied to the 'code' paradigm, and thereby to a presumption of
mutual knowledge which is 'psychologically implausible' (1987: 698):
Does it follow that pragmaticians who hold to the code model but describe
comprehension in inferential terms are being inconsistent? Not necessarily. It is
formally conceivable that a decoding process should contain an inferential process
as a sub-part. However, for this to be possible, speaker and bearer must use not
only the same language but also the same set of premises, because what makes the
code model explanatory is that symmetrical operations are performed at the
emitting and receiving ends. (1987: 698).
In reality, though, Sperber and Wilson maintain that while speakers and
hearers may share some assumptions, there will be others which they do not hold in
common. This very much squares with what we have been saying about the diverse
intent, commitment and knowledge of those who attend worship in relation to the
propositions of the lex credendi which is articulated in worship. For Sperber &
Wilson, the key question concerns just how speakers and hearers are to distinguish
the assumptions they share from those they do not share(1987: 698). In order to
draw this distinction, Sperber and Wilson claim that interlocutors 'must make
second-order assumptions about which first-order assumptions they share; but then
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they had better make sure that they share these second-ocder assumptions, which
calls for third-ocder assumptions, and so on indefinitely'. Despite their
pervasiveness, Sperber & Wilson argue that these models of Infinite regress and
'necessary' mutual knowledge lack substance. Indeed, they point out crucially that
'pragmaticians have offered no independent support for the claim that individuals
engaging in verbal communication can and do distinguish mutual from nonrnutual
knowledge' (1987: 698).
From this basis, Sperber arid Wilson move on to reject both the 'mutual
knowledge hypothesis' and the code model of linguistic communication which
implies it (1987: 698). Instead, they develop Grice's account of Implicature in a
new direction, on the understanding that implicatures are communicated 'not by
coding, but by providing evidence of the fact that the speaker intends to convey
them' (1987: 699). In specific terms, this means that Sperber and Wilson
decompose Grice's intentional ism into two distinct 'goals' of communication (1986:
54ff):
1. An Informative Intention - the intention to make manifest or more manifest to
the audience a certain set of assumptions.
2. A Communicative Intention - the intention to make mutually manifest to
audience and communicator the communicator's informative intention.
What is being established here is that effective communication depends not
only on the conveyance of immediately-evidenced information, but also on a
successful transmission of the speaker's intention to convey information, even
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where direct evidence for such information may be lacking. For Sperber & Wilson,
communication is thus founded crucially on ostensioii (the signal that the speaker
has something to communicate) as well as upon inference (the logical process by
which the addressee derives meaning). What is more, these two dynamics are
fundamentally related. To some extent, the roots of this ostensive-inferential link
can be traced to Bach & Hamish's earlier attempts at recasting speech act theory in
Gricean terms ([1979J 1991: 238, cf. 1987: 712). Certainly, their work had
confirmed that 'the intended effect of an act of communication is not just any effect
produced by means of the recognition of the intention to produce a certain effect, it
is the recognition of that effect: While admitting that this seemed to be a reflexive
paradox, Bach & Hamish had gone on to confirm that 'the effect, the hearer's
recognizing the speaker's intention to produce that effect, is not produced by the
hearer's recognizing that intention - that would be worse than a paradox, it would
be a miracle'. Rather, 'it is produced by the hearer's recognizing that the speaker has
an intention to produce a certain effect that he is to identify (and thereby have
produced in him) partly by recognizing S's intention to produce an identifiable
effect'.
As this exegesis makes clear, allowing for what Sperber & Wilson would
come to call 'ostension' means that 'understanding' can be accounted for in terms
radically different from 'reading the mind' of a 'Sender' or 'Speaker'. Appositely
from our point of view, Sperber & Wilson themselves illustrate the working of
ostension from a kinesic example:
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Peter and Mary are sitting on a park bench. He points in a direction where she had
not so far noticed anything in partiallar. This time, she takes a closer look and
sees their acquaintance Julius in the distance. sitting on the grass. (1987: 7(0).
The point here is not just that Mary 'infers' the presence of Julius from Peter's
gesture, but that she does so through recognising that by pointing in Julius'
direction, Peter himself intends to demonstrate to her that if she pays attention she
will gain some relevant information (1987: 7(0).
In liturgy, we find several examples of ostension working in a similar way.
Just as pointing is a convention associated with 'picking something (or someone)
out', so the 'segmentation' of liturgy is often signalled by kinesic actions which
'make ostensive' the intention of a Minister or other speaker to address the
congregation to some particular end. Hence, when a Minister 'moves down' from a
pulpit or lectern after the opening hymns and prayers to stand before the
congregation, the congregation not only infer the commencement of a 'Children's
Address' from her actions, but also recognise from those actions her ostensive
intention to begin that address (see AS 3.65ff.; 4.139ff.; 6.97ff.). If this seems a
rather abstract distinction, it comes more sharply into focus when language itself
functions 'non-literally' or ambiguously in the context of worship. The following
lines come from the Eucharistic Prayer in the URC Service Books 'Second Order
of Worship' (1989: 28):
(24) MINISTER.: As we share in the sufferings of Quist, so give us grace
that we may know the power of his resurrection, ..
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(URC 1989: 28)
Here. there is a logical implicature that communicants either do or will
experience the same 'sufferings' that Jesus experienced. Nevertheless, in the context
of the rite as prescribed, there is no direct evidence that this can or will be the case.
Certainly, there is nothing to suggest that the Messiah's pain will be immediately
apparent to every member of the congregation; besides, it is likely that not
everyone would feel that their past, present or future hurts would merit such an
elevated comparison. All the same, when the 'ostensive' positioning of the Minister
behind a communion table spread with elements symbolising Christ's 'broken body'
and 'shed blood' is taken into account, the purport of the message becomes much
clearer: the sharing is principally the sharing of Holy Communion, not the sort of
'empathic' sharing which might be 'inferred' from the sentential meaning alone.
Doxologica11y, there is a suggestive link here with Calvin's depiction of the
eucharistic elements as 'seals' analogous to the seals which are impressed onto
formal documents and letters ([1559] 1960: IV.14.5; IV.14.21-2; IV.16.4; IV.19.2
cf. Wallace 1953: 137-9). Though he deals only with the Austinian ramifications of
Calvin's theology, Vincent (1979) anticipates what we have been saying about the
paralinguistic 'ostension' of eucharistic discourse-meaning when he advances this
analysis:
[The seal] is a remarkable sign in that it adds nothing to the 'signifying substance'
of the body of the letter itself. It exists wholly as an action: it consists of an
AUlHENTIFICATION of the intention of the addressor of the message, and of a
confirmation of that space within the letter in which the receiver is identified as
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addressee. As in the case of the sealed message, so in the case of the sacrament
the confirmation of sincere intent ..coincides with what might be considered as the
creation, in the receiver, of the attitude which befits that of an addressee: (1979:
152-3).
If this sacramental example seems to dualise the verbal and non-verbal aspects
of communication, Sperber & Wilson are quick to point out that though inference
may characteristically be linked with saying and ostension with showing, the two
are in fact 'continuous' with one another (1987: 700). Indeed, it will be noted that
their own 'Paul and Mary' example. as well as our earlier 'Children's Address'
scenario involve no language at all, but still entail both ostension and inference.
Rather, Sperber & Wilson stress that 'inferential communication and ostension are
one and the same process, but seen from two different points of view: that of the
communicator who is involved in ostension and that of the audience who is
involved in inference' (1987: 700). Indeed, we can on this basis demonstrate
equally from our corpus that just as gestures are 'inferable' as well as 'ostensive', so
language itself can be a means of ostension as well as a source of inference.
Specifically, this becomes apparent in contexrualisation - the process whereby
those isolated 'sentences' which are the focus of logical inferencing have their
function illuminated by recognition of what the speaker has 'shown' them to mean
in his previous discourse. Here, for example. the potential difficulties in 'inferring'
the lection Isaiah 41: 2-4 are alleviated by the 'ostensive' utterances with which the
Minister introduces it:
(24) MINISTER:
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[ ...] this morning
traditionally we concentrate o:n the message of the prophets,
a:nd the:
~ of the ~ as see:n lbmugb the prophets.
This..morning we have ..as often on the first Sunday of Advent a reading
from the prophet Iaiib,
which Richard will read in a moment,
which will speak of the coming of Cm!s who was going to: ..be• •from
2Y1Sideof Israel,
to try: to..help a:nd ..save Israel from its ~.
It's unusual that the Old Testament.has a look..a:t someone from outside
of Israel
(usually they're not /looked atl at ill usually they're just a Rmblem ..just a
In!rden).
~ time Cyrus becomes ..one who comes from the wt.
and who who is !mpicked up (in ma:ny way:s and.lllDbolisms)
as looking to the ~ in order to find various ~ of salvation.
(And Richard will read that for us now).
(AS 6.63-76)
We shall have cause to return to this sort of 'contextualising metadiscourse',
for it is another instance of that non-homiletic pedagogy which we have identified
as a prolific and recurrent feature of Reformed worship.
Now to some extent, Sperber and Wilson's distinction of informativeness from
communicativeness constitutes little more than a restatement of Grice's insistence
that discourse must be analysed not just referentially but interpersonally - that is,
with regard to the CP and its related Maxims as well as to straightforward
'propositional truths'. Despite this, they go on to criticise Grice and his followers for
constructing a model which is 'almost entirely ex post facto' and which thus lacks
the all-important feature of predictivity(1986: 37; cf. Chametsky 1992):
Given that an utterance in context is found to convey particular implicatures, what
both the hearer and the pragmatician can do is to show how, in intuitive terms, an
argument based on the context, the utterance and general expectations about the
behaviour of the speakers justifies the particular interpretation chosen. What they
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fail to show is that, on the same basis, an equally well-formed argument could not
have been given for a quite different and in fact implausible basis.
Grice's idea that the very act of communication creates expectations which it then
exploits provides a starting-point Beyond that, the inferential model needs a more
radical reworking in order to become truly explanatory. A psychologically realistic
answer must be given to such basic questions as these: What shared information is
exploited in communication? What fOnDSof inference are used? What is relevance
and how is it achieved? What role does the search for relevance play in
communication? (1987: 699).
In attempting to answer these questions, Sperber and Wilson posit two
fundamental and related concepts - namely cognitive environment and
manifestness. We have already seen that the latter enters into their definition of
communicative intention, but in explicit terms these two key notions are defined as
follows:
A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.
A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if, and only if, the individual is
capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as
true or probably true. (1986: 39; 1987: 699).
On this basis, Sperber & Wilson maintain that 'to be manifest is to be perceptible or
inferable' (1986: 39). Consequently, 'an individual's total cognitive environment
consists not only of all the facts that he is aware of, but of all the facts that he is
capable of becoming aware of at that time and place' (1987: 699; my emphasis).
This in tum leads them to make a vital distinction between Tacts'and 'assumptions:
and thus to develop a model of 'mutual manifesmess'which is less rigid, less truth-
conditional and more 'graded' than previous models based on mutual knowledge:
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Manifestness is...detined as a property not only of facts but more generally, of true
or false assumptions. It is a relative property: facts and assumptions can be more or
less strongly manifest Because manifest is weaker than known or assumed. a
notion of mutual manifestness can be developed that does not suffer from the same
psychological implausibility as mutual knowledge (1987: 699).
As Leech and Thomas point out (1990: 202), Sperber & Wilson's presentation
of manifestness as a 'relative property' which exhibits degrees of strength and
weakness represents a major breakthrough for pragmatics. First and foremost, it
allows for the possibility that certain significant effects can be 'brought about'
through discourse itself, rather than discourse being something to which pre-
existent 'thoughts' are 'brought along' for 'expression' and 'recognition'. From a
doxological perspective, this in turn validates the traditional 'Catholic'
interpretation of lex orsndi, lex credendi. Secondly, it offers a plausible explanatory
framework for pragmatic ambivalence. It provides a basis for the conclusions we
drew from our own data at 5.6.2 - namely, that the discourse of church ceremonial
often relies on studied ambiguities and figurative polysemy in order to evoke
notions of mystery, ineffability and transcendence in the providence of God, and to
sustain a ritual which can and must speak in 'many and various ways' to different
worshippers with varied levels of understanding and commitment (Hebrews 1: 1).
Hence, though Sperber & Wilson hint (1986: 41) that mutual manifestness will be
especially strong in ritual", thanks to the cultivation there of a mutual cognitive
4. The &etu&1example quoted by Sperber & Wilson is the ritual of Freemasonry. the content of which differs markedly from
that of mainstream Christian litur&y. but whose lenetal communicative dynamics in terms of Relevance Theory are clearly
comparable.
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environment in which 'assumptions' extend to the identity and pragmatic
competence of participants, their model still leaves room for a multiplicity of
meanings and a range of interpretations within that environment. Because 'manifest
is weaker than known or assumed' and because it covers potential as well as actual
meanings, utterances in Sperber & Wilson's model do not have to be reduced to
unitary or determinate denotations.
Having said this, although manifestness is a 'relative' phenomenon insofar as it
concerns 'all' the assumptions an individual is 'capable of mentally representing and
accepting as true' (1987: 699), Sperber and Wilson wisely recognise that effective
communication relies in specific exchanges on a selection of such assumptions as
are considered necessary for salient inferences to be made in that particular case. It
is at this point that Relevance becomes crucial. At bottom, Sperber & Wilson
propose that observation of this Maxim results from placing a restriction on the
number of inferences drawn from an utterance - though there is no doubt that this
number can still be more than one. The restriction in question is achieved according
to a Principle of Relevance which they define as follows:
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own
optimal relevance.
The 'presumption of optimal relevance' here is explained as resting on two
conditions:
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a) The set of assumptions {l} which the communicator intends to make manifest to
the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process
the ostensive stimulus.
b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have
used to communicate {l}.
(1986: 158)
Taking these two conditions together, Sperber & Wilson go on to argue that
relevance, like manifestness, is a matter of 'degree' (1986: 123-32). More explicitly,
it is analysable in terms of a 'cost/benefit trade-off between informativeness and
'processibility' (1986: 125; 1987: 703). We have already seen how Grice recognised
that interlocutors might permit Quantity violations in exchange for a 'payoff in
terms of Manner, and have illustrated this with reference to liturgical
circumlocution at examples (9) and (10), and the 'Charismatic 'Justltlat (12) - (14).
What Sperber and Wilson suggest is much the same, but far from being an
exception, they argue that this sort of quid pro quo is a fundamental feature of all
communication. Specifically, they contend that it can be expressed as an
interaction of two Extent Conditions:
1. An assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects are
large.
2. An assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to
process it in that context is small.
(1986: 125)
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What Sperber and Wilson mean by 'contextual effects' here is best grasped by
an initial reference to their comparison of 'old' and 'new' information:
some information is old: it is already present in the individual's representation of
the world. Unless it is needed for the performance of a particular cognitive task,
and is easier to access from the environment than from memory, such information
is not worth processing at all. Other information is not only new but entirely
unconnected with anything in the individual's representation of the world. It can
only be added to this representation as isolated bits and pieces, and this usually
means too much processing cost for too little benefit Still other information is
new but connected with old information. When these interconnected new and old
items of information are used together as premises in an inference process, further
new information can be derived: information which could not have been inferred
without this combination of old and new premises. When the processing of new
information gives rise to such a multiplication effect we call it relevant The
greater the multiplication effect, the greater the relevance. (1986: 48).
Again here, there is a confirmation of what is brought about' in discourse, as
well as of what is brought along' to it. Specifically, the 'interconnection' of old and
new information to which Sperber and Wilson refer here is said by them to
generate 'contextual effect' in three main ways:
a) By the introduction of new assumptions ('contextual implications')
b) By the strengthening of old assumptions
c) By the elimination of old assumptions in favour of new assumptions which
contradict them
(cf. Leech &Thomas 1990: 203)
Of these three categories, it is the second type of contextual effect (b) which
carries by far the greatest significance for liturgy. Even at its most apparently
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'spontaneous', the discourse of church worship is still characteristically reliant on
antecedent 'assumptions' from Scripture, tradition and surrounding culture. What
Sperber and Wilson offer is a means of accounting for how, and to what extent,
these assumptions can be reaffirmed even while surface features of lexis, grammar
and phonology are varied. In view of the English Reformed tradition's rejection of
set texts in favour of 'semi-free' discourses bound ideationally by God's Word from
the Bible and doctrine, but set loose from prescribed vocabulary and syntax, this
seems helpful.
It should be apparent by now that the diversity of worship through the 10
churches in our field survey is quite considerable. Nevertheless, it is also clear that
despite marked differences of structure, style and churchrnanship, certain key
assumptions are 'strengthened' almost across the board. Most obviously, a
recognition and exposition of the meaning of 'Advent' is shared by nine of the 10
services analysed; only in the Warsash transcript is there no recognition whatsoever
that worship is taking place on Advent Sunday, and it is no coincidence that this
reflects the most radically informal and 'extemporary' service in our sample.
Historically, liturgical commemoration of Advent was one of the babies thrown out
with the bathwater of Roman 'ritualism' (Davies 1948: 75-6; Nichols 1968: 100),
and it may be that the Warsash approach represents a trace of this. By contrast.
observance of the Advent season, and of the Christian year as a whole, has been
substantially revived in English Reformed churches during the last century. as part
of a more general move to restore links with the more positive aspects of Patristic
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and early church practice, and it is this which our corpus more generally reflects
(Micklem 1936: 173; Barkley 1966: 35). We have already witnessed the Minister
of Wheatley's appeal to 'traditional' assumptions about Advent in his lengthy
service introduction (24); similar reinforcements of established assumptions are
evident in the following examples:
(25) MINISTER:
(26) MINISTER:
(27) MINISTER:
T~,
i:s,
Advent.~.
The day when,
We OFflO,ALL Y,
OFflOALLY,
Sta:rt to look forward ..to ~tmas.
(AS 1.105-11)
Today is the first Sunday in Advent
it's the church's new year's day
(AS 2.144-5)
A ~.day todiY,
AQvent Sunday,
the fust.S!mday inAQvent,
when we're
pr~g,
for the coming of Jesus ~
(AS 8.5-10).
In each of these cases, the Minister 'makes manifest' certain assumptions from
the wider 'cognitive environment' of ecclesiastical convention and institution, and
these assumptions are thereby 'strengthened' in the local cognitive environment of
their particular church service. A similar process attends the lighting of Advent
candles, which also appears in nine of our 10 transcripts:
(28) MINISTER;
(29) MINISTER;
(30) MINISTER.:
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There's been a tradition for,
very many ~turies in ~ parts of the Christian church of
lighting a gndle on an .A.c;lventring,
on each S!mday inAdvent
And you know that in ~t years we have
adQpted..that custom here, ..in England and
m in EmJDmuel.
(AS 2.169-75)
Today,
is the..~,S!.mday in Advent
And like at ~veryAdvent we're going to light the gndIe,
every SYnday.
!ill then (we're going to have a £!a}tral one on Christmas Day itsID,
to move us ggser and £IQser to that day,
when we'll celebrate the coming of our Um;l.
(AS 10.36-42)
I said at the beginning iBMvent where we ~ebrate,
the process leading up to the coming QfJesus the J.igb! of the world.
You see in nOnt we have..a gmdle at Qrrigmas.
Stuck in a ~e bolder,
and at ~ year we- we UdU candles to reminQ us,
of the countdown to the coming of this lig):U.
(AS 10.48-53)
If the assumptions of 'Advent' are most specifically strengthened at one time
of the year, then other assumptions are bolstered more regularly in Reformed
worship. One of these is the assumption that we are sinners who must confess our
transgressions to God. Although set 'prayers of confession' do not occur in every
transcript, and are perhaps significantly absent from the more evangelical services
held at Derriford (AS 4), Warsash (5), Bulwell (8) and High Heaton (10), even
those who do not include them as a dedicated item still implicitly strengthen this
assumption by means such as praising Jesus for identifying with 'our human lives in
their frailty and sin' (AS 4.41-2) or by petitioning God to 'help us put aside those
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things that we build up for our own sakes' (AS 8.282-3). Furthermore, Sperber &
Wilson point out that the relative 'strength' or 'weakness' with which assumptions
are 'made manifest' depends on much more than the words used to express them, is
borne out by the fact that in our corpus, very similar assumptions about sin are
conveyed at comparable levels of manifestness, despite quite contrasting styles of
discourse:
(31) MINISTER: Almighty God,
in Jesus you have ~ us to ~ as children of the light,
but we have preferred our QM) way ..the way of dm:kness.
we have DQl been Elling.
to ~ the light of ~ into every: ..part of our lives.
we have not been willing
to respond with whol~ ol!;gience and lQtal dedi~.
Lord,
have mm<Y upon us.
(AS 6.30-40 (From Dixon 1983: 12-13)
(32) [Jesus] i!so said that he had come to call the ordinary.
that is the: difficult,
the ~kward..people.
People who make mistakes,
and make a mess of their ~.
people like you and~. [• ..]
Gracious God,
you ~ US and know US,
!Qtally.
You know how ...mixed up we are, [...]
Lord,
we need your forgiveness.
(AS 7.463-96)
In their respective settings, the 'contextual effects' of these prayers seem
ultimately to be very similar: despite their stylistic differences -the first relatively
formal, the second relatively colloquial - they appear comparably to 'count as'
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liturgical confessions. Having said this, it would be quite wrong to suppose that
Sperber & Wilson do not take account of stylistic considerations in formulating
their theory. Far from it: they warn against any necessary or absolute distinction
between the 'form' and 'function' of communication, as if what we 'mean' can be
entirely separated from the way we express ourselves. Indeed, Sperber and Wilson
contend that style is properly defined not in terms of the morphological, syntactic
or prosodic construction of linguistic 'figures', but as something which 'arises...in
the pursuit of relevance' - that is, in regard to the aforementioned 'cost/benefit'
equation of contexrual effectiveness and cognitive processibility. (1987: 706). Their
I
own exemplification of this is that we characteristically take the trouble to read a
difficult poem because we reasonably expect that it will reward us with' a level of
aesthetic, intellectual and spiritual satisfaction commensurate with the work we put
in to understanding it (1986: 236-7). In the two church service examples just cited,
(31) could be said to require somewhat more 'cognitive processing effort' in that its
style is more 'marked' and archaic in comparison with (32), which is relatively
more 'accessible" 'familiar' and 'everyday'. Having said this, (31) could be
represented as a more typical prayer of confession vis a vis the institutional context
of Christian worship, where, as we have seen, it may be permissible to flout certain
conversational Maxims precisely in order to distinguish both God and His church
from the language-games of 'secular' life. As Crystal has confirmed (1965: 151), 'it
is still necessary for a religion to have a special, "marked" style to highlight its
specialized purpose. This is a formally abnormal kind of language which one does
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not normally use or expect, and in its unfamiliarity lies its value, for it attracts
attention to the exceptional purpose of its function',
Now Sperber & Wilson stress that the dual 'extent conditions' on Relevance of
'informativeness' and 'processibility' are not absolute, but vary relative to 'context'.
The problem with liturgical discourse is that its 'context' is both 'sacred' and
'profane', Although the church needs a distinctive language for its Christian
members, this language cannot become so distinctive that it encourages esotericism
or Gnosticism, or confuses those who are not yet 'inducted' into the rite, These, as
we have been pointing out, were precisely the grounds on which Calvin attacked
the Latin Mass and on which the Puritans rejected 'set forms', On the other hand, if
it becomes too 'vernacular', it may risk descent into banality and even 'gimmickry',
Thus, while the Wheatley confession (31) may be harder to 'process', it might be
said to yield greater 'effect' in relation to the established context of church worship;
reciprocally, though the Weoley Castle confession (32) seems more immediately
'processible', it appears to yield less 'effect' with regard to the liturgical context,
even while connecting more dynamically with the mainstream of 'social discourse',
Granted, one could argue from another point of view that by introducing a more
contemporary, conversational style, the Minister in (32) is actually highlighting or
'foregrounding' a contextually alien mode of discourse by transposing it from its
normal habitat into a 'foreign' context. In this scenario, the worshipper has to make
more rather than less effort to infer the Relevance of the colloquialisms, because
they do not 'fit' his expectations of what a 'prayer of confession' should be, Further
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still, it might also be thought significant that Wheatley URC is an old chapel in a
rural Oxfordshire village whereas Weoley Castle Community ChW'Ch(URC) is a
modem, brick-built centre in the middle of a large outlying council estate. In each
case, 'context of situation' and 'context of culture' could be said to have determined
the relative 'processibility' and 'markedness' of the styles used. Put simply: elevated
and archaic language may be more 'relevant' in a more conservative or traditional
setting, and colloquial language more relevant in a more 'contemporary' or
modernistic setting. Indeed. it is quite probably because of this. rather than because
of their sheer 'content' alone. that the two prayers in question seem. in the end. to
generate a roughly equivalent level of 'contextual effects'.
What is clear from all this is that Sperber & Wilson would appear justified in
presenting 'style' as something which can affect meaning, rather than as something
which merely transmits meaning as defined in advance of linguistic instantiation.
As Warner points out, this has profound implications for the study of liturgical
language in general and liturgical revision in particular. Noting that most liturgists
have seen 'meaning' and style as separate issues in liturgical study and composition.
Warner contends that 'if style affects implicature. then stylistic changes in the
language of worship may have far-reaching consequences for the faith of the
worshipping community' (1990: 163). Not only this: he makes it clear that while
potentially momentous, these consequences are unlikely to be as theologically
damaging as those which would spring from maintaining the old conception of
meaning as 'something construable in terms of a set of coordinates independent of
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style [and thus] truly explicable in terms of truth conditions and their analogues,
after the programmes of formal semantics'. Certainly, we ourselves have already
confirmed (2.4.1 ff.) Warner's contention that these terms are not only 'implausible'
with respect to linguistic theory but 'devastating' for theology.
In order more closely to trace the 'consequences' at which Warner hints - that
is, the consequences of adopting a relevance-theoretical approach to liturgical
discourse in contrast to a traditional semantic approach - it is important to reiterate
that Sperber & Wilson's strategy allows us to posit degrees of implication and
inference rather than unitary or absolute correspondences between words and 'the
world'. As a result, it becomes feasible to speak of implicatures exhibiting diverse
levels of 'strength' and 'weakness' (1986: 197-202) in relation to Grice's condition
of Indeterminacy:
The fiction that there is a clear-cut distinction between wholly determinate,
specifically intended inferences and indeterminate, wholly unintended inferences
cannot be maintained. Relevance Theory offers a way of getting rid of this fiction
without sacrificing clarity of conceptual framework. ..
An utterance with a fully determinate implicated premise or conclusion forces the
bearer to supply just this premise or conclusion and attribute it to the speaker as
part of her beliefs. An utterance with a small range of strongly implicated premises
or conclusions strongly encourages the bearer to use some subset of these premises
or conclusions, and to regard some subset of them - not necessari.ly the same subset
- as part of the speaker's beliefs. An utterance with a wide range of weakly
implicated premises or conclusions again encourages the hearer to use some subset
of these assumptions, and to regard some subset of them - again not necessarily the
same - as part of the speaker's beliefs. Clearly, the weaker the implicat1lres, the
less confidence the hearer can have that the particular premises or conclusions he
supplies will reflect the speaker's thoughts, and this is where the indeterminacy
lies. However, people may entertain different beliefs on the basis of the same
cognitive environment The aim of communication in general is to increase the
mu1Ual.ity of cognitive environments rather than guarantee an impossible
duplication of thought{. (1986: 199-200).
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An obvious consequence deriving from this proposed 'cline' of weak-To-strong
implicatures is that it promises to dissolve Grice's (already fuzzy) distinction
between 'conventional' and 'conversational' implicatures: if determinacy and
indeterminacy are matters of degree rather than clear-cut division, and if Grice was
thus wrong to make them key indicators of 'conventionality' vs.
'nonconventionality', we can avoid the temptation of polarising liturgical discourse
in simplistic terms as either 'formulaic' or 'extemporary'. In addition, tropes like
metaphor, symbol, hyperbole and metonymy - which have long been the central
'stylistic' foci of many 'traditional' liturgical language studies (Brook 1965;
Ramshaw 1986; Wren 1989) - can be treated not as 'discontinuous' from literal
discourse, but rather as 'resulting from the same standard process of comprehension'
- that is, from the same 'presumption of optimal relevance' (1987: 708). Again, the
difference is not one of kind, but of degree: figurative devices typically achieve
relevance through conveying a range of weak implicatures rather than a small
number of 'stronger' implicatures or (as in literal discourse), a single implicature.
This means that they are 'less direct' and so require extra processing effort (1986:
235). According to the Principle of Relevance, they should compensate for this by
offering as 'pay-off a greater set of contextual effects (1986: 236-7). Furthermore,
because Sperber and Wilson's analysis is based so thoroughly on the relative
strengths of implicatures rather than on sheer reference, figurative devices are
accorded no 'special' status but are instead said to resemble other rhetorical
strategies like repetition, zeugma and semantic parallelism (1986: 217-224). Hence
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repetition, which is so crucial in Ladriere's conception of liturgical language
performativity (1973: 60), can be seen as far more than a mere duplication of either
structure or meaning. Rather, like metaphor, it is to be interpreted as widening the
range of weak implicatures available to an addressee, thereby offering a worthwhile
inferential pay-off. So, according to Relevance Theory, the difference between 'My
childhood days are gone' and 'My childhood days are gone, gone' is that the
repeated 'gone' invites the hearer to assume that in addition to all the implicatures
which could be derived from the first 'gone', 'there is a whole range of still further
premises and conclusions which the speaker wants to implicate' - an assumption
which would in turn demand an 'expansion of context' to include such possibilities
as the speaker encouraging the hearer to compare one another's childhoods, or to
convey a particular feeling of reminiscence and regret (1987: 706-7).
With these explanations, Sperber & Wilson claim to reinterpret what have
often been represented as 'emotive' or 'affective' strategies in discourse in such a
way thatthey are seen to display a 'wide array of mutual cognitive effects' (1987:
707). However, by representing these effects as 'poetic' (1986: 222), they might be
seen to have precluded an analysis of liturgical tropes and schemes along the same
lines. Such a reservation stems from two closely connected factors. Firstly, the
'literary' devices employed in ritual language tend, almost by definition. to be
'frozen' - that is, stereotyped and routinized; secondly, they can often be traced
neither to a specific 'addressor' nor to a perceptible cognitive 'intention'. Indeed, it
is for reasons akin to these that Gail Ramshaw prefers to designate liturgy as
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'metaphoric rhetoric' rather than 'poetic discourse' (1986: 3). This definition appears
to make good sense when set in relation to ancient institutionalised forms like the
Kyries; Gloria and Agnus Dei. each of which displays the kind of repetition,
rhythm. imagery and symbolism which is exploited by poets. but whose purpose is
much less geared towards the revelation of 'self-reflective consciousness' than most
poems, and whose function is much more to instantiate the corporate ecclesial
language-game than to point up the aesthetic potentialities of language itself (cf.
Ramshaw 1983: 3):
(33) MINISTER:
AlL:
Lord,
have ~ upon us
Christ have mercy upon us,
Lord have mercy upon US.
(AS 6.38-40 cf. URe 1989: 7)
(34) Glory to God in the highest,
and peace to his people on earth.
Lord God, heavenly King,
almighty God and Father,
we worship you, we give you thanks,
we praise you for your glory.
(URe 1989: 8)
(35) Lamb of God, you take away the sin of the world,
ba~ men::y 00 us.
Lamb of God. you take away the sin of the world,
ba~ men::y OD us.
Lamb of God, you take away the sin of the world,
Grant us peace.
CURe 1989: 18)
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We shall return to the fixed repetitions of formulae like these in Chapter 8, but
at this stage it is worth noting that for Sperber & Wilson (1986:2), 'what is
communicated by a religious ritual is quite different from what is communicated by
a list of stock-exchange rates' (1986: 2). Having made this point however, they
subsequently and disappointingly bypass such formulaic and 'institutionalised'
discourses and instead focus almost entirely on situations in which a single
'message-originator' and a single 'receiver' are physically co-present and so
communicating by explicit ostension, as well as by inference. In this sense, their
exemplification fails to reflect the comprehensiveness of their theory. While this
makes the immediate application of Relevance to liturgy more difficult, Sperber &
Wilson do at least offer occasional hints as to how their ideas might be adapted in
this direction. First, they are well aware of the 'standardised' nature of many
linguistic strategies - ego of the fact that metaphors are not always 'cognitively
created' by the addressors who use them (1986: 236). Indeed, as we have seen, their
whole point about 'metaphoric creativity' is that it varies along a scale, being more
apparent where the range of potential weak implicatures is large. Despite the fact
that Relevance Theory allows for ambivalence even where the level of mutual
manifestness is high, it is likely that ritualized figures will still yield fewer such
weak implicatures than a freshly-written poem and will therefore be less 'creative'.
This is precisely because, in spite of its often deliberate ambiguities, liturgical
discourse is inferentially limited by external factors like doctrine, canon law and
the history of interpretation - factors which can in their tum be said to contribute to
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the 'mutual cognitive environment' of church worship. Thus, while liturgical
utterances may display a plurality of implicatures, they cannot in any realistic sense
display an infinity of implicatures: isolated individuals may decide to make liturgy
mean what they want it to mean, but their conclusions are unlikely to be 'relevant'
to the communicative dynamic of liturgy itself, which must be expounded first and
foremost as a corporate, socially-constituted dynamic and not as an individual or
'one-to-one' interaction.
Understandably, Warner casts such institutional limitations on liturgical
Relevance as confirming the 'Protestant' conception of lex orandi, lex credendi: 'if
"relevance" is to be invoked in this context norms are needed by which it is to be
established, and these must be primarily theological' (1990: 169). Likewise, in a
comment pertinent to our earlier analysis of confessions, Warner reflects:
In religion, we are told, the way, the truth and the life are different aspects of the
one unity; if this is so, then one's life of prayer and worship is likely to be
internally related to one's belief structure, Lex orandi; lex credendi; confessing
oneself before God as a 'miserable sinner' (even in the Tudor sense of the word) in
whom there is 'no health' has implicatures which render more credible than do
weakened formulations that claim 'Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and
canst not look upon iniquity', Reciprocally, the move to weaken the corporate
expressions of penitence may not be wholly unrelated to the decline in the belief
in the reality of hell (1990: 163).
Relevance theory, then, offers a model with which it is possible genuinely to
account for the 'bi-lateralism' of doctrine and worship - a framework in which 'faith'
can be seen as both brought along to liturgical discourse by 'tradition' and
'orthodoxy', and brought about by it as individuals are existentially and
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orthopraxistically inducted into the ecclesial discourse-community (cf. Ladriere
1973: 56-8). Although Sperber & Wilson show little inclination towards the sort of
'sociological' and 'institutional' models of meaning which we have been using. it
must be stressed that their avowed intentionalism (1986: 64). while most usually
personalised. is not such as to deny the frequently 'second-hand' or echoic' nature
of human discourse (1986: 237-243). Indeed. at one point they go so far as to admit
that 'an echoic utterance need not interpret a precisely attributable thought' and that
as such 'it may echo the thought of a certain kind of person or of people in
geneml(1986: 238, my emphasis). They continue,
Suppose you tell me to hurry up and I reply as follows:
More haste, less speed.
This utterance is a literal interpretation of a traditional piece of wisdom which
achieves relevance by making manifest that I find this piece of wisdom indeed
wise in the circumstances. Clearly, however. what makes traditional wisdom
traditional is that it is attributable not to any specificsourcebut to people in
general (1986: 238-39)
As we have been stressing, the 'specific sources' of liturgical discourse are
often extremely difficult to trace, and in the final analysis, are rarely attributable to
individuals alone. Sperber & Wilson's interpretation here is therefore especially
significant for us - although it might be argued that the freedom to select and apply
'unattributed' formulae in specific circumstances is still far more restricted in liturgy
as a whole than in the sort of casual talk from which their example is drawn.
Indeed, although the prerogative of'selectional variation' constituted a fundamental
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principle of English Reformed Dissent. it is legitimate to question the degree to
which even extemporary worship can be said to resemble those 'conversations' and
one-to-one dialogues with which Sperber & Wilson are so overwhelmingly
concerned. It is to this very matter that we shall now turn.
